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Synergistic Application
of Metaphorical and Humorous Elements
in Polish and English Advertising Discourse

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Bionote

Anna Stwora obtained a double PhD from the Institute of Linguistics, Faculty of Humanities of the University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland, and the Sapienza University of Rome, Italy. Her research interests revolve around multimodal discourse of advertising, especially in its metaphorical and humorous dimensions, as well as around broadly conceived humour studies. She is also interested in specialised registers, cognitivism, communication studies, and contrastive linguistics. In 2020, she took up a post as editorial assistant at *The European Journal of Humour Research* and became a member of the board of the Cracow Tertium Society for the Promotion of Language Studies. She has been involved in several projects, including seminars, workshops, and conferences devoted to humour and contrastive studies, as well as to business language and culture. Her recent publications include *Humor Research Project: Explorations in Humor Studies* (2020, co-edited with Marcin Kuczok and Mariola Świerkot) and *Exploring Business Language and Culture* (2020, co-edited with Urszula Michalik, Iwona Sznicer, and Paweł Zakrajewski).

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Humour and Metaphor in Advertising— Embarking on a Journey

Given the noticeable impact of humour and metaphor on contemporary ads, it comes as no surprise that both are frequently used in advertising discourse. However, it is still a relatively new concept to think of humorousness and metaphoricity as similar in terms of the cognitive experience provided; it turns out that both require a similar shift in cognition, for they “[...] involve a semantic contradiction [or] incompatibility that the recipient has to disambiguate, using his/her linguistic competence and encyclopaedic knowledge to find some analogy or other ‘common link’ to relate the involved planes of meaning” (Krikmann, 2009, pp. 14–15). The recipients are therefore made to look for additional implications and connotations, as well as to interpret, compare, and transfer meanings appurtenant to various domains, in the case of metaphors, and to different scenarios, in the case of humour. To my mind, combined in advertising, the two phenomena present a unique research challenge when it comes to understanding incongruities and the instances of conceptual blending.

To date, the subject of comparative studies on both figurativeness and humour in ads has received little attention, as the two were usually studied in isolation. In spite of extensive research on metaphorical language in advertising and on what may produce humour in ads (e.g., superiority humour, puns or irony), the issue of incongruity-resolution-based humour and metaphors in press advertising has received rather scant attention.

Hence, faced with such a gap, it seems useful to enquire into the joint operation of both the humorous and the metaphorical in contemporary advertising discourse, with special emphasis placed on their reception by the audience. This book is an attempt at joining three academic fields, namely, advertising discourse, metaphor, and humour research, with multimodality

as an overreaching thread. It will address questions related to cognition, communication, and humour, as instantiated in a selection of ads. The present volume is anchored in cognitive linguistics and communication studies, for one of its major objectives is to study the reflections of general conceptual mechanisms in language and the other to show how advertising messages communicate complex ideas of both metaphorical and humorous nature to the recipients. It should also be specified at this point that the book subscribes to the incongruity-resolution theory of humour which “defines humour as a cognitive-linguistic problem-solving task that elicits positive affect (Goel & Dolan, 2001; Raskin, 1985; Suls, 1972)” (Strick, Holland, Van Baaren, Van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 2013, pp. 7–8).

Research in cognitive linguistics has shown that there has been an increased interest in the role of metaphors and, in particular, of mental spaces and conceptual blending, in the production of humour (cf. Brône, Feyaerts, & Veale, 2015; Attardo, 2017). Citing Krikmann, “the theory of humour and the cognitivist theory of figurative speech have begun to notice and reach out towards each other” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 34), which, in turn, has led me to have a closer look at the synergistic application of metaphorical and humorous elements in both Polish and English multimodal press ads.

First of all, it should be clarified that multimodality relies on the simultaneous application of different modes of communication. It assumes “the interaction and combination of multiple modes within single artefacts” (Bateman, 2008, p. 1) or, in other words, it presumes the use of several distinct semiotic codes to convey a message, for instance, the textual and the visual mode in the case of press ads, with all the modes incorporated being treated as one meaningful entity (cf. Bateman, 2008). At the same time, multimodality assumes that each semiotic mode is responsible for the completion of specific tasks (Stöckl, 2015) (e.g., the anchoring function of the text (cf. Barthes, 1977) that helps the perceiver to avoid over- or misinterpretation).

Despite different functions they may perform, the modes involved create an inextricable network of interrelations that results in the creation of one semantic entity; this reciprocal contextualisation, as Maćkiewicz (2017) puts it, leads to the emergence of new meanings that were not contained in the aforementioned semiotic codes, which testifies to the synergistic communication effect of multimodality (Maćkiewicz, 2017, p. 40). Apart from the fact that such messages are simply more interesting due to the application of several modes that interact with each other, they are more

pleasurable to the eye than ads dominated by the textual mode alone, for example. What is more, multiple impressions generated by various forms create more chances to impress the perceiver and hence attract his attention.

The power of metaphors in advertising is of great importance as well because they are frequently more attractive and more cognitively engaging than any straightforward claims. Pérez-Sobrinó (2017) is of the opinion that, as a discourse genre, advertising is actually symbiotically tied to metaphor in that “metaphor suits the specificities of advertising because both consist in putting into correspondence two discrete domains: in the case of metaphor, the source and the target domain; in advertising, the product or service being advertised and the corresponding positive attributed values” (Pérez-Sobrinó, 2017, p. 50). Following this line of reasoning, it can be said that advertising as such constitutes fruitful a domain of study for metaphor scholars. Therefore, not only do metaphorical ads appeal to the audience thanks to their originality, that is, owing to a game of meanings played by the advertiser and the audience (cf. Bralczyk, 2000), but they also constitute a pool of novel figurative constructions to be studied. The usage of the figurative in advertising, in turn, aptly illustrates how the pre-existing knowledge structures in human minds in the form of cognitive schemas, frames, and scripts help people to identify relevant facts without the need “to sift through the blizzard of information” (Cialdini, 2007, p. 60) each and every time they want to communicate something or decode the message they receive.

When it comes to humour in advertising, it is employed to entertain the audience and, therefore, to dispose the prospects favourably towards the goods advertised. Thanks to the note of levity introduced, the message starts to stand out from the information clutter and creates a more relaxed cognitive environment for the perceiver, thus oftentimes conducing to increased liking for the ad, product or brand (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006). Apart from contributing to a pleasant cognitive environment, humour in advertising makes ads more appealing because, just like metaphors, humour usually provides the audience with involving content, that is, with a puzzle to solve. Nevertheless, resorting to humour is relatively risky a strategy in advertising, for whether a humorous ad succeeds or fails depends on many variables to be discussed in the ensuing chapters.

What follows from this short introduction is that both metaphoricity and humorousness are issues of significance when it comes to constructing memorable and influential ads, since they are said to facilitate ad appreciation and increase the prospects’ attention. Humorous metaphorical

ads may therefore pose a greater cognitive challenge to the audience, as they are characterised by considerable conceptual complexity resulting from the simultaneous application of the two phenomena. Based on the aforementioned contention that there are some marked similarities in perception of humour and metaphor, the following discussion will centre on the synergistic interaction of metaphorical and humorous elements in multimodal ads.

For this research, I first gathered two corpora that consisted of multimodal humorous metaphorical ads in English (100 press ads) and Polish (100 press ads); the selection for the two language corpora was made according to the following criteria: (i) the ads were multimodal in their nature, that is, they combined visual and verbal information alike; (ii) they contained a metaphor (verbal, visual or multimodal); and (iii) they made use of incongruity-resolution-based humour. The two language corpora were subsequently divided into several subgroups according to the “butt of the joke,” which made it possible to secure roughly equal representation of different humour targets identified in the selected ads in each language group studied (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed account of the methodology used). A proportional number of advertisements was then chosen from these sub-sets and, as a result, the final sample to be analysed and included in the questionnaires comprised 20 ads for each language group so as to prevent the task from becoming too tiring for research participants.

As stated above, the principal aim of the present research is to investigate the workings of conceptual integration and the incongruity-resolution mechanism on the basis of humorous metaphorical press ads in English and Polish. The specific objectives to attain are as follows:

1. To study the way in which metaphorical constructs may be used as vehicles for humorousness in advertising discourse. To achieve this goal, I will first provide an overview of the theoretical frameworks concerning the phenomenon of advertising and cognitive linguistics, as well as of the existing studies on metaphor in advertising. I will also explore topics connected to humour research in order to establish that there is some compatibility between the theory of conceptual integration and the incongruity-resolution model. Then, in the analytical chapter, I will perform a qualitative content analysis of selected English and Polish press advertisements (all the transcripts of the advertising material used can be found in Appendix 1);

2. To check ad liking (ad ratings) and affective attitudes (emotional responses) in an attempt to capture the emotional reactions of the informants to the ads sampled. This will be accomplished by having each research participant rate a set of humorous figurative ads. Ad ratings will be determined thanks to the use of a Likert-type scale, whereas emotional responses will be measured on the basis of visual self-reports that apply the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) assessment technique (cf. Lang, 1980; Morris & Waive, 1993) (detailed information on research participants is included in Chapter 5, while the survey used to study ad ratings and emotional responses is available in Appendix 2);
3. To investigate the ways in which research participants understand and interpret the mechanisms inducing metaphor and humour in ads. To this end, I will use open-ended questionnaires and collect the informants' feedback on the ads they previously rated (see Appendix 3). The questionnaires filled in by the informants will provide post-exposure results and thus help to check whether research participants are actually aware of the mechanisms at work in the course of ad comprehension and appreciation.

Finally, more broadly, the present volume is also to advance current knowledge of effective pragmatics of humour in figurative advertising messages and to build the base for future research into advertising phenomena within linguistic frameworks. That is why this book aims to take a comparative approach and hence discuss the similarities and differences between the two corpora, one in English and the other in Polish. The analysis will show whether it is possible to identify any observable trends in the interplay between the concepts found in both metaphorical and humorous constructions in selected multimodal ads.

As far as the structure of this book is concerned, Chapter 1 deals with the phenomenon of advertising, that is, with its definition, purpose, and operation. It discusses print advertising and, therefore, centres on the verbal, visual, and multimodal facets of advertising with a view to presenting different modalities by means of which the advertising stimulus can be conveyed to the audience.

After this introductory chapter, it seems imperative to explain how the said audience manages to develop a decoded multimodal message into a relevant one. To this end, Chapter 2 touches upon the most important pragmatic theory pioneered by Sperber and Wilson (1995) known as

Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) with a view to demonstrating how the expanded version of RT proposed by Forceville (2020) can accommodate various dimensions of mass-communication.

Then, the following chapter delves into the theoretical foundations of research on metaphor. Chapter 3 refers to the theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1994, 1997, 1998) and then adumbrates the theory of conceptual integration (conceptual blending theory) formulated by Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002). The chapter explores the ways of identifying metaphors as such (cf. Pragglejaz Group, 2007; Steen, 2007), to which I refer in the subsequent operationalization of metaphor and cite existing research on the construction of verbal, visual, and multimodal metaphor in advertising.

Chapter 4 addresses the topic of humour and its numerous definitions. It cites relevant literature on the key theories of humour known as the incongruity-resolution, superiority, and relief theories (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017) and also stresses the role of the prototype theory (Rosch, 1973; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) in the shaping of humour and its strength. Following such researchers as Nerhardt (1976) and Giora (1991), I associate non-prototypicality with an increase in humour value. Furthermore, the chapter probes into the linguistic approach to humour, all forms of which are claimed to be descendants of the incongruity-resolution theory (Krikmann, 2006). The theories presented include the Script-based Semantic Theory of Humour (SSTH) (Raskin, 1985) and the General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH) (Attardo & Raskin, 1991). Some polemic points concerning the SSTH and GTVH, raised in large part by Brône and Feyaerts (2003, 2004) and Brône, Feyaerts, and Veale (2006), are included. Emphasis is also placed on the Graded Salience Hypothesis outlined by Giora (2003) since it emerges as a pertinent area of research in the context of this volume. Relevance-theoretic treatments of humour are presented too so as to further the understanding of how different approaches may be combined to explain humorous discourse.

Given the multimodal standpoint adopted for this book, Chapter 4 stresses the role of both the visual and the multimodal in the production of humour. Discussion on previous research on humour in advertising ensues and, finally, similarities in the conceptual operations involved in the creation and understanding of both humour and metaphor are emphasised. The observation that such common features exist is made on the basis of the works by Attardo (1994, 2006, 2015), Brône and Feyaerts (2003), Dynel (2009), Kyratzis (2003), and Müller (2015), all of whom see the theory

of conceptual integration by Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002) as a common denominator of metaphor and humour.

Chapter 5 clarifies the scope of the present study, shows the data collection procedure and research methodology, restates research objectives, and describes the group of research participants. Most importantly, it reports on the results of qualitative content analysis, which is supplemented with pertinent examples from the samples of humorous metaphorical ads in English and Polish. Furthermore, in line with the objectives of this research, a comparative study is conducted to present ad ratings and emotional responses for the ads from the English and Polish set. Last but not least, the chapter focuses on the reception and interpretation aspect, for it is also devoted to ad comprehension by research participants.

The final chapter presents conclusions on the workings of conceptual integration and of the incongruity-resolution mechanism, as instantiated in selected multimodal press ads in English and Polish. It is also devoted to the possible limitations of the study and to avenues for further research.

Chapter 1

Advertising as Communication—Theoretical Framework

“In a sense, advertising is the ‘official art’ of the advanced industrial nations of the west” (Dyer, 1982, p. 1). It constitutes part and parcel of contemporary culture, shaping values and attitudes within the consumerist society of the modern age. What is more, advertising has become something more than just a marketing tool aimed at introducing and marketing a wide range of consumer goods to the general public; it has evolved into one of the main modes of communication and expression, changing the perception of the world by the mass public. Thus, it can be said that the global significance of both advertising and its discourse results not only from the pervasive nature of ads themselves or their central place in the cycle of conspicuous consumption, but also from the fact that we can profit from studying advertising as an instance of communication.

In the light of the interconnectedness of the realm of advertising and the whole field of human communications, the first chapter seeks to give a general overview of the phenomenon of advertising, with special emphasis on print advertising and its fundamentally multimodal nature. In this volume, the term *advertising discourse* will cover a wide range of both linguistic and non-linguistic techniques deployed by advertisers in their promotional communication. Accordingly, the foregoing overview will not only be focused on description and systematic classification of print advertisements in general, but also on the methods for analysing ads’ multimodal structure (Bateman, 2008; Kress, 2012; Hiippala, 2014). Nonetheless, let us first proceed to the delineation of the phenomenon of advertising as marketing communication.

1.1 The Phenomenon of Advertising

One of the reasons for the worldwide interest in how advertising messages operate and influence societies is their prevalence; since advertising is literally everywhere nowadays, an ad is no longer regarded as a peripheral creation, but rather as a part of contemporary popular culture and language studies. Multifaceted as it is, the phenomenon of advertising is a slippery case, for it shares features with a wide variety of disparate genres such as fairy tales, conversations, novels, or even jokes and poetry (Bralczyk, 2000). As a genre, it draws upon other texts and contexts in order to increase its creative and persuasive appeal; however, its particularity is in the intention to induce people to buy a particular product or service.

Yet an advertising message is perceived not only as a marketing tool, but also as an instance of communication between the ad's producer and recipient or, to be more specific, as a hybrid communication specimen within which the textual, the pictorial, and sometimes also the phonic, merge (Bovéé & Arens, 1992; Cook, 2001; Wojtaszek, 2011a). Due to the presence of various modes the ad is composed of, none of its parts should be viewed in isolation, but rather in a constant interplay resulting in multilayered meanings.

1.2 Definition, Purpose, and Operation of Advertising

It seems suitable to start with an explanatory account of the very notion of advertising which may be defined as a multifaceted process of persuasive, non-personal communication and marketing practices of both economic and social importance that conveys an openly sponsored, paid-for message (Bovéé & Arens, 1992, p. 7). It is intended to promote goods or services, to raise awareness of goods' presence on the market, to win converts to ideas, and of course to sell. The main objective and function of advertising were succinctly yet clearly stated by Janoschka (2004), who lists the staple, intrinsic traits of advertising messages:

The economic aim of advertising is to achieve higher profits and to benefit from increased sales of advertised products. Its basic function is to persuade the audience to [...] purchase. (p. 18)

As far as the term *advertising* is concerned, Beasley and Danesi (2002) explain it as follows:

The term *advertising* comes down to us from the medieval Latin verb *advertere* “to direct one’s attention to.” In line with its etymology, it can be defined simply as any type or form of public announcement intended to direct people’s attention to the availability, qualities, and/or cost of specific commodities or services. (p. 18)

Interestingly enough, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the Polish equivalent for the word *advertisement* is *reklama*, which has its roots in the Latin verb *reclāmāre* and means “crying out” or “shouting.” This is due to the fact that, in the past, merchants needed to attract prospective customers to their stands at the market somehow so they shouted, loudly and/or repeatedly (Murdoch, 2003, p. 18). Archaic as it may seem, though, the ancient people’s way of promoting their products is actually reflected in contemporary ads which recurrently, and sometimes even ad nauseam, appear on TV or in the radio.

In spite of the fact that both definitions certainly shed some light on the idea, functions, and origins of advertising, they still do not offer sufficient an answer to the question about the nature of advertising since it is a more complex issue. It is not enough to say that it is an act of persuasive communication designed to sell. To explain it, it is essential to take into account not only its communicative function, but also its place in popular culture, with its power to produce and reinforce cultural, racial, and social stereotypes, to foster values and lifestyles, as well as to provide people with concepts serving as instruments by means of which they apprehend their reality. Hence, owing to its being located at the crossroads of communication, cognitive, media, and social studies, advertising should be conceived as a collection of various branches that merge in individual ads. In order to try to understand its operation, it is indispensable to investigate the interplay of both extrinsic and intrinsic factors from which emerges a complex persuasive appeal. Being the hallmark of advertising discourse, this persuasive appeal works towards promotion of or selling goods and services, that is, towards imprinting ideas onto ad recipients or spurring them into the action of buying.

The key purpose of every advertising message is to catch and maintain people’s attention (Capples, 1997; Goddard, 1998; Berger, 2011), which entails a psychological process in the course of which information provided by a certain marketer “is made available for cognitive and emotional analysis” (Anderson & Kirkorian, 2013, p. 35) by the audience. This can be done in a number of ways: by means of “format, content, information and

semantic characteristics” (Boerman, Smit, & van Meurs, 2011, p. 297), that is, by the physical form of the advertising message, the idea expressed by this form, facts provided about the subject of an ad, and by different shades of contextual meaning, respectively.

Thanks to its ability to capture attention and draw it to goods or services, often binding them to particular emotional states, an ad is capable of raising awareness of their presence on the market. This can be done by means of textual, visual, and sound elements, separated or combined, in order to appeal to consumers’ consciousness and subconscious, changing what they think into what they want. The linguistic elements employed may include ingenious form, rhythm, rhyme, alliteration or repetition; the pictorial are able to draw attention through vivid colour, font size or type, photographs or cartoons, whereas the phonic pulls ad recipients in with sounds, chords, cadence, or music in general. Nevertheless, there is more to an ad than catches the eye, as we should never forget the immediately cultural, social, and cognitive environment of advertising with its concomitant contextual factors capable of triggering interesting associations; this issue will be elaborated on in the forthcoming sections.

In addition to being vehicles for the communication of advertising content, ads perform another vital role, that is, they seek to satisfy consumers’ needs or “to create desires that previously did not exist” (Dyer, 1982, p. 4). They give prospective customers a promise of pleasure, completion, success or joy and posit that the very possession or use of a product will equal fulfilment and satiation of a need. Therefore, they use numerous calls to action designed to spur people to take steps and buy the products or services promoted. Cognately, enhancing brand or company image through advertising may also be treated as a kind of selling practice, for what is being sold is value added to a given business.

In order to better apprehend the operation of ads, it is vital to enquire into the persuasive selling processes behind them, which may rest more on psychological manipulation than on cogent arguments. In an attempt to shine a light on effective persuasion in advertising, it is crucial to consider the following categories of influence enumerated by Dyer (1982), whose list was in turn based on Andren et al. (1978). First and foremost, the language of marketing may take many forms, the catchiest of which is a slogan, with its textual and phonetic qualities designed to please the eye or ear of the recipient. Both slogans and copies, that is, the texts within ads, may include attractive figures of speech or imaginative syntactical or semantic peculiarities applied with a view to swaying target audiences in favour of

goods and services promoted. As might be expected, in the contemporary era of visual communication and consumption, images play a decisive role in advertising practice, which may be observed in the size and amount of pictorial elements; nowadays, the eye catcher occupies more and more space, requiring attention on the part of the consumerist society.

The visual and textual elements of an ad may carry the contents twofold in nature; it is therefore possible to speak of informational and emotional ads, the former of which are centred on a body of facts and hard data, such as goods' availability, affordability or bargains, while the latter seek to arouse intense feelings, stimulating the audience by investing ads with all sorts of emotional appeals, including sex appeal and sensuality, but also any type of positive feelings such as friendship, love, or liking (Andren et al., 1978; Dyer, 1982; Cialdini, 2007). However, negative emotions, like greed, doubt or fear (Caples, 1997; Evans, 2001), may also be part of emotional ad content, for they can help to pressure people into action. As far as emotions are concerned, the meaning embodied in the recurrent second person singular form "[...] explicitly differentiates an individual social actor [...] from a [...] group" (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 39), enabling the establishment of better rapport with the audience through direct communication, for example via advice or sheer flattery; this may open space for enhanced persuasion thanks to the positive influence of emotions on ad recall (Agres, Edell, & Dubitsky, 1990; Mehta & Purvis, 2006) which act as supporting stimuli.

Another weapon of influence is the ability to trigger positive associations owing to the application of attitudinal amplifying adjectives and adverbs that render a message even more evocative. In a similar vein, the use of distinctly positive key words referring to life, freedom, nature, and family also helps to produce positive responses, as indicated by *inter alia* Dyer (1982) and Andren et al. (1978). As already signalled, for an ad to be persuasive, it should contain a promise of either convenience or satisfaction of needs and realisation of dreams. What is more, a variety of other aspects connected with the form of a message should be taken into account, including the entertainment factor that appears when an ad contains a pun or a joke, a funny figure or juxtaposition, which may induce liking (Walker & Dubitsky, 1994; Cialdini, 2007).

An equally significant issue comes with the concept of value transference, which allows selected attributes or phenomena "to seem obtainable through use of product" (Dyer, 1982, p. 89; Andren et al., 1978). Products and services promoted in ads are not only presented as those that can please

or benefit a person exposed to an ad, but also invested with desirable features and positive emotions promising a positive change once ads' objects are purchased. Hence, advertisements skilfully put temptations in the way of consumers, asserting that the ownership of a product will profit them and assure value transference, or even enable transposition into the better world depicted in an ad (Bralczyk, 2000; Lewiński, 2000; Stwora, 2017). Such practices allow for the cultivation of an attractive, or sometimes even upmarket, brand image thanks to the creation of emotional value for the recipient (Falkowski, 2002). Likewise, people may also be manipulated owing to the scarcity principle (Fromkin & Brock, 1971; Brock & Brannon, 1992; Cialdini, 2007) suggesting that the product advertised is rare, in great demand or fashionable to the point of becoming unavailable in the near future. Therefore, what can soon become unobtainable is usually seen as more attractive and the offer thus appears a valuable opportunity despite the subjection of demand to scarcity and ensuing exclusivity. Evidence gathered by Cialdini lends considerable support to the proposition that the scarcity principle can strengthen sales due to a simple psychological mechanism of psychological reactance (Cialdini, 2007), which constitutes an automatic defensive reaction against limiting existing choices.

The same holds true for testimonials in which famous people, institutions or community's grass roots give glowing recommendations of certain products. For evidence, let us turn to the principles of authority and social proof, with the former pertaining to celebrity endorsements and the latter to ordinary people presenting word of mouth or socially sanctioned practice (Cialdini, 2007). Both are based on the *donnée* pertaining to herd behaviour and are thus supposed to make people respond in a reflexive fashion and emulate others—to seek strong validation from other members of society who are able to provide marketing creeds. The social aspect was further investigated by Cialdini and led him to come up with the idea of the unity principle, postulating that when people are able to identify themselves with others, they tend to be influenced by these others in a more effective manner (Cialdini, 2016). For that reason, marketers tend to utilise complex social relations as a pillar of self-esteem to which a person can refer in ads, appealing not only to his self-image, but also to the image of the group he belongs to. This can be observed in broadly uniform and apparently self-imposed images of a modern man and woman derived from advertisements and commercials (Martin, 2006).

Although the topic of the composite structure of ads and their possible appeals is far from being exhausted, this section is intended to offer just

a hint of the immense power behind advertising messages and, for now, this short but sufficient introduction will provide a sound basis for further discussion.

1.3 Print Advertising

Advertisements and the press are inextricably entwined (Dyer, 1982) since they share common origins in the age of the printing press. As a medium used to transmit a message, whether informational, entertaining or promotional in nature, print quickly conquered the world of information exchange, forever changing human culture. The language of print advertising has been thoroughly discussed by, *inter alia*, Leech (1966), Vestergaard and Schröder (1985), Tanaka (1992, 1996), Cook (2001), and McQuarrie and Phillips (2008), and each of these works makes an important contribution to our understanding of this type of ads.

The intention of this section is to discuss print advertising in more detail, with particular emphasis on ads in newspapers, magazines, catalogues, and leaflets. Each subtype mentioned is produced on paper as a static ad composed of textual and/or visual elements; each is also spatially restricted, hence rendering shortness and meaning compression its defining attributes (Bruthiaux, 2000).

1.3.1 Newspapers

In the first place, the spotlight will be given to newspaper ads, which appear either as independent pages in a paper or alongside the editorial content, coming in many sizes. Looking for a source of income, people in the press industry rely upon ads and thus include paid advertising in their newspapers; the same holds true for magazine ads and broadcast advertising, with the only difference that advertising messages in papers are commonly viewed as more reliable (cf. Bovée & Arens, 1992). This credibility factor may be due to the long tradition of press and, consequently, of newspaper advertising too.

The press is an active medium—it requires attention while reading, turning pages, and searching for what seems personally interesting or useful. Despite the fact that newspapers are usually read selectively, they provide something for every reader because they tend to be broad in scope (Bovée & Arens, 1992, p. 458). Consequently, ads in this medium represent a variety of commodities and services, as well as enable marketers to reach

many possible groups. However, a related disadvantage here is that a given ad may not appeal to all the groups exposed to its operation.

What is more, although it is possible for a paper to be reread or shared easily, it usually lands in the dustbin once read, making it impossible for an ad within to survive more than a day or a week, till the next issue appears, of course. Another limitation in papers' advertising potential is due to lower paper quality, which can prove problematic in the reproduction of illustrations. Nevertheless, press advertising is still very popular among marketers who realise that repeated ad exposure is one of the most important facets of the advertising effort.

In brief, when it comes to enumerating the subcategories of newspaper ads, we can differentiate between newspaper display advertising, classified ads, advertorials, and pre-printed inserts (Bové & Arens, 1992; Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006). These will be discussed in order below. Display ads appear either on the page adjacent to or on the same page as regular editorial content and are composed of several elements, including a headline, slogan, body copy, and images, brand-identity elements, as well as additional informational items located in the signature line, "often accompanied by a price-tag, slogan, trade-mark [...]" (Leech, 1966). The following paragraphs will cover some of the abovementioned components.

To start with, I should first differentiate between a slogan and a headline. Following *The New Oxford Dictionary of English*, while the former can be defined as a repetitive expression of persuasive character, as "a short and striking or memorable phrase used in advertising" (Pearsall, 1998, p. 1754), the latter functions as "a title at the head of a page [...]" (Pearsall, 1998, p. 846) or an ad, in this context. The use of both is viewed as an effective way of imprinting advertising messages on consumers' minds owing to several key features they possess, namely: "fluency, conciseness, persuasiveness, and mnemonic effect" (Lim & Loi, 2015, p. 283). The qualities they exhibit determine the syntax of advertising language as such, hence creating the idiosyncratic characteristics of advertising discourse in general. This, in turn, makes it easier for advertisers to establish identifiable brands associated with specific messages transmitted by means of language.

Notwithstanding the fact that it is typical of newspaper ads to contain body copy, that is, the main text explaining the purpose of the ad or describing its object (Leech, 1966), it is nowadays less elaborate than in the past. Newspapers are naturally expected to engage the reader and an absorbed person willing to pay attention to the paper's content is also more likely to read a longer copy in an ad. However, it is observable that the

proportion of space allotted to pictures is on the increase; that people seem more interested in the aesthetic factor applied, in the brands promoted or the emotions conveyed by an ad than in any specific product information. That is why so many copywriters reduce their copy or even delete it completely in favour of non-textual areas, that is, graphics. As the process of decoding information from a picture is much shorter than the one of text processing and apprehension (Rayner et al., 2001; Boerman, Smit, & van Meurs, 2011), an advertiser has to decide whether he will opt for the brevity and ease of mental processing offered by photos and illustrations presenting everything in a rather straightforward manner, or whether he wants to make ad recipients ponder over an ad longer and extract meaning from the textual.

Conversely, classified ads include only copy—they are usually placed in separate sections and allow few or no images (Bovée & Arens, 1992; Bruthiaux, 1996; Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006). Given their strictly functional character and brevity, they are optimal for individuals interested in selling real estate, cars or furniture, hiring workers or employees, and offering services; they are also suitable for matrimonial and to let announcements. Their distinctive shortness and lack of any ornamental form results from the fact that they are charged for by the number of letters or lines used and have to fit the width of one newspaper column.

Another type of newspaper advertising is a little bit problematic since it is written in the form of an article, pretending to be an instance of “objective” journalism. This mode of press advertising is called an advertorial and can be described as “an advertisement often thinly disguised as legitimate news matter” (Ellerbach, 2004, p. 61); the term itself is a portmanteau of the words “advertisement” and “editorial” so it logically stands for an ad that resembles editorial content, mixing promotion and the form of news together. This is often done in the form of a testimonial provided by an average-person-on-the-street, or a person assumed to be an expert in the field, for example a doctor or a scientist, or by means of celebrity endorsement (Cialdini, 2007). Though it often contains a disclaimer stating that such content is to be conceived as an ad (Bovée & Arens, 1992), the commercial source is not always made evident to the reader, which can be perceived as misleading or even deceptive a practice.

Moving on to another subtype within the genre of press advertising, it seems germane to briefly describe pre-printed inserts. As the name suggests, it is ad material put inside the newspaper, usually in its fold, and take the form of “a separate, smaller section of the paper” (Bovée & Arens, 1992,

p. 468). Pre-printed inserts may appear as brochures, coupons, or mail-back letters printed either by the printing house along with the current issue of the paper or by an independent advertiser. Especially in the latter case, such ad material tends to be glossy and very colourful with the aim of catching the eye of the reader.

Having briefly described the main types of press advertising, the study will move on to discuss salient features of contemporary ad design. In spite of the fact that advertising as such escapes perfect description owing to its parasitic and changing nature, some defining characteristics are possible to trace. For now, it is enough to mention that advertisements rely heavily on the exploration and exploitation of other genres, from which they abundantly draw in terms of style, form, and associations (Bralczyk, 2000; Wojtaszek, 2002); this issue will be elaborated upon in the section devoted to the verbal component of an advertising message.

Parenthetically, it can be added that the position of an ad on the page is also a key factor in capturing the readers' attention; ads' placement on the back cover of a newspaper or a magazine enhances their chances of being noticed by the audience because, in this way, an advertising message may stand out from the information clutter. In order to perform even better, it is advisable for an ad to match the content it accompanies or the prospective target audience; for example, an ad in a newspaper or a magazine can potentially be geared towards a particular demographic group or relate to the professional interest of the targets. Page side, ad's size, and the proximity of the editorial, as well as the section of publication should be considered; "English speakers are used to reading text from left to right, working progressively down the page. The verbal text in the box, top left, is therefore in prime reading position" (Goddard, 1998, p. 15), but it is also true of eye-catching ads of considerable size to attract attention first in general. The page context may, thus, be an additional factor to consider in respect of ads' application.

Let us return to the notable features belonging to the language of press advertising—first comes the persuasive and, at the same time, highly conventionalised form and content. The border between the two blurs in advertising messages, for the significance of a given word used in an ad is viewed both at the structural and semantic level (Bralczyk, 2000). While the first may give rise to rhymes or cadence helping to establish recall of particular slogans, the other is concerned with different shades of meaning that can be found based on the perceiver's mental dictionary and on firmly anchored cultural associations. The choice of language items to be incor-

porated rests not only on words that carry information, but also on those suggesting attitudes, eliciting emotions, mentioning the most attractive features of goods advertised, and, therefore, inducing the reader to buy. However, in order to persuade even more effectively, the static form of press ads goes beyond the verbal and combines both text and image, giving prominence to visual material (McQuarrie & Phillips, 2008). But apart from the ongoing process of elevating the visual component while limiting the textual, several other significant changes have taken place in the realm of press advertising as regards the evolution of its style and language.

Clearly, a process of change involved in the approach to strategies applied in advertising is observable. Myers (1994) points out that contemporary advertising language tends not towards direct or conspicuous claims but rather towards more subtle meanings that result from language-play or metaphorical expressions. As observed by Phillips and McQuarrie (2002) and Wojtaszek (2011a), the construction of advertising messages has evolved over time, favouring the creative aspect of language use that requires multi-layer processing rather than straightforward claims. The presence of tropes and visuals is even more conspicuous in magazine ads, which will be the next subject to be looked into.

1.3.2 Magazines

The first common association sparked off upon hearing about a magazine is for sure connected with a colourful and glossy cover, as well as with a plethora of pictures and attractively packed content. This general impression of magazines is thanks to their high-quality reproductions with brilliant, vivid, and appealing colours, as well as due to the unmistakable prestige factor (Bové & Arens, 1992) of many periodical publications. Most magazines are subject-specific, concentrated on a particular topic, for example fashion, cars, health, lifestyle, or business. As a rule, readers choose those magazines in which the editorial content is congruent with their interests (Berger, 2011) and, accordingly, owing to their thematic profile, such publications are aimed at a particular readership group. This, in turn, encourages collection of accurate information about the audience targeted so as to produce interest within the group.

The main difference between a newspaper and a magazine is that the former presents news, while the latter is centred on one particular topic. Furthermore, a newspaper is broader in scope and reach but less emotionally engaging, so to speak, whereas a magazine is narrower in terms of the audience covered, yet much more personalised and able to create loyalty

in the audience. Apart from the loyalty factor produced due to appealing content suited to the expectations of the readers, magazines serve as tools shaping human desires and opinions, providing more emotion and less information, as opposed to newspapers. What is more, they are sometimes collected by those who buy them, which engenders “long shelf life” (Bové & Arens, 1992), making it possible for the reader to return to a copy whenever he wishes. Their further advantages include numerous design options that help to create attractively unusual messages that catch the eye. Nevertheless, among the serious limitations that magazine producers and advertisers have to face are: higher costs, cut-throat competition, and the tendency for ads in magazines to be clustered, rendering it difficult for a single ad to stand out. The abovementioned target audience of subscribers is limited in number, though. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that a magazine ad is better tailored for the prospective audience due to its being based on media tastes and preferences of the target group, its coverage is restricted to this particular group only.

Moving on to the features of magazine advertising, McQuarrie and Phillips (2008) examine quite a few changing aspects of magazine ad style over the years on the basis of their effectiveness; it follows from their study that the amount of body copy used tends to decrease sharply while the pictorial element is given prominence and nowadays occupies a substantial portion of the ad. This is due to the fact that consumers’ approach to magazine ads has changed over time, transforming advertisements, in the eyes of most people, into mere pictures and thus reducing their function as written text.

If we ask why the style of advertising has changed, it appears that while the older ads assume an attentive *reader*, the more recent ads presume a visually oriented, casually browsing *viewer*. (McQuarrie & Phillips, 2008, p. 96)

The fact that present-day advertisements are more and more abundant in visual components reflects profound changes in the media, communication, and social context (Leiss, Kline, & Jhally, 1990; McQuarrie & Phillips, 2008). The media as such are no longer a source of information but of infotainment—communication patterns need to be as brief as possible owing to the requirements of the modern lifestyle; finally, because of these communication standards promoted by television and the Internet, the society as a whole is being taught to look rather than to read, since any text

requires attention and extraction of meaning, which is time-consuming, whilst the image is simply given and offers readily-understood “mental shortcuts to other, more abstract and complex ideas” (Stwora, 2019a, p. 59). Therefore, the recipient of an advertising message, once conceived as a focused reader, has changed, now being treated as a viewer, leafing through the content in search of eye-catching elements on the page.

Such changes in ad style, especially the transition from the copy-centred to picture-dominant ads, are conducive to increasing numbers of “visually reproduced brand-package-product” (McQuarrie & Phillips, 2008, p. 104). Furthermore, the pictorial evolved over time to present the audience not only with images of products and brands, but also with imagined worlds, pictorial metaphors, wordplays, and puns (Bralczyk, 2000), inviting the reader to engage in and play a game of meanings. This trend is noticeable across many product categories and has been found to enhance consumer perceptions of brands (cf. Childers & Houston, 1984; Toncar & Munch, 2001; McQuarrie & Phillips, 2005; Djafarova, 2008). Nonetheless, the dominance of the visual component is even more visible in catalogues, which will be overviewed in the section to follow.

1.3.3 Catalogues

As far as catalogues are concerned, they share many features with magazine ads since they are designed to maximise attention capture thanks to the dominance of pictures and resultant pleasure from visual experience. According to the definition provided by *The New Oxford Dictionary of English*, a catalogue is “a publication containing details and often photographs of items for sale, especially one produced by a mail-order company” (Pearsall, 1998, p. 286), optionally by a manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer. Such brochures or small booklets may be thus described as printed promotional material containing illustrations and relevant information about the products or parts thereof (Leech, 1966; Šmid, 2000). They are different from magazines and newspapers, though, in that they consist solely of advertisements since they are devoted to promotion of a particular set of goods on offer and do not contain any informational or infotaining content.

Printed catalogues today have their online counterparts as well and both are structured so as to present the product to the reader efficiently and effectively at the same time. They offer information about products and their prices, as well as about various models offered, sometimes with detailed specifications and, obligatorily, contact and ordering information. Less emphasis is placed on description in general—it is data that matters in

brochures, as well as the abundance of images since their persuasive appeal primarily rests on visual attention.

1.3.4 Leaflets

Referring again to a dictionary definition, a leaflet is “a printed sheet of paper, sometimes folded, containing information or advertising and usually distributed free” (Pearsall, 1998, p. 1047), whose purpose is to give facts about a product or service. Leaflets, also known as flyers, are low-cost printed messages intended for wide distribution, usually by being handed out to passers-by or put into mailboxes. Most of them are perused for direct market information, yet there are also those produced by non-profit organisations or by organisers of events of a cultural, religious or political character.

By fine-tuning the elements of an advertising leaflet, advertisers try to find the best possible way of encoding their message in a concise manner in order to make it short and thus easy to read and process (Karaśkiewicz, 2013). Because of space and time restrictions imposed by the leaflet’s format and human attention, advertisers must make sure that their message gets across to potential readers. In this light, a screaming or even lurid headline is helpful, for most people will glance at the big letters at the top but will frequently disregard the rest. Nevertheless, a headline or a slogan on a leaflet is still accompanied by body copy containing a persuasive call to action, as well as the company name which appears along with the logo (Leech, 1966).

Despite big numbers of leaflets, their life and people’s possible exposure to their contents are very short. One reason is that there are simply too many of them for a person to devote time to every flyer he is given; another is that people are often too preoccupied with other things to pay attention to a piece of paper they receive on the street. By and large, closer attention is usually paid to more personalised messages that come with mail.

1.3.5 Direct Mail

While the types of print advertising hitherto discussed are all forms of indirect mass communication, direct mail, as the name itself reveals, is concerned with direct marketing. It constitutes a form of persuasive marketing communication which addresses the customer personally by means of employing print media encompassing the whole gamut of possibilities: from letters and newsletters to coupons, flyers, brochures, and direct mail

catalogues, either printed or online (Spiller & Baier, 2005). Their primary function is to solicit an immediate response from the receiver, to show him the benefits of the bargain, as well as to provide him with a tailored sales offer and contact information to allow ease of response. According to Janoschka (2004), response elements can be defined as follows:

Response elements are, for instance, return cards and envelopes, fax numbers with conveniently prepared return fax sheets, but also telephone numbers or e-mail and Internet addresses. They may include additional supplements like brochures, catalogues, free gifts, vouchers etc. which are meant to have a positive impact on the person addressed. (Janoschka, 2004, p. 31)

Printed direct mailing requires prior consent on the part of the addressee whose surname and contact details are included in the database of a marketing agency, producer or retailer. Such a database of recipients is built upon people's socio-economic profiles and their demonstration of interest in the product in the past. It is thus possible to narrow the number of possible targets on the basis of market analysis or previous interactions with a customer. The communicative situation is clear so the receiver is more liable to pay attention to what he finds in his mailbox among the letters and bills. However, when it comes to drawbacks, constantly incoming direct mail may project a "junk mail" image (Kotler, 2000) on this advertising process, causing the addressee to become irritated with such messages. Instead, recent studies show that "consumers are increasingly likely to respond positively to permission-based (opt-in) sales e-mails, and to see them as replacing print direct mail communication" (Cheung, 2010, p. 355).

Despite the fact that direct-marketing sales letters require more expenditure due to the requisite personalisation aspects, they are a good tool, the aim of which is to establish "[...] credible, long-term customer-agent relationships" (Cheung, 2010, p. 370). This tool is used with the express purpose of maintaining good rapport with customers, reminding them of a brand or a product they interacted with.

1.4 Ads Today—On Multimodal Advertising Discourse

We can only understand what advertisements mean by finding out *how* they mean, and analysing the way in which they work. (Williamson, 1978, p. 17)

The opening citation catches the general gist of advertising discourse that, from the linguistic point of view, can be studied only through the examination of its constituent parts and their operation in the meaning-making process. Various incarnations of advertising language, like words, pictures, sounds, and their extensions, that is, “brand names, logos, trademarks, jingles, and slogans have become a part of the ‘mental encyclopaedia’ of virtually everyone who lives in a modern day society” (Beasley & Danesi, 2002, pp. 1–2). They are ubiquitous and very powerful in terms of their influence on the recipients and the ways in which they perceive the world and themselves, which is why ads as such cannot be regarded as a peripheral human creation, but rather as a fully-fledged form of communication.

Advertising carriers may rely on written word, on image or sound, or on the combination of these; for this reason, it can be said that today’s advertising reaches far beyond the monomodal system in order to convey messages. It is a dynamic discipline that employs different codes, from linguistic to pictorial, which enter into complex interaction with each other. That is why advertising discourse as such must be seen in the light of multimodality and why the linguistic in ads must be studied along with the graphic, for it is impossible to impose purely linguistic models upon pictorial forms. The ways in which various forms of advertising discourse may be deployed will be of interest here. For the purpose of clarity, the verbal and non-verbal constituents will be discussed in separation, and then a demonstration will follow of how these two modes can be combined to support each other’s communicative potential in multimodal messages.

1.4.1 The Verbal

[T]he medium through which ads can interact with the general public and thus perform its function is language. (Wojtaszek, 2002, p. 7)

Discovering the world of ads, their communicative force, operation, and appeal would not be possible if not for language, which is, simultaneously, the medium and the message, to use McLuhan’s (1994) terms. The verbal language peculiar to advertising has been thoroughly studied by numerous linguists and communication scholars (e.g., Leech, 1966; Williamson, 1978; Dyer, 1982; Vestergaard & Schrøder, 1985; Leiss, Kline, & Jhally, 1990; Grunig, 1991; Myers, 1994; Tanaka, 1992, 1996; Goddard, 1998; Bralczyk, 2000; Cook, 2001; Gajewska, 2011). This vast collection of previous

pieces of research into advertising discourse has informed an integrated approach to the investigation of the language of advertising, allowing other researchers in the field for the operation within tried and tested theoretical frameworks.

The first task to undertake here is to explore the linguistic properties of the language of advertising, which, nonetheless, is not an easy thing to do because of the dynamic nature of language itself. There are, however, several common and (almost) all-embracing features of ads' language appurtenant to the general genre of advertising discourse. Based on the paper by Lazović (2014), it is possible to enumerate several universal language features typical of advertisements across various languages; these can be found at the phonological, orthographic, lexical, grammatical, and semantic, as well as at the pragmatic level (Lazović, 2014, p. 91), and this basic organisation will be used in this part of the chapter.

Starting with the phonological level, we can enumerate alliteration, rhythm and rhyme, repetition, as well as sound symbolism (Lazović, 2014) as its basic components. To this list, Myers (1994) adds homophones, assonance, and parallelisms. The occurrence of the same letters or sounds in advertising messages renders them more memorable and attractive, both in visual and auditory terms. Making use of similarities ensuing from sound repetition of adjacent or connected words and/or phrases by means of homophony or rhyme (Cook, 2001) results in interesting and powerful parallel constructions (Cook, 2001; Brierley, 2005) which use repetition as an attention-grabbing mnemotechnic strategy designed to anchor ads' content in the minds of the audience. Additionally, the way a word sounds is also meaningful, for it may carry some connotations due to sound symbolism (Bralczyk, 2000), contributing to the overall impression an ad may have on its recipient.

Moving on to the orthographic level, two aspects deserve brief description, namely: deviations in spelling and capitalization (Lazović, 2014). The verbal component in ads may be either informal and relaxed or more ceremonious and sophisticated. Nevertheless, both alternatives resort to unconventional use of language or incorrect spellings that often create puns in order to attract attention (Leech, 1966; Janoschka, 2004). Such creative deviations and word-building processes have become salient elements of the discursive genre in question. Unconventional use of language is also observable with regard to brand new words that appear in ads; some are created specifically for a particular advertising message and typically take the form of an original name of a product or its qualities (cf. Bralczyk,

2000). Another distinctive feature of advertising language comes with capitalisation, that is, using solely capital letters or starting each word in a row with an initial capital; sometimes the accumulation of punctuation marks appears as well with a view to introducing suspense or emotion.

The investigation of linguistic means employed in ads is often conducted at the lexical level, relating to trigger words, brand names, slogans, and catch phrases (Lazović, 2014), as well as to body copies, headlines, taglines, and captions. A truly “extensive repertoire of linguistic choices available to copywriters when creating advertising material” (Lazović, 2014, p. 90) is provided by Leech’s (1966) work on the language of advertising, based on ads in English, in which he offers a comprehensive body of lexical items used in advertising discourse. A variety of trigger words and keywords that may initiate consummatory behaviour on the part of the audience or excite their attention is available to advertisers who appreciate their persuasive appeal and countless naturally positive associations carried by certain words like “home,” “love,” “fresh,” “clean,” or “power” (cf. Bralczyk, 2000), for they signal values and emotions people typically associate with particular notions. Following Geis (1982), the strength of a claim is made even greater thanks to emphasis placed on product names, the application of modal verbs, quantifiers, nouns, adjectives, and comparative constructions.

Adjectives and adverbs are generally considered the most essential elements of advertising language, for they are capable of naming the attributes of goods and services presented in ads (Bralczyk, 2000) and, hence, of creating their images in people’s minds; for instance, Pisarek (1993) reports that the most frequently used adjectives in British ads include: “good/better/best,” “free,” “delicious,” “full,” “sure,” “clean,” “wonderful,” “special,” “fine,” “big,” “great,” “real,” “easy,” “bright,” “extra,” “rich,” and “golden” (cf. Pisarek, 1993), but the list can be expanded to encompass such epithets as “new,” “original,” “super,” or “special” (cf. Pisarek, 1993). What is more, these and other adjectives and adverbs can make it possible for a synaesthetic experience to occur because a proper formulation, a right choice of wording, may trigger a sensation in the audience that is typical of experiencing something through other senses. For example, describing a sound as clean involves the transference of impression from one sense to another, here: from auditory to visual experience. The prospect’s imagination can also be stimulated thanks to verbal juxtapositions since the power of comparatives and contrast in advertising is such that it can create appealing messages because of symbolic, culturally anchored meanings

carried by the words contrasted, as well as due to the possibility of offering evaluative judgements (Stwora, 2017).

The most important part of the verbal message transmitted in an ad is the headline or the slogan, which is usually the biggest in size. Works by Rees (1982), Grunig (1991), and Bralczyk (2000) show the use and architecture of slogans in detail, providing the whole picture of idiosyncratic features typical of these short phrases used in advertising. According to Bralczyk (2000), it is in the slogan where the verbal persuasive ploys are centred, for the unique combination of words therein included is often the only element a person pays attention to. In this light, conciseness, attractiveness, and the capability of producing a mnemonic effect are crucial features of a slogan (Lim & Loi, 2015) because most people will just take a swift glance at the big letters at the top, frequently disregarding other textual elements.

The same holds true for the headline and catch phrase, which function as the ad's title and its leading "signature" expression, respectively. "These major linguistic stimuli, that is, slogans, headlines, and catch phrases, owe their power not so much to their content, but rather to the means used, which likens them to magic formulas or spells, repeated over and over again" (Bralczyk, 2000, p. 7, trans. A.S.). The concepts and pieces of information they carry are further elaborated on in the main body of the ad known as body copy, whose chief purpose is to describe the product promoted and convince the prospect to consider purchasing goods or services on offer by means of a persuasive call to action (Leech, 1966).

Another, yet much shorter textual form found in advertising discourse comes with the caption and tagline; the former is "a sentence or short piece of copy that explains what you are looking at in a photo or illustration" (Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006, p. 296), whereas the latter is "a short phrase that wraps up the key idea or creative concept that usually appears at the end of the body copy. It often refers back to the headline or opening phrase" (Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006, p. 296), thus concluding to a framing device that may enhance the message. In sum, various lexical structures mentioned above are responsible for the creation of the overall persuasive context in which brand names are joined with specific contextual situations and ensuing emotional states communicated in an ad (Bralczyk, 2000).

To the pending list of linguistic characteristics typical of ads, it is imperative to add these pertaining to the grammatical level, realised, among others, through structural simplicity, ellipsis, imperatives, and superlatives (Lazović, 2014). The advertising syntax (Leech, 1966) itself

tends towards structural simplicity and text reduction (Wojtaszek, 2014), not only because of time and space constraints imposed by the advertising media, but also in order to condense meanings and, thus, facilitate message processing by the audience (Stwora, 2017), for “succinctness, a defining characteristic of the discourse of advertising, implies specific socio-cognitive and communicative mechanisms” (Bruthiaux, 2000). Hence, an advertising message cannot be excessively wordy, for the shorter it is, the easier it will be for the recipient to comprehend and remember (Dyer, 1982; Bralczyk, 2000). Apart from the use of contracted forms, meaning-laden words and phrases, as well as shorter structures, syntactic ellipsis is also present (Myers, 1994), since elliptical constructions allow for the omission of words from clauses and thus for brevity without any damage to the ad’s comprehensibility.

Another salient feature of the language of advertising may be observed with regard to the use of direct and imperative forms (Dyer, 1982; Wojtaszek, 2014), which are strongly addressee-oriented, urging the audience to act or think in a given way. “The prospective customer is continually exhorted: ‘Buy X,’ ‘Discover Y,’ ‘Find out about...’ [...], ‘Try it today’ [...]” (Dyer, 1982, p. 114), which obviously serves strictly persuasive goals. Except for imperative structures, interrogatives and exclamations are also part and parcel of advertising language (Myers, 1994), as they aim at engaging the audience and inducing emotions. In fact, almost all words may potentially be invested with emotions, which leads to the creation of attitudes by bringing associations to the perceiver’s mind and stimulating it with contextually and functionally adequate language items that constitute vehicles for meanings and feelings alike. The occurrence of the superlative and hyperbole (Bralczyk, 2000) can communicate emotions too, since they are used to express different degrees of quality and amplify selected features of the product.

Many attention-getting devices can be identified with regard to the semantic level of the language of advertising, for it is rife with metaphors, metonymies, word plays, and other figures used to express different shades of meaning, ambiguity, and figurativeness (cf. Lazović, 2014). It is an axiom that an ad must embed itself in the consumers’ memory and that, for this purpose, it resorts to inventive and fresh means of presenting its content. Metaphor is perhaps one of the most prevalent figures of speech to be identified here, for it provides the widest variety of conceptual embroidery available. A substantial body of research has accumulated with regard to metaphor conceived as a linguistic device employed in advertising discourse

(e.g., Dyer, 1982; Świątek, 1995; Tanaka, 1996; Bralczyk, 2000; Cook, 2001; Dynel, 2009; Phillips & McQuarrie, 2009).

The rationale behind the use of this figure in advertising is its great communicative attractiveness, which follows from the fact that “the power of a metaphorical figure lies in its metaphoricity (i.e., cross-domain comparison) or its figurativeness (i.e., artful deviation), or both” (Phillips & McQuarrie, 2009, p. 49), of which more in the third chapter. For now, let it be stated that it is a fundamental figure of speech which “describes juxtapositions of referents not normally associated” (Mac Cormac, 1990, p. 1), which results in an interaction between two various domains on the conceptual plane. It is applied to make ads more engaging and to structure the perceptions of message recipients by means of involving content, that is, a puzzle to solve, for it requires thinking about the combination of elements that enter into metaphorical relations and the resultant meaning.

A well-chosen metaphor is something more than a chance for a product advertised to become personified and presented as an animate object with a soul of its own (Bralczyk, 2000); a metaphor may spark associations and emotions that will provoke interest in the audience and induce liking for an ad and the product itself, which can potentially translate into boosting sales in the future. This is also true for such figures of speech as metonymy (Cook, 2001), simile, and paradox (Brierley, 2005), with metonymy sharing the operation of substitution of one term for another with metaphor, the only difference being the nature of the relation between the terms. This is due to the fact that metaphor relies on two separate, and usually also disparate, domains between which the perceiver can draw open-ended analogies, while metonymy operates within a rather close-ended set of associations and contiguities (cf. Dirven, 2002; Radden & Kövecses, 2007).

The frequency of puns and wordplay in advertising discourse shows that the use of language for humorous purposes is a popular strategy too (Tanaka, 1992, 1996; Bralczyk, 2000; Sutherland & Sylvester, 2000; Cook, 2001; Brierley, 2005; Djafarova, 2008; Gajewska, 2011; Díaz-Pérez, 2012), which is used to entertain prospective consumers and make them more receptive to advertising messages because of the emotion factor involved. “The function of punning (wordplay) in advertising varies from double meanings to humorous effects” (Djafarova, 2008, p. 267), yet the primary function of language plays in ads, except for amusing the recipient, is to conduce to liking and positive attitude towards an ad. Puns are both creative and intriguing, they ask to be interpreted in order for the audience to find the hidden links between the denotative and connotative

meanings; as a result, they require additional processing effort which may translate into increased memorability essential to the effectiveness of the advertising effort (Tanaka, 1992; Djafarova, 2008). Considerations related to further research on humour in advertising will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

As can be observed on the basis of the ongoing discussion, advertisers eagerly experiment with language and its resources aiming at the extension of appeal and enhancement of effectiveness thanks to ingenious attention-getting devices. To this end, they employ figurativeness, puzzle, and ambiguity offered by figures and tropes (Brierley, 2005) that help to stimulate interest in the audience. “Broadly defined, a figure of speech entails the use of words in a manner that is varied from common use” (Djafarova, 2008, p. 268; cf. Leigh, 1994); in such a way, the audience has to devote more attention to and expend more cognitive effort on decoding meanings, which gives rise to more involved processing (Falkowski, 2002). Resulting from this cognitive effort, the structuration of meaning-making elements takes place, leading to what can be called *perceptual synthesis*, which enables the perceiver to recreate or discover encoded meanings on the basis of contextual expectations and previous experience which cause stimuli to mean (cf. Rock, 1985; Falkowski, 2002).

Seeking to answer the question of how language structures advertising discourse, it is imperative to consider its analysis at the pragmatic level, which principally boils down to contextually motivated discursive matters like deixis and the general text organisation with regard to its composition and function performed. Furthermore, it deals with implicature and relevance, which are central to proper decoding of all messages, not only those of marketing origin (this pair of notions will be explained in more detail at the end of the chapter).

In ads, just like in any other forms of communication, the use of interactional markers, that is, personal pronouns, is a key factor which establishes contact between the advertiser (the addressor) and the audience (the addressees). As such, the forms of direct personal audience addressing in advertising are able of creating a style that is regarded as more personal or even intimate owing to the use of you-addressing, for instance (cf. Leech, 1966; Janoschka, 2004; Lazović, 2014). Conscious of its importance, advertisers often adjust the deictic usage of pronouns to the type of ads chosen for a given product (cf. Goddard, 1998); for example, they opt for the first person singular in testimonials. Nevertheless, the most commonly used pronoun reference comes with direct second-person forms, as deictic “you”

and “we” can be directed at almost anyone. It should be clarified here that words are deictic if their denotational meaning is dependent on the specific context in which they are used; deixis, thus, can be defined as a means of “[...] *pointing* via language” (Yule, 2011/1996, p. 9) and referring to specific contexts that express distance or proximity in terms of persons, time, and space. As an example, it may be pertinent to refer to the difference between the inclusive and exclusive “we.” The inclusive one is designed to enhance contact between the advertiser and the audience, including the addressee in the group identified as collective “we,” whereas the exclusive one is purposed to exclude the addressee and imply that the pronoun used indicates the speaker plus other people (Yule, 2011/1996). Naturally, several other dimensions of the pragmatic level could be mentioned here; however, for the purpose of conciseness and text organisation, they will be discussed in the following parts of the chapter.

Wielding influence on the linguistic reality, ads are capable of awakening curiosity in potential customers by means of figures, tropes, or keywords (Caples, 1997). What is more, they often make use of intertextuality in order to evoke even more associations and create even more attractive messages.

The term intertextuality refers to the way one text can point to or base itself on another. [...] Intertextuality can be an important component of an advert’s meaning, in that the original text being referred to established a message, which the second text can then use and elaborate on. In this way, the second text doesn’t have to work so hard—it can take for granted that the original text has left a trace which it can use to its advantage. (Goddard, 1998, p. 69)

Intertextuality is, hence, a way to imbue advertising messages with additional meanings owing to the use of quotations from, allusions to, or transformations of other texts belonging to a given cultural heritage. Based on people’s prior knowledge of well-known texts, films, or public figures, it becomes possible to add layers of depth to an ad and let these cultural factors shape its final meaning. This intertextual quality may refer not only to literary allusions, but also to the structure of an advertisement, for ads as such may be labelled as parasitic discourse that borrows from different genres, from dialogues, through cartoons and fairy tales, to masterpieces of theatre and literature (Bralczyk, 2000; Cook, 2001; Wojtaszek, 2002). Due to such cross-references, it can be said that advertising messages are

essentially parasitic upon their sociocultural surroundings in that they “[...] exist through other genres and culturally significant artefacts, either by attaching themselves to them [...], by co-occurring with them, or by imitation” (Cook, 2001, p. 39). But not for this appropriation of meanings, context, and genres, the language of advertising would have been much more superficial and lacklustre.

In spite of the fact that, in this day and age, the textual element in advertising discourse no longer maintains its pre-eminence and caves in to the power of the visual, words are still crucial in advertisements for several reasons. The textual may prove more specific and simply more effective when it comes to presenting ads’ lines of argumentation. The same holds true for the so-called high-involvement products that require more time and thought from the consumers before deciding to purchase them; using words instead of pictures is, hence, better if an ad contains a piece of information that should be explained in more detail to the prospect. Last but not least, abstract qualities, such as honesty, justice or standards, may be delivered through words more aptly due to the fact that they are accommodated in one notion that is easier printed or said than shown (Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006, p. 261).

Sundry theoretical frameworks offering insights into the language of advertising show that although the perceiver can detect some patterns of language use typical of ads in general, language is a dynamic system subject to the continuous processes of language change and contextual influence. “These processes themselves are not simply linguistic: language change reflects changes in the world around us, both in terms of physical realities and in terms of attitudes and values” (Goddard, 1998, p. 84), so it can be firmly stated that pragmatics is able to impose meanings on the semantic layer of ads too. Attention-getting devices of various kinds are present in the domain of advertising language. Next to words, ads rely strongly on visuals since images can considerably enhance the “look and feel” of an advertising message and exert profound impact on the way in which ads are processed.

1.4.2 The Pictorial

While the previous unit highlighted the way in which the verbal component of an ad works, this one will investigate the visual rhetoric in advertising discourse. First, some basic ideas concerning the operation of the pictorial layer and its impact will be presented with the aim of showing the pow-

erful allure of photographic representations and broadly conceived images in human communication; this, in turn, will make it possible to discuss advertising imagery and its potential effects on the audience.

“To begin with, visuals are assumed to be self-explanatory by default: one sees a picture and, upon processing and interpretation conditioned by his mind, surrounding culture, and context, arrives at a meaning carried by an image” (Stwora, 2019a, p. 58). The faculty of sight allows people to see, hold certain contextually motivated cognitions, and, consequently, make sense of what they are presented with. It is important to stress that this process is dependent upon vast contextual knowledge and previous experience for sufficient visual literacy to be achieved.

Seeing has more to do with learning and knowledge than with the unambiguous transfer of images to the brain. When we see things, we know what is there partly because of knowledge gained from previous experience. When we observe an image, we ‘read’ it rather than just absorb it, and it is therefore accurate to talk of visual ‘literacy’ [...]. (Dyer, 1982, p. 75)

Drawing upon this quotation, it is possible to reach a conclusion that “[...] the term *literacy* is extended here to encompass the interpretation of visuals, forever joining seeing, learning, and understanding in a triad of culturally determined perception and signification” (Stwora, 2019a, p. 58). Just like any other code, the pictorial one carries specific meanings, which means that its addresses need to demonstrate the ability to decode them, especially in contemporary mass-mediated culture, which gives much more weight to the visual layer of communication. This transition of both the informative and the emotive aspect to the pictorial form renders visuals more believable and appealing since, typically, people simply believe in what they see. What is more, “the visual [...] offers unrivalled sensual immediacy, connotes further information, and arouses stronger emotions (cf. Mirzoeff, 2002)” (Kuczok, Stwora, & Świerkot, 2020, p. 7), as well as requires less cognitive effort and time; yet, immediate as it is, meaning derived from pictures seems less reflective (cf. Dyer, 1982; Beasley & Danesi, 2002; Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006), which seems particularly useful when it comes to advertising.

This technique to let the pictorial speak for itself applies to the advertising effort as well; it can be readily observed that visuals are inclined to take over almost the entire ad today, as they depict real objects

better than words “and they generally offer greater opportunity for the communication of excitement, mood, and imagination” (Dyer, 1982, p. 69). Therefore, pictures are quite effective in eliciting emotive responses from receivers, influencing their attitudes and, most importantly, offering mental shortcuts to other, more abstract and complex ideas one wishes to communicate. (Stwora, 2019a, p. 59)

Images are simply indispensable when it comes to making people look at something and arresting their attention; yet there is a difference between seeing and perceiving so as to process and interpret. As stated by Henderson (1992), the concept of *visual attention* rests on “the selective use of information from one region of the visual field at the expense of other regions of the visual field” (Henderson, 1992, p. 260), which means that the perceiver’s gaze is directed towards something (here: towards a photo, a drawing, or an illustration) he caught sight of. Seeing and paying cognitive attention are, nonetheless, poles apart (Styles, 2006; Boerman, Smit, & Van Meurs, 2011) since looking at something does not necessarily mean giving it conscious attention. Still, the power of the visual may make its way to the minds of the audience quite effectively even due to colour or the spatial arrangement on the page, without activating any deeper meanings.

The visual imagery in advertising is very eye-catching and often sophisticated, which makes it convincing, as it frequently provides the receiver with true-to-life representations of reality; these representations are sometimes enhanced and spiced up, though, which may lead to a conclusion that such images should be treated as simulated reality (cf. Messaris, 1997). Improved as it may be, the pictorial offers so many advantages to the advertiser and so much aesthetic appeal to the audience that it is a must in marketing communication. Parenthetically, while discussing the great aesthetic potential of advertising, it should be mentioned that appealing visual stimuli are not restricted to ads because they are widely used when it comes to packaging, hence influencing the product design itself.

Upon encountering a visual ad, human sight is impacted not only by commercial photography or cartooned representation of a product, but also by other formal features of the picture, including shapes and colouring. Colours are tools for advertisers to manipulate and play with, to attract attention, as well as to establish correlations between products or services and depicted situations, activities, or emotional states, hence building brand identity (Williamson, 1978; Sivik, 1997; Garber & Hyatt, 2003; Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006). Proper colour-coding is not only a key

to grabbing people's attention through sensory experience; it also serves as a means to carry associative, symbolic information derived from learned social and cultural contexts (Scott, 1994; Garber & Hyatt, 2003). Colour experience, including such features as hue and saturation (Sivik, 1997; Kress, 2012), for example, is thus determined by the cultural background of the target audience and its associations, which vary across different nations (cf. Lucy, 1997). The application of various shades in advertising, alongside its power to establish brand recognition, has its aesthetic and meaning-making merits, especially when it comes to conveying additional, symbolic messages to the consumer. That is why colours are persuasive in nature—they can communicate emotions, values, and attitudes, changing the way the viewer feels. Even a faint tinge is capable of drawing the perceiver's attention to a particular element in a black-and-white picture, totally changing its focus and meaning. Therefore, colour-coding can surely be perceived as a discursive tool that may communicate different things by means of helping to express subtle nuances (Scott, 1994) and, consequently, to influence cognitions of the perceiver.

Reliant on the visual field is also typography—the font used, with different flavours of typefaces that come in many variations, from condensed to expanded and from italicised to boldfaced (Bovée & Arens, 1992; Cook, 2001; Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006; Wojtaszek, 2011a), is capable of carrying information about the product, as well as implied values, features, and emotions. Being paralinguistic in nature, typeface and font size may, for instance, seem to whisper or scream, depending on their appearance (Bralczyk, 2000); some may be perceived as either feminine or masculine, elegant or casual, formal or informal, changing people's reception and interpretation of what is written. This is due to the fact that the visual aspects of written language can influence human processing thereof (cf. Tavassoli, 2003), for they present the viewer with supplementary stimuli carrying additional pieces of information which add up to a final picture of an ad and to its compound meaning.

Although the role of layout and the general composition of an ad have long been known to wield enormous influence as structuring devices, the communicative potential of typography was less popular an issue among researchers in the fields of linguistics and semiotics (Van Leeuwen, 2005b). The printed word, which may act as a means of expression on its own, is said to have two levels of meaning: “the ‘word image,’ the idea represented by the word itself, constructed from a string of letters, and the ‘typographic image,’ the ‘holistic visual impression’ [...]” (Bellantoni & Woolman, 2000, p. 6).

This relation between the pictorial form and the concept behind the font can be likened to the interaction of the *signifier* and *signified* (de Saussure, 1986) in semiotic terms, which refer to the physical form and the idea expressed by this form, respectively. Each alternative use of font-type, its colour, texture, or other distinctive property, has its purpose not only on the plane of visual style, but also when it comes to meaning making, carrying connotations, or creating metaphorical messages (cf. Bralczyk, 2000; Van Leeuwen, 2005b). Typography is thus a composite semiotic mode of a unique meaning-making potential. “Every choice of a signifier in each of the modes (colour, font, lettering, drawing) points to a decision made about an apt match of ‘what is to be meant’ with ‘what can best express that meaning’ [...]” (Kress, 2012, p. 41). A similar proposition concerning the visual message and its features is put forward by Royce (2007), who claims that the constituents of the pictorial carry specific semantic properties and that the visual techniques applied are capable of meaning transference.

All these elements within the pictorial realm, that is, images, colouring, and fonts, “form a compositional unity within an ad and are a means of visual communication which, just like the verbal one, is composed of three levels of meaning (Panofsky, 1970; Dyer, 1982) that can be labelled as denotative, connotative, and ideological or cultural, respectively” (Stwora, 2019a, p. 60). In Dyer’s terms:

1. The first level is that of primary or natural subject matter consisting of lights, colour, shape, and movement and the elementary understanding of representation, whether of people, objects, gestures, poses or expressions, and the interrelations which comprise events.
2. The second level is that of secondary or conventional subject matter which relates to the wider culture. At this level, motifs and combinations of motifs are linked to themes and concepts. According to Panofsky, certain motifs (which carry secondary meanings) may be called images, and combinations of images may be called stories or allegories.
3. At the third level we come to intrinsic meaning or content, which is discovered by “ascertaining those underlying principles which reveal the basic attitudes of a nation, a period, a class, a religious or philosophic persuasion—unconsciously qualified by one personality and condensed into one work” (Panofsky was referring here to paintings). (Dyer, 1982, p. 74)

The surface level is experienced thanks to visual perception, that is, upon seeing the picture as it is and accessing its surface meaning, detached from interpretation. At the level of interpretation, on the other hand, the perceiver accesses symbols and concepts that carry secondary meanings and go beyond the form itself. Lastly, having unpeeled the denotative and connotative layers, the addressee extracts further, ideologically and contextually motivated meanings. Only after the perceiver has taken into consideration the “grammar,” “syntax,” and implications of the visual design can he understand the final meaning behind the pictorial, centring “on the way in which these elements are combined into meaningful wholes” (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 1) instead of analysing these components in separation. The three levels of meaning thus function as one in the comprehender’s mind, guided by the rules pertinent to visual semiotics.

In general, human beings have a natural inclination towards looking at things and, likewise, towards looking for meanings in everything that surrounds them—in what they read and in what they see. This would explain why people are able to apply unwritten, pictorial modes of communication, that is, those that rest on visual perception, instead of written or spoken ways of coding and decoding of information. The difference between the verbal and pictorial exists, in fact, only in terms of taxonomies (Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004), resources, and structures used to convey the message; the citation below clearly demonstrates this similarity between the two codes as regards meaning making.

Like linguistic structures, visual structures point to particular interpretations of experience and forms of social interaction. To some degree, these can also be expressed linguistically. Meanings belong to culture, rather than to specific semiotic modes. And the way meanings are mapped across different semiotic modes, the way some things can, for instance, be “said” either visually or verbally, others only visually, again others only verbally, is also culturally and historically specific. (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 2)

Therefore, comparably to written constructs, the modes of visual communication discussed herein are culture-specific, resting on social conventions, as well as on consolidated ways of transmitting and interpreting messages. The pictorial can be “read” and understood because it is not the code that matters, but rather symbols and meanings defined by a given historical and cultural context that can give rise to interpretations (cf. Kress

& Van Leeuwen, 1996). Of course, nowadays, as the process of globalisation continues and exerts its influence on more and more communities, we may see the evolution of something that could be labelled as global visual semiotics, characterised by uniform forms and features pertinent to the design of visual messages.

To a certain extent, mass-mediated global culture has absorbed many societies across the globe, leading to the emergence of analogous signification systems and communication practices. This, in turn, makes people perceive the world through the lens of pictures, photographs, and the like that start to become their primary instruments of communication, potent and evocative, yet able to mould what the perceiver sees. Further reflections on the visual domain and on image culture can be found in Barthes (1977), Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996), Coleman (1998), and Schroeder (2002) who put emphasis on the fact that communication has become more visual in this day and age, which is true for ads too.

Having sketched out some basics in terms of visual communication, the section will investigate the pictorial component in ads and its role as an attention-getting device, as well as give a brief account of possible techniques applied in visual rhetoric in advertising discourse. To this end, I will refer to existing research on visual advertising, which demonstrates that the pictorial does not merely lead the eye of the perceiver to written advertising copy. A considerable amount of space is nowadays devoted to the illustrative material (McQuarrie & Phillips, 2008; Wojtaszek, 2011a) and verbal text is often used with the aim of reinforcing the visual, not the other way round (cf. Dyer, 1982). As a matter of fact, an engaging or inspiring photo can proverbially be worth a thousand words, to the point that some ads are even devoid of text since images, apart from being effective “attention-seeking devices” (Goddard, 1998), can simply convey information more effectively than words. As already stated above, images in ads are self-explanatory and hence easily processed. They demand little written description (unless intentionally designed to do so) and successfully appeal to human sight thanks to the photographic naturalness of objects, people, and locations depicted, making ads even more persuasive and believable (cf. Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006).

While ads in newspapers typically require a little bit more attention from the reader owing to longer copy, magazine ads usually draw only a passing glance from the reader, or maybe a viewer, for present-day magazines are in general filled more with pictures than text. This may result from the fact that marketers rely more heavily on the precepts of visual consumption

these days, adopting a visual approach (Schroeder, 2002) and focusing on attractive design, on visual elements that appeal to senses, and on culturally-determined connotations. What emanates from this prevalence of images is the idea of reduced processing effort because information in an ad is made more compact, synesthetic, and holistic (Beasley & Danesi, 2002), causing the visuals to “[...] persist in the mind because people generally remember messages as visual fragments, or key images that are filed easily in their minds” (Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006, p. 291). Given the complexity of human psychology of perception and its indisputable impact on people’s consummatory behaviours, an inquiry into the meaning and operation of images in advertising seems even more critical an issue.

Advertising has been accompanied by images virtually since its coming into existence; this is due to the fact that the communicative potential of an advertising message is enhanced once the visuals are included, for they constitute a great rhetorical device of significant persuasive impact. The visual rhetoric and its swaying effect have been studied by Barthes (1986/1964), Scott (1994), Messaris (1997), McQuarrie and Mick (2003a, 2003b), Phillips and McQuarrie (2004), as well as by Lagerwerf, Van Hooijdonk, and Korenberg (2012), to mention but a few. Among other things, these authors “address the comparative effects of colour versus black-and-white images, photographic versus drawn representations, or similar distinctions, and link these directly to persuasion outcomes [...]” (McQuarrie & Mick, 2003b, p. 192). The major compositional structures expressed by means of images naturally vary from ad to ad, from advertiser to advertiser, and from product to product; hence, it is possible to provide only some general statements on the subject of the pictorial in ads.

In general terms, images in advertising are used either to present a product to a prospective consumer or to attract him to an ad thanks to its visual attributes, including colouring, creative oppositions or contrasts, puns, atypical elements, or imaginative juxtapositions. These and many others make up an ensemble collectively known as *visual rhetorical figures*, which are comparable to, yet dissimilar from, those used in verbal rhetoric, not only in terms of the code itself. Although the taxonomies designed for the verbal and visual rhetoric may overlap in some cases, they are not interchangeably adequate (Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004) due to the inherent differences between the two modes. As mentioned earlier, visual literacy is not exactly the same as the ability to read a text owing to dissimilar “grammar” and “syntax” of the two semiotic modes (Scott, 1994; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 1996). The intentionality and immediacy of images in ads

causes the features of a product depicted (or suggested) to form signifieds that can frequently be inferred on the spot (Barthes, 1986/1964), along with the emotive load and further connotations carried by the pictorial.

Even in terms of more complex, unusual, and less direct imagery that deviates from realistic depictions of reality, metaphorical visuals in ads (usually in the form of visual rhetorical figures like juxtaposition, replacement, or fusion) stay comprehensible. It is because, in the course of their lives and through repeated exposure over time, people learn how to interpret and react to such messages, identifying them as inventive and nonstandard, yet perfectly comprehensible communicative practices (cf. Scott, 1994; Phillips & McQuarrie, 2002; Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004). The palette of possible combinations and figures available in the domain of visual rhetoric is very rich, yet the relation between visual structures and meaning operations used to explain metaphorical visuals (Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004) will be explained in more detail in the section devoted to metaphors in advertising, included in the third chapter.

For now, it will suffice to say that strong reliance on metaphorical pictures to influence the audience has received consideration from many researchers (Forceville, 1996; Phillips, 2003; Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004; Jeong, 2008), whose aim was to answer questions about the production and perception of meanings, about the differences between the form and content, as well as about their persuasive effect. They also asked whether it is possible for this effect to be attributable to visuals and the argumentation they provide or rather solely to rhetorical devices, that is, to the metaphorical content (Jeong, 2008). There are many issues connected with the pictorial in advertising, with the abovementioned topics being merely the tip of the iceberg; in this light, I will limit myself to a brief summary of the aims of visual advertising.

Following the list compiled by Wells, Moriarty, and Burnett (2006), the principal objective of visuals in advertising is to command attention thanks to their being more credible, sensual, and appealing than words, as well as far more memorable. Moreover, pictorial advertising communicates instantly, as an image usually speaks for itself, easing the cognitive burden of decoding written language and anchoring associations. It therefore links goods and brands with specific visual stimuli and related emotional states communicated by an ad. The power of the visual: of a realistic picture, a funny drawing, a startling photo, an inventive collage, or any other creative visual concept, has certainly led to the appearance of “new-style ads [...] structured as images that provide visual entertainment in their own right”

(McQuarrie & Phillips, 2008, p. 96)—ads in which visuals take over the entire ad, sometimes leading to a conspicuous absence of written language.

“The *donnée* of the visual culture as such does not necessarily ‘exclude verbal material from its investigations’ (Mitchell, 2006, p. 300) so the interaction in terms of composition and meaning making between the two seems natural” (Stwora, 2019a, p. 60). When the linguistic and the pictorial are applied in tandem to produce composite meanings (Tanaka, 1996), an ad becomes slightly more complicated, for the perceiver needs to take both semiotic modes into consideration. Thus, the following section will focus on multimodal communication that links the textual, visual, spatial, and sometimes even aural resources (Murray, 2013).

1.4.3 The Multimodal

It was traditionally the “written text” that played the central role, serving as the principle carrier of information. But things have changed: nowadays that text is just one strand in a complex presentational form that seamlessly incorporates visual aspects ‘around,’ and sometimes even instead of, the text itself. (Bateman, 2008, p. 1)

The said complex presentational form (Bateman, 2008, p. 1) is particularly noticeable in multimodal advertising messages that exploit the complex, dialogical interplay between the verbal and non-verbal components (Karaśkiewicz, 2013). The idea of combining several modes of expression in communication is, nevertheless, not a new concept since it was classical rhetoricians who alluded to the use of both linguistic and extra-linguistic elements in public speaking, including voice pitch, rhythm, and gestures, etc. (cf. Aristotle, 2004). An exponential increase in technology and new media, however, exposed the issue to further scrutiny, inviting many researchers interested in the subject of contemporary communication to elaborate on the issue of multimodality (cf. Van Leeuwen, 1999; Burn & Parker, 2003; Royce, 2007; Bateman, 2008; Kress, 2010, 2012; Murray, 2013; Hiippala, 2014).

Multimodality as such presumes the use of several meaningful compositional elements, i.e. many different modes of communication, with a mode defined as “[...] a socially and culturally shaped resource for making meaning. Image, writing, layout, speech, moving images are examples of different modes” (Kress, 2010, p. 79). A formulation of this sort implies that an inventory of semantically related

visual and lexical items is used in one message in order for them to work together to produce a coherent, meaningful whole. In spite of the fact that it may seem that one element is featured as more prominent due to its considerable size, for example, neither of them can be labelled as the principle carrier of information, for the very concept of multimodality refutes the order of priority of any of the modes that contribute to the final meaning (cf. Bateman, 2008). (Stwora, 2019a, p. 61)

Therefore, at the root of this concept lies equality of heterogeneous manners of information presentation, which allows for the combination of distinct semiotic modes, whose interaction leads to the creation of unified communication units. The ensuing patterns of this interaction on the semiotic plane give rise to further meanings, which, in Lemke's (1998) words, proves that the combination of modes is likely to cause the "multiplication of meaning" instead of simple addition.

Horn's (1999) position on the issue of multimodality is that, once merged, the components of a multimodal message become one in terms of aggregate meaning and that the removal of any one of them would result in a partial or complete alteration of meaning, "[...] destroying or radically diminishing the meaning a reader can obtain from it" (Horn, 1999, p. 27). Although meanings in multimodal messages occur in two (or more) forms, these forms concur to produce further meanings that have to be viewed holistically, as coalesced into one meaningful unit for the purpose of a given message in which they were placed. Consequently, multimodality is something more than just a random collection of items representing different semiotic codes and more than a matter of spatial placement of the verbal and visual on one page. In the following extract from Kress, it is possible to find the following claim:

Multimodality asserts that 'language' is just one among the many resources for making meaning. That implies that the modal resources available in a culture need to be seen as one coherent, integral field, of—nevertheless distinct—resources for making meaning. [...] In a multimodal approach, all modes are framed as one field, as one domain. Jointly they are treated as one connected cultural resource for (representation as) meaning making by members of a social group at a particular moment. All are seen as equal, potentially, in their capacity to contribute meaning to a complex semiotic entity, a text, and each is treated as distinct in its material potential

and social shaping. Each therefore needs to be dealt with as requiring apt descriptive categories which arise from that difference. (Kress, 2012, p. 38)

The elements of a multimodal artefact, or the modal resources, as Kress puts it, conflate so as to produce an overall meaning; they do not add up but rather fuse into one large, multimodal, and culture-dependent unit since they are granted equal status in terms of meaning-making potential. Hence, the interaction of semiotic systems that enter such multimodal meaningful relations (Bateman, 2008) rests upon a reciprocal influence, with all the modes incorporated treated as one entity. The co-occurring verbal and visual modes complement each other so as to produce a compound meaning on the basis of “intersemiotic complementarity” (Royce, 2007) in spite of the fact that they vary in terms of operation:

[...] features of meaning are shared among all modes—intensity, framing, foregrounding, highlighting, coherence and cohesion, forms of genre, etc.—even though they will differ from mode to mode. Intensity may be materialized as loudness in speech and as saturation in colour, or as thickness or bolding in writing or in image. (Kress, 2012, pp. 46–47)

The elements pertinent to one code may have their counterparts in other codes, which makes the investigation of such semantic relationships even more interesting an issue. There is a meaningful concept behind each decision concerning linguistic items and the elements of visual design in a multimodal message. Furthermore, there is a *sense-relation* (Halliday & Hasan, 1985; Cook, 2001; Royce, 2007) between different modes in such a piece of information: of repetition (R), when iteration takes place and meanings expressed by means of two (or more) codes echo each other; of either synonymy (S) or antonymy (A), with meaningful items expressed in different semiotic codes (similar or opposite in meaning, respectively); of hyponymy (H), that is, superordination or, in other words, “the classification of a general class of something and its subclasses” (Royce, 2007, p. 70), or of meronymy (M), which refers to constituent parts of a bigger whole (Halliday & Hasan, 1985; Royce, 2007); and of collocation (C), which rests on habitual juxtaposition or co-occurrence of particular items (Halliday, 1985; Royce, 2007). The sense-relations listed above may be generated by various modes and render the multimodal artefact coherent, both internally and externally, that is, as regards both structure of the message

(its physical form) and its context (its socioculturally dependent content) (cf. Van Leeuwen, 2005a; Bezemer & Kress, 2008).

In the light of these sense-relations and the aforementioned intersemiotic complementarity, it becomes apparent that multiple semiotic codes are able of joining forces, so to speak, and composing a structured multimodal matter that may be “read” as a whole. The idea of reading multimodal messages is not new (cf. Goddard, 1998) since to read is to “look at and comprehend the meaning [...] by mentally interpreting the characters or symbols of which it is composed” (Pearsall, 1998, p. 1543), and such an operation may be performed with regard to both written or printed letters and images. The action of reading entails the related notion of literacy, which may refer to decoding and interpreting the meanings included in both verbal and pictorial elements; therefore, the general “reading” proficiency, as regards multimodal communication, has to be seen as a correlative relationship between semiotics, multimodality, and the products of culture. Given the interrelatedness of elements within this complex meaning-making system, it seems that the visual culture “is a challenge to traditional notions of reading and literacy as such; it is as much a revolution in verbal culture as it is in the study of the visual image proper” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 300), and thus requires a multimodal approach to be adopted.

Just like any other type of multimodal message, an ad rests on the aforementioned interaction between the textual and the pictorial that supplies the perceiver with a new body of information that emerges from the intersection of modes (Mitchell, 2006). It thus comes as no surprise that advertisers decide to co-deploy modes in advertising messages, making use of all the advantages offered by multimodality and, quite often, opting for poster-like presentation of goods and services—with a large picture and short copy that have to be perceived as a whole. The question of multimodal advertising was addressed by Van Enschot, Hoeken, and Van Mulken (2008), Rossolatos (2013), Wojtaszek (2016), and Pérez-Sobrino (2016) with the aim of exploring the ways in which advertisers make use of “[...] the simultaneous orchestration of diverse presentational modes” (Bateman, 2008, p. 1) to achieve the best appealing results.

“To *write* what the image *shows* would take too much space, and [...] too much time to read” (Kress, 2012, p. 40); nonetheless, the text is usually needed for the image to be properly contextualised because the picture proper could simply fail to convey what it is supposed to unless supported with textual cues. This is particularly true when it comes to abstract pictures that contain metaphorical meanings, in which case the recipient

suspects that an image carries figurative content but wants to make sure by means of reading the copy or the headline (Caples, 1997). As stated by Barthes (1977), the signification of images in ads is intentional and designed for optimal reading by the audience. He explicitly points out that the text in an ad, usually labelled as caption, headline or copy, is a denoted hint that serves the attribution of meaning to the picture (cf. Dyer, 1982). In his writings, he claims that “anchorage is the most frequent function of the linguistic message” (Barthes, 1977, pp. 40–41), that is, that the verbal controls the way in which the image is read, hence indicating the meaning that should be ascribed to the pictorial.

Drawing on his concept of *anchoring*, Barthes (1977, pp. 38–41) says that the textual element in a multimodal ad, or any other multimodal artefact, serves as a hint that narrows the range of possible interpretations of the visual component and guides the comprehender. To be more specific, it frames the interpretations of the audience and, consequently, makes it possible for them to work out the meaning intended by the advertiser, thus preventing them from feeling lost in the bottomless well of potential meanings. Notwithstanding the fact that Barthes stresses the influence of the text on reading the image in a multimodal artefact, the impact may take the form of a two-way process as well, with the visual element specifying the meaning of polysemous verbal components. Moreover, since no message exists in a void, the effect of the cultural context on the final meaning is obviously to be taken into consideration because “such anchoring can also be achieved beyond the immediate co-text, by means of intertextuality” (Koller, 2009, p. 47). This anchoring through culture prevents the stream of connotations from flowing *ad infinitum* and helps to choose correct interpretations.

Verbal-visual juxtapositions, as “multimodal ensembles” (Kress, 2012, p. 41) typical of advertisements these days, constitute an ideal welding of the textual and visual, giving rise to what can be labelled as visual-verbal rhetorical figures, which have a two-way effect on each other. All in all, “a multimodal approach is not just the presence of different modalities [...], but also the interaction among modalities” (Rossolatos, 2013, p. 100). It is also worth mentioning that the layout structure within a multimodal artefact is far from being random; rather, it is functionally motivated, usually focusing on the communicative function performed (Hiippala, 2014, p. 120). For each stratum within the multimodal item, cognitive operations involved depend on the interaction between different modes and on the resultant interpretation of the receiver who makes sense of the

multimodal artefact. The mental process of understanding through various modes has to encompass multimodality in its entirety: the textual cannot be isolated from the pictures used or colour applied in an ad (Cook, 2001), just like moving images cannot be abstracted from music, speech, and dramatic action in films, as follows from the theory of the kineikonic mode (Burn & Parker, 2003). It follows then that if a multimodal message is to be understood properly, the elements belonging to the multimodal ensemble must be perceived as a whole for them to establish sense-relations, retain their meaningfulness (cf. Bateman, 2008), and guide the recipient through differently coded meaning paths simultaneously.

Speaking of paths, it is impossible not to mention reading paths (Kress, 2003; Royce, 2007; Hiippala, 2012), which are possible directions taken by human sight while interacting with a multimodal material that determine and order the way it is read. Multimodal artefacts are non-linear and multidimensional, which means that there is no fixed sequence of reading the content. The perceiver's eyes can move around the page in a manner that may be suggested by size or colour, which can make an element more salient on the page; yet reading paths will always be subject to individual interest and attention.

Additionally, it can be added that multimodal messages may be viewed through the lens of *narrativization* (Royce, 2007), that is, the production of multimodal narratives. The proposition that text and image constitute fragments of a broad-spectrum syntagm “realised at a higher level, that of the story” (Barthes, 1977, p. 41), was put forward as a result of an observation concerning the way in which the verbal and pictorial elements stand in a complementary relationship; a relationship which is capable of “telling” a complex story by means of various yet concurrent codes. Storytelling is a common technique in multimodal advertising discourse, especially when it comes to commercials, which can show the audience more pictures in rapid succession and, thus, convey more meanings. In the multimodal environment, multiple semiotic codes used in narratives serve as potent tools of persuasion owing to the enriching presence of trans-semiotic relations (Ventola, 1999; Hoffmann, 2010) that open up further opportunities for interesting and captivating storytelling.

In closing, let it be added that it is imperative to see that an ad is always set against the sociocultural context. Multimodal ads as such are very contextual (Cook, 2001), as they depend on the in-ad context, resulting from the cross-modal interaction on the structural plane, as well as on the context outside the ad, which interacts with its perceivers,

their surroundings, and other products of culture. This heavy dependence on the contextual factor naturally leads to the wide topic of understanding and communication in general, which will be outlined in the next chapter.

1.5 Summary

In the first chapter, consideration was given to advertising itself, to its definition, purposes, and operation. Given the focus of this volume, special attention was paid to print advertising. Then detailed discussion of the verbal, the visual, and the multimodal in ads followed, making it possible to understand the way in which various modalities may be applied in advertising messages to convey meanings effectively. Multimodality itself was described as the prominent feature of contemporary advertising and as the meeting point of the textual and the visual that creates “[...] a unique environment in which richer, more extensive and more attractive conceptual encoding becomes possible” (Wojtaszek, 2011a, p. 159). The following chapter offers brief yet valuable insights into the ways in which the relevance-theoretic perspective can be useful in explaining the workings of multimodal advertising discourse. It will zoom in on RT, laying emphasis on RT applied to visual and multimodal forms of communication, as well as on the Graded Salience Hypothesis.

Although this initial chapter does not exhaust all available approaches to the topics mentioned, it does provide a balanced and comprehensive overview of advertising perceived through the prism of communication studies—a prism allowing for the formation of a wide spectrum of topics that may be included under the umbrella term *advertising research*. Nowadays, this term has stopped referring only to the content of ads *per se* and can be extended to all the semantic, sociocultural, and pragmatic aspects of advertising.

Chapter 2

Relevance Theory in Visual and Multimodal Advertising

Human beings base their existence upon successful communication, which is why they are sensitive to any signals others may want to communicate in hope of finding out something that may be valuable, useful or beneficial and thus worthy of attention. Various kinds of signals (verbal, paraverbal, visual, or multimodal) are therefore conventionally treated as an “invitation to engage in communication” (Forceville, 2020, p. 60). Although Relevance Theory (henceforth RT), as conceived by Sperber and Wilson (1995), is predominantly concerned with face-to-face communication between two interlocutors, Forceville (2020) strongly asserts that it can accommodate visual and multimodal forms of mass communication, offering explanation as to the workings of advertising discourse. He claims that RT is crucial to understanding how the audience ends up entertaining the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs the advertising agency actually wanted to convey in the ad.

The paramount objective of this short albeit informative chapter is to synthesise the fundamental elements of the RT framework, as seen by Forceville (2020) in his latest book *Visual and Multimodal Communication. Applying the Relevance Principle*.

Notwithstanding the fact that the present volume takes a cognitive slant, it would not be right to disregard the basic principles of RT since a comprehensive account of communication processes would not be complete if not for the theory in question. Actually, cognitive linguistics and RT, though distinct and developed independently, are not entirely incompatible (Forceville, 2020). They may be seen as complementary and not mutually exclusive, which is by no means to imply that they are convergent or that they use the same set of methodological tools. On the contrary, their methodological individuality should be stressed at this point in the discussion so as to avoid misunderstandings. In this book, I will relate to the relevant-

theoretic perspective at various stages of discussion to provide a holistic outlook on the multimodal advertising discourse that uses metaphor and humour in tandem.

2.1 Basic Principles of Relevance Theory

To begin with, RT constitutes a framework for understanding the process of utterance interpretation put forward by Sperber and Wilson (1995). It should be mentioned that it was inspired by the works of Grice (1975, 1989) but I will not delve into the topic of the Gricean paradigm owing to the fact that the theory is relatively widely known. One point that should be made, though, is that the paramount objective of RT is to describe communication. That is to say, “it does not prescribe rules for its correct use. In this sense, RT differs from Grice’s cooperative principles, which are formulated in a ‘thou shalt (not) ...’ manner” (Forceville, 2020, p. 55). In this section, the focus is on the fundamentals of RT, which aims at explaining how people manage to understand each other in a conversation; how come they become aware that another person wants to initiate communication in the first place; and how they succeed in developing a decoded message into a relevant one.

Owing to the fact that Sperber and Wilson (1995) focus on face-to-face conversation, their examples mostly refer to verbal exchanges between Mary and Peter who probably know each other quite well and can therefore largely base their exchanges on information that is “mutually manifest,” as put by Sperber and Wilson. Not only do they rely on shared contextual information, but also on shared experiences from the past that condition their “cognitive environments” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 38), that is, “certain assumptions in the sum total of [...] knowledge, beliefs, and emotions” (Forceville, 2020, p. 39). These shared assumptions are presumed to be the common ground allowing for the construction and transmission of meanings through language. “Speakers must compose their language carefully, bearing interlocutor’s common ground in mind. Listeners, in turn, are required to consult common ground in their comprehension of that language” (Colston, 2019, p. 103) (for constructive suggestions on the improvement to the very conceptualisation of common ground see Colston (2019, pp. 118–125)). The communication process naturally requires two parties: the sender/addressor of the message and the addressee/audience. The former first needs to signal his “intention to inform the audience of [...]

[his] informative intention” (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 611) and overtly express an “intention to inform the audience of something” (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 611). These two types of addressor’s intention are known as communicative and informative intention, respectively, and are the *sine qua non* of ostensive-inferential communication. The audience, on the other hand, has to recognise the intention(s) of the sender in order for the communication act to be successful.

According to RT, people are inclined to search for meaning in everything that is communicated to them because they assume that the content conveyed may prove beneficial, useful, or valuable, that is, relevant and, therefore, worth their while. Sperber and Wilson claim that every person is capable of devoting attention to “the relevant stimulus and to process it in the most relevant way” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 11). They understand relevance itself as “a property of stimuli, for example, which are inputs to perceptual processes, or of assumptions, which are inputs to inferential processes” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 261). What is more, they say that each partner in the process of communication assumes the exchange to be as efficient as possible and hence expects that the other party in the conversation will be relevant.

The most vital and fundamental tenet of Relevance Theory is the fact that human cognition and communication are relevance-oriented, which means that people are “programmed” to process an input in the most valuable (relevant) way in order to entertain an array of cognitive effects at the lowest mental cost (effort). (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 9)

In other words, people are naturally sensitive to signals others may want to communicate, for they base on the assumption that every time something is communicated, it is to serve a particular communicative purpose. They therefore believe they should pay attention and look for information because the message conveyed is likely to be optimally relevant. The very formulation of the message, on the other hand, should not require too much cognitive effort for the information to be retrieved. “For a message to be relevant to a given addressee, that message must have a ‘positive cognitive effect’ in the cognitive environment of that addressee” (Forceville, 2020, p. 40), which means that the information conveyed should (a) make the addressee accept a new set of assumptions, (b) lead the addressee to either abandon or weaken the old ones, or, conversely, (c) strengthen the assumptions already entertained.

The degrees of relevance are directly proportional to the effect a given piece of information has on the cognitive environment of the addressee. The acceptance of the information by the addressee equals fulfilment of the informative intention expressed by the addressor of the message in the act of communication. Cognitive effects produced in the mind of the perceiver come at a price of mental effort which, for the message to be optimally relevant, should not be too hard. “The more mental effort an addressee must invest to recover a message’s effect, the less relevant it becomes. [...] In short, relevance arises from a balance between effect and effort” (Forceville, 2020, pp. 41–42).

As a cognitive pragmatics theory, [...] [RT] aims to analyse the inferences that the hearer makes when trying to identify the speaker’s communicative intentions based on what the speaker has coded [...], together with the predictions of relevance that speakers make when choosing an utterance or text for coding their thoughts and transferring them to other people. (Yus, 2016, p. 1)

The message is hence assumed to be coded in the most appropriate way possible in a given context. Being competent users of the same language, both interlocutors rely on the same set of vocabulary items and rules of grammar for the message to make sense; and being able to decode the message is the first step on the path of meaning interpretation (Forceville, 2020). Carston (2002) is of the opinion that the message is processed by the addressee and set against contextual circumstances in which the exchange takes place, resulting in “an output representation, which is the semantic representation, or logical form, of the sentence or phrase employed in the utterance” (Carston, 2002, p. 57). This leads to the creation of a “string of concepts, with certain logical and causal properties” (Carston, 2002, p. 57), which produce a template presenting a whole gamut of propositions, likened to slots to be filled. As Carston further explains, pragmatic inference is essential in order to develop this template into the proposition that the addressor of the message wanted to express.

Logical forms, then, are the output of linguistic decoding. The logical form of “he went to the bank” could be formulated as “some person(s) relocated [in a specific manner, using a specific mode of transport, under specific circumstances] [from a specific place] toward a specific place.” This is the “template” of which “he went to the bank” is one possible manifestation (“they moved to the mall” is another one).

In RT, it is crucial that the logical form is a “syntactically structured string of concepts with some slots, or free variables, indicating where certain contextual values (in the form of concepts) must be supplied” (Carston, 2002, p. 64, emphasis mine, ChF [i.e. Charles Forceville]). (Forceville, 2020, p. 43)

Such logical processing, based on the state of affairs, on how the world works, is an important aspect of interpretation. Once infused with additional, contextual information derived from other sources, a logical form becomes fully propositional, that is, represents “definite states of affairs [which] constitute the individual’s encyclopaedic knowledge, his overall representation of the world” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 73) or “the sum total of everything [...] [that] is true of the world and anything in it, and crucially informs all the decisions taken in interaction with that world” (Forceville, 2020, p. 44).

As regards the procedure of developing a decoded message into a relevant one thanks to the logical form, the addressee needs to engage in at least one of the following mental processes (though processing itself usually takes place in the blink of an eye). The first option is reference assignment, which “pertains to the clarification of what person, event, or action in the world is signalled by a given word or phrase” (Forceville, 2020, p. 44). The second one is based on disambiguation, that is, on the removal of uncertainty as to the meaning of an ambiguous or polysemous expression to find out which referent is actually meant. Lastly, there are enrichment procedures in the course of which information is supplemented with contextual data available to both interlocutors; such procedures consist in various inferential processes “required to complete the interpretation of semantically incomplete expressions, narrow the interpretation of vague expressions, and, more generally, enrich the linguistically encoded meaning to a point where the resulting overall interpretation would be relevant enough” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 256).

Once the procedures mentioned above have taken place, “the ostensive stimulus has been developed into a, possibly complete, logical form” (Forceville, 2020, p. 45). In Wilson and Sperber’s terms, an ostensive stimulus is a manifest act performed by the sender of the message that is designed in such a way so as to “attract an audience’s attention and focus it on the communicator’s meaning” (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 611). The rule of thumb is that once the addressee arrives at the conclusion that he identified as the correct interpretation of what was conveyed, he will stop further processing

in search for relevance. The information conveyed between the sender and the addressee may vary in explicitness, though. In RT, the sum total of all explicit information, which encompasses both “linguistically encoded and contextually inferred conceptual features” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 182), that can be derived on the basis of a particular utterance is known as *explicature*. In essence, “an assumption communicated by an utterance U is *explicit* if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 182). Thus, the more instrumental the role of contextual features, the less explicit the explicature.

RT posits that the communication process can work out because of shared background assumptions made by the addressor and the addressee. Since the latter is aware that the former conventionally aims at being optimally relevant, combining the information received from the sender with other, additional pieces of information (beyond the already identified explicature) is sometimes necessary to produce desired positive cognitive effects. When interlocutors base on inferences, founded upon both explicatures that follow from the message decoded and on contextual assumptions, we can speak of implicit information, termed *implicature* in RT. “Any assumption communicated, but not explicitly so, is implicitly communicated: it is an *implicature*. By this definition, ostensive stimuli which do not encode logical forms will, of course, only have implicatures” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 182).

Another handful of relevance-theoretic terminology should be introduced here to clarify the communication process in more detail. Implicated premises consist in the construction of “an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions” (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 615), whereas implicated conclusions, according to the creators of RT, are based on “constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (implicated conclusions)” (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 615). The reason why interlocutors in a given exchange are able to communicate successfully is that they share one context and, on top of that, know the rules of communication: they know that communication should be “geared towards the maximisation of relevance” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 11) and that it should lead to the activation of speaker-intended assumptions in the addressee. “Relevance increases with the useful implications for future behaviour that accepting the message brings with it, and it decreases with the amount of mental energy required to derive these useful implications” (Forceville, 2020, p. 61). It is hence possible for the addressee to assume that the sender of the message intends to be optimally relevant and,

furthermore, that the range of possible directions in search for positive cognitive effects must be narrowed in line with the contextual setting.

RT hence posits that when they communicate, people perform a kind of “mind-reading” to assess the accessibility of contextual information and predict inferential strategies (Yus, 2017). What they need to do is make predictions of relevance, optimise their messages to fit the common ground (bearing particular effects in mind), and “provide reasonable proportions of new information” (Colston, 2019, p. 104) at a relatively small cost, measured in terms of mental effort. Sometimes, however, the parties in the communication process “overestimate the clarity and effectiveness of their own utterances (Keysar & Henly, 2002)” (Colston, 2019, p. 105). According to Wu and Keysar (2007) and their knowledge overlap hypothesis, referred to in Colston (2019), “the more information interlocutors share, the more they will use their own knowledge in making references” (Colston, 2019, p. 105). As a rule, the lower the knowledge overlap, the more attention should be paid to common ground for the whole communication process to stay successful.

2.2 Relevance Theory and Visual/Multimodal Mass Communication

Although RT originally envisaged the prototype form of communication between two interlocutors, in his seminal work, Forceville (2020) claims it is possible for RT to be applied to mass communication and beyond language in its textual form, provided some of its central tenets are revisited. Firstly, there is a difference between being relevant to someone in face-to-face exchanges and in mass communication. In the latter case, Mary needs to be optimally relevant not only to Peter, but also to many other people who attend to the message at the same time, yet in a mediated, indirect way since they do not share the same spatio-temporal setting.

In visual and multimodal mass-communication, each individual in the mass-audience will process the stimulus in the context of his own personal knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and goals. Put differently, the shift from one-to-one to mass-communication does not affect the central RT tenet that relevance is always relevance to an individual. (Forceville, 2020, p. 111)

According to Forceville, regardless of its mass quality, multiple addressees recognise the attention-getting tools applied in a message as an attempt by

the sender to express communicative intention. In spite of the fact that the very conditions of access to information may differ from individual to individual, as a rule, the audience is aware that the information conveyed may carry potentially important meaning and, therefore, is received with presumption of optimal relevance irrespective of the number of addressees or the modalities used. “Human beings are constantly on the alert for any information” (Forceville, 2020, p. 71) so they assume that the message they attend to can help secure positive cognitive effects at low cost, measured in mental effort needed for the information to be retrieved. It can be said that people are “programmed” to be receptive to information, which applies to mass contexts too. Notwithstanding its mass quality, the sender of the message is capable of envisaging the collective image of the addressees, along with the outline of their encyclopaedic knowledge in their cognitive environment, and sometimes even with the general ideological, demographic, or psychographic characteristics of the audience (Forceville, 2020, p. 109; cf. Colston, 2019).

Parenthetically, it should be added that encyclopaedic information pertains to the pieces of knowledge in the perceiver’s cognitive environment, that is, to “folk and specialist assumptions, cultural beliefs and personal experience stored in the form of propositional representations, scenarios or scripts and mental images” (Solska, 2017) (these terms will be explained in more detail in the chapters to follow). Each message is checked against the encyclopaedic knowledge of the addressee and because of the fact that all people “think alike” in that they base on common patterns, usually experiential and mutually manifest for the members of the same socio-cultural context, the encoding of a message in mass communication becomes a bit easier. It would be unfeasible to produce a message taking into consideration innumerable cognitive environments of the members of the audience; instead, given the schematicity of human cognitive patterns, the sender can think of a prototypical cognitive environment of a typical member of the audience, as perceived by the addressor. Naturally, the sender “has only limited opportunities to control what implicatures are processed” (Forceville, 2020, p. 103) by mass audiences. Yet contextual cueing and the very form of the message can be helpful (and decisive) in narrowing the range of interpretations.

In his book, Forceville opines that communication works the same way irrespective of the medium, mode, or genre applied. He explains that “the principles of effect and effort apply in much the same way in visual communication as they do in face-to-face verbal communication, given that

any ostensive stimulus comes with the presumption of optimal relevance to the addressee” (Forceville, 2020, p. 73). If the stimulus takes the form of an image or a multimodal artefact, it is, respectively, either the visual or multimodal component that “provides the input to the comprehension process” (Pinar Sanz, 2013, p. 13). Hence, information (textual, visual, multimodal, or else) is understood on the basis of the same pattern that was first identified for verbal utterances by Sperber and Wilson. His argument runs as follows: “A communicator deploying visuals ostensively wants to inform an addressee or audience of something (and/or express an attitude, belief, or emotion vis-à-vis that information), and communicate this intention by any of a wide range of attention-grabbing devices” (Forceville, 2020, pp. 96–97).

The proposition, therefore, consists in accepting the fact that the notion of the “code” can be used with reference to linguistic utterances and the elements of visual stimuli alike; that they are subject to similar mechanisms of meaning making by way of “combining ostensive stimuli with ad hoc context, yielding implicatures as well as explicatures” (Forceville, 2020, p. 78). By nature, visuals do not have grammar or syntax in the sense that language has; yet Forceville claims that, just like the verbal mode, visual input conduces to the processes of:

- a) reference assignment (e.g., simplified images of people or things focus only on the most salient features thereof, which necessitates the adoption of references drawn from encyclopaedic knowledge),
- b) enrichment (e.g., if there are some intertextual references to be made so as to understand what is meant or if some elements are left out of the picture in order not to increase processing effort on the part of the audience, the addressees will simply add the missing parts and imagine the image as a whole thanks to the fact that it is available in their cognitive environment).

The aforementioned process of disambiguation, which is taken into account in the case of verbal messages, is excluded here because “the procedure of verbal ‘disambiguation’ does not have an equivalent in the sorting out of ostensive visuals that is distinct from reference assignment” (Forceville, 2020, p. 84). The context may be helpful in choosing between visual forms which may pertain to different notions, people, or things, though the possible “set of visuals” which may resemble each other is not limited, as it is the case with linguistic items. Hence, Forceville says, “visuals

are, in one way or another, incomplete and require that the addressee assign a referent to one or more of their elements” (Forceville, 2020, p. 97). This is easily done thanks to the addressee’s knowledge of standard scenarios.

After various enrichment procedures, [...] visuals can then give rise to explicatures and implicatures. But since visual elements do not have a syntax in the sense that languages have (and thereby can by definition not be ungrammatical), this claim can only be upheld if the term syntax is taken in the broader sense of a system regulating what counts as an acceptable structure governing the relations between elements or entities. (Forceville, 2020, p. 255)

2.3 Relevance Theory in Advertising—The Issue of Genre Attribution

In any concrete case to which it applies, relevance is what guides people through the maze of meanings, conveyed either verbally or pictorially, or even in a multimodal manner. While discussing the concept of being optimally relevant to mass audiences, it should also be stated that there is yet one decisive pragmatic factor which accounts for remarkably similar interpretations across members of the audience. It is connected with the idiosyncratic form of the message, captured by the notion of *genre*.

In his book, Forceville, after Neale (2000), uses this term in a broad sense to denote the general “kind” or “type” of a phenomenon (e.g., a text, film, multimodal artefact, etc.). What is more, while referring to Stöckl (2016), Forceville directs his attention to the fact that genre may be understood as a category characterised by specific design and patterns of production, along with certain expectations in terms of reception (Forceville, 2020, p. 118). This stance echoes Busse (2014) who says that “genres play a crucial role in the production and reception of meaning” (Busse, 2014, p. 116), thus being useful in establishing common ground between the addressor and the addressee(s). This is due to the fact that each genre provides “a historically specific pattern of organisation of semiotic material along a number of dimensions in a specific medium and in relation to particular types of situational constraints which help shape this pattern” (Frow, 2015, p. 80). Accordingly, Forceville asserts that genre is the governing force behind the interpretation of discourse, irrespective of coding.

Genre attribution takes place on the basis of certain familiar conventions shared within a given cultural community. Its members are able

to recognise these patterns and use them in interpretation. This process entails not only the form (i.e., the constitutive elements or building blocks that shape the genre itself), but also the functions of a given genre; for example, being familiar with advertising discourse, the audience conventionally expects that the message be aimed at promoting a product. In line with Forceville, “knowing, or thinking we know, the genre a visual or multimodal discourse belongs to activates expectations about how, on the basis of the genre conventions that we (hopefully) can recruit from our cognitive environment, this discourse purports to be relevant for us” (Forceville, 2020, p. 133). The role of situational context in the process of genre attribution is not to be underestimated either since the audience comes across a genre in specific circumstances; thus, the range of possible meanings that can be communicated explicitly or inferred from the discourse is also largely determined by the context.

Though Sperber and Wilson do not address the issue of genre (in fact, RT is criticised on these grounds by, *inter alia*, Frow (2015)), it may be owing to the fact that RT was originally focused solely on verbal exchanges between two interlocutors (Forceville, 2020). Despite this gap, the theory in question can and should be viewed as an important tool in answering the following questions voiced in the excerpt below:

The theory helps the analyst focus on the following issues: how do communicators attempt to attract a prospective audience’s attention, and when can they be said to have produced a positive cognitive effect or reward in that audience? What knowledge and beliefs does that audience need to (be able to) summon to arrive at the supposedly intended meaning? Which elements await reference assignment and/or enrichment? What is the role of the generic and institutional context in these procedures? What explicatures and implicatures should or can be derived from the text? How is the information divided over visuals and language? (Forceville, 2020, pp. 131–132)

Interpretation rests on the presumption of relevance; on the addressee’s fluent command of the codes used to construct the message; on his or her knowledge of the genre and its idiosyncrasies; on the arsenal of encyclopaedic knowledge at his disposal; as well as on proficiency in terms of reading “how people, objects, locations, time frames, events, and scenarios represented in the discourse resemble people, objects, locations, time frames, events, and scenarios in the ‘real’ world” (Forceville, 2020, p. 132).

In a way, this is tantamount to saying that genre attribution can be perceived as an act of categorisation, that is, the process of placing an element into a particular group or class of other similar things based on a specific set of criteria.

This point inevitably leads to the idea of prototypicality and to the prototype theory (Rosch, 1973, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), which is concerned with categorisation and concept formation. The kernel of this theory seems quite straightforward, as it holds that category membership rests on in-group resemblance, understood as closeness to the most typical member—a paragon called a prototype, that is, “a best or most typical example of the concept, sharing the maximum number of features or attributes with other instances and a minimum number with instances of other concepts” (Colman, 2008). According to this view, concepts do not have distinct boundaries; these are fuzzy and structured around “characteristic features rather than defining properties” (Colman, 2008).

An item that conforms to all of the criteria is a fully prototypical, exemplary specimen of the category; an item that fails one criterion is a less prototypical specimen; one that fails two criteria is even less typical, until it becomes debatable whether a specimen should be counted as belonging to the category at all. (Forceville, 2020, p. 126)

Reverting to the subject matter of genre attribution, though, little do we realise how crucial it is unless we start having doubts as regards its correct assessment. It is on the basis of textual, visual, multimodal, and contextual cues, as well as thanks to the information relating to fixed genre schemata which are present in our cognitive environment that we are able to ascribe a specific genre to a given type of discourse. Along the lines of RT, in mass communication, it is imperative for the sender of a message not to leave any room for doubt about the intended genre attribution, for this information is vital for the audience whose members search for relevance. Knowing the genre, the perceivers instinctively expect an advertising message to take a particular form, have certain communicative goals, and produce desirable outcomes. Thanks to these pieces of information, they can develop a decoded multimodal advertisement into a relevant message.

The audience realises that the message is intended to “trigger a positive cognitive effect or reward [...] and thus come with the presumption of relevance” (Forceville, 2020, p. 65); in the context of advertising discourse, a message produced for commercial purposes is therefore assumed to

pertain to the improvement of the consumers' knowledge of products or services promoted. Needless to say, the communicative, informative, and inherently persuasive intentions are not the only ones behind an ad, for an advertisement may as well entertain (of which more in the chapters to follow), build (or break) community ties, or serve as a way of artistic, political, or cultural expression, to name but a few. To cite Yus:

[...] there are myriad forms of cognitive satisfaction that may offset the effort involved in processing the information and that have often been dismissed, including a whole range of feelings, emotions, empathy, phatic connotations, community membership, socialization, etc. I group all of these 'alternative' sources of user satisfaction under the generic label of *cognitive rewards*. (Yus, 2011, p. 65)

Heavy emphasis is consequently put on cognitive satisfaction, that is, not only on the perceiver's expectations about the exchange itself, but also on the fulfilment of emotional or social needs and the pleasure derived from the said fulfilment. Accordingly, Forceville claims that the very notion of positive cognitive effect should be broadened and thus viewed as a "positive emotional effect" (Forceville, 2020, p. 57, after Wharton & Strey, 2019, p. 261) to capture both the "cerebral" and "emotive" functions of a message. This point seems especially valid in the case of advertising discourse, which is rarely neutral; apart from information, it carries value judgements, emotions, and attitudes which help to frame a given message and ascribe meanings to particular stimuli or parts thereof.

When applied to advertising discourse, RT may offer valuable insights into the process of marketing communication because it deals with exerting specific effects and producing relevant meanings at a rather small cost in time and energy required for processing effort.

In relevance theory terms, communication is successful only when (a) it attracts the attention of the target audience, (b) it indicates that the speaker wishes to convey a message of interest to the hearer, (c) the audience recognizes the speaker's informative intention and finds it worthwhile to make the effort to understand what the speaker intends to tell them, and (d) the message received by the hearer is as close as possible to what the speaker has in mind. A successful process of advertising communication meets all these requirements. (Xu & Zhou, 2013, p. 494)

Given the aforementioned, the interpretation of ads within the relevance-theoretic framework proves instructive when it comes to understanding the process of conveying meanings in ads (which is performed by the addressor) and assigning meanings to ads (which is done by the addressee(s)). Once the audience is presented with an ad, their attention is turned to what they see, read, or hear, as they become busy searching for optimal relevance. Since they know that the advertiser's message is purposeful by genre and convention alone and that he surely wants to convey something, they engage in the interpretation process to uncover intended meanings. The message "comes with the presumption of optimal relevance" (Forceville, 2020, p. 73) so each ad carries a promise of relevance, suggesting that it provides "some relevant information which will make the audience's effort worthwhile" (Xu & Zhou, 2013, p. 495). The effort the audience invests is thus expected to result in some kind of a reward upon the construction of the dynamic context and completion of the process; in consequence, the said process should be made attractive enough to result in a "positive emotional effect" (Forceville, 2020, p. 57, after Wharton & Strey, 2019, p. 261), for example, thanks to the use of figurative expressions, puns, witty contrasts, or word puzzles (Tanaka, 1996; Stwora, 2017). It should nevertheless be remembered that "an optimally relevant message [...] strikes a good balance between sparking beneficial insights or emotions and requiring the investment of mental energy" (Forceville, 2020, p. 61). If this balance is upset, the ad may easily fall short of the mark.

All in all, the abovementioned considerations show that studies into relevance are of high importance since they explain how the process of understanding works and how the addressor's intentions are recognised by the audience. In the ensuing chapter, the importance of RT will surface once again in the context of figurative language comprehension, showing that the interface between pragmatic and cognitive approaches may possibly lead to useful cross-fertilization among research fields.

2.4 Summary

All things considered, because of "constant selection pressures toward increasing efficiency" (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 610) in proper functioning of a society whose members need to exchange thoughts and ideas to live and thrive, the significance of RT in the human cognitive system and communication is a fact to be reckoned with. Though the processes

captured by RT are spontaneous and instinctive, they are no less important to understanding how people communicate successfully. As stated by the authors of the theory themselves:

[...] [O]ur perceptual mechanisms tend automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive way. (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 610)

Perception and selection of relevant stimuli, checked against human cognitive environment (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 38), leads to the activation and processing of possibly relevant assumptions. As posited by Forceville (2020), whether the stimulus itself takes verbal, visual or multimodal form is immaterial. So is the difference between one-to-one and one-to-many communication, on condition that some of RT's central tenets are expanded and revisited so as to accommodate visual and multimodal forms of mass communication. After all, the theory is flexible enough to allow for such expansion, as explained in this chapter.

A piece of information is relevant insofar that it incurs a pertinent positive cognitive effect at a rather small cost. Because human minds are "programmed" to look for relevance in what is communicated, it is assumed that the addressor purposefully gives clues to the addressee(s) as to the meaning intended. Such clues are held in the form and content alike, which is to say that apart from what is conveyed, it is correct genre attribution that is a prerequisite for proper understanding; in other words, discourse type influences the audience's understanding of the communicator's intention. What is more, since "cognition is geared to the maximisation of relevance" (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 610; cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1995), it can be expected that what is communicated will be relatively easy to understand by the perceiver and take neither too much time nor cognitive effort. This aspect will be referred to and elaborated on in the following chapters devoted to metaphor and humour in advertising. To my mind, RT and its far-reaching changes introduced by Forceville (2020) may be extremely helpful in discussing humorous metaphorical advertising discourse and its perception by the audience. This is due to the fact that they may serve as an explanation as to why not all possible covert senses are accessed and why some implicatures effectively block further inferencing processes in specific communicative contexts (Wojtaszek, 2002).

From the observations herein presented, it can be concluded that RT is considered an essentially pragmatic framework for utterance interpretation in terms of relevance (Bosco, 2006) but, as revealed in the following chapter, it is versatile enough to assist in explaining the workings of figurative language too. As postulated by, *inter alia*, Colston (2019) and Forceville (2020), the paradigm of conceptual blending theory used in tandem with RT is indispensable to proper analysis of visuals and multimodal discourse, which, in a sense, renders the two theories complementary. While they should not be mixed, and it is imperative to keep in mind that they represent distinct standpoints and were developed independently, together they surely paint a more holistic picture of the communication process.

Chapter 3

Advertising and the Power of the Figurative

In the previous chapter, I have drawn upon existing research into advertising and communication to provide an accurate description of both marketing and meaning-making processes. Yet, in order to understand the operation of the figurative in communication and in advertising in particular, a wider cognitive perspective must be brought to bear on the process of the creative construction and interpretation of meanings embraced in ads. The figurative, that is, what departs from standard, literal use and expresses something in terms which normally denote something else, informs every aspect of human communication, as it is woven into the fabric of both everyday tête-à-têtes and official speeches, manifesting itself in metaphors, metonymies, synecdoches, “idioms, proverbs, poetry, polysemy, and other linguistic phenomena [which] are grounded in nonlinguistic conceptual mappings” (Katz, 1998, p. 29).

In essence, figurativeness is all about how people perceive the world and how they draw analogies between things in order to understand the surrounding world and abstract concepts as well (Bralczyk, 2000, p. 48). “The ability to coin and use metaphors is an innate skill of all humans, no matter how much intelligence or erudition they may have” (Danesi, 2008, p. 93). So, although not every language user is able to discuss figurativeness at the elemental conceptual level, all or at least most of them can readily create and understand figurative expressions, which testifies to the fact that figurative devices are not only a matter of decorativeness limited to poetry, but rather that they are ubiquitous means of understanding, expression, and conceptualisation (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980; Katz, 1998; Kövecses, 2010). Albeit often associated with a decorative ploy used in poetry or rhetoric, metaphor is not to be viewed as an exclusively embellishing device that deviates from the norm for the sake of originality. On the contrary,

it should be studied as a communication strategy used to convey abstract concepts in a more comprehensible or attractive manner (cf. Danesi, 2008). Metaphor is there for us to help to grapple with abstract notions in the best way possible, that is, through concrete ones, so as to facilitate knowledge acquisition, enhance comprehension (cf. Richards, 1936/1965), and render the message more interesting to the audience.

As can be easily inferred from these introductory paragraphs, it is the relationship between advertising and metaphor that will constitute the sole focus of this chapter. Starting with the very definition of metaphor, I will centre on Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). She will limit herself to pointing out to several important aspects which can be helpful in the analysis of the advertising material included in the analytic part of this book. It should be clarified that the taxonomy of metaphor will not be discussed here for the purpose of conciseness (for a more detailed account of taxonomisation of metaphors and the identification procedure for metaphorical expressions see, for example, Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Steen, 1999; Crisp, Heywood, & Steen, 2002; Kövecses, 2010; Nordquist, 2013, 2018).

In the final sections of this chapter, various aspects of metaphoricality in advertising discourse will be outlined to show the ways in which the figurative is handled in advertising and from the standpoint of RT as well. In fact, metaphor suffuses the system of advertising communication since it constitutes a potent rhetorical device that frequently attracts the prospects' attention, which is done thanks to its breaking or exploiting language rules and juxtaposing various concepts (Dyer, 1982; Sopory & Dillard, 2002).

3.1 A Few Words on Metaphor

The paramount objective of the cognitive paradigm is to study the hallmarks of cognitive linguistics, that is, metaphors, which are understood “as reflections of general conceptual systems, psychological processing mechanisms, and specific patterns of bodily experience” (Gibbs, 2015, p. 168) that manifest themselves in communication (cf. Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980). In fact, it is metaphor that offers answers to a host of problems concerning cognitive representations and the power of the figurative, which reveal “important insights into people’s common metaphoric conceptions of various, mostly abstract, topics” (Gibbs, 2015, p. 168).

First of all, I should provide an actual definition of *metaphor*, as it is given in several random dictionary entries. It is “(1) a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable [or] (2) a thing regarded as representative or symbolic of something else” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.). It may also be described as “(1) a word or phrase that means one thing and is used for referring to another thing in order to emphasise their similar qualities [or as] (2) something that is intended to represent another situation or idea” (*Macmillan Dictionary* n.d.). Likewise, the definition in question may be phrased in yet another manner: a metaphor is “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest likeness or analogy between them” (*Merriam-Webster Dictionary* n.d.).

It seems that the explanations listed above differ slightly and, concurrently, overlap to some extent, for each highlights different aspects of the metaphorical. These range from a figurative departure from the literal and standard use to symbolic representation; from cross-domain reference to emphasis placed on shared qualities being the core of a metaphor *per se*; and from the ideational and abstract to more concrete representation created on the basis of implied resemblance. The overreaching thread that may be observed here is the idea of *meaning transference*, which is corroborated by the linguistic origin of the term discussed that dates back to ancient Greece (*meta* “beyond” + *pherein* “to carry” = *metapherein* “to transfer”) (cf. Danesi, 2008, p. 92; *Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.).

From the vantage point of linguistic research, metaphor rests on semantic similarity between the elements involved, namely, between the source or vehicle, whose attributes are mapped onto the target, and the target that is usually more abstract or less accessible a notion which is linked to something familiar or concrete (Danesi, 2008). “The mechanism here is that an equivalent for a large and diffused area of meaning can be found in another (more concrete and well-compartmentalised) semantic area” (Johansen & Larsen, 2002, p. 41). Such a partial meaning relationship, according to Peirce (1982), testifies to the fact that the source and target domain are signs in nature—signs “in which the representative character of the first sign is expressed by the second sign” (Johansen & Larsen, 2002, p. 40), to be precise. The recurring themes of likeness, comparison, and analogy in terms of meaning relationship are echoed in the following excerpt from Dynel as well:

Metaphor is an inexplicit comparison of two seemingly unrelated concepts, one familiar and one unfamiliar, as a result of which features of the unknown one are revealed by analogy. [...] Therefore, the source and the target manifest common features/attributes, which constitute the relational basis [...] [for] the emergent meaning. However, besides the similarity evoked, there will always be residual dissimilarity between the tenor and the vehicle. This dissimilarity is dubbed “tension” (Tourangeau & Sternberg, 1982) [...]. (Dynel, 2009, pp. 29–30)

Owing to this tension resulting from residual dissimilarity, we can speak of selectivity as regards mapping of a given conceptual structure from one domain onto another; this is due to the fact that it is never the whole domain but rather one or several of its constituent conceptual elements that are being mapped (Kövecses, 2010; cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980). Metaphor thus proves that it is not only linguistic, but also conceptual a phenomenon. Following the line of thought offered by Lakoff (1993), “metaphor should be understood as a property of our conceptual systems, not as a property of language *per se*” (Katz, 1998, p. 4). And this conceptual dimension is the basic underpinning of understanding since it allows for coherent organisation of experience thanks to its highlighting systematic, fixed correspondences between the source and target domains.

I will not be going very deep into details of the cognitivist paradigm proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (2003/1980), for it is relatively widely known. However, some general remarks on metaphoricity should be made by way of an introduction. Based on the Aristotelian dichotomy between abstract and concrete concepts that come together in metaphorical expressions, it was Richards who posited that meanings produced by metaphors result from the perceived interaction “[...] between the abstract topic of the metaphor (LIFE IN LIFE IS A STAGE) and its concrete vehicle (STAGE IN LIFE IS A STAGE)” (Danesi, 2008, p. 97). This ensues from people’s feeling that the two happen to share some properties and that they can somehow be experienced in a similar fashion, thus constituting the *ground of the metaphor* (Richards, 1936/1965), that is, “the common area of meaning shared by the topic and the vehicle in the mind of the speaker” (Danesi, 2008, p. 97). This may also be referred to as *tertium comparationis*, that is, the third part of the comparison that constitutes the common ground between the concepts, provided that they have at least one quality in common. Basically, “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing

in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980, p. 6). Nevertheless, the meaning operations that take place in a metaphor do not simply rest on substitution or “juxtapositions of referents not normally associated” (Mac Cormac, 1990, p. 1), but rather on conceptualisation, which points to the conclusion that, in Lakoffian theory, we deal with what is labelled as *conceptual metaphors*. These are

[...] fundamental tools which human beings use day after day to conceptualise and categorise certain “less clearly delineated” parts of their world picture in terms of “more clearly delineated” parts, a certain operation of projection, or mapping between two “somethings.” (Krikmann, 2009, pp. 19–20)

To precise the notion of conceptual metaphor, it may be useful to cite Kövecses as well:

In the cognitive-linguistic view, metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain. [...] A convenient shorthand way of capturing this view of metaphor is the following: CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN A IS CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN B, which is what is called a conceptual metaphor. (Kövecses, 2010, p. 4)

In this light, it can be said that each conceptual metaphor requires the presence of two domains known as the source and the target, that is, the one from which the metaphorical mapping is drawn and the other which is mapped in accordance with the pattern derived from the source. The cognitive theory of metaphor assumes that the source domain is familiar, more concrete, and well-structured a concept, usually referring straightforwardly to real experience, whereas the target one is in need of structure owing to its being more abstract or unfamiliar to the perceiver. What is more, conceptual metaphor is not only about understanding one domain in terms of another, but also about the way people think about things in general and about how they map the qualities selected from the semantic vehicle to the tenor according to a certain pattern. The very existence of this pattern, which may be referred to as common conceptual framework (or network), points out to the presence of a systematic and relatively well-fixed set of correspondences which exist between the elements of the domains in question. They help to determine which elements or portions of the conceptual network (co-)occur most frequently or, in other

words, “which sources are employed most commonly to understand which common targets” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 17; cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980).

Thus, the framework imposed by the source is transferred onto the target to a limited extent, focusing solely on the aspects relevant to and consistent with the metaphor constructed, disregarding any “residual dissimilarity between the tenor and the vehicle” (Dyner, 2009, p. 30) which does not fit and is simply irrelevant. Such an operation of highlighting or hiding certain aspects of the domains entering the metaphor is essential for the proper creation of the metaphorical structure, for metaphor is anchored in perceived similarity between the domains (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980). The source-target pairing is therefore subject to a restricted set of mappings that either come to prominence or remain hidden to the perceiver, in line with the requirements posed by a given metaphorical situation.

Despite their fixedness, conceptual patterns are still flexible enough to allow for the creation of other metaphorical expressions that may seem novel to the perceiver owing to ingenious juxtapositions of domains. Nonetheless, the way in which people structure their experience actually boils down to several recurring domains the perceiver can draw from; these generally seem to prove the importance of bodily experience, natural environment or man-made objects as points of reference. Having surveyed a substantial number of source and target domains, Kövecses lists the following common domains:

These source domains include the HUMAN BODY, HEALTH AND ILLNESS, ANIMALS, MACHINES AND TOOLS, BUILDINGS AND CONSTRUCTION, PLANTS, GAMES AND SPORT, COOKING AND FOOD, MONEY AND ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS, FORCES, LIGHT AND DARKNESS, HEAT AND COLD, and MOVEMENT AND DIRECTION. The common targets include EMOTION, DESIRE, MORALITY, THOUGHT, SOCIETY, RELIGION, POLITICS, ECONOMY, HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS, COMMUNICATION, EVENTS AND ACTIONS, TIME, and LIFE AND DEATH. The target domains fall into such higher groups as psychological and mental states and events, social groups and processes, and personal experiences. (Kövecses, 2010, p. 28)

His findings, which resurface in numerous case studies on conceptualisations (Jäkel, 2003; Stwora, 2018a), confirm the unidirectional nature of conceptual metaphors that typically go from concrete to abstract domains and usually not the other way round (although, naturally, there are certain cases in which the source domain is as abstract as the target itself, as in LIFE IS A POSSIBILITY or LIFE IS A COMPROMISE that appear in Kövecses (2005)). In

this way, conceptual metaphors serve the purpose of understanding more complex or intangible concepts thanks to the attribution of *emergent properties*; “these are properties which are neither standardly associated with the individual constituents of the utterance in isolation nor derivable by standard rules of semantic composition” (Wilson & Carston, 2008, p. 1).

Thus, what happens in a metaphor is not only a clash of domains brought together on the basis of structural similarity or substitution of one domain of experience with another; rather, more often than not, metaphor leads to the emergence of features not explicitly present in any of the domains which enter the metaphorical. It is therefore conducive to the *ad hoc* appearance of the third, common, yet independent space and, thus, a novel property that emerges when the component objects are joined together in a metaphor (Gineste, Indurkha, & Scart, 2000). This point will be elaborated on in the section devoted to the conceptual blending theory put forward by Fauconnier and Turner (2002).

3.2 Considerations Related to Mental Spaces

Another paradigm shift in cognitive theory can be contributed to Fauconnier who came up with the theory of idealised cognitive models known as *mental spaces*, which are seen as “active mental representations consisting of self-contained ‘packets’ of information” (Grady, 2005, p. 1597; cf. Fauconnier, 1994). In other words, by mental spaces he/she means temporary conceptual constructs built up as discourse unfolds (Evans & Green, 2006), which refer to “a small, bundled array of related mental elements that a person activates simultaneously” (Turner, 2015, p. 212) in metaphorical thinking.

What Fauconnier attempts to convey is that schematic mappings operate so as to construct and link mental spaces, which are temporary, “partial structures that proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning of our discourse and knowledge structures” (Fauconnier, 1997, p. 11). They are therefore different from conceptual domains described beforehand in that they are constantly constructed online when people communicate, as a result of linguistic information and current context that trigger a far more complex meaning operation than the bundles of pairwise bindings would ever do (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008). In such cases, situation modes activate, forming short-term mental models or representations of what is actually cognitively happening in a specific context (Colston, 2018).

According to this theory, what people actually do when they communicate is set up mental spaces since “language, along with other aspects of expression and contextual framing, serves as a powerful means of prompting dynamic on-line constructions of meaning that go far beyond anything explicitly provided by the lexical and grammatical forms” (Fauconnier, 1998, p. 251). Mental spaces can therefore be likened to conceptual packets that serve the purpose of understanding thought and discourse as they unfold; what is more, they map onto each other in the course of dynamic metaphorical processing, most often going unnoticed by the language speakers due to their unconscious character. That is why Fauconnier (1998) says they are responsible for what he/she calls “backstage cognition,” that is, for the workings of various online understandings and cognitive processes that work in concert with language as people think or speak but remain hidden from any conscious thought. Naturally, the term language used herein should be understood as referring to both linguistic expressions and non-linguistic or multimodal elements that have saliency in a given context (Fauconnier, 1997).

This approach to meaning construction assumes that mental spaces are connected with each other in a network called *mental web*. Since it is not possible for a language user or perceiver to hold all the spaces active in his mind simultaneously, he/she focuses on one or another space in the mental web but the very existence of the network enables him/her to shift between spaces freely (Turner, 2015). Cognately, “recently activated mental spaces remain latent and are easier to activate” (Turner, 2015, p. 212) as a result of available conceptual connections such as inference, reference or structure projection, which are established within the web to link constructed mental spaces (Nolan, 2001). Trans-spatial connections are made thanks to a set of vital relations, which encompass “time, space, identity, change, cause-effect, part-whole, analogy, disanalogy, representation, property, similarity, category, intentionality, and uniqueness” (Turner, 2015, p. 212), and even that of counterfactuality, for instance. These vital relations specify the properties assigned to the elements contained within mental spaces.

As such, mental spaces are regulated by existing knowledge structures in the form of frames and idealised cognitive models (ICMs) (Evans & Green, 2006). While the former notion stands for an underlying conceptual structure which provides “the abstract-induced schemas that drive mappings across mental spaces” (Nolan, 2001, p. 29), the latter depends on the assumption that there exist conceptual structures which organise human knowledge in an idealised manner. It basically means that they

involve abstraction and simplification; that they provide the shortest ways of structuring mental spaces, which may depart from the objective state of affairs in the world but, at the same time, are able of imparting organising structures through the creation of conceptual categories (cf. Lakoff, 1987; Cienki, 2010).

It is important to note, though, that “the ICMs themselves are not entities in the mental spaces. They provide relational structure linking the roles, that is, are entities in the spaces” (Nolan, 2001, p. 22). It can therefore be said that they provide a conceptual framework to be filled in with potentially relevant details, as can be seen on the example of certain verbal formulas that typically introduce a story and thus invoke the “storytelling ICM” that makes it possible to construct relevant mental spaces and, consequently, helps to understand the story itself (Lakoff, 1987, pp. 281–282; Cienki, 2010). The propositional structure of idealised cognitive models may vary, as posited by Lakoff who names several kinds of ICMs, among which we can find simple propositions (such as negations, quantifications or conjunctions), feature bundles (i.e., specific categories or collections of properties), as well as scenarios (or scripts), to name but a few. It is beyond the ambit of this unit to deal with all of them since they are not relevant to the pending discussion. I will therefore briefly mention only the notions of scenarios and scripts (which will be used interchangeably in this volume) because they will be of interest in the subsequent chapter.

A *metaphorical scenario* refers to rudimentary mental representations of particular situations (Semino, 2008; Colston, 2018); an idealised cognitive model structured according to a scenario will imply an outline or postulated sequence of events, that is, it will presuppose an initial and final state, as well as a chain of events between these two points. En passant, within the framework provided by some conceptual metaphor theorists, a potentially relevant issue of *embodied simulations* (ES) can be mentioned, in which “sensory and motor neural programs are run in an AS IF ACTUALLY HAPPENING mode” (Colston, 2018). It means that they are mental processes responsible for conceptual imitation of a situation or process as a result of simulating the metaphorical experience thanks to the power of the perceiver’s mind (including memories of certain experiences) and his previous interaction with the world. “Embodied simulations enable people to project themselves into the minds and actions of others, including the objects or event referred to” (Gibbs, 2017, p. 233) since, as Bergen (2012) contends, human brains are capable of altering, moulding, and adjusting mental networks, thus engaging in a creative process of constructing mental worlds

which are perfect simulations of the states, actions or phenomena construed. This process is obviously constrained by embodied experience and contextual or discursive immersion, which determine the way of grasping the concept contained in a given metaphor (cf. Gibbs & Colston, 2012, p. 225).

Embodied simulations can be compared to mental scripts that also serve as “additional resolution simulations” (Colston, 2018), which are activated while thinking in figurative terms. In this context, we can surely think of Schank and Abelson’s (1997/1977) example of the “restaurant script” as a scenario-based ICM which specifies the set of events that habitually take place once people visit a restaurant, along with the setting, objects, and behaviours typically involved (Cienki, 2010). Looking at yet another example, that is, that of a “battle scenario,” for instance, we can see that there is a certain fixed chain of events, that the situation involves two (or more) parties, and that it implies struggle and winning or losing. In general, scenarios are rather narrow as opposed to conceptual domains. The former “include narrative, argumentative, and evaluative frame aspects, which suggest a specific, pragmatically loaded perspective for inferences about the target topic” (Musolff, 2016, p. 64); the latter, on the other hand, are much broader and richer mental representations that provide people with background knowledge necessary for understanding various experiences (e.g., consider a BATTLE scenario and the conceptual domain of WAR) (cf. Semino, 2008).

These examples constitute a perfect illustration of the workings of frames or models that refer to vital knowledge structures and hence serve as information background for interpreting meanings, both metaphorical and literal. A related subject worth mentioning in this context is that of *image schemas* which may be defined as “embodied pre-linguistic structures of experience, together with their extensions, driven by conceptual metaphor mappings” (Žyško, 2017, p. 83) or as deeply-rooted and “largely unconscious mental outlines of recurrent shapes, actions, dimensions, and so on that derive from perception and sensation” (Danesi, 2008, p. 102). They provide language users with usually unconscious but dynamic and, most importantly, recurring patterns of “perceptual interactions and motor programs” (Johnson, 1987, p. xiv), which are responsible for structuring human experience and making it coherent. Parenthetically, it should be stressed that “the scopes of terms such as *frame*, *schema*, and *script* overlap enormously and many analysts treat them as interchangeable (e.g. Tannen, 1993)” (Yus, 2016, p. 120).

Yule (2011/1996), on the other hand, sees them as similar structures that, nonetheless, differ in that *schemata* are the most general cognitive patterns based on pre-existing knowledge structures and *frames* are more fixed, static patterns to the schemata; “a frame shared by everyone within a social group would be something like a prototypical version” (Yule, 2011/1996, pp. 85–86), that is, a general concept people have in their minds, which is relatively stable among the perceivers. Last but not least, according to Yule, *scripts* are considered to be pre-existing knowledge structures that involve event sequences, which makes them more dynamic types of schemata, on the basis of which people recognise the expected sequences of actions in particular situations. “For example, we have scripts for what normally happens in all kinds of events, such as going to a doctor’s office, a movie theatre, a restaurant, or a grocery store” (Yule, 2011/1996, p. 86).

Simply put, these “schematic constructs impose conceptualisations of experience that function as simplistic and formulaic patterns arising from imagistic domains” (Stwora, 2018a, p. 103; cf. Lakoff, 1987; Croft & Curse, 2004); they are therefore major structuring forces when it comes to the construction of ICMs (Lakoff, 1987; Cienki, 2010). Contemporary studies in metaphor centre on the mental networks and structures upon which the examples of metaphorical language forms depend. These include:

- a) frames and scenarios,
- b) metaphor as an elaborate structuring of conceptual networks via partial correspondences underlying semantic-pragmatic organisation and its expression through language,
- c) the account of presupposition in terms of discourse worlds linked to each other,
- d) the treatment of “scopal” phenomena, like opacity and transparency, as referential correspondence between concrete or mental images. (Nolan, 2001, p. 32)

In sum, this section reviewed some of the most important tenets of the theory of mental spaces, as expounded by Fauconnier and his followers. The application of such a viewpoint made it possible to unmask the width and depth of the metaphorical by virtue of the fact that, as cognitive structures, mental spaces are much wider and richer than domains in that they entail idealised cognitive models, frames, and/or scenarios which structure their operation in terms of figurative communication and thinking.

Now considered the forerunner of the conceptual integration theory, the theory of mental spaces has not only created the theoretical underpinnings of the architecture of mental space constructions *per se*, but also led to the idea that perhaps the “conceptual projection from one mental space to another involves projection to middle spaces” (Nolan, 2001, p. 58). Such a stand was soon adopted by conceptual blending theorists who opt for the multi-space model of thought, which can be likened to a conceptual network (Kövecses, 2010).

3.3 Deliberations on Conceptual Blending Theory

In this section, the main spotlight is given to *conceptual integration* or, in other words, to *conceptual blending*, which was developed to explain the process of “online meaning construction” (Coulson & Oakley, 2000, p. 175; Brône, 2017). The modern account of the conceptual blending theory as we know it was introduced by Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002). Their findings correspond to the already adumbrated model by Fauconnier (1994), except for the institution of four instead of two mental spaces in order to explicate the cognitive processes better.

As follows from Figure 1, the input spaces A and B roughly correspond to the source and target domain; yet, while domains were governed by directionality, leading to mappings from the source to the target domain, they failed to explain the emergence of related concepts which appear in the course of processing and understanding the metaphor, as they were present in neither of the domains involved but still perceptible to the comprehender’s mind. In a nutshell, the cognitive-linguistic approach “assumes that multiple mental spaces can participate in a mapping, compared to the two-space or two-domain models in conceptual metaphor theory” (Gibbs, 2015, p. 170; cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner, 2015).




FIGURE 1. The Conceptual Integration Network (Adapted from Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 46 and redesigned by A. Stwora)

That is why Fauconnier and Turner propose the introduction of the third space they call the *blend*. It is created online and combines vital elements and relations which belong to both input spaces with its own structure responsible for the overall, blended sense. Three general remarks should be made in this context. Firstly, for the emergence of the blend, there must be a set of mappings that characterise the relationship between the two input spaces which share a particular structure. Secondly, the blended space is bound to inherit its structure from both the source and target input. And finally, the interaction or even clash of the elements present in the inputs leads to the projection of yet another set of meanings, which results from the said clash, to the blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Kövecses, 2005). The emergent structure in the blend is thus created owing to the unique combination of the input spaces plus the blend itself (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). It should be added here that basic for the conceptual integration theory is the notion of projection, which assumes that the elements and relations that enter the blend are always partial and selective (Turner, 2015).

The *generic* level, on the other hand, constitutes the fourth space that “is a schematic representation of structure common to all spaces” (Kyratzis, 2003, p. 5), which makes the creation of metaphor possible thanks to the similarity found in each mental space involved. As such, “the generic space contains the abstract structure taken as applying to both input spaces” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 271), thus allowing for the creation of metaphorical

mappings between the source and target. What happens in the process discussed is the emergence of a network of mental spaces whose conceptual fusion allows for the creation of a metaphor. Such an integrative approach to cognition requires the network to be inherently multidirectional, since transference is made between all the spaces involved for the concepts to be “put together in the right relation” (Weaver, 2013, p. 157). While the generic provides a basic schema for the operation of the whole metaphor and while the input spaces are populated by rather elementary conceptual domains, the blend is more sophisticated a space that can actually feed fantasy and provoke other related thoughts (Krikmann, 2009), thus acting as a vehicle for communicating additional meanings outside the source-target frame. As such, there are two major goals behind the introduction of the blend:

1. To make the model reflect online processes of understanding and using metaphors in actual communication (see e.g. Katz et al., 1998, p. 163);
2. To distinguish more clearly the “domain-bound” and “propositional” aspects of metaphor, to relate purely cognitive aspects of metaphor (embodiment, conceptuality) with their linguistic manifestations, which were regarded as quite irrelevant in the former Lakoffian theory. (Krikmann, 2009, p. 29)

Having pinned down the principal objectives of the conceptual blending theory and the theoretical model itself, it becomes apparent that the advances in the theory of metaphor allowed for transition from a simple, two-domain model to a more complex one, which consists of the elements of both inputs and the emergent elements as well. As noted before in this chapter, emergent properties are not mere combinations of input spaces (Gineste, Indurkha, & Scart, 2000; Romero & Soria, 2014) but sprout from the blend, that is, from “a new mental space that contains some elements from different mental spaces in a mental web but that develops new meaning of its own that is not drawn from those spaces” (Turner, 2015, p. 212). Blending is hence a complex mental operation that simultaneously inherits from each input space involved and “develops emergent content of its own, which arises from the juxtaposition of elements from the inputs” (Gibbs, 2015, p. 171).

Pertinent to the issue of conceptual integration, or blending, are those of compression and expansion. Owing to the fact that the blend does not

constitute “[...] a small abstraction of the mental spaces it blends and is not a partial cut-and-paste assembly either, because it contains emergent ideas” (Turner, 2015, p. 214), it involves the two processes in question. Thanks to compression, information contained in the blend is reduced in volume, so to speak, for it constitutes a compressed version of what we could find in the vast mental web it serves; yet this compression can be unpacked and used effectively so as to refer the perceiver to the whole mental web of associated notions, concepts, and relations which are necessary for comprehension (cf. Turner, 2015). The process of decompression, or expansion, hence makes it possible to draw other mental connections and elaborate integration networks. “For example, a cause-effect relation connecting different mental spaces in the network may be compressed into a representation relation or an identity relation within the integration network” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 54).

As noted earlier, the blending theory “[...] usually treats metaphors as analogical mappings” (Grady, 2005, p. 1596; cf. Coulson, 2000; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), which means that the connection between the input mental spaces rests on some kind of likeness or, alternatively, on various templates for blending stored in memory, which manifest themselves in cognitive frames or idealised models (cf. Kövecses, 2005). The cognitive link between the two, relevant, and, most importantly, shared features of the input spaces provides the basis for the counterpart connection(s) between the inputs, thus producing a blended conceptualisation that is the reflection of shared attributes. Except for associations “between distinct mental representations that remind us of one another because they strike us as similar in some way” (Grady, 2005, p. 1597), the role of stored patterns that underlie conceptual integration processes should be acknowledged. These assure the conventionalisation of the links within the integration network, which leads to the emergence of recurring patterns responsible for the metaphor system itself. Naturally, there do occur patterns based neither on analogy, nor on any easily traceable cause-and-effect relations, and these are captured by Grady’s (2005) theory of basic mappings termed as *primary metaphors*. In his works, he presents primary metaphors as foundational inputs to conceptual integration, that is, he argues that there are some “[...] ‘ready-made’ connections, i.e. entrenched metaphoric correspondences between concepts, that provide the basis for the real-time construction of metaphoric blends” (Grady, 2005, p. 1595).

These are conceptual associations which create the illusion of similarity—it is easy to lose sight of the fact that coldness and lack of emotion, for example, are fundamentally different and incommensurable, just as height and quantity are. The associations in our experience are so strong that the aloofness of a group of people is felt to be similar to the coldness of a glacier unless we focus consciously on the relationship between them. People “just do” think in terms of such metaphoric patterns and the blends which build upon them. (Grady, 2005, p. 1613)

What follows from the above formulation is that, in the case of primary metaphors, likeness between domains is illusive since the two inputs simply cannot be judged by the same standards. Nonetheless, such incommensurability should not be understood as a reflection of erring in metaphor construction but rather as a proof that there are certain unmotivated relations, in which fundamental perceptual concepts are mapped onto other, equally fundamental, yet not directly perceptual ones (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Grady, 2010).

Existing literature on the subject says that some primary metaphors seem more motivated than others. For instance, difficulty and heaviness are often paired in primary metaphors since, as Grady (2005, 2010) explains, people usually associate manipulating heavy objects with strain and effort. Likewise, happiness and brightness also go hand in hand in the figurative, perhaps owing to the fact that human beings prefer sunshine to darkness, as daylight makes them feel safer and more in control. In order for these metaphoric conceptualisations to arise, there had to appear certain “metaphoric counterpart connections” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 47), which are the products of conceptual integration. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find any experiential correlations that would readily explain the pairing of theories and buildings, for example. The same holds true for the primary metaphor MORE IS UP by Lakoff and Johnson (1999), which maps a set of basic perceptual concepts onto another equally fundamental and equally abstract perceptual one (Grady, 2005, 2010).

Following these examples, it can be said that the central claim made by Grady, marking his approach as distinct from earlier works in the field of conceptual metaphor theory, is that the structure projection between spaces does not always involve mapping from concrete to abstract concepts (Evans & Green, 2006). “Instead, Grady argues that the distinction between target and source relates to degree of subjectivity rather than how

clearly delineated or how abstract a concept is” (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 304). He furthermore places emphasis on the unidirectionality of primary metaphorical patterns, exemplifying his point with the primary metaphor SUCCESS IS A FORWARD MOTION (Grady, 2010), which shows that the concept of success can be thought of as motion forward but there is no way the relation could work the other way round, for forward motion is not usually conceived as success. To conclude this point, primary source concepts frequently apply to sensory-perceptual or sensorimotor experience, and therein lies the impact of Grady’s works, whereas the target ones tend to “[...] relate to subjective responses to sensory-perceptual experience” (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 305; Semino, 2008).

To sum up, seen as an organising frame of great importance, conceptual blending theory is particularly revealing because it aims at explaining the cognitive grounding of metaphorical communication. Having replaced the two-domain model developed by conceptual metaphor theorists with a network model, the approach proposed by Fauconnier and Turner accounts for several key aspects of online understanding previously neglected by researchers in the field (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002; Kövecses, 2010). Not only does it add the generic and the blend to the model of mental spaces, but also introduces the perceiver to the world of complicated networks and properties that emerge in the metaphorical, showing him the processes behind the creation of online mental networks and active mental representations.

As seen through the lens of the blending framework, the figurative complexity and creativity brought about by the conceptual integration theory opens up more possibilities concerning the construction of the metaphorical, which go beyond the unidirectional nature of conceptual metaphors. As parenthetically noted in the section devoted to conceptual metaphors, there are certain marginal instances of metaphors in which both the source and the target are quite abstract (Kövecses (2005) and his examples: LIFE IS A POSSIBILITY OR LIFE IS A COMPROMISE). What such domains share is not only the generic-level structure, but also actual (or perceived) shared features that form a solid basis for a creative metaphor.

The recognition of such real or perceived common features can contribute to the creation of a substantial number of novel metaphors (Kövecses, 2005). One more advantage of the network model outlined herein boils down to better understanding of metaphorical structures through making metaphor analyses more refined, systematic, and precise. The application of the multi-space model makes it possible to understand how human con-

ceptual system operates in general, “how it projects elements from one to another, how it fuses two domains into one, how it builds up new domains from existing ones” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 267). It therefore offers crucial insights into the operation of metaphors in practice, opening the perceiver’s eyes to the world of complex mental networks of features and meanings which structure human perception, thinking, and communication.

Lastly, in their discussion on conceptual integration, Fauconnier and Turner (2002) additionally provided several optimality principles responsible for the effective production of blends. These, however, will not be described here for the reasons of conciseness. Suffice to say that the general cognitive processes of composition, completion, and elaboration can be further explained by the principles of unpacking, metonymic tightening, pattern completion, the intensification of vital relations, or the one of relevance, to name but a few. For a more elaborated description see Fauconnier and Turner (2002), Libura (2007), and Ginter (2009) who explore the topic in more detail.

3.4 Identifying Metaphoric Language

Notwithstanding the foregoing, identifying metaphoric language itself may prove a little bit problematic. By way of example, “primary metaphors based on correlations in experience often do not strike us as metaphorical in nature at all” (Kövecses, 2005, p. 267), so it becomes difficult to trace their metaphorical roots. As a rule, metaphor gains currency when it captures the fancy of a substantial number of people for a longer period of time (Danesi, 2008) but some metaphors tend to congeal and hence lose their charming peculiarity and perceived metaphoricity, becoming clichéd and worn out, so to speak, because of repeated usage. Once a metaphor becomes heavily conventionalised, it turns out to be so common to the users that it is perceived to have lost at least part of its genuine metaphorical nature (Dyer, 1982; Świątek, 1995; Romero & Soria, 1998; Danesi, 2008). That is why, in this context, we can speak of “lexicalised metaphors” (Romero & Soria, 1998) which are noticeable no more in daily language and, consequently, are classified either as *dead* (or *stock*) *metaphors* or as mere instances of polysemy (Gibbs, 2015).

Some figurative or rhetorical expressions have passed into daily use and, as a result, are less surprising and memorable. We all accept that

expressions like “musical taste,” “I’ll eat my words,” or “chewing over an idea” are not to be taken too literally; we interpret them in a figurative sense. They are examples of *metaphor*, where a word acceptable in one context (e.g. “eat” in the context of food) is transferred to another context. Eating words is an absurd proposition unless we interpret the phrase in a figurative, non-literal way. Interpreted figuratively, this metaphor suggests the right kind of association: eating–swallowing–taking in–taking back–retracting. In other words, we see a symbolic identity or connection between the literal and figurative meaning of a word. (Dyer, 1982, p. 121)

This symbolic connection, however, is not straightforwardly perceptible to the user anymore, unless he really ponders over the actual components that form a given expression. This is due to the fact that, as a result of the gradual process of conventionalisation of certain expressions that have initially been semantically deviant, people start to treat certain metaphors as if they were plain, literal phrases, since their original, metaphorical source has been soaked up by everyday communication, often coinciding with idiomatic expressions (Lakoff, 1987; Mac Cormac, 1990; Dynel, 2009). “Metaphors serve as catalysts for linguistic change; the metaphors of one generation become banal expressions of another generation” (Mac Cormac, 1990, p. 16). Accordingly, when people stop conceiving of some figurative expressions in metaphorical terms, such metaphors just die quietly, becoming parts of ordinary speech, no longer considered surprising or unusual. By way of example, consider the sentence: “I see what you mean,” which reflects the fact that people actually became so used to conceptualising understanding in terms of seeing that they ceased to perceive this conceptualisation as figurative. “Metaphor may hence be conventionalised to the degree that it becomes part of the language code, at least as this is reflected in cultural repositories such as dictionaries and grammars” (Steen, 2007, p. 10).

The question concerning dead metaphors has received considerable attention of both theoretical and empirical nature but, as may be expected, there is no lack of disagreement when it comes to the character of the said death. “Determining whether a given metaphor is dead or just unconsciously conventional is not always an easy matter” (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 130; cf. Maliszewski, 2018). While the researchers referred to in the previous paragraph focus on the processes of demetaphorization and literalisation that come with the death of the figurative, Lakoff and

Johnson (2003/1980) opt for a different view, as they redefine the notion of metaphor's death itself. They argue that metaphor's fixed place in language does not make it less alive. On the contrary, they claim that as long as a metaphor combines two different referents providing people with somehow transformed meanings and concepts, we cannot deny its figurative nature, no matter how conventionalised it could be. Inasmuch as the interaction between the domains is possible to be traced, an expression remains metaphorical.

In contrast, *creative* or *novel metaphors* are founded upon inventiveness and freshness which usually takes place when a person “juxtaposes conceptual referents never before combined, producing both a semantic anomaly and a new conceptual insight” (Mac Cormac, 1990, p. 136). Their creativity lies in their being deviant and parasitic upon standard language use which, by definition, testifies to their creative nature (Ortony, 1993, p. 2). Such metaphors are therefore “non-existent in semantic memory and are unlikely to fit any pre-established source-to-target mappings” (Dyner, 2009, p. 30), although they do consist of elaborations, instantiations or compositions of conventional conceptual metaphors (Tendahl, 2009; Gibbs, 2015; Urquidi, 2015). “Innovation creates new meaning but creative figurative language must also recruit conventional elements into meaning construction” (Urquidi, 2015, p. 219); however, there is processing variance in understanding conventionalised figurative and novel meanings since “the former tends to be processed as a comparison [and] the latter as more abstract categorization” (Urquidi, 2015, p. 219), with any conventional elements functioning as generic content in novel blends resulting from generic integration (Urquidi, 2015). Naturally, creative metaphors entail more conceptual effort on the part of the perceiver since they are contingent on active creation and comprehension which offer new ways of perception that may often surprise language users by their strangeness. The aptness of a metaphorical expression is said to correlate positively with the dissimilitude between the domains (Tourangeau & Sternberg, 1982).

In the production of metaphor, we always deal with selective conceptual projection, which means that “each source is associated with a main meaning focus (or foci), and it is this that determines what gets mapped from the source; items outside the main meaning focus do not get mapped onto the target” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 307). Nonetheless, it does not mean that people cannot map things differently and thus create novel metaphorical expressions. The novelty and surprisingness of a given metaphorical concept

makes the perceiver reflect on its meaning, as it compels him to start pondering over its sense and, also, to fill in “knowledge gaps” in a creative fashion (Danesi, 2008). A particularly important source of creativity in the use of metaphors comes with real discourse and, more precisely, with the way in which it shapes communication. Several contextual and discursive aspects are responsible for the production of unconventional, novel metaphors, among which we can enumerate “(1) the immediate linguistic context itself, (2) what we know about the major entities participating in the discourse, (3) the physical setting, (4) the social setting, and (5) the immediate cultural context” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 292). These (and several other) factors condition the use, production, and reception of both creative and dead metaphors.

Given the abovementioned, the existence of highly conventional, dead metaphors raises several questions about the identification of figurative expressions themselves. How is the perceiver supposed to know whether a given expression is (still) metaphorical? How does he arrive at the conclusion that his assumptions concerning its metaphoricity are correct? Is there any line between dead and fresh metaphors? If yes, who draws the line? From this point, questions radiate in all directions. Addressing the first two questions posed above, Kövecses (2010) and Gibbs (2015) opt for the metaphor identification procedure (MIP) outlined below:

1. Read the entire text-discourse to establish a general understanding of the meaning.
2. Determine the lexical units in the text-discourse:
3. (a) For each lexical unit in the text, establish its meaning in context, that is, how it applies to an entity, relation, or attribute in the situation evoked by the text (contextual meaning). Take into account what comes before and after the lexical unit.
(b) For each lexical unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the one in the given context. For our purposes, basic meanings tend to be
 - more concrete (what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, smell, and taste),
 - related to bodily action,
 - more precise (as opposed to vague),
 - historically older.

Basic meanings are not necessarily the most frequent meanings of the lexical unit.

- (c) If the lexical unit has a more basic current, contemporary meaning in other contexts than the given context, decide whether the contextual meaning contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison with it.
4. If yes, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical. (Pragglejaz Group, 2007, p. 3)

Following the line of thought offered by the Pragglejaz Group (2007) (i.e., an international team of metaphor researchers interested in devising a reliable method for metaphor identification in discourse), to identify metaphors effectively in a given discourse, the perceiver has to first consider the overall discursive context and understand it. Then, it is essential to recognise and decide about the boundaries of the units of meaning, along with their (inter-)relations. Parenthetically, it should be added that although the Pragglejaz Group centred on metaphors found in texts and hence was talking about lexical units, the method they propose may actually be extrapolated to visual and multimodal metaphors. This is due to the fact that the units in question can be treated as semantic units, since the lexical ones are actually words or chains thereof and should be understood as the elements responsible for conveying specific meanings; in the context of this book, these units will therefore refer to textual, pictorial, and multimodal instantiations alike.

Upon the establishment of contextual meaning, the division into concrete and abstract senses follows, helping to establish the boundary between plain and figurative meanings in a given context and in other contexts as well. Finding indirect meanings thus rests on deciding “whether the basic meaning of the word is sufficiently distinct from the contextual meaning [...] [and] whether the contextual meaning of the word can be related to the more basic meaning by some form of similarity” (Steen, 2007, p. 12).

Some cognitive linguists tried to look for other criteria of identification when it comes to the figurative, such as the criterion of indirectness, for instance; yet indirectness itself is not sufficient a condition upon which the perceiver can classify something as metaphorical. Likewise, “finding metaphor in discourse is not just a matter of identifying metaphorically used words but also of identifying their related conceptual structures” (Steen, 2007, p. 16). Faced with the fundamental problem of moving from the metaphorical expression (i.e., the linguistic form of metaphor) to its actual conceptual structure, Steen (1999, 2007) put forward the procedure for the conceptual analysis of metaphor described below:

1. Find the metaphorical focus.
2. Find the metaphorical proposition.
3. Find the metaphorical comparison.
4. Find the metaphorical analogy.
5. Find the metaphorical mapping. (Steen, 2007, p. 16)

The first step involves finding metaphor-related units and “terms which express the focus, vehicle, or source domain of the metaphor” (Steen, 2007, p. 17; cf. Gibbs, 2015), which is achieved by finding those units which seem somehow indirect, incoherent or incongruous in the context provided (Cameron, 2003; Charteris-Black, 2004). These units will be labelled as metaphorical if they can be integrated into the overall sense of discourse through drawing comparisons or showing similarities that result in the resolution of the incongruity. Citing Steen, the second stage is about “the transformation of the linguistic expressions of the text into conceptual structures in the form of a series of propositions” (2007, p. 17). It means that various possible scenarios of conceptual skeletons are created in the perceiver’s mind. Then follows the identification of open comparison and analogical structures (Steen, 2007):

The third step transforms the single proposition with concepts from two distinct domains derived in step 2 into an open comparison between two incomplete propositions which each pertain to another conceptual domain. This can be done because we assume that there is some form of cross-domain mapping between the two conceptual domains framing the two sets of concepts distinguished in steps 1 and 2. Step 3 makes this explicit. (Steen, 2007, p. 18)

Consequently, the third stage highlights corresponding and/or dissimilar elements in order to align the domains contrasted. It can be said that the method thus accounts for the indirect, contextual meaning which is analysed thanks to the identification of contrasts and resemblances between basic meanings and the meanings found in a given context. This, in turn, is done thanks to cross-domain mappings, on the basis of which it is possible to draw inferences that can help to pinpoint the figurative meaning. Finding metaphorical analogies is the fourth step that partially elaborates on the third one but, at the same time, requires the addition of “new conceptual substance to the mapping between the two domains in order to make the mapping complete” (Steen, 2007, p. 18).

Finally, in the fifth step, there comes the resultant metaphorical mapping that makes the picture clear enough for the perceiver to see all the correspondences that, until this very stage, remained in the background of the analogy drawn. Implicit relevant elements of one schema are projected onto implicit elements of the other, thus testifying to the fact that a given expression, picture or multimodal artefact is actually metaphorical in nature, for it substantially enriches the semantic content derived. Notwithstanding, the most amazing thing is that the procedure described above is so automatic to human minds that people do not think of all these steps in the process of comprehension, as their minds are specialised in the creation of conceptual worlds.

There obviously are other issues that also need to be commented on at this point, for instance, the question about the line between fresh and dead metaphors. The systematic procedure for the identification of metaphorical units in discourse encapsulated in the MIP may come in handy but it does not dispel all doubts connected with metaphoricity. In terms of cognitive linguistics, semantics can be seen as a branch concerned with meaning which is based on the subjective instead of the objective understanding of meanings and perception of reality (Lakoff, 1987; Fauconnier, 1994; Jaszczolt, 2006). The feeling about the actual freshness or staleness of a given metaphorical expression is hence contingent upon the audience and context factors.

Metaphoricity may really be a matter of cognitive activation for specific individuals in particular moments of speaking and listening [...] (Müller, 2008). For example, people may use so-called dead metaphors, but still give evidence of having vital metaphorical knowledge motivating a word's or phrase's use in context. (Gibbs, 2015, p. 174)

Any judgment as to the metaphor's being creative or dead cannot be reliably formed by just looking at the discursive context but will always involve the audience factor too. A wide collection of semantic universals can be traced, yet much depends on the perceiver himself (Kövecses, 2005). Over time, even the most innovative and creative metaphors may undergo eventual lexicalization and thus enter the language system as conventionalised entries in everyday dictionaries of language users. Suffice to say that, in all cases, it is the context and audience factors that condition whether a given metaphor is perceived as novel or not.

3.5 Verbal, Visual, and Multimodal Metaphor in Advertising

The premise that guides semiotic analysis is that the signification systems created by advertising are, more often than not, reflective of innate structures in the sensory, emotional, and intellectual composition of the human body and the human psyche. This would explain why the forms of expression that advertising creates, and to which people respond instinctively the world over, are perceived as being so appealing. (Beasley & Danesi, 2002, p. 27)

As posited by numerous researchers in the field, “metaphors gain their full value when they occur in real discourse” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 14; cf. Semino, 2008). The following discussion will thus centre on existing literature concerning verbal, visual, and multimodal metaphors in the discourse of advertising. These are treated as hooks to make the audience interested and such “hooks can be the prelude to a more cognitive appeal, where the brain is engaged in working out a puzzle” (Goddard, 1998, p. 108). The rationale behind the communicative complexity of ads and their metaphoricity is that they should attract consumers’ attention through their originality, that is, through a game of meanings played by the advertiser and the audience (cf. Bralczyk, 2000).

Faced with attractive, engaging, and cognitively appealing content, the audience is “more likely to adopt a favourable attitude towards the product or service on offer once it appreciates the ad’s ingenuity and deviation from the norm” (Stwora, 2020a, p. 135). Such a claim is also found in Wojtaszek (2002), who says that one way of eliciting desired reactions from the prospects is through defamiliarisation of the advertising message: “[T]he world of advertising must be very surprising for the audience in order to maintain its saliency, and this can be achieved by constantly new combinations of entities and contexts” (p. 158). “Upon understanding the addressor’s intention behind the advertising message, the recipient is satisfied to notice the figurative-literal friction and comes to perceive himself as special, intelligent, or even as one of a few individuals to have solved the puzzle, which makes him feel the chosen one” (Gajewska, 2011, p. 128; cf. Lewiński, 1999, trans. A.S.). The perceiver’s satisfaction with his successful reasoning makes him content and the time expended on solving the puzzle can contribute to better ad recall (Tanaka, 1996), thus possibly influencing his future purchase decisions, brand loyalty, product and/or brand recall, etc.

The element of surprise, puzzle or artful deviation in advertising is frequently realised through metaphor so, in the light of the foregoing, it comes as no surprise that advertising agencies use metaphorical messages to boost their attractiveness. Metaphors are known to elicit more cognitive elaboration than straightforward claims (Toncar & Munch, 2001) and that is why they are widely used in advertising discourse to convey more associations than a literal message would. Also, “the purpose of any advertising campaign is to make the target audience remember the transmitted message, which will eventually change the consumer’s buying habits due to the impact the advertisement has on their thinking, feelings, and behaviour” (Skorupa & Dubovičienė, 2015, p. 109). Metaphor should therefore be perceived as a tool that helps to establish good rapport with the prospects who, thanks to the interpretation of the figurative, play the game of meanings and may remember the positive image of the brand which stands out from the information clutter (Stwora, 2017, p. 126). The role of metaphor in advertising does not end here, though, because metaphorical figures may be based on artful deviation and/or cross-domain comparison (Phillips & McQuarrie, 2009, p. 49).

The latter is a potent persuasive tool, for the cognitive processing of information in ads that contain metaphors involves projecting the characteristics of something (or someone) onto the product featured. Cross-domain comparisons make the audience draw inferences from advertisements as to the products’ attributes (Tanaka, 1994, p. 90) owing to the cognitive networks created in the process of understanding metaphorical meanings therein contained. Although both representation and activation of metaphorical senses in ads may prove risky, since some receivers may miscomprehend incomplete product claims, advertisers seem willing to accept that risk (cf. Toncar & Munch, 2001). That is because “an advertising metaphor is a persuasive device that hides as well as reveals” (Velasco-Sacristán & Fuertes-Olivera, 2006, p. 1984) so while some features are highlighted, others are left unsaid or uninferred, which is convenient for the advertiser who can emphasise the advantages of his product or service in an expedient manner.

3.5.1 Verbal Metaphor in Advertising

In view of the foregoing, this part moves on to consider previous research on verbal advertising discourse which employs the figurative. “An appropriately selected metaphor may work wonders in promoting the sale of an

item” (Kövecses, 2005, p. 171), which explains the continuing presence of metaphors in advertising (for the works on textual metaphor in ads following the A IS B format see: Cook, 2001; Díaz-Pérez, 2000; Dyer, 1982; Goddard, 1998; Hitchon, 1991; Katrandjiev, Velinov, & Radova, 2016; Kelly, 2016; Kövecses, 2005; O’Shaughnessy & O’Shaughnessy, 2004; Shan Ahmad, Abid, & Iqbal, 2016; Skorupa & Dubovičienė, 2015; Świątek, 1995; Tanaka, 1996; Tuan, 2010; Velasco-Sacristán & Fuertes-Olivera, 2006; Vestergaard & Schrøder, 1985; Widerski, 2016).

“Metaphoric expressions have been most exhaustively studied in the verbal mode, i.e., as surface-level linguistic expressions of metaphorically structured mental models” (Koller, 2009, p. 46). The study into the instances of metaphorical expressions found in ads centres either on specific examples of the figurative which appear at the textual level (as in, e.g., Kövecses (2005), Świątek (1995) or Velasco-Sacristán & Fuertes-Olivera (2006)) or on strictly semiotic approaches that deal with the relationship between an in-ad sign and its object or referent (as in Vestergaard & Schrøder (1985), for instance). The relevance-theoretic perspective (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) to the study of metaphors in advertising discourse has resulted in numerous contributions by Tanaka (1996) and Díaz-Pérez (2000), to name but a few dealing with this specific standpoint. The linguistic approach to metaphor in advertising, on the other hand, is favoured by such researchers as Świątek (1995) and Kövecses (2005), and is particularly common when it comes to the analyses of metaphors used in slogans (cf. Dyer, 1982; Goddard, 1998; Hitchon, 1991; Katrandjiev, Velinov, & Radova, 2016; Kelly, 2016; Shan Ahmad, Abid, & Iqbal, 2016; Skorupa & Dubovičienė, 2015). The list of works provided in this section is by no means exhaustive but, to my mind, constitutes a fine exemplification of research in the area discussed.

Usually, scholars interested in verbal metaphor in advertising aim at investigating conventional metaphors put into body copy or heading and the one that has primacy is connected with personification. For example, in his article, Świątek (1995) features various manifestations of the metaphor COMMODITIES/PRODUCTS ARE PEOPLE/ACTIVE AGENTS. He also identifies an emotion-laden metaphor PRODUCTS ARE FAMILIES (GROUPS OF PEOPLE) (Świątek, 1995, p. 68), which finds corroboration in Kövecses (2005), who says that the goods promoted are frequently presented as family members or friends; this, in turn, evokes specific attitudes and feelings in people, which can result in building positive brand attitudes. Such examples are widespread in the analyses of the textual, metaphorical layer in advertising, just like the metaphor PRODUCTS ARE PEOPLE ACTING TOWARDS THE USER (Świątek, 1995, p. 66).

This one is crucial due to its persuasive appeal which makes the audience feel that the products are destined to help them in some way and hence make their lives better. Thanks to personification, “people and objects can become interchangeable” (Dyer, 1982, p. 92; cf. Goddard, 1998), as in the slogan “The Pepsi generation.” The intention of each ad designer is to make his message communicate the advantages coming with the product or service offered and metaphor can effectively do it through the attribution of specific features associated with a person or thing onto the goods advertised.

Hitchon (1991) posits that metaphor in slogans is a persuasive tool, performing better than factual, literal claims. This line of thought is supported by McQuarrie and Phillips (2005), and by Sopory and Dillard (2002) in their article on persuasive effects of metaphor, which says that the advantages of metaphor over literal language include: “(a) pleasure or relief, (b) communicator credibility, (c) reduced counterarguments, (d) resource matching, (e) stimulated elaboration, and (f) superior organization” (Sopory & Dillard, 2002, p. 382). First of all, metaphors evince semantic anomalies which are simply more cognitively engaging than literal claims. “The reward of pleasure [...] leads to reinforcement of the metaphorical meaning and the evaluation associated with it” (Sopory & Dillard, 2002, p. 385). What is more, the ads that make use of the metaphorical are judged more favourably by the audience (Bowers & Osborn, 1966) since, as a result of being coupled with augmented processing effort necessary to comprehend the figurative, message recipients are less likely to raise counterarguments.

As regards the resource matching view (Jaffe, 1988), the process of “deriving meaning from a metaphorical expression demands cognitive elaboration (Ortony, 1979), which ensures a better integration of (high quality) message arguments in memory and ultimately a greater persuasion relative to the literal message” (Sopory & Dillard, 2002, p. 386). Being responsible for forming specific associations between the pieces of new information encountered and prior knowledge, cognitive elaboration in the metaphorical carries one more advantage over literal language, for it evokes more associations in semantic memory. Lastly, owing to its regular pattern, metaphor enriches the general organisation of the message because it puts message claims in order by linking the features of one domain with the other in an orderly manner, that is, by triggering relevant semantic associations brought about by the source and transferring them *en bloc* to the target.

These are only several benefits which can be gained from the incorporation of metaphors into advertising discourse. Perhaps the most important, though, is the one related to the operation of the metaphorical *per se*, for it allows for the conceptual integration of the product realm with the semantic pool of values, emotions, and features. The mental image of a product or service, once metaphorised, changes for the perceiver because it acquires new, appealing characteristics. Moreover, metaphors applied in ads are always used in such a way so as to boost the product's image because "the features mapped from source to target are positive ones (unless the metaphor is used to disqualify a competitor's brand, in which case the mapped features are typically negative)" (Forceville, 2009, p. 33).

To sum up this point, in his deliberations on the language of advertising, Cook (2001) refers to its metaphorical aspect and comes up with an idea which bears a striking resemblance to the theory of conceptual blending. He basically says that advertising is founded upon metaphor, for it is the metaphorical that makes it possible to form an association between the product featured in an ad and another object, quality or emotion. He discusses this process in terms of a "fusion" or "marriage" between two different "spheres" (Cook, 2001), which can relate to both verbal and visual instantiations of metaphor in ads.

3.5.2 Visual Metaphor in Advertising

Metaphors are capable of mapping experience between the linguistic and non-linguistic realm, as well as between two non-linguistic realms, as in the case of visual metaphors. Technological development in computer graphics has strongly influenced current media trends which gravitate towards visuality, as testified by the visual turn in advertising discourse (studied by, *inter alia*, Berger, 2011; DeRosia, 2008; Forceville, 1996, 2008; Ivković, 2011; Lagerwerf & Meijers, 2008; Maalej, 2001; McQuarrie & Mick, 1992, 2003a, 2003b; McQuarrie & Phillips, 2005, 2008; Phillips, 1997, 2003; Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004; Schroeder, 2002; Scott, 1994; Stwora, 2019a; Yu, 2009; Yus, 2009; Vahid & Esmae'li, 2012; Williamson, 1978).

Logically, metaphorical targets in visual ads often coincide with the products promoted and are depicted therein as concrete objects: "[A] beer brand is depicted as a wine; an elegant watch as a butterfly, a close-fitting bathing suit as a dolphin's tight and supple skin (examples from Forceville, 1996)" (Forceville, 2009, p. 28). The claim made by Yus (2009) is that "[...] processing visual metaphors does not differ substantially from processing

verbal metaphors, the main difference being the way in which the input is transferred to the central inferential processor” (Yus, 2009, p. 153). While exploring figurativeness and pictoriality in ads, we can also come to the conclusion that “visual contextualisation facilitates the understanding of verbal metaphors” (Baran, 2013 p. 56; cf. Lakoff, 1987; Forceville, 1996).

Interpreting visual metaphors does not differ substantially from verbal metaphor comprehension. Both kinds of metaphor are “decoded” by a specialized mental module (Fodor, 1983) which delivers schematic information that has to be enriched inferentially in order to obtain the intended interpretation (an optimally relevant one) [...]. (Yus, 2009, pp. 167–168)

Again, the pragmatic principle of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) plays a decisive role in arriving at the interpretation of the metaphor itself (Forceville, 1996, 2009; Yus, 2009), for it is relevant similarity between the domains depicted that makes the whole message work. Recapitulating the arguments of Relevance Theory, comprehension follows two stages:

- i. Following a path of least effort, test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, enrichments, implicatures) in order of accessibility.
- ii. Stop when the interpretation satisfies the current expectation of relevance. (Yus, 2009, p. 148)

Upon encountering a visual (or any other) ad, the audience will be testing various interpretive hypotheses in their minds, according to the pattern outlined above, until they arrive at the most relevant meaning that matches the communicative situation. It is also to be remembered that each ad is comprehended against a broader context provided by the ad itself, by other advertising messages, by the prospects’ previous encounters with the brand or product on offer, and by their knowledge about the surrounding world as well. These furnish the audience with many contextual details needed to understand the message properly, mediate the relationship between the message and the world, and hence evoke mental representations (cf. Coulson, 2000). Non-linguistic metaphors are the actual foundation of human understanding and experience of visuals, music, and other art forms, as people tend to perceive the qualities of what they see or hear in such a way so as to make it metaphorical and map the attributes of one

domain to another (cf. Johnson & Larson, 2003). The same holds true for visual ads, in which the features commonly attributed to products are changed as a result of mappings.

The key advantage of visual ads, however, is that they are less literal than their textual counterparts, which makes them more open to interpretation. This “openness of visual metaphors in advertising stimulates the elicitation of consumers’ elaborative thoughts” (Lagerwerf & Meijers, 2008, p. 19), thus inviting the audience to come up with more associations concerning a given pictorial message. Apart from inviting more extensive interpretations, visual ads can benefit from the fact that they are more straightforward than their verbal counterparts. This is owing to the fact that, in such ads, the feature, value or emotion implied by the pictorial may be readily transferred from the picture to the product featured (cf. Williamson, 1978). What is more, given the immediacy of pictures, the meaning that can be derived from images is less reflective (Dyer, 1982; Beasley & Danesi, 2002; Wells, Moriarty, & Burnett, 2006), which means that their persuasive appeal is much stronger, as people tend to take what they see for granted.

An important observation to be made here is that “pictorial metaphors are monomodal: their target and source are entirely rendered in visual terms, just as their verbal sisters have a target and source entirely rendered in language” (Forceville, 2008, p. 464). Yus (2009, 2016) says that people understand images based on two basic types of information, namely, on *prototypical visual referents* and *prototypical visual syntax*. The former denote encyclopaedic entries that contain exemplary, visual elements and attributes which are stored as typical of an item depicted in a given picture. The latter, on the other hand, refers to the arrangement of items in the picture and to the items frequently associated with the ones depicted. Having access to these two types of information, the perceiver’s mind, usually unconsciously, checks whether the visual arrangement of objects he sees fits the visual schemas, that is, the patterns stored in his prototypical visual syntax for these specific objects. It is worth mentioning at this point that visual schemas precede and therefore deeply influence perception (cf. McMahon, 2003, p. 266; Kriegel, 2004; Yus, 2009, p. 154; Yus, 2016, pp. 273–274).

In general, as the number of visual features of the image which belong to the prototypical visual referent increases and its prototypical visual syntax fits stored schemas, the effort involved in its processing will

decrease accordingly. Highly iconic images are normally filled with features fitting the prototypical visual referent of the image that the reader possesses, but there can be other images containing less prototypical features, generating so called scales of iconicity. (Yus, 2009, p. 154)

Furthermore, visual perception as such works bottom-up and top-down at the same time. The perceiver “constructs and integrates the prototypical visual referents from the available visual elements” (Yus, 2009, p. 154), which agrees with the bottom-up quality but, simultaneously, he tests the input images encountered against his mental storage of prototypical visual referents and against the prototypical visual syntax, which testifies to the top-down quality. These mental processes underlying visual perception help to update the version of meaning that is supposed to be drawn from a given image. Besides, it should be borne in mind that visual perception itself is never isolated or independent from the context, including the relationship and interaction between the producer and the viewer of the image (cf. Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996), and that past exposure to objects or images thereof considerably constrains the perceiver’s future perceptions (Villafañe & Mínguez, 1996, p. 100).

To yield a fuller picture of the operation of triggering metaphorical senses by the pictorial, Yus (2009) proposes that it is an incongruity in the visual syntax of the image that forces the perceiver to consider a metaphoric interpretation of what he sees (for more elaboration on the importance of incongruity in visual metaphor see the section on metaphor as the source of humour in the fourth chapter). Visual ambiguity is then dealt with as the perceiver searches for an optimally relevant interpretation beyond the denotative which, owing to the incongruity detected, makes little sense. “The first step in making sense of a visual metaphorical ad is to understand that the ad’s images cannot be read literally” (Phillips, 2003, p. 301; cf. Mac Cormac, 1990).

Given the embeddedness of visual metaphors in advertising, the audience generally expects that such a message is intended to communicate connotative (i.e., metaphorical) information. At this stage, it enquires into the “intended relationship that holds between the depicted images and the encyclopaedic (conceptual) information stored about the referents of these images, mostly of a stereotypical quality” (Yus, 2009, p. 156). It involves the identification of two images or elements related metaphorically, as well as determining whether both are present in the picture.

The visual arrangement (syntax) is then taken into account, which enables the perceiver to infer the character of the relationship between the source and target image, which can be based on similarity or opposition, for instance (cf. Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004).

The final question to be asked reads as follows: “[A]re the prototypical encyclopaedic referents of the images *themselves* the ones that are going to undergo inferential adjustment in order to obtain a metaphoric interpretation or do the images stand for a different encyclopaedic referent?” (Yus, 2009, p. 156). The choice of image-associated conceptual features follows, leading to the construction of a metaphorical mapping through inference. In fact, the perceptual operation described in this paragraph is based on a model for the analysis of pictorial metaphors developed by Forceville (1996) (cf. Phillips, 2003; Kövecses, 2010), who says that:

For anything to be a metaphor, pictorial or otherwise, the following three questions should be capable of being answered: (1) What are its two domains? (2) What is its target domain, and what its source domain? (3) Which feature or (structured) cluster of features can or must be mapped from source to target? (Forceville, 1996, p. 108, adapted from Black’s 1979 interaction theory) [...]. (Forceville, 2008, p. 464)

Thus, being founded upon Black’s (1979) interaction theory of metaphor (cf. Gineste, Indurkha, & Scart, 2000; Indurkha, 1991, 1992), Forceville’s model is centred on the answerability of these three key questions, with the last one pertaining to the actual interpretation of metaphor and the choice of attributes to be mapped which, in turn, are governed by the principle of relevance.

When it comes to the structure of the visual and ensuing meaning operations, we can also follow the typology proposed by Phillips and McQuarrie (2004) in their article on the typology of visual rhetoric in advertising (see Table 1). They suggest the application of a matrix whose cells are arranged along two dimensions, that is, the one of visual structure and the one of meaning operation, which are located along the axes of complexity and richness, respectively.

COMPLEXITY	visual structure	RICHNESS		
		meaning operation		
		connection (‘A is associated with B’)	comparison	
			similarity (‘A is like B’)	opposition (‘A is not like B’)
juxtaposition				
fusion				
replacement				

TABLE 1. The Typology of Visual Rhetoric (Adapted from Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004, p. 116)

The said visual structure refers to the way in which the elements are pictured in the ad, encompassing *juxtaposition* (two side-by-side images), *fusion* (two combined images), and *replacement* (in which the image present points to the one that is absent in the ad) that correspond to different levels of image complexity. Meaning operation, as such, is all about the cognitive processing required to understand the pictorial and is classified in terms of richness. It can therefore be subdivided into the operations of *connection* (that corresponds to the claim “A is associated with B”), comparison for *similarity* (“A is like B”), and comparison for *opposition* (“A is not like B”). “Consequently, the typology asserts that there are nine, fundamentally distinct, kinds of visual rhetorical figures” (Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004, p. 116) which may prove particularly useful while analysing ads.

As research into visual ads gained traction, many researchers became inspired not only by the communicative potential of pictures, but also by their combinations with the textual layer. The turn towards the multimodal ensued, making visual metaphor merge with the verbal one so as to create one meaningful entity of great persuasive appeal.

3.5.3 Multimodal Metaphor in Advertising

In advertising discourse, it is usually impossible to separate the textual layer from the visual one because they simply have to be considered together for the final meaning to be understood properly. “Although the image may stand out as a separate unit, the verbal element often helps to determine the metaphoricity of the image” (Negro Alousque, 2015, p. 309) and, most importantly, constitutes an equally meaningful unit that, together with the pictorial, contributes to the final meaning (cf. Bateman, 2008). Such a mixture of modes combined for the purpose of advertising has led to increased academic interest in multimodality. This section will therefore be devoted to linguistic research into multimodal advertising (exemplary

works on the issue include: Baran, 2013; Forceville, 2008, 2009; Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009; Koller, 2009; Kövecses, 2010; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 1996; Negro Alousque, 2015; Pérez-Sobrino, 2017; Pérez Hernández, 2015; Pérez-Sobrino, Littlemore, & Houghton, 2017; Phillips, 2000; Rossolatos, 2013; Urios-Aparisi, 2009; Van Enschoot, Hoeken, & Van Mulken, 2008; Wojtaszek, 2016; Yu, 2009).

“A multimodal metaphor is a cognitive process in which two domains are represented in two different modes” (Urios-Aparisi, 2009, p. 97). Being located at the confluence of the textual and pictorial, multimodal metaphor in advertising aims at establishing “interactions between verbal and pictorial information” (Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009, p. 3; cf. Koller, 2009) so as to produce a compound metaphorical unit whose aim is to sell the product on offer by means of communicating the message (“e.g., ‘product X has property Y’) in an artfully divergent way” (Van Enschoot, Hoeken, & Van Mulken, 2008, p. 143). The attributes by means of which both the source and target domain are cued are based on their relevance, hence various mappings may be either highlighted or constrained, depending on the intention of the advertiser and, ultimately, on the interpretation of the recipients (Urios-Aparisi, 2009). In multimodal ads, the target (which usually equals the goods advertised) can be conveyed either explicitly or metonymically, for example, by one of its parts, by its jingle or logo, while the source is usually either represented in an explicit manner or inferred implicitly. “In fact, research on advertising has found that making claims about a product by means of indirect representations can create positive inferences and a more receptive attitude toward the brand by the audience (McQuarrie & Phillips, 2005)” (Urios-Aparisi, 2009, p. 97).

Apart from their ingenuity and attractiveness resulting from the combination of divergent codes, ads referring to multiple modes of communication benefit from “the synergic effect of multimodal communication” (Pérez-Sobrino, 2017, p. 18), for the overall output produced by the multimodal is more than the sum of its parts; this is because, following Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996), the constituent modes work simultaneously in isolation and in combination, thus contributing to the overall meaning. The study of multimodal metaphor, applied both in advertising and in wider contexts provided by visual studies, addresses the expression of metaphor through two different modes of representation or sign systems. “The two phenomena can be slotted as target and source, respectively, and captured in an A IS B format that forces or invites an addressee to map one or more features, connotations, or affordances” (Forceville, 2008, p. 469). This may

be done in various configurations, which differ in the ways of interaction between the textual and the pictorial elements.

1. In the first category of ads, the image instantiates a metaphor that is backed up by the text. The source and the target are visually cued.
2. In the second category, the image and the text combine to trigger a metaphor. There are two modes of representation of source and target: (i) the source is visually cued, while the target is verbally rendered; (ii) the source and the target are visually manifested.
3. Whereas in the previous categories the image has a metaphorical character *per se*, in the third category the image does not apparently encode a metaphor; it is the text that reveals the metaphorical meaning of the image, even if the source and target are visually expressed. (Negro Alousque, 2015, p. 310)

In short, this categorisation boils down to the formula below, in which + stands for the presence of metaphorical cueing and – for lack thereof:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. target: visual +, verbal – | source: visual +, verbal – |
| 2. target: visual –, verbal + | source: visual +, verbal – |
| or | |
| target: visual +, verbal + | source: visual +, verbal – |
| 3. target: visual –, verbal + | source: visual –, verbal + |

Multimodal manifestations of metaphor therefore differ according to the character of the source and target. In order to facilitate the perceiver's comprehension of different degrees of metaphoricity of the image, Negro Alousque (2015) designed a simple scale on the basis of which metaphoricity in the pictorial is conditioned by the kind of relationship between the picture and the text. The utmost degree of metaphoricity is to be found in visual representations of both source and target, with no interference on the part of the textual needed to arrive at the metaphorical meaning. Next is explicit metaphorical image, which contains a visual representation of both inputs, supported by the text. A lower degree of metaphoricity present in the image is exhibited when verbal manifestations of the target are combined with visual representations of the source and target alike; although the metaphorical image is explicit, the image-text combination reinforces the message, partially transferring the target to the textual

realm. Finally, the minimal degree of visual metaphoricity refers to implicit metaphorical images in which metaphor is inferred solely from the text (cf. Negro Alousque, 2015).

The non-verbal modes obviously lack the most straightforward signals in the form of the “is” or “is like” formula found in the textual means of expressing similarity, yet they somehow trigger metaphoricity thanks to specific stylistic means. “Of course, this holds for verbal metaphors that do not have the paradigmatic A IS (LIKE) B format as well [...]. But whatever means are chosen in this latter case, the cues are themselves of a verbal nature” (Forceville, 2009, p. 31). The multimodal approach to metaphor is as a cross-modal mapping in which the elements and relations that cue metaphorical similarity depend on the modes themselves, as well as on whether they are deployed in combination or in isolation (Forceville, 2009, p. 31). Accordingly, it is possible to trace several ways of constructing such metaphors in multimodal advertisements.

The first one to be mentioned is *perceptual resemblance* which functions solely in monomodal ads since “only a visual representation can perceptually resemble another visual representation; only a sound can perceptually resemble another sound in volume, timbre, or pitch” (Forceville, 2009, p. 31). Visual similitude may be realised in a number of ways, for example, through salient positioning, matching colour, similar size or shape, whereas the textual one is realised by means of alliteration, rhythm or rhyme, for instance. The most important thing about resemblance, however, is that it does not necessarily reside in the things contrasted, but rather in the manner of representation that captures this particular similarity. As confirmed by Pérez-Sobrino, “multimodal analysts have found in advertising a wealth of examples to investigate resemblance metaphor, precisely because they readily prompt comparison between two entities on the grounds of perceptual similarity” (Pérez-Sobrino, 2017, p. 122).

Another way of building multimodal metaphors in ads is through the *unexpected filling of schematic slots*, which rests on “placing a thing in a certain context [that] may strongly, even inescapably, evoke a different kind of thing, namely the thing for which the given context is the natural or conventional place” (Forceville, 2009, p. 31). When the perceiver’s mind is taken by surprise by some changed, distorted or deviant scheme, he still schematically fills it with the elements which are prototypically involved in the said scheme or scenario, thus arriving at the metaphorical meaning.

There is also the case of *simultaneous cueing* in which two elements are signalled in different modes and “metaphorical identification is achieved by

saliently representing target and source at the same time” (Forceville, 2009, p. 31). Put differently, the very nature of the cues provided by the source and target is contingent upon the sign systems chosen to form a given representation and it is simultaneity of the presentation of the domains that activates the metaphorical (Forceville, 2008). The weight and saliency of a mode can vary and therefore trigger more or less conceptual complexity (Pérez-Sobrino, 2016).

Further discussion on multimodal metaphor inevitably leads to the topic of *script* or *scenario*, already touched upon in this chapter. In one of the latest works dealing with the application of the theory of conceptual metaphors to multimodal environments, Pérez-Sobrino (2017) stresses the importance of a *metaphor scenario*, understood as a structured “interactional pattern” (Pérez-Sobrino, 2017, p. 130) behind the metaphorical construction that works at the intersection of modes. These scenarios are rudimentary mental representations of particular situations and their interpretations (Semino, 2008; Colston, 2018), and can be viewed as rich frames or as organised ways of showing source concepts that form “mini-narratives,” which dominate the manifestations of source domains and domain mappings (Musolff, 2006, p. 23). Having arrived at the conclusion that the simple A IS B format proposed in conceptual metaphor theory may prove insufficient to address the dynamic nature of metaphor (Forceville, 2009, p. 11; Koller, 2009, p. 48), Musolff (2006, 2016) came up with the following definition of a metaphor scenario:

Unlike abstract image schemas, scenarios include narrative, argumentative, and evaluative frame aspects, which suggest a specific, pragmatically loaded perspective for inferences about the target topic. These inferences are not cognitively or logically binding but rather a set of assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about prototypical elements of the source concepts (participants, story lines, default outcomes) as well as ethical evaluations, which are connected to social attitudes and emotional stances prevalent in the respective discourse community. [...] Scenario-based perspectives inform users’ metaphorical interpretations that appear in the empirically elicited data. (Musolff, 2016, p. 64)

Given that people “usually resort to fully-fledged events and ongoing actions to make sense of a metaphor” (Pérez-Sobrino, 2017, p. 122), a metaphor scenario seems better an option to analyse advertising discourse due

to its situational nature. More often than not, ads tell stories and their multimodal variety, combined with the metaphorical, is often able of constructing mini-stories founded upon metaphorical mappings. These, however, are richer than image schemas, for example, because they carry more cultural, emotive, and evaluative load, which provides the perceiver with more assumptions as to the direction of a given interpretation. In this way, a metaphor scenario can be seen as complementing the basic assumptions of the cognitive view on metaphor, since it assumes the existence of a larger, narrative-like frame which guides interpretations.

“All metaphor users/interpreters have a range of scenario perspectives to choose from. Some of them may be found to use the non-default/non-typical versions, but the majority in each group appear to ‘agree’ on using the ‘mainstream’ scenario patterns” (Musolff, 2016, p. 64). Deviant patterns, however, are frequently applied in advertising to catch the prospects’ attention, which may lead to the conclusion that advertising creativity rests on moulding and reconstructing scenarios in order to make them less typical but, at the same time, hint at the prototypical interpretations with a view to contrasting them with the new ones carried by deviant elements thereof. Hence, apart from the patterns that point out to similarity, there is some incongruity, resonance or deviation involved in the very process of constructing the metaphorical. This statement agrees with the one by Tourangeau and Sternberg (1982) and Dynel (2009) who stress the importance of residual dissimilarity in the production of metaphors.

Multimodal ads usually “[...] exhibit resonance when they combine wordplay with a relevant picture to create ambiguity and incongruity” (McQuarrie & Mick, 1992, p. 180). But, as already mentioned, there are ads in which the metaphorical resides solely in the visuals. Following the line of thought offered by Forceville (1996), Yus (2009) says that the shift from the denotative interpretation of the multimodal to the connotative, metaphorical one (which requires far more inferential processing and mental effort) lies in the detection of an incongruity. It “[...] turns up between the activation of the stored prototypical visual referents during perception and the actual visual configuration of the image or images making up the visual metaphor (Forceville, 1996, p. 115)” (Yus, 2009, p. 274). The perceiver “must make a connection between two realities in order to resolve the incongruence” (Pérez-Sobrino, 2017, p. 128) that follows and this type of incongruity is realised by what is labelled in literature as an *ad hoc pointer* (Yus, 2005, 2009). This name is intended to reflect the *ad hoc* nature of a given visual or multimodal message that serves specific commu-

nicative purposes and points towards desired connotative and inferential interpretations.

Thus, an incongruent or deviant scenario suggested by an ad hoc pointer makes the audience aware of the fact that they should look for some further metaphorical interpretation which would help them map from “the source element” to “the target element” correctly (Yus, 2009). “A closer look at the textual part would alert the viewer that further cognitive activity is in order” (Pérez-Sobrino, 2017, p. 129), forcing him to discard all the misguided hypotheses concerning his interpretations and embrace the figurative meaning. This perspective will prove invaluable in the ongoing discussion concerning the metaphor/humour overlap to be explored in the subsequent chapter.

3.6 Relevance Theory and Figurative Language

In the context of RT, it has already emerged that the parties in the process of communication usually manage to communicate successfully despite the existence of secondary, less-salient meanings. They are aware of the duality of meaning in communication, of the polysemous nature of certain words and images, and of the presence of additional but subordinate variations of meaning. Still, it would be germane to ask: how come the literal and the figurative rarely compete at the level of interpretation in advertising messages? How does the comprehender come to a conclusion that the col-lateral and often figurative meaning is the case in a specific advertising context? The underlying structure of the dual system of meaning rests on the contextual factor, which delineates the meaning range of a particular message (Gee & Handford, 2012, p. 1), on common knowledge concerning the general rules of communication, and, last but not least, on appropriate genre attribution. Consequently, it may be said that RT plays a vital role in the process.

Although there is a distinct demarcation between the paradigm of conceptual blending theory and that of RT, there are some interesting parallels between them (Gibbs & Tendahl, 2006; Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008; Wilson, 2011). For instance, “the two approaches share the fundamental belief that communication cannot be treated in isolation from cognition and other psychological processes” (Piskorska, 2020, p. 1). Colston (2019) and Forceville (2020), among others, see them as complementary in proper analysis of visuals and multimodal discourse. In fact, both theoretical bases

have great potential to “shed new light on old debates and suggest fruitful directions for research” (Wilson, 2011, p. 195). The two theories remain standing alongside one another, in tandem possibly “leading to even greater crosstalk and cross-fertilization among disciplines working towards a scientifically holistic understanding of human language” (Colston, 2019, p. xvi). For this reason, the present section draws upon two distinct bodies of research (on Relevance Theory and cognitive linguistics) in analysing the nature of figurative language applied in advertising discourse. As the topic of cross-fertilization between these traditions is very broad, it seems impossible to offer an in-depth examination of this issue within the limits of this book. Given the scope of the present volume, only a short discussion will be presented here, yet the reader must be assured that a more comprehensive account of the issue can be found in the sources herein cited.

To begin with, although the cognitive paradigm is a key instrument in metaphor studies, the pragmatic slant provided by RT can be considered equally helpful in explaining what happens when the audience is faced with a figurative message. In fact, RT does not privilege literalness in a message and figurative constructs, irrespective of coding, “achieve relevance without any problem” (Forceville, 2020, p. 50). Any potential gaps between the linguistic, context-specific, and speaker-intended senses are filled in thanks to inferential mechanisms guiding human comprehension (Piskorska, 2020, p. 2). Nevertheless, it is only natural that “the further the hearer moves from literalness, the more processing effort is expended and more positive cognitive effects (possibly also different kinds of effects) can be expected to be gained” (Piskorska, 2020, p. 2). The perceiver is likely to devote more time and effort to decoding a figurative message since he hopes for optimally relevant interpretations to be extracted upon the activation of inferential mechanisms. These expectations stem from the fact that, in line with RT, every single communication act is received based on expectations of relevance and geared towards optimisation (i.e., producing cognitive gains at a processing cost which is justifiable given the said gains) (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).

The message itself assumes and, ideally, produces a set of specific pragmatic effects, understood as “additional meaning(s) arising in interlocutors from utterance comprehension” (Colston, 2019, p. 101). Focusing on the use of figurative language, Colston (2019) highlights the fact that a variety of names has been used in previous academic literature to denote various types of said effects, for example, social functions, discourse goals, pragmatic functions/effects, or communicative goals (Colston, 2019, p. 14).

He further states that, though not labelled pragmatic as such, other theoretical constructs actually point to similar yet not entirely convergent effects. “Implicatures, positive cognitive effects, interpretive hypotheses, and inferences are cognitive work that takes place to fill in or fill out meaning to justify the relevance of someone having said something optimally” (Colston, 2019, p. 40). In spite of the fact that, to some extent, these processes may overlap with pragmatic effects, they are essentially (psycho)linguistic or cognitive, whereas pragmatic effects, “although possibly stemming in part from these sources, also may frequently emerge fully, separately, or come in combination with implicatures from structural, embodied, psychological, and sociocultural components of the figures and interlocutors (Colston, 2009)” (Colston, 2019, p. 40). The very issue of effects, then, may prove more complex than assumed at face value (this complexity is further addressed by Colston (2019, pp. 40–52)).

It can be said that the effect aimed at in the case of metaphor is meaning enrichment brought about by means of “implicatures, inferences, positive cognitive effects, and embodied simulations” (Colston, 2019, p. 102). The formula that produces particular pragmatic effects through figurative language boils down to three essential steps: “[...] for metaphor, one needs (1) a relatively abstract target domain, (2) a relatively concrete source domain with some kind of potential alignment (e.g. structural) with the target domain, and (3) a linguistic construction that juxtaposes the source and target domains” (Colston, 2019, p. 102). The only flaw in this short outline is “the extent to which a speaker of a figure can select his or her ingredients and embark on the concomitant processes without consideration of what is currently in the mind of the addressee/hearer” (Colston, 2019, p. 102). That is exactly where RT may prove crucial, armed with the explanatory power of common-ground considerations and optimal relevance which enable selection of contextually appropriate, positive cognitive effects. To recapitulate the main assumptions behind optimal relevance, it presumes that

- (1) there is additional meaning that the speaker wants the comprehender to infer, (2) computing this additional meaning is worth the comprehender’s effort (i.e. it is not just superfluous), (3) this meaning fits with what the comprehender can and would prefer to infer, and (4) once there is enough additional meaning inferred to justify the effort to infer it, the comprehender can stop inferring additional information. (Colston, 2019, p. 29)

Naturally, the exchange between the sender and the addressee(s) can fail due to noise factors. For example, it may so happen that despite shared scenarios and common knowledge of the genre, people will attach different connotations to the message anyway. As expounded by Forceville, “[...] each message interacts necessarily with the sum total of everything the communicators know, believe, feel, etc., and interlocutors may have incorrect ideas of each other’s knowledge, beliefs, feelings, etc.” (Forceville, 2020, p. 61). In spite of the fact that the communicative context and correct genre attribution usually constrain misinterpretations, it should be kept in mind that, ultimately, people communicate “by providing each other with an amalgam of explicit and implicit information” (Forceville, 2020, p. 62) on the basis of which the overall sense is built.

The mechanism of blending is often necessary in the process of comprehension because some ostensive stimuli may be too incomplete and thus insufficient in terms of mental spaces or scenarios evoked for the perceiver to make sense of the message. What the perceiver needs to do is turn the pieces of information and respective mental input spaces involved into a blend, relying on a set of shared properties in the generic space. As a result of the merger between the spaces (inputs and the generic), a new meaning in the form of the blended space, with its own emergent meanings, will be created.

[J]ust as knowledge of the grammar and vocabulary of a language allows a person to understand an infinite number of new, creative sentences, so a knowledge of scores of conceptual domains enables the addressee of a new message to cobble them together in unprecedented ways when the message requires this. (Forceville, 2020, p. 93)

As might be expected, the theory of conceptual blending has its limitations too. For instance, notwithstanding that it does acknowledge the significance of pragmatic factors in the whole meaning-making process, it actually pays little attention to them (Forceville, 2020, p. 94). That is why the perspective provided by RT may be so vital in this respect. While it should be stressed that the two theories in question adhere to fundamentally different methodological assumptions and have their own distinct objectives, in some respects, they may be seen as complementary (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008). To illustrate this point, let us have a look at the treatment of metaphor in RT and cognitive linguistics presented by Wilson (2011), who, after Gibbs and Tendahl (2006) and Tendahl and Gibbs (2008),

suggests that the combination of the abovementioned theories may yield invaluable insights.

In the first place, it should be highlighted that relevance theorists and cognitive linguists gravitate towards two clashing views on the “place” where metaphors originate in (Gibbs & Tendahl, 2006; Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008). The former are of the opinion that metaphors arise in linguistic communication and, consequently, that “cross-domain conceptual mappings may result from repeated use of linguistic metaphors, but are not essential to either the production or the interpretation of metaphors” (Wilson, 2011, p. 210). The latter, on the other hand, claim that metaphors have their origin in thought and “see linguistic metaphors as depending on pre-existing cross-domain mappings” (Wilson, 2011, p. 210).

In other words, from the relevance-theoretic perspective, by nature, metaphors emerge in communication. It is argued that language use is rather loose and even if the message conveyed is characterised by high levels of complexity and vagueness, it does not have to be figurative. “On this approach, there is a continuum of cases between literal talk, loose talk, hyperbole, and metaphor, none of which is necessarily a surface reflection of any pre-existing conceptual mapping” (Wilson, 2011, p. 196). The authors of RT themselves claim the following:

We see metaphors as simply a range of cases at one end of a continuum that includes literal, loose and hyperbolic interpretations. In our view, metaphorical interpretations are arrived at in exactly the same way as these other interpretations. There is no mechanism specific to metaphor, no interesting generalisation that applies only to them. (Sperber & Wilson, 2008, p. 84)

The fundamentals of cognitive linguistics, in their turn, arise out of the assumption that metaphor is remarkably widespread in language since it is pervasive in human thought. As a result, “linguistic metaphors are treated as surface reflections of underlying conceptual mappings between different cognitive domains [...] and have their roots in cognition rather than communication” (Wilson, 2011, p. 196). In an attempt to bring the two approaches together, Wilson hypothesizes that neither of them is wrong since some mappings may be perceived as the products of language and others—of thought. Her stand on the issue is not unfounded, for Gibbs and Tendahl, for instance, held similar views. In order to illustrate her proposition, Wilson lists two sets of examples:

Whereas relevance theorists offer many analyses of standard examples such as (1a)–(1c), which are familiar from classical rhetoric, cognitive linguists have been more concerned with examples such as (2a)–(2c), which they see as reflecting conceptual mappings across cognitive domains:

(1)

- a. Robert is a *computer*.
- b. Susan is a *wild rose*.
- c. Sally is an *angel*.

(2)

- a. Bill's marriage is *on the rocks*. (LOVE IS A JOURNEY)
- b. He *destroyed my defences*. (ARGUMENTS ARE FIGHTS)
- c. Your theory is *falling apart*. (THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS). (Wilson, 2011, p. 197)

Furthermore, the researcher cited above contends that the role of concepts in both approaches may be seen as a sign of interrelation between the theories under consideration. To be more specific, Wilson argues that RT perceives understanding of metaphors as conditional upon linguistic and contextual clues necessary to produce new, occasion-specific concepts, “which are typically not identical to any of the concepts linguistically encoded by the metaphorically-used word or phrase, although they inherit some of their inferential properties from those concepts” (Wilson, 2011, pp. 197–198). Accordingly, it is possible for a certain pattern to emerge from “repeated use of linguistic metaphors linking items from distinct cognitive domains” (Wilson, 2011, p. 198), which seems close to the theory put forward by cognitive linguists.

To take just one illustration, many cultures have a set of flower metaphors (e.g. daisy, lily, violet, rose) which are typically applied to women. From a cognitive linguistics perspective, these linguistic metaphors might be seen as surface reflections of an underlying conceptual metaphor *WOMEN ARE FLOWERS*, based on systematic correspondences between the domains of women and flowers. From a relevance theory perspective, these linguistic metaphors would be seen as originating in creative uses of language for opportunistic communicative purposes, which, if repeated often enough, might result in the setting up of systematic correspondences between the domains of women and flowers. Here again, there is a genuine question about whether, and to what extent, conceptual cross-domain mappings originate in language use,

and are therefore to be explained at least partly in pragmatic terms. (Wilson, 2011, p. 198)

Hence, as noted above, it is not far-fetched to say that RT can complement the cognitive approach to metaphor in several ways. Its enriching perspective shows that it is possible for some metaphors to be conceived as “creative loose uses of language” (Wilson, 2011, p. 198) and provides explanation as to how linguistic metaphors can result in new sets of ad hoc concepts. But the possible crosstalk between the two disciplines goes the other way round too. For example, the model provided by conceptual blending theory helps to explain in more detail which mental spaces should be evoked for the message to achieve relevance and for the communication process to be successful. Also, the theory of conceptual integration does not differentiate between modalities (i.e., one input space can as well be textual, whereas the other input space can take the form of a picture) and this proposition can be extrapolated to make adjustments to RT (as suggested by Forceville (2020)) in order to render modality irrelevant and hence make RT applicable to visual and multimodal content.

In terms of pictorial and multimodal metaphor, the explanatory power of RT seems limited compared to cognitive linguistics. Nevertheless, Forceville (2020) offers an interesting, pragmatic outlook on this issue. Following the line of thought proposed by Romero and Soria (2014), he says that the greatest problem in terms of RT’s application to metaphors is the issue of emergent properties; he stresses that RT “cannot account for the ad hoc, emergent meaning that is typical of its creative varieties. Emergent meaning in metaphor is meaning that does not reside in the target, nor in the source, but comes into being in their interaction (Black, 1979)” (Forceville, 2020, p. 95). Referring to the now widely cited exemplary metaphor “Robert is a bulldozer,” Romero and Soria (2014) point out that emergent properties should be ascribed to the target and source alike.

When the speaker uses “bulldozer” metaphorically [...], he is not talking about a bulldozer but about Robert, a person, and he is not interested in applying this expression to things that it literally applies to. Nothing is meant to be conveyed about literal bulldozers. [...] In its metaphorical sense, this predicate is not applied to certain machines, the metaphorical meaning of its properties does not have the requirement that they have in RT of being applicable to both a tractor fitted with caterpillar [tracks] and Robert, a person. (Romero & Soria, 2014, p. 499)

In order to solve this problem, the abovementioned authors turn to Black (1979), whose idea, paraphrased by Romero and Soria, runs as follows: “[M]etaphorical interpretation is explained taking into account metaphorical ad hoc concepts that result from an inferential task that involves a partial mapping from a conceptual domain onto another” (Romero & Soria, 2014, p. 490). It means that the addressee needs to make some pragmatic adjustments in terms of mapping with a view to eliminating these properties of the source that do not fit the specific contextual situation at hand and activating uniquely the properties that are pertinent. “Such pragmatic adjustment takes the form of a matching process fine-tuning the mappings from source to target domain that is to result in the understanding of the now metaphorically transformed target (‘Robert-as-bulldozer’)” (Forceville, 2020, p. 95).

The pragmatic and cognitivist paradigms thus seem interconnected in that they aid in explaining discursive phenomena from two different standpoints. Despite the parallels and possible ways of cross-fertilization between these traditions, we should not lose sight of key differences pertaining to their distinct methodological origins and goals. For instance, RT favours the view that it is imperative for the comprehender to draw specific common-sense inferences and additional inferences about the addressor’s meaning alike; in other words, in the process of comprehension, he needs to acknowledge both informative and communicative intentions of the addressor (cf. Wilson, 2011). To infer such meaning by the audience actually “involves an ability to ‘mindread’ (i.e., to infer the mental states of others on the basis of their behaviour)” (Wilson, 2011, p. 210) and this special-purpose, inferential procedure takes place solely in the communicative and not in the cognitive domain (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 2002). The cognitive paradigm, on the other hand, holds the view that understanding results from the application of “[...] general-purpose cognitive and linguistic abilities to the communicative domain” (Wilson, 2011, p. 210).

Though the two approaches give priority to different aspects (i.e., to the primacy of communication in RT and of cognition in cognitive linguistics), it seems potentially fruitful to consider how they can work together towards bettering our understanding of communication processes, especially in metaphor studies. “A pragmatic approach such as RT, which fits well with many of the assumptions of cognitive linguistics, suggests a natural way of explaining how the inferences hearers draw in communicative situations might be suitably constrained” (Wilson, 2011, p. 211), that is, how come that the audience manages to understand the message

the way it was originally intended by the addressor. Furthermore, because some patterns are simply not valid when transferred to other domains, RT can be of assistance to blending in the following way:

What makes it valid to draw a particular inference in interpreting a given utterance is that, unless this inference were valid, the utterance would not yield enough implications to be relevant in the expected way. Thus, a speaker who formulates her utterance in such a way as to encourage her hearer to derive a certain inference is largely responsible for its validity. Thus, [...] a pragmatic account of metaphor of the type proposed by relevance theory might have worthwhile implications for cognitive linguistics. (Wilson, 2011, p. 211)

3.7 Summary

The chapter was devoted to the issues of cognition and metaphor, in which metaphor was presented as a figure that involves an implied, cross-domain comparison and as a context-dependent communicative device designed to communicate messages that could be difficult to grasp otherwise (cf. Chilton & Schäffner, 2002; Velasco-Sacristán & Fuertes-Olivera, 2006). Starting with some general remarks on the epochal theory of conceptual metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson (2003/1980), I have outlined the theory of idealised cognitive models known as mental spaces, which are seen as “active mental representations consisting of self-contained ‘packets’ of information” (Grady, 2005, p. 1597; cf. Fauconnier, 1994), thanks to which background knowledge is actively evoked in the perceiver’s mind and distributed over different mental spaces (Brône, 2017, p. 252). Then I moved on to describe the ensuing multi-space model known as the conceptual blending theory by Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002), which offers an innovative outlook on the complexities of mental operations (e.g., elaboration, composition, and completion) involved in the production of the metaphorical. In spite of the fact that people use metaphorical expressions on a daily basis, they may find it difficult to describe the principles behind the identification of metaphors in discourse. That is why this chapter offered a brief operationalization of the term metaphor, provided definitions of both novel and dead metaphors, and described the metaphor identification procedure itself.

Once this theoretical background was outlined, I have proceeded to consider previous research on verbal, visual, and multimodal metaphor in

advertising discourse. It was said that the extensive use of metaphor in advertising lies in its function to convey complex information in another, oftentimes original, way and in its ability to veil the message a little bit. “It takes a familiar conceptual structure (vehicle) in one situation and transfers it *en bloc* to another situation (tenor). Since we know the vehicle well, we can use it as one unit, thus saving a lot of work” (Aharoni, 2018, p. 17) because there are some innate concepts in human minds, some “plug and play representations” (Colston, 2018) that facilitate and influence cognition. They ensure that people are able to observe some patterns in and correlations “between different entities or areas of experience” (Semino, 2008, p. 7), which makes it easier for them to communicate figuratively.

It was stressed that the mixture of modes combined for the purpose of advertising has led to increased academic interest in multimodality and in multimodal metaphors as well, for the blend may “[...] operate on two different levels, i.e. at the cross-section of the picture and the text, or within the pictorial representation” (Dyvel, 2011a, p. 70). Of central interest was also the structure of the visual (i.e., the figures of juxtaposition, fusion, and replacement) and ensuing meaning operations (of comparison for similarity/opposition and connection), as proposed by Phillips and McQuarrie (2004) in their article on the typology of visual rhetoric in advertising. In order to facilitate the identification of the degrees of metaphoricity in multimodal artefacts, the use of the metaphoricity scale of image in advertising by Negro Alousque (2015) was suggested. Lastly, emphasis was put on the pragmatic underpinnings of metaphor offered by RT (for an in-depth discussion of figurative language seen through the lens of RT see the sources cited in the last section of this chapter). Despite different methodological origins and purposes, the approaches offered by cognitive linguistics and RT were presented as potentially overlapping and equally useful in casting light on non-literal communication processes. While the former tradition identifies thought as the source of figurativeness (perceived in relation to language), the latter centres on the inferential side of figurative speech comprehension (Piskorska, 2020, p. 1). It was shown how the relevance-theoretic approach may be relevant (pun intended) for a host of problems that heretofore have resisted analysis based solely on cognitive frameworks and how the two disciplines discussed may be combined to generate interesting insights.

Chapter 4

Advertising and Language for Humorous Purposes

Advertisers compete for consumers' attention in the ceaseless information flow provided by mass media. That is why they are forever struggling with design of their advertising messages, with negotiation of meanings, as well as with choices concerning words and images they want to present in the most persuasive manner possible. They therefore turn to infotaining practices, wrapping advertising content in humorous form. (Stwora, 2020a, pp. 129–130)

Indeed, “as media outlets continue to expand, many advertisers have turned toward humour as a way to break through that clutter and to reach increasingly jaded consumers” (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, p. 16). Bringing them mirthful pleasure through engaging advertising content is one of the marketing strategies aimed at attracting their attention since it has the power to entertain and relax the audience, thus making them more prone to persuasive claims, as they open themselves up to be influenced by infotainment in the form of enjoyable advertising experience (cf. Cialdini, 2007; Fuentes Luque, 2010). Following Gajewska's outlook on humour in advertising discourse, “the recipient is more often willing and eager to participate in the act of communication, he seeks to be astonished, amused, or even shocked by inventive advertising attempts rather than intrusively persuaded to simply buy a product” (Gajewska, 2011, p. 126, trans. A. S.). Moreover, linking humorous and promotional content in one message contributes to the so-called halo effect because it is able to create positive attitudes towards the goods advertised. It can therefore “predispose an individual towards developing liking for a product or service by association with an advertising message that caused pleasurable reception” (Stwora, 2020a, p. 135).

Apart from its definite marketing advantages, the humorous frame is far more important because it enhances the arousal of intellectual curiosity and, most importantly, “allows people to communicate messages they would not be able/allowed to communicate otherwise” (Dynel, 2017). This is usually achieved thanks to the advertising context itself which makes the audience assume that what is conveyed is supposed to be tongue in cheek. Frequently, there is also some kind of ambiguity involved so it is possible for the consumer to arrive at two (or even more) equally feasible interpretations of the same message (cf. Giora, 2003; Wojtaszek, 2014). What seems innocent and ordinary at face value may, in fact, carry various associations, euphemisms or understatements which are deliberately imprecise and can be perceived as funny or even humorously indecent at times. “Humour can be a bearer of meanings (literal or implicit)” (Dynel, 2017), stir up strong emotions, and engage the audience, which is why its commonness in the discourse of advertising is quite significant. It manifests itself in a variety of ways (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006), as it relies on wordplay, incongruous juxtapositions, homophony or homography, inventive comparisons or metaphors, polysemy, ambiguity, and the like, all of which imply transference of semantic structures.

Owing to the fact that the phenomenon of humour has been widely studied, a substantial body of work has built up so as to describe the ways in which it is possible to elicit humour on the part of the hearer in everyday communication and advertising alike. A selection of key points germane to the subject of broadly conceived humour will be discussed in detail in this chapter. Some of the key topics explored herein will include an attempt at defining humour as such and introducing its basic typology. Then a cluster of studies surrounding the linguistic approach to humour will be investigated. Further theoretical body of evidence will bear on the issue of previous studies into the field and will include a separate section devoted to marked similarities in terms of perception of humour and understanding metaphors. Finally, I will focus on humour in advertising. As will be shown, while previous linguistic research addresses the role of metaphor and humour in ads alike, little has dealt with the combination of both in advertising discourse (cf. Pérez-Sobrino, 2017), which is why I have decided on this specific topic.

4.1 Defining Humour

Humour is an inherently human trait that defies a unitary analysis or a single perspective since the term covers a whole range of communicative, social, and psychological aspects of human behaviour. (Yus, 2016, p. 37)

Paradoxically, universal to all human beings as it may be, the phenomenon of humour itself tends to be described in various manners across the literature on the subject of humour studies, for there is little agreement among researchers about its operation, scope, impact or even about the accuracy of the term *per se* (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006; Pluszczyk, 2017a). As stated by Weinberger and Gulas, “an all-encompassing, generally accepted definition of humour does not exist” (Weinberger & Gulas, 1992, p. 49), for what we can find is just a collection of explanations as regards the notion in question. That is why the following pages intend to demonstrate various definitions and understandings of humour.

Dictionaries offer many senses of the word. Humour is defined as

1. A comic, absurd, or incongruous quality causing amusement.
2. The faculty of perceiving what is amusing or comical [...].
3. An instance of being or attempting to be comical or amusing; something humorous [...].
4. The faculty of expressing the amusing or comical [...].
5. Comical writing or talk in general; comical books, skits, plays, etc.
6. Mental disposition or temperament [...]. (Michalik & Sznicer, 2017, p. 20)

Humour is all these things and much more, as the semantic field of humour itself is very extensive. According to Oxford Learner’s Dictionary, *humour* is (1) “the quality of being amusing or comic, especially as expressed in literature or speech” or (2) “the ability to express humour or amuse other people” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.); in its first meaning, it is said to be synonymous with the “comical aspect, comic side, funny side, comedy, funniness, hilarity, [and] jocularly” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.), while the other connotes such terms as “wittiness, funniness, facetiousness, drollery, [and] waggishness” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.). The dictionary by Macmillan, on the other hand, provides the reader with

the entries “the quality that makes a situation or entertainment funny” or “something said or done that is funny” (*Macmillan Dictionary* n.d.). Another meaning to be found in this source is the one referring to “the ability to know when something is funny, and to laugh at funny situations” (*Macmillan Dictionary* n.d.).

An important disclaimer that should be made here is that humour and laughter do not always go hand in hand and, most importantly, are not synonymous, for it is not necessary for the perceiver to dissolve into fits of laughter in order to find something humorous (cf. Provine, 2000; Attardo, 2017; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017). This was already discussed by Stern (1996), for example, who posits that the term humour itself is likely to breed confusion due to the fact that it is used to refer to both the content of a humorous nature and the effect it has on the recipients. She therefore proposes a revision in terminology used to talk about the humorous factor and opts to distinguish between the *stimulus*, which she calls “comedy,” and the *response*, which she labels as “laughter.” Her treatment of the subject of response is debatable, though, since the outcome of the humorous stimulus cannot always be equated with laughter; the action of laughing itself is just one possible effect in a range of reactions which may be triggered since a person can also just smile or show no reaction whatsoever and yet be amused.

More precise and satisfying an account of humour is to be found in *Cambridge Dictionary* and *American Heritage Dictionary*. The former lumps a few senses together in a definition that reads as follows: “[T]he ability to find things funny, the way in which people see that some things are funny, or the quality of being funny” (*Cambridge Dictionary* n.d.), which actually refers to three different aspects of the humorous, which can be labelled as *cognitive*, *perceptive*, and *attributive*, respectively. One more explanation that overlaps with the classification derived from *Cambridge Dictionary* is put forward by the said *American Heritage Dictionary* which offers the following entries: (1) “the quality that makes something laughable or amusing; funniness,” (2) “that which is intended to induce laughter or amusement” or (3) “the ability to perceive, enjoy, or express what is amusing, comical, incongruous, or absurd” (*American Heritage Dictionary* n.d.). Therefore, the theory about the possible division of humour into the three aspects mentioned stands corroboration.

Drawing on the cognitive and perceptive aspects of humour, it can be said that humour is extremely impressionistic, which means that, to cut a long story short, a person has a feeling that something is funny; funny

things are likely to cause amusement, and amusement, in turn, results from humour (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017, p. 50) but humorousness *per se* is always subjective (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011; Drozd, 2020). Wide as the notion of humour may be, it should be borne in mind that humour is certainly not to be perceived as an inherent feature of anything, be it a comment, an ad or else. Humour is always in the eye of the beholder, so to speak, and hence is forever dependent on the perceiver and on the context in which it occurs, as it is specific to time and place. In brief, nothing is innately funny in itself because humorousness is a matter of subjective perception and thus resides in the specific (humorous) effect that is produced in the mind of the recipient (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017, p. 39).

Especially valuable in this discussion is the statement provided by Gulas and Weinberger: “[H]umour is the rubric most accepted as the stimulus evoking an intended or unintended pleasurable effect often resulting in a form of subdued or exuberant laughter” (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, p. 22). Notwithstanding, humour and laughter cannot be seen as symmetrical—a mental phenomenon (i.e., humour) cannot simply be identified with laughter, which constitutes a complex neurophysiological manifestation of amusement (Attardo, 1994). “Very many writers on the subject of laughter [...] have failed to recognise the distinction between the two [LUDICROUS and LAUGHTER]” (Pidington, 1933, p. 87) and, likewise, numerous humorologists use the terms *humour* and *laughter* interchangeably in spite of the fact that they are not equivalent. Humorous responses may encompass a wide range of positive emotions, such as amusement, pleasure, delight, etc., which may not entail actual laughter on the part of the audience (cf. Yus, 2016).

It should also be noted that the actual scope of the notion of humour is very broad because it can refer to a plenitude of related concepts. In order to illustrate the degree of complexity of humour, it is advisable to refer to the schema proposed by Schmidt-Hidding (1963) whose simplified version is reproduced below. To understand it properly, though, the reader first needs to be acquainted with four key notions it is based on, which are: humour, ridicule, wit, and fun.




FIGURE 2. The Semantic Field of Humour Based on Schmidt-Hidding (1963, p. 48) and Hempelmann (2017, p. 38) (redesigned by A. Stwora).

Wit is usually associated with intelligent humour, with the power of reasoning, and with “the ability to relate seemingly disparate things so as to illuminate or amuse” (*Merriam-Webster Dictionary* n.d.), as well as with “the ability to express oneself intelligently in a playful or humorous manner, often in overturning audience expectations” (*American Heritage Dictionary* n.d.). The notion “originates from the word field of wisdom and cleverness, the quick operation of the mind (Trier, 1931). In the collocation ‘wit and humour,’ wit came to cover the more aggressive, cerebral aspects, while humour covers the benevolent, crude aspects” (Hempelmann, 2017, p. 36). Unsurprisingly, when it comes to *fun*, it typically connotes what provides “enjoyment, amusement or light-hearted pleasure” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.), frequently connected with playfulness and boisterousness as well, whereas *ridicule* stands for “the subjection of someone or something to contemptuous and dismissive language or behaviour” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.), which involves mockery and teasing or even absurd imitations and misrepresentations.

The semantic field of humour presented above is very flexible and capacious, which is why Schmidt-Hidding created a two-dimensional plane on

which he located the terms from the field of humour. It features two basic dimensions that range (1) from fun to wit and (2) from ridicule to humour; one shows “the degree of cerebrality [...] from cerebral wit to crude fun” (Hempelmann, 2017, p. 37), whereas the other—“the degree of aggression from aggressive ridicule/mock to non-aggressive humour” (Hempelmann, 2017, p. 37). In other words, the vertical cognition/vitality dimension shows various kinds of the humorous that range from the manifestations of keen intelligence, inventiveness, and “natural aptitude for using words and ideas in a quick and inventive way” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.), associated with wit, to playfulness and light-hearted pleasure which are aimed at pure fun. The aggressive/affiliative horizontal dimension, on the other hand, is extended between two other limits, namely, the one of ridicule or derision aiming at mockery or criticism and the one of humour that relates to emotion and will (cf. Schmidt-Hidding, 1963; Hempelmann, 2017).

Last but not least, I would like to address the question concerning the concept of enjoyment engendered by humorous content in general (Mehta & Purvis, 2006). It is an axiom that people tend towards fun and entertainment, towards humour and pleasure, which pertains not only to life, but to communication as well. In this light, humour may be perceived as a kind of message operating under changed communicative circumstances governed by non-*bona-fide* communication, which violates conversational maxims (cf. Raskin, 1985) (of which more in the sections to follow).

The fact that a sign no longer refers to its “natural” referent but to another “paradoxical” [...] referent, gives a “negative,” “paradoxical” value to the sign, and so its humorous effect. Humour is seen as “a kind of language [...] characterized by the negative, or paradoxical, value assumed by the sign” (Dorfles, 1968, p. 104). (Attardo, 1998, p. 176)

In this context, it should be noted that such a definition of humour actually seems akin to the one of aesthetic or figurative use of language, for it can be seen “as a deviation from a ‘norm’ and as such is liable to the same criticism” (Attardo, 1998, p. 176; cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980) concerning the cognitive processes involved. First of all, the perceiver must recognise that the message was intended to be humorous and grasp the meaning behind the humorous stimulus itself. Only then may he

proceed to appreciate its humour value (cf. Hay, 2001), which is subject to numerous and remarkably diverse factors, such as language, culture, gender, upbringing, context or “the sense of humour, itself a complex construct [...] involving individual and group differences, mainly as a personality trait” (Hempelmann, 2017, p. 36).

4.2 Types of Humour

One of the earliest linguistic discussions of humour is found in Cicero, who distinguishes between humour “de re” and “de dicto.” The distinction is fundamental and matches precisely modern-day differentiations between “referential” and “verbal” humour: the former is purely semantic/pragmatic and does not depend on the linguistic form (the signifier), whereas the latter crucially does. In practical terms and simplifying a little, verbal humour is comprised of puns, ambiguity-based humour, or humour that is based on repetition of parts of the signifier (for example, alliteration). All these forms of humour exploit characteristics of the signifier to bring together incongruous semantic or pragmatic meanings. Referential humour, on the contrary, is based only on semantic/pragmatic incongruity. (Attardo, 2017)

There are numerous criteria of humour types, among which we can enumerate the intention of the addressor to produce humour and amuse the audience, his benevolent or malevolent intent, and the levels of wittiness or light-heartedness (cf. Alexander, 1997, p. 10). Humour can therefore be intentional or unconscious, successful or failed, caustic or benevolent, inventive or deadpan, appealing or appalling; these features, can be viewed either from the addressor’s or the addressee’s perspective, as they deal with the production and reception of humour, respectively, hence yielding no concrete results as far as objective typology is concerned. In this light, it is germane to refer to the study by Buijzen and Valkenburg (2004) which “yielded seven humour categories: slapstick, clownish humour, surprise, misunderstanding, irony, satire, and parody” (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004, p. 162), which differ in terms of benevolence and complexity.

To begin with, *slapstick humour* is a type of “comedy based on deliberately clumsy actions and humorously embarrassing events” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.); commonly associated with an exaggerated and “physical pie-in-the-face type of humour” (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004, p. 162) of rather unfriendly nature, slapstick usually involves malice, absurdity, and

violence which more often than not exceed the boundaries of standard comedy. *Clownish humour*, on the other hand, is characterised by simple playfulness, foolishness, and humorous exaggeration; it entertains through jokes or antics, which frequently involve vigorous arm and leg movements. When it comes to *surprise*, it is far more cognitively demanding but equally benevolent and founded upon sudden or unexpected changes of concepts or images (of which more in the sections to follow).

As far as *misunderstanding* is concerned, it entails failure to understand something or someone correctly. What is more, “it tends more toward victim humour in that it reflects laughing at others’ ignorance or disappointment” (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004, p. 162). As regards *parody*, it can be defined as an imitation or distorted representation of someone or something with deliberate exaggeration for comic effect. It is usually strongly contextualised and thus requires considerable knowledge of the situation, genre, style or person that is being parodied (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004).

Irony and *satire*, on the other hand, represent the types of relatively pungent humour because they are “often antagonistic but cognitively more demanding than slapstick. Irony clusters with sarcasm and puns, whereas satire involves making fun of a well-known person or situation” (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004, p. 162). Referring to dictionary definitions, irony can be described as expressing oneself by means of “using language that normally signifies the opposite, typically for humorous or emphatic effect” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.). It is aimed at conveying something that “seems deliberately contrary to what one expects and is often wryly amusing as a result” (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries* n.d.). Another set of definitions points out to the ambiguity involved, suggesting that irony should be understood as “an expression or utterance marked by a deliberate contrast between apparent and intended meaning” (*American Heritage Dictionary* n.d.), or to inconsistency through “incongruity between what might be expected and what actually occurs” (*American Heritage Dictionary* n.d.). Satire may involve irony as well but it usually aims at exaggerating or ridiculing someone or something with a view to exposing and/or criticising various vices or inanities. It is therefore associated with humour which attacks human foolishness and flaws through irony, derision, or caustic wit.

The state-of-the-art picture of humour categories boils down to three major types thereof, namely, to *incongruity-resolution*, *superiority*, and *relief theory*. The first one to be discussed below is a cognitive theory (Attardo,

1994) having its roots in the works of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Aristotle (Pluszczyk, 2017a, p. 58). It holds that “humour is seen as a consequence of the discrepancy between two mental representations, one of which is an expectation and the other is some other idea or a percept” (Nerhardt, 1976, p. 47). It therefore rests on the revisitation of initially activated concepts that have to be suppressed for the more relevant and compatible meaning to get across (Giora, 2003).

The other (i.e., the superiority theory) is classified as a social theory (Attardo, 1994) related to ego-boosting comparisons between the perceiver and other individuals that flow from the feeling of being better than or superior to them. Its origins go back to Bergson, Hobbes, and Plato (Pluszczyk, 2017a, p. 58) whose aim was to “dissect the dark and twisted side of humour” (McGraw & Warner, 2015, p. 120) which involves decorum violation, bias, and stereotyping, that is, all “humour communications in which one party is disparaged or aggressed against by another party” (Suls, 1976, p. 41). The last one to be mentioned in this chapter will be the relief theory of humour, which can be categorised as a psychoanalytic theory (Attardo, 1994) that draws on Freud, for instance (Pluszczyk, 2017a, p. 58). According to this theory, humour constitutes a form of venting pent-up energy or easing nervous tension; hence, humour offers relief from negative feelings, usually through laughter.

It can therefore be stated that each of the categories listed by Buijzen and Valkenburg (2004) can actually relate to one or more of the three main theories of humour proposed in the preceding paragraphs:

Incongruity theory explains the humorousness of the more innocuous humour categories (i.e., clownish humour, surprise, misunderstanding). For example, surprise involves incongruous narratives and unexpected events. *Superiority theory* explains some of the less innocuous categories (i.e., satire, irony) because these humour categories involve outwitting others and laughing at the less fortunate. Finally, *relief theory* could explain the antagonistic nature of slapstick humour. Even though the three humour theories can explain one or more specific humour categories, some categories can be explained by more than one theory. For instance, slapstick can be explained by all three theories: it encompasses coincidence (incongruity theory), malicious delight (superiority theory), and aggressiveness (relief theory). (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004, pp. 162–163)

4.2.1 Incongruity-Resolution Theory

Most jokes make up a discourse that best exposes our tendency to opt for the salient interpretation first. They exploit the fact that we wear mental blinkers, which, in the absence of apparent evidence to the contrary, keep us attending to the most salient interpretation initially. [...] Jokes indeed tend to involve some salience imbalance that invites the comprehender to process the more salient but eventually incompatible meaning first [...] in order to dispense with it and activate a less salient but congruent meaning. (Giora, 2003, p. 168)

First and foremost, humour may be engendered by dissonance, juxtaposition, and contrast which expose the unusual, the surprising, and the incongruous that change the incipiently assumed meaning of the message. In the light of this meaning change, contrast, in a broad sense, can be treated as something more than just a stylistic operation since it can also be perceived as a tool of information construction and processing (cf. Stwora, 2017) which rests on different shades of meaning. What is more, “it has been observed that some meanings are so salient they resist suppression even when they are not instrumental to the comprehension process” (Giora, 2003, p. 27).

Having said that, it will come as no surprise that the main focus of this section is to shed light on the mechanism of incongruity that, as the name suggests, rests on some kind of incompatibility or discordance which appears at the intersection between two concepts or elements involved, hence carrying humorous potential. It is “understood in psychology as a deviation from the cognitive model of reference, or, from a linguistic viewpoint, a mismatch or contrast between two meanings” (Dynel, 2011b, p. 3). By its very nature, incongruity “represents a violation of expectation. An unexpected concatenation of events, a conspicuous mismatching, an unlikely pairing of cause and effect—all of these have in common a violation of normal expectancy” (Bruner & Postman, 1949, p. 208).

In his book entitled *The Act of Creation*, Koestler (1964) discusses three main forms of human creativity which comprise art, discovery, and humour. This triad, strange as it seems, shares a common feature, for each of the notions listed above displays “[...] a specific type of bisociation ~ bisociativity between the two frames of reference (worlds of discourse)” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 15; cf. Dynel, 2011a, 2018; Johnson, 1976; Koestler, 1964; Krikmann, 2006 (and numerous references therein); Norrick, 1986, 1987). The cognitive theory of bisociation reads as follows:

[Bisociation means] perceiving of a situation or idea [...] in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference [...]. The event [...], in which the two intersect, is made to vibrate simultaneously on two different wavelengths, as it were. While this unusual situation lasts, [the event] is not merely linked to one associative context, but bisociated with two. (Koestler, 1964, p. 35)

“In the case of humour, it means comic collision of or oscillation between two frames of reference ~ worlds of discourse ~ codes ~ associative contexts” (Krikmann, 2006, p. 28) because humour is about “shifting [...] a sign (a word, an action) from its context” (Dorfles, 1968, p. 101). In spite of the fact that, from a strictly linguistic point of view, the theory of bisociation (which is also roughly coextensive with the notion of script opposition (Raskin, 1985) to be described in the sections to follow) may not seem very revealing and structured, “its applications to the linguistics of humour have been numerous and interesting [...] and its terminology is widely used” (Attardo, 1994, p. 175). That is why the proposition adumbrated above can be seen as an introduction to the incongruity theory.

“Incongruity theories are essentially cognitive, that is, they are based on some objective characteristics of a humorous text or other act (situation, event, picture, etc.)” (Krikmann, 2006, p. 27). Being labelled as the most influential approach to the study of humour, *incongruity* is defined as “a mismatch stemming from the structural features of a stimulus or as a clash with expectations and mental patterns” (Dyner, 2013b, p. 26, cf. Morreall, 1989, 2009). It is also described as “a mismatch, disharmony or contrast between ideas or elements in the broadest possible sense” (Attardo, 1994, p. 48), and this contrast between what the perceiver expects and what he actually encounters constitutes the bedrock of the incongruous juxtaposition theory.

In general, it can be said that “it depends on the likelihood of the less accessible/salient interpretation to be relevant to and included within the category proposed initially” (Giora, 2003, p. 168) which was originally assumed by the perceiver. In purely cognitive terms, the notion of incongruity may also be described as “a conceptual shift, a jolt to our picture of the way things are supposed to be” (Morreall, 1983, p. 60), or as a “discrepancy between two mental representations, one of which is an expectation [...] and the other is some idea or percept” (Suls, 1983, p. 41). The role and operation of incongruity in humour is aptly explained

in the citations below which refer to mental spaces and frame-shifting mechanisms:

The sense of nonsense comes from the exposed (if typically unarticulated) contradiction that must underlie any faulty inference in a mental space. [...] It is not incongruity in a stimulus that causes humour; it just happens to be the case that incongruity in a stimulus often plays a part in the discovery of a faulty mental space and its deconstruction. (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p. 400)

The recipient begins to process textual or other information reducing it to the most accessible ~ salient ~ “preprimed” script, and proceeds until the interpretation bounces over a semantic obstacle and fails. Then some instantaneous cognitive work will be done to overcome the contradiction and another interpretation that has so far remained hidden can be found. The renewal of understanding is attended by the emotion of surprise and satisfaction. (Krikmann, 2006, p. 27)

As such, with regard to the frame-shifting (or script-switching, as it is labelled in the Script-based Semantic Theory of Humour and the General Theory of Verbal Humour) approach and the Graded Saliency Hypothesis, incongruity takes place when dissimilarities between the concepts involved are perceivable “while the points of convergence are covert” (Dynel, 2009, p. 33). This clash may be perceived as astounding or simply funny in itself but researchers in the field of humour agree that it is at the point of *resolution* of the incongruity that the interpreter realises its funniness (Attardo, 1994; Mulder & Nijholt, 2002; Dynel, 2009).

“It is here argued that resolution operating on various cognitive rules is [...] of crucial significance to humour appreciation” (Dynel, 2013b, p. 28). This particular conceptualisation of humour finds corroboration in Maier (1932), for instance, who also claimed that “the experience of humour, together with other forms of insight, involves a sudden and unexpected restructuring of the elements culminating in a solution” (Dynel, 2018, p. 3). Humorous incongruity and surprise therefore result from a lesser degree of saliency that, upon incongruity resolution, is found to be relevant in a given communicative situation despite its initial escaping the perceiver’s attention (Giora, 2003).

In their seminal studies, Suls (1972, 1983) and Shultz (1972, 1976), *inter alia*, demonstrated that humour is perceived at the moment of realisation and resolution of a contradiction or inconsistency, thus giving rise

to the Incongruity-Resolution Theory (IRT), “which states that humour is perceived at the moment of realisation of incongruity between a concept involved in a certain situation and the real objects thought to be in some relation to the concept” (Pinar Sanz, 2013, p. 14). It assumes that funniness springs from a two-stage process which involves (1) incongruity (I) *per se* and (2) incongruity-resolution (IR). In the course of the former, the perceiver finds his initial expectations about the concepts disconfirmed (Suls, 1972, 1983). When it comes to the latter, he “engages in a form of problem solving to find a cognitive rule” (Suls, 1972, p. 82) governing the incongruity encountered so as to process the message properly, reconcile the incompatible concepts or scenarios, and thus make them more congruent (cf. Yus, 2016; Piskorska, 2017). “Accordingly, having completed the incongruity and resolution stages, the interpreter re-appreciates the nature of the incongruity and its resolution” (Dynel, 2009, p. 29).

In other words, everyone has some expectations and makes certain assumptions about the material to which he is attending and humour occurs when new perceptual data alters these previous assumptions (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017), making the perceiver work towards incongruity resolution. Relevant evidence for this assumption comes from Suls, who maintains that “the humour stimulus is deliberately constructed to play-off these expectations and thus generates incongruity. After this stage has occurred, the respondent is motivated to resolve or make sense of the incongruity” (Suls, 1976, p. 41).

Thus, what is simply observed as surprising prior to the stage of resolution is given new power to engender humour when the recipient perceives an incongruity and resolves it, which leads the interpreting part to generate many possible meanings behind an incongruity in search for explanation. To resolve an incongruity, it is imperative to seek certain similitudes or points of resemblance between the attributes possessed by the concepts which, once found, are capable of “granting the interpreter the pleasurable feeling of cognitive satisfaction consequent upon his/her arrival at a resolution and the resultant appreciation of humour” (Dynel, 2009, p. 33). At this point, let it be noted that the incongruity-resolution mechanism is widely used in advertising to make ads more attractive through the element of surprise.

By appreciation of the advertiser’s ingenuity, the hearer is expected to develop a positive attitude towards him and the product. The world of advertising must be very surprising for the audience in order to maintain its saliency, and this can be achieved by constantly new

combinations of entities and context. The possibilities are infinite, the only limit being human imagination. (Wojtaszek, 2002, p. 158)

Consequently, the picture becomes even clearer when the perceiver recognises that humorous incongruity is based primarily on surprise and novelty, with violated expectations or rules of grammar (either verbal or visual) being the triggers that bring about suddenness, unexpectedness, and freshness (cf. Suls, 1972; Morreall, 1983; Forabosco, 2008; Dynel, 2009, 2013b). All in all, “the explicit razing of a previously committed belief in a mental space can be nothing if not surprising” (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p. 399; cf. Morreall, 1983; Dynel, 2013b). The perceiver first nurtures some expectations about the script encountered and when his or her expectations are violated by what he or she has not expected to happen, he or she is suddenly caught off guard, which causes humour (Morreall, 1983; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011; Dynel, 2013b). That is why incongruity in advertising, for example, rests on “juxtapositions of referents not normally associated” (Mac Cormac, 1990, p. 1).

Nonetheless, as claimed by Attardo (2001) and Raskin (1985), it is not the stimulus itself that carries the humorous load but rather contradictory or incoherent scripts activated in the mind of the perceiver (cf. Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017). Nothing is intrinsically funny all by itself because amusement is born in the mind of the perceiver. It is the realisation that the perceiver has made a mistake in his previous reasoning connected with the construction of a particular mental space that can amuse or please the recipient.

At this point, it seems useful to address the issue of the model that takes the Incongruity-Resolution (IR) Theory as its basis, namely, the Surprise Disambiguation (SD) model developed by Ritchie (1999) which best illustrates and summarises the IR process itself. This model, based on the two-stage model by Suls (1972), proposes several processing steps which are essential to interpret the humorous:

- a text is read, make predictions
- while no conflict with predictions, keep going
- if input conflicts with predictions:
 - if not ending—PUZZLEMENT
 - if it is the ending, try to resolve:
 - no rule found—PUZZLEMENT
 - cognitive rule found—HUMOUR. (Mulder & Nijholt, 2002, p. 14)

The two-stage model presented above assumes that the appearance of the conflicting element (originally: the punch line, yet the input that conflicts with initial predictions can actually take any form, not only linguistic or limited solely to punch lines) results in an incongruity which needs to be resolved by means of a certain cognitive rule that would make the message coherent. Nevertheless, Suls does not specify how to define a cognitive rule, nor the operation thereof, so it can be said that “the two-stage model relies on some (undefined) form of ‘humorous logic,’ and so leaves the difficult problem of ‘incongruity’ relatively untouched” (Mulder & Nijholt, 2002, p. 14). In this context, and in the light of more recent research on the topic, “incongruity resolution may sometimes be tantamount to the hearer’s conscious acknowledgement of incongruity’s presence, and thus cognitive mastery of a stimulus, with no clear cognitive rule being specified (cf. Ruch, 1992)” (Dyrel, 2013b, p. 28).

Ritchie (1999), on the other hand, advanced the SD model assuming that “there are two different interpretations for the set-up of a joke, one more obvious to the audience than the other” (Mulder & Nijholt, 2002, p. 13), that is, one more and the other less salient. The perceiver is not aware of the incongruity and hence of the less salient element until the trigger (termed the “script-switch trigger” (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1998) or the “disjunctor point” (Giora, 2003)) in the form of a conflicting element appears and evokes the other meaning. The model therefore requires an ambiguous setup because “having decided that the text is intended as a joke, the hearer concludes that the two senses are supposed to co-exist humorously” (Yus, 2003, p. 1299). This statement stays in line with the general tenets of the classical IR theory, which, by way of a reminder, holds that “one interpretation is initially taken to be the case, and another supplants it later” (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p. 289). Citing Giora:

The strongly felt mismatch of meaning salience and context at the disjunctor point triggers the need for a revisitation. The more salient meaning or script [...] has to be abandoned in favour of a less salient interpretation or script [...]. Note that even when the initial context is supportive of the less salient meaning, the salient meaning is activated initially, regardless of context. (Giora, 2003, p. 169)

In a nutshell, the perceiver first assumes the most plausible interpretation, which results from the initial script, but once he reaches the “disjunctor point” (Giora, 2003), he is caught off guard when he realises

that his initial interpretation was simply wrong. It is at this point of script clash and revision of predictions that he is able to perceive the message as humorous. “Thus, the processing of humour comprises two characteristic stages: (1) resolution of a schema-incongruity in order to ‘get the joke’ (cognitive stage), and (2) experience of positive affect (affective stage)” (Strick et al., 2013, p. 8).

The incongruous juxtaposition of concepts has great potential for the production of perceptual surprise which engenders humour. This surprise flows from the violation of expectations as to the final interpretation, that is, from the perceiver’s filling of a schematic slot with an unexpected or less salient script (Forceville, 2009). “In the light of all this, incongruity is here defined as a cognitive state caused by a surprising/unexpected stimulus which diverts from the cognitive model of reference (Forabosco, 1992, 2008)” (Dynel, 2013b, p. 27). The said cognitive model is used by the perceiver to interpret incoming stimuli, for it “highlights the comparative and interpretative aspect: a model is a sort of preliminary representation and minitheory which the subject uses in his relationship with reality” (Forabosco, 1992, p. 54; Forabosco, 2008, p. 48). The surprisingness of a stimulus is, predictably, dependent upon individual experience and thus upon individual cognitive model reference (cf. Morreall, 1983; Dynel, 2013b). Consequently, upon encountering an incongruity, the perceiver’s cognitive model of reference is violated, thus engendering a conceptual shift (Morreall, 1983) from his initial expectations conditioned by his conceptual system (Dynel, 2013b). “In this vein, it can be said that humour involves the enjoyment of cognitive shifts, i.e. the enjoyment of sudden changes (Morreall, 2010)” (Dynel, 2018, p. 3).

To my mind, Dynel (2013b) is particularly worthy of notice for her attempt to link humorous incongruity with a kind of psychologically-proven mental discomfort experienced by people who hold two (or more) contradictory values, ideas or beliefs. She draws an interesting parallel between humorous incongruity and the theory of social psychology known as *cognitive dissonance*, advanced by Festinger (1957) and expounded by Cooper (2007). The premise of the theory in question is that people in general do not tolerate inconsistency in their actions or reasoning, as inconsistent cognitions arouse dissonance and uncomfortable psychological tension. Faced with discrepant cognitions, people feel motivated to reduce them and compelled to restore consistency in some way.

This point is also raised by Yus who says that “human cognition does not like to encounter incongruities, and when it does, it is eager to solve

it as part of a biologically-rooted tendency to rule out discrepancies in the individual's picture of the world" (Yus, 2016, pp. 86–87). "Contrary to cognitive dissonance, however, incongruity conducive to humorous effects cannot be fully resolved, with residual incongruity (Forabosco, 2008) remaining" (Dynel, 2013b, p. 28) because some tension will still linger for the humorous experience to take place (cf. Suls, 1983; Forabosco, 1992, 2008; Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Oring, 2003).

Another psychological aspect worth mentioning is that of cognitive safety (Morreall, 1987), that is, of a state that fosters relaxation and/or uninhibited processing. That is because "a cognitive shift promoted by incongruity must be taken playfully by an individual disengaged from ordinary concerns" (Dynel, 2013b, p. 28) for him to appreciate the humorous content to the fullest and to actually see the incongruity, that is, to see that his interpretations differ in an amusing way.

What does it mean for two interpretations to differ in an amusing way (as opposed to merely not being the same)? [...] The amusement IS the sense of discovering the false committed active belief. It is often, but not always, two in interpretations of something that bring this to light. In fact, the two interpretations are *always* "merely not the same," as Ritchie (1999) says. It is not that they "differ in an amusing way"; it is *the way the difference is discovered* that is amusing. The humour lies in what their difference points out about the mistake the audience has made. (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p. 291)

Mirthful pleasure, therefore, results from incongruity resolution, since it is not enough for two things, patterns, situations or scripts to differ; rather, the way in which this difference is discovered is responsible for producing humorous response. By virtue of the fact that the situation involves finding a thought-perception mismatch (Michalik & Sznicer, 2017), it is the mistake in reasoning that is funny. "Yus suggested that the realisation that one has been fooled by the joke teller, coupled with 'a positive interaction of the joke with the addressee's cognitive environment,' helps explain the humorous effect" (Yus, 2003, p. 1313)" (Ritchie, 2005, p. 280).

Such a "fooling device" in the form of incongruity is relatively easy to produce in a message because the introduction of an inappropriate element can take place at any language level (in terms of prosody, incongruity can be brought about by rhyming or alliteration; when it comes to semantics, it involves various conceptual juxtapositions; and as far as pragmatics is

concerned, it can be introduced by competing presuppositions, “violation of language norms and rules or logical principles, appeal to quasi-logical principles, lack of fit between the statement and reality/the state of affairs, or a mismatch between an utterance and the accompanying non-verbal expression)” (Dyner, 2013b, p. 26). In short, it suffices for a principle governing a given level to be violated for incongruity to emerge (cf. Morreall, 1989, 2009) and, upon resolution, cause “a comic collision of or oscillation between two frames of reference / worlds of discourse / codes / associative contexts” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 17); as shown, the humorous capacity resides in this incongruity-resolution pattern and is regularly used to execute humour.

This, in turn, works because people expect to encounter humorous effects “as part of the mutually manifest information” (Yus, 2016, p. 87) between the parties involved and because they find pleasure in both solving incongruities and being “fooled” by the addressor. As noted by Morreall, the pleasure of humour “is not the enjoyment of incongruity, but the enjoyment of a kind of puzzle solving similar to what scientists do” (Morreall, 2009, p. 15), which was colloquially called *the aha-moment* (Yus, 2016). Still, nota bene, not all incongruity is humorous (Ritchie, 2005; Venour, Ritchie, & Mellish, 2011) and detection and perception of incongruity is conditioned by usually unconscious, individual decisions. In closing, it seems suitable to quote Giora:

[...] [A]utomatic access of salient information is a “rational” process, after all. It avails information that might be intended, affecting seamless integration with context; it avails information that might be used in spite of contextual misfit; it avails information deemed necessary for deliberate manipulations (such as humour). Contrary to appearances, then, the mind is neither “stupid” (Fodor, 1983) nor wasteful. (Giora, 2003, p. 60)

4.2.2 Superiority Theory and Disparaging Humour

Apart from humorous incongruity, humour can also stem from a feeling of superiority over the target of a joke or pun. Such a feeling causes amusement, satisfaction or mirthful pleasure in the hearer resulting from his enhanced self-esteem, which is usually due to a downward comparison. If the humorous situation involves a certain *butt*, that is, someone or something at which ridicule is directed, we deal with disparaging humour which constitutes the core of the *superiority theory of humour*. “There are numerous

accounts of humour which victimises the target via disparagement, belittlement, debasement, degradation, humiliation, etc.” (Dyner, 2013b, p. 28), and this debasing variety which belongs to the class of affective-evaluative theories will receive consideration here.

In essence, people laugh at the misfortunes of others owing to the fact that others’ weaknesses, hardships, and flaws make them feel triumphant and simply better than the unlucky targets. Nasty as it sounds, others’ faults and misadventures make the perceiver automatically assert his superiority in his laughing at the inferior or the unfortunate and at their stupid acts or awkwardness (Berlyne, 1969; LaFave, 1972; Zillmann, 1983; Mulder & Nijholt, 2002; Legman, 2006/1968; Dyner, 2013b; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017; Pluszczyk, 2017a, 2017b). The theory in question therefore holds that humour follows from the misfortune suffered by the butt of the joke and the perceiver’s feelings of superiority over other, less-fortunate people (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017; Michalik & Sznicer, 2017).

This stance was already taken up by Morreall who claimed that humour results from “nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly” (Morreall, 1983, p. 5). Hence, it can be said that humour viewed through the lens of superiority theory involves some form of winner/loser logic (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004; Martin, 2007; Michalik & Sznicer, 2017). Even “Plato, in some of the earliest known musings on the subject, argued that people laugh out of malice, delighting in other’s pain and misfortune” (McGraw & Warner, 2015, p. 122), which testifies to the presence of an aggressive element in this type of humour (Ritchie, 2005).

Indeed, aggression-based theories state that superiority humour is a form of attack by the joke teller on the butt of the joke, which can be either individual or collective. “The aggression approach gains credibility from the persistent popularity of jokes that play on stereotypes about particular ethnic and religious groups, women, and other social categories, often focusing on lower status and powerless groups” (Ritchie, 2005, p. 277; cf. Krikmann, 2006; Raskin, 1985). Deprecating humour is therefore simply malicious because it is used to display aggressive behaviour, as well as to establish and enjoy superiority under the mask of humour (Legman, 2006/1968).

There is a host of jokes that ridicule sexual, ethnic or political minorities, which may lead to the assumption that a large part of humour comes from status differentials (Attardo, 2015), hence accentuating class

boundaries, for example. “Jokes of this nature often serve the dual purpose of excluding the target group and enhancing the social solidarity of the joke teller and audience (Attardo, 2001)” (Ritchie, 2005, p. 277), which proves that humour may both divide and unite, either through insinuation or explicit claims. The emphasis is put on the opposition “me versus the other,” which leads to hostility that surfaces in jokes in which mirth flows from the comparison to the other.

Such aggression (both actual and more or less harmless one expressed through humour) is bound to cause tension that can be released through laughter, which is also called “the channel of least resistance” (Krikmann, 2006, p. 29). In line with this statement, “Koestler (1964) argues that humour is motivated by aggressive and/or apprehensive, self-defensive or assaulting impulses, and laughter is said to be an act of overt or covert unloading of these impulses” (Krikmann, 2006, p. 29). This unloading can be related with another, less-fortunate being and with taboo topics, giving birth to ideological, religious, sexist, racist, homophobic, ethnic, offensive or scatological humour, for instance. Such jokes will naturally vary in hostility levels, depending on the joke teller, on his worldview and disposition, as well as on the context in which the joke appears.

Specific sociocultural contexts obviously result in various requirements concerning the rules of politeness and, hence, of hostility levels. It was Ritchie (2005) who said that superiority theory of humour is founded upon the subversion of polite realities. As he explains: “[T]he deeper social truth expressed by a joke is likely to be subversive, at least in the sense that it contradicts the polite fictions or ‘stipulated’ realities by which we ordinarily conduct our everyday social interactions” (Ritchie, 2005, p. 281). This claim gives support to the statement that “comedy can divide and degrade” (McGraw & Warner, 2015, p. 119), as well as that “humour comes from a dark place” (McGraw & Warner, 2015, p. 120), which seems quite evident if we look at disparaging humour that can potentially hurt people and damage interpersonal relations as well (Morreall, 2009). Making things funny can often mean crossing the line between what is humorous and what can be considered distasteful or simply rude (cf. Stwora, 2020a), which, nonetheless, does not stop people from using disparaging humour on a daily basis.

In the armamentarium of human competition, scorn, insult, and mocking are well-tested weapons. Putting someone down by humorously demonstrating an infirmity in their cognitive capacities effi-

ciently makes the humourist and the addressed audience look superior in comparison, [...] at the same time making the humourist appear good natured, not just angry or aggrieved. This is a common use of humour in modern society, but not its original or even secondary purpose, which is, more plausibly, the demonstration of intellectual prowess (with or without a target or butt of the joke) to potential mates and allies. (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, pp. 399–400)

Expounding on the topic, Hurley, Dennett, and Adams claim that, under this theory, the humorous frame can be extended to encompass superiority through intellect expressed by means of puns, which are described as “[...] a game of wits where the punner proves to the listener his superlative mastery of words” (McGraw & Warner, 2015, p. 123). Disparaging humour is hence also about showing that someone has a ready tongue and is truly sharp-witted, which is why this humour variety scores well as a way of humour elicitation (cf. Pluszczyk, 2017b).

Interestingly, it also emerges that, except for the “feeling of superiority in finding something laughable” (Michalik & Sznicer, 2017, p. 21) due to some kind of downward comparison, the superiority theory of humour eagerly points to various failures for one more reason, namely, to make people realise their mistakes in the mental models assumed. As already stated in the part devoted to the incongruity theory, “the identification of failure is central to humour” (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p. 400) and while the incongruity theory deals with conceptual discrepancies found in opposing scripts, the one of superiority is all about showing different shades of failures or about exporting “a particular unwanted trait to some other group [...] [to] laugh at their folly, perhaps glad or relieved that it is not our own” (Davies, 1990, p. 7).

In spite of the aggressive aspect of such humour, it is vital to remember that it may serve a good cause too, for example, in the form of benevolent humour which “describes a humorous outlook on life that entails the realistic observations and understanding of human weaknesses (and the imperfection of the world) [...] [and] their benevolent humorous treatment” (Ruch & Heintz, 2016, p. 35). As the name suggests, this type of humour treats human weaknesses benevolently, with a view to showing what is wrong, yet in a well-meaning manner. Apart from that, aggressive overtones can also enable release of pent-up tension, which is captured by the relief theory.

4.2.3 Relief Theory

The pivotal tenet of the relief theory is that humour, and especially humorous laughter, is a manifestation of the release of nervous tension or pent-up nervous energy (Critchley, 2002; Mulder & Nijholt, 2002; Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017; Michalik & Sznicer, 2017). Support is here given to a view that there is some kind of mental or emotional strain that needs to be eased through humour, which acts as a means of comic relief (cf. Morreall, 2009) and hence enables re-evaluation of a difficult or serious experience (Piskorska, 2017). The advocates of this theory believe that thought processes, especially in stressful situations, can cause nervous tension and once this built-up tension is released through positive emotions, a person experiences humour and/or laughs (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017, p. 83), which can be likened to catharsis. In other words, “when this energy is released we experience laughter, not only because of the release of this energy, but also because these taboo thoughts are being entertained” (Mulder & Nijholt, 2002, p. 4).

This class of theories is focused mainly on the recipient of humour, or more specifically, on the psychological effects humour allegedly brings about in the recipient. Freud considers humour one of the so-called substitution mechanisms which enable to convert one’s socially tabooed aggressive impulses to acceptable ones and thus avoid wasting additional mental energy to suppress them. (Krikmann, 2006, p. 28)

As seen through the lens of the relief theory, which is a theory of physiological or psycho-physiological nature (Rutter, 1997), humour elicitation is most likely to be connected with a taboo, for example, sex, fears, stress, perversion, frustrations, neuroses or even illness, disabilities, and death (Pluszczyk, 2017a, pp. 58–59; cf. Mulder & Nijholt, 2002), which becomes funny in the punch line thanks to comic relief that comes with re-evaluation. “In this view, humour is mainly used to reveal suppressed desires and to overcome sociocultural inhibitions” (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004, pp. 147–148), to release nervous psychological tension (cf. Berlyne, 1972; Blackford, Gentry, Harrison, & Carlson, 2011), or to act as “a strong buffer against stress and anxiety” (Bury, 2020, p. 178). It therefore acts as a pressure-relief valve, so to speak, usually culminating in outbursts of laughter that bring about release of tension.

Naturally, “today almost no scholar in philosophy or psychology explains laughter or humour as a process of releasing pent-up nervous energy” (Morreall, 2016) because whatever energy is expended when someone laughs, it seems far-fetched to claim that this energy is superfluous in any way. Contemporary researchers hence refute the claims made by Spencer (1911) and Freud (1974/1905) that the energy released through laughter is the one of repressing thoughts and emotions which require venting. By way of explanation, Freud assumed that “the energy released in laughing at a joke is the energy normally used to repress hostile and sexual feelings” (Morreall, 2016). What would follow from this presumption is that people who laugh hardest at sexual or aggressive jokes should be likely to repress hostile and sexual feelings. Yet it was as early as in the 1970s that Eysenck (1972) showed that the informants who enjoyed aggressive and/or sexual humour the most were not repressing such feelings, but rather expressing them. Having found out that the relief theory can easily be challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds, “philosophers and psychologists studying humour today do not appeal to Freud’s theory to explain laughter or humour. More generally, the Relief Theory is seldom used as a general explanation of laughter or humour” (Morreall, 2016). Furthermore, the theory presented in this section fails to give any adequate explanation as to why people find certain things funny, hence perhaps being more suitable to describe laughter (as a physiological reaction to the humorous) instead of humour (which is more cognitive) (Mulder & Nijholt, 2002).

What seems appealing in the theory in question, however, is the social aspect of humour and laughter (see Stwora, 2020b) for a detailed account of the sociopragmatic and strategic functions of humour). It is due to the fact that humour can successfully serve as an icebreaker, lead to stress reduction, persuade and motivate others. Humour makes it easier to say the unspeakable (Barsoux, 1993) and communicate face-threatening messages (Liu, 2015; Dynel, 2017), especially in more formal contexts in which there is not much room for humour. In this respect, it is correct to speak of humour and release of tension since enjoyment of a joke is in something that was being repressed in more serious or formal contexts and is finally released through humour (Billig, 1997) to ease mental and/or emotional strain (Berlyne, 1972; Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004). When it comes to joking itself, on the other hand, “the tension involved in searching for a solution may be released when the ‘meaning’ of a joke is discovered” (Yus, 2003, p. 1314), that is, when the incongruity found results in some kind of relief, as people “experience a pleasant sensation when humour

replaces negative feelings like pain or sadness” (Mulder & Nijholt, 2002, p. 4).

Approached from this angle, humour is a matter of pleasure connected with cognitive relief, which was already noted by, for example, Bowers and Osborn (1966) in their discussion of metaphorical expressions. They argued that “a metaphorical expression is a semantic anomaly, the recognition of which leads to negative tension [...]. When the metaphorical meaning is finally understood, the negative tension is relieved” (Sopory & Dillard, 2002, p. 385). There comes the three-stage process of recognising such an anomaly, that is, the perception of an error, unexpected similarity or novelty, recognition of the conflict, and resolution, which obviously (and correctly) makes us think of the incongruity-resolution model. Finding the meaning intended by the addressor is thus pleasurable in that it dissipates any negative tension, which, in turn, can be conducive to relief. “The reward of pleasure or relief leads to reinforcement of the metaphorical meaning and the evaluation associated with it. In contrast, literal language does not pose any linguistic puzzle to resolve and consequently yields neither pleasure nor relief” (Sopory & Dillard, 2002, p. 385). In the same vein, it can be argued that the dissipation of negative tension entails that the metaphorical meaning and its evaluation can be reinforced, thereby increasing the persuasive appeal (Sopory & Dillard, 2002).

It should be kept in mind that the theories of humour outlined herein can interpermeate, which means that many instances of humour can be explained by more than one of the theories summarised (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004). In fact, it becomes apparent that humour, in all its theoretical dimensions, rests on some kind of incongruity (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017), as even the superiority theory is based on laughing at the other (i.e., at what is different, disparate or incongruous) and the relief theory is founded upon the change of state from arousal to release and relief (Koch, 1989) (which, again, range between two extremes and hence are naturally incongruous). Acknowledging that resolvable incongruity captures the workings of all humour types, the idea of incongruousness has permeated humour research so intensely that it was also applied by researchers in linguistics of humour.

4.3 The Linguistic Approach to Humour

Humour studies provide the questions, and linguistics provides the answers (when it can). (Attardo, 2017)

Having considered the key theories of humour, the chapter will now probe deeper into the linguistic approach to humour, all the forms of which stem from the incongruity theory (Krikmann, 2006). First, however, it seems suitable to refer to other useful theories that can shed some light on humour comprehension. It is widely acknowledged in academic research that, apart from the linguistic theories of humour that will be outlined herein, humour comprehension involves other models of utterance comprehension as well, namely, Sperber and Wilson's RT (see Dynel, 2009; Yus, 2016; Piskorska, 2017; and Wieczorek, 2019 on RT and humour), Fauconnier and Turner's conceptual blending theory (1998, 2002), and Giora's Graded Salience Hypothesis (2003) (cf. Solska, 2017). These must be kept in mind while trying to understand the workings of humour because all of them provide firm basis for grasping the essence of humorous communication.

This part of the book falls into several subsections. In the first place, I focus on the topic of salience that will aid in exploring the issue of comprehension in more detail. After that, I address the basic tenets of the Graded Salience Hypothesis outlined by Giora (2003) and then proceed to describe selected relevance-theoretic treatments of humour. Afterwards, the Script-based Semantic Theory of Humour and the General Theory of Verbal Humour will be described. Last but not least, the visual and multimodal means for producing humour will receive consideration.

4.3.1 Graded Salience Hypothesis

The following pages will concentrate on the Graded Salience Hypothesis sketched by Giora in an attempt to explain why and how polysemous words are weighted in favour of one meaning. The question she posed in her research was how "privileged meanings shape the way we understand language" (Giora, 2003, p. 3); to this end, she centred on understanding figurative and literal language, contextual factors in language interpretation, and salience (Giora, 1997, 2003), which collectively shape human linguistic behaviours.

For her, saliency is being the most frequent and "foremost on one's mind" (Giora, 2003, p. 15), and this primacy is established upon four pillars:

of conventionality, familiarity, frequency of use, and prototypicality (stereotypicality). Following this line of reasoning, the most frequent meaning of a polysemous word is the one that is perceived as the most common, in accordance with what is generally said in standard communicative situations. This regular way of communicating translates into greater familiarity with the form and its potential meanings, with which also comes frequency of use that results from ossifying patterns of communication. Thanks to repeated exposure to certain senses, meaning consolidation takes place and one meaning may become more accessible than others, hence establishing its prototypicality (cf. Rosch, 1973, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), that is, the quality of being more typical or more representative in a graded categorisation. Such stereotypical meanings are primed in the comprehender's mind and in his mental dictionary, leaving out other senses as marginalised and peripheral. It is essential to add here that the Graded Salience Hypothesis is primarily concerned with decontextualised meanings isolated from their sociolinguistic environment, yet it still acknowledges the effects of contextual information once the privileged meaning has to be suppressed due to coherency of the comprehension processes.

Giora further elaborates on gradation and dynamism, which are the most important features of salience (Giora, 2003). Gradation assumes that a wide range of possible senses can be attributed to a given expression, or even to a single word, and that the primacy of meaning can be graded according to its saliency without the activation of meanings which feel inappropriate in the specified context. In this view, "meaning salience is a graded notion, ranging between salient, less-salient, and non-salient outputs" (Fein, Yeari, & Giora, 2015, p. 3). Dynamism, on the other hand, presumes that inferred meanings may be adjusted in line with the context, so that the activation of less salient meanings takes place once the most salient one is rejected. In other words, there is a whole gamut of optional meanings on the ladder of signification but some are privileged and come to the perceiver's mind first, whilst others are simply blocked (Giora, 2003). Moreover, if this first, salient meaning disrupts comprehension and is thus excluded upon activation as not fitting the context, the perceiver's mind suppresses it and starts to search for another relevant meaning, as the comprehender starts to look for possible explanations (cf. Williams, 1992).

Insofar as the dynamic character of meaning making is concerned, there is no lack of disagreement as regards the stage at which the cognitive choice is made, which explains why various processing models have been

proposed by language researchers. Some argue that interpretation follows directly from the context and that the mind adjusts to it automatically, granting the perceiver selective access to relevant, contextually appropriate interpretation without considering the unsuitable senses (cf. Wilson, 1998; Bates, 1999). Others opt for the modular view and hence are of the opinion that all potential alternatives are accessed simultaneously (cf. Fodor, 1983).

Designed to explain the conditions under which a person chooses the most relevant meaning in a more accurate manner, the Graded Salience Hypothesis proposed by Giora presumes that access to meanings is ordered in the perceiver's mind and arranged from the most privileged to irrelevant ones, "regardless of contextual information or authorial intent" (Giora, 2003, p. 10), with contextual and linguistic processes running in parallel (Peleg, Giora, & Fein, 2001; Giora, 2003). It may be compared to a weave composed of many possible strings of meaning the perceiver's mind may follow upon hearing or seeing a particular expression. Furthermore, this weave forms a steady, predictable pattern, which makes it possible for the person who interprets the message to envisage the concept that is likely to follow. This can be supported by the citation below:

Importantly, the predictive contextual mechanism assumed by the Graded Salience Hypothesis is such that it allows for the anticipation of oncoming meanings and concepts rather than the specific words that have been selected to represent them. (Peleg et al., 2001; Giora, 2003, p. 23)

It is therefore possible to assume that a specified meaning will spring to the perceiver's mind, triggered by the preceding items encountered in a given context. Although the priority of one, more salient meaning over the other is a matter of convention, actually any meaning can be given primacy, depending on previous exposure to this sense and individual experience, as salience is the product of learning and acquaintance with language (Zajonc, 2000; Giora, 2003). Similarly, the consumer's experience of advertising discourse and mass media tells his mind that he should rely on the meanings rendered salient in the course of his lifetime, during which the formation of mental associations takes place. He becomes aware of the attributes and functions of the language of advertising, and of communication patterns as such, which allows for rapid recognition of intended meanings.

To conclude this part, it should be emphasised that “the notion of salience is probably one of the most important constructs in recent accounts of the intake, mental processing, and understanding of information by users of language” (Wojtaszek, 2014, p. 159) because it provides satisfactory and informative a model which explains the operation of graded and dynamic meanings. For the interpretation to be tapped, the multilayered network of semantic features of a polysemous element (linguistic, visual or multimodal) needs to be interpreted in the perceiver’s mind to access its most salient meaning primed in his mental lexicon. If the contextual and/or lexical processes lead to rejection of this salient meaning, it becomes suppressed and its alternatives are accessed instead. Latent interpretations are “activated only if there is no gradual increase in informative content in the most salient meaning and if the most salient meaning does not fit the context” (Solska, 2017); yet the activation of more salient meanings is never completely inhibited (cf. Giora, 2003).

With regard to humorous incongruity, works authored by Giora were already cited in this volume, for they are of great relevance to the development of models which rely on gradation of meanings and their salience. As a matter of fact, applied to humorous incongruity, Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis seems compatible with the frame-shifting approach. “According to Giora, we invariably access the most salient meaning first. Humour exploits this tendency by providing an initial account consistent with a highly salient interpretation; the punchline forces us to revisit initially activated, but contextually suppressed, concepts” (Ritchie, 2005 p. 279). This theoretic account hence acknowledges “active suppression of the original interpretation” (Ritchie, 2005 p. 279). Exploring the excerpt below, it is possible to come to a conclusion that salience is a force to be reckoned with because salience-based interpretations are not blocked by contextual information:

The Graded Salience Hypothesis also allows contextual information to play a significant role in comprehension. It may affect processing initially via its predictive mechanism (Peleg, Giora, & Fein, 2001) [...]. It may also affect suppression of inappropriate interpretations once they are detrimental to the appropriate interpretation (Giora et al., 2007). However, even when strongly biasing, contextual information will not block salient meanings and hence salience-based interpretations when incompatible. According to the Graded Salience Hypothesis, then, salient meanings and salience-based interpretations are privileged

[...], enjoying priority even when incompatible. (Fein, Yeari, & Giora, 2015, p. 4)

Though non-salient meaning alternatives that emerge are seen as the source of mismatch and require the perceiver to revisit his initial meaning choices, the more salient meaning, that is, “coded meaning foremost on our mind due to conventionality, frequency, familiarity or prototypicality” (Giora, 2003, p. 10), is still activated before the less salient but congruent one, even if the initial context supports the latter (Giora, 2003, p. 169). Studies into saliency prove that salient meanings, owing to their status, “are activated first, rejected as the intended meaning and reinterpreted in consistency with the Principle of Relevance” (Giora, 1998, p. 85), which situates the theory formulated by Giora in the wider context of RT (though it must be stressed, of course, that they should not be treated as synonymous).

4.3.2 Relevance-Theoretic Treatments of Humour

In his paper, Yus (2017) explains that RT may prove a suitable instrument of analysis when applied to the interpretation and effects of humour. Fitting the incongruity-resolution pattern, it comes as no surprise that the role of this framework in the comprehension procedure may prove crucial. Drawing upon the workings of RT, “the speaker is able to predict, to a greater or lesser extent, through which processes the interpreter is expected to go in an attempt to derive the intended interpretation” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 56). In essence, this knowledge allows the addressor to envisage possible interpretative stages and plan the message in such a way so as to produce particular desired effects, for example, induce a humorous response in the addressee. The humorous effect is said to be achieved thanks to “(a) extraction of a logical form, (b) ambiguity resolution, (c) reference assignment, (d) enrichment, and (e) deriving implicatures. Whereas the extraction of a logical form is a context-free stage, further procedures are inferential, so they are context-based” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 51, after Yus, 2003, pp. 1304–1308). Let us look at these procedures in more detail:

- (a) extraction of a logical form: this process takes place at the language level, centring solely on the output of linguistic decoding, without consideration of context or the addressor’s implicated message, and aims at developing a decoded message into a relevant one. The construction of the humorous effect may therefore be founded

upon modification or rearrangement of the order of noun or verb phrases. Because of human decoding capabilities, people tend to “choose the more effort-saving grammatical string” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 56), which may be used to engender humour. When the message is constructed with the humorous outcome in mind, “the communicator is likely to predict which interpretation would be chosen as the first one [...] in order to invalidate it later. So the hearer searches for the correct interpretation which, as it will turn out, was unlikely and was not taken into account earlier” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 57). The recipe for humour that emerges here is that the more likely interpretation proves incorrect despite being chosen first and the less likely one, accessed later, turns out to be valid.

- (b) ambiguity resolution: termed disambiguation in Forceville (2020), it is “connected with finding the intended interpretation of ambiguous terms when there are [at least] two equally competing meanings of a word” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 57). What this mechanism has in view is the removal of uncertainty when a polysemous or ambiguous expression appears in the text in order to determine which referent is actually meant. One interpretation, according to Yus, “is more stereotypical in the current context” (Yus, 2003, p. 1305) and should be arrived at by the perceiver to resolve the ambiguity.
- (c) reference assignment: this operation is performed based on location of “spatial-temporal referents for indexicals” (Yus, 2003, p. 1305). Put differently, it “pertains to the clarification of what person, event, or action in the world is signalled by a given word or phrase” (Forceville, 2020, p. 44). To create humour, the addressor of the message manipulates the set of referents for indexicals to be interpreted by the audience. Initially, the audience may be led towards choosing one referent but, as the discourse proceeds, they will realise that the initial choice was inconsistent with the information provided by other discursive and contextual cues; this, in turn, will cause them to search for alternative meaning that fits the context (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 59).
- (d) enrichment: the procedure consists in inferential processes that aid in making semantically incomplete expressions complete based on contextual data; as the very name suggests, it aims at enriching the meaning encoded through broadening or narrowing so as to result in an interpretation that is relevant enough (Sperber & Wilson,

1995, p. 256). As explained by Wieczorek (2019), “the communicator [...] leaves as much information incomplete as possible with the presumption that this semantic incompleteness can be easily filled out by the hearer” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 59), and this stage can be used to generate humour.

- (e) deriving implicatures: to recapitulate, “an implicature is an assumption which is recovered by the hearer with the presumption that the speaker observes the Principle of Relevance. In RT, a proposition may be strongly or weakly communicated (Sperber & Wilson, 1995)” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 60). Reporting on previous research on humour and RT, Wieczorek says that the derivation of multiple weak implicatures conduces to greater degrees of humorous effects (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 60, after Yus, 2003, p. 1307). It should be remembered that “the speaker’s task is to direct the hearer’s set of assumptions to help him/her arrive at the [...] relevant interpretation” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 69) but it is the audience who is deemed responsible for deriving implicatures (Yus, 2003; Jodłowiec, 1991a, 2008).

In fact, all these processes, including the coding phase itself, may be capitalised on to produce humorous effects (Yus, 2012a). Expectation of relevance makes the perceiver assume that incongruity will be resolved after extra inferencing effort that, in turn, will be offset by cognitive effects (Yus, 2017). He is then guided towards the less salient but more relevant sense, acknowledges the clash of meanings, and resolves the initial incongruity, which leads to humour. People are naturally capable of assessing the range of possible interpretations for a given input in a specific discursive situation determined by the context and of ranking them in terms of relevance. Nevertheless, the very assessment procedure takes place unconsciously, for it is impossible for an individual to be mindful of all possible interpretations. As a result, the perceiver automatically picks the most relevant one, usually paying no attention to lateral alternatives. That is exactly where humour can emerge: the audience is led to choose the initially relevant interpretation but this option proves inadequate and thus needs to be supplanted by the meaning which was first perceived as less likely but, in the end, turned out to be correct (Yus, 2017).

As such, “humorous interaction is bracketed off from normal interaction” (Barsoux, 1993, p. 50) because “normal rules governing serious interaction are momentarily suspended” (Barsoux, 1993, p. 49). Expecting cognitive

gains, for instance in the form of humour, pleasure or entertainment, the perceiver accepts “that he is entering or has just entered into a joking game [...]. The addressee accepts the fact that he is provided with an input which may be irrelevant, blatantly untrue or senseless and that conversational principles are straightforwardly violated” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 72). Following the line of thought offered by Grice (1975), humour violates the cooperative principle (CP) so frequently that “the claim that all jokes involve the violation of (at least) one maxim of the CP is commonplace in humour research” (Attardo, 1993, p. 541). The communicative principle of relevance proves useful since it sets a given message in a context, which serves as a cognitive environment, and implies conceptual meanings and implicatures conveyed in the said context. The trigger in the form of incongruity is treated as an ostensive stimulus to the perceiver’s cognitive system (Solska, 2017), which means that despite violating one or more maxims of conversation, the message is assumed to be produced deliberately and, therefore, to carry communicatively relevant content which is worth the processing effort on the part of the audience (see Chapter 2 for more information on RT and the following important contributors to relevance-theoretic treatments of humour: Jodłowiec (1991a, 1991b, 2008), Tanaka (1992), Attardo (1993), Curcò (1995), Piskorska (2005, 2016), Krikmann (2006), Yus (2003, 2008, 2016, 2017), Dynel (2012, 2013a, 2017), Solska (2012b), Wieczorek (2019)).

In deriving meanings, the addressee draws on contextual information he can glean from such sources as discourse surrounding the linguistic material being processed, the physical setting in which communication is taking place, and the assumptions provided by the words in the utterance being processed. [...] [W]ords encode mentally represented concepts and can serve as a springboard for inferentially deriving non-lexicalised, occasion specific concepts (e.g. metaphors). They give access to three types of information stored in the three “entries” of the concept:

1. lexical information: lexical and grammatical properties [...],
2. encyclopaedic information: folk and specialist assumptions, cultural beliefs and personal experience stored in the form of propositional representations, scenarios or scripts and mental images,
3. logical entry: a set of rules which apply to logical forms of which that concept is a constituent. (Solska, 2017)

In the course of comprehension, the perceiver follows the path of least cognitive effort; “hearers generally arrive at the first accessible interpretation which provides a balance between mental effort and cognitive effects” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 68). In a sense, in humorous communication, the audience is fooled into selecting the first meaning that ultimately proves inconsistent when the overall discursive context is taken into account. “As discourse is proceeding, incongruity occurs and has to be resolved by the surprised addressee who searches for an alternative interpretation which would be valuable for the whole text and consistent with the Principle of Relevance to yield the desired effects” (Wieczorek, 2019, p. 68). In contrast, let it be added that while the Graded Saliency Hypothesis referred to in the previous section clarifies the order in which both literal and humorous meanings are accessed, the major advantage of RT is that it offers an explanation as to what triggers deviation of meanings and “why the comprehender holds on to the extraneous meaning” (Solska, 2017).

It was Attardo who first said that “an area that might reveal itself a new prominent issue is the application of Relevance Theory to humour analysis” (Attardo, 1994, p. 334) but humorology had to wait long for any researcher to give the topic in question adequate consideration. An important, full-fledged treatment of humour from the relevance-theoretic perspective can be found in Yus (2016), although there have been some earlier attempts at handling the topic, for example, by Curcò (1995) and Jodłowiec (1991a, 1991b, 2008). In his book, Yus aims at exploring both the implications and applications of RT for humour production and interpretation, suggesting that the relevance-theoretic approach goes hand in hand with incongruity-resolution theories. This finds corroboration in Attardo (2017) who claims that “because Relevance Theory takes the principle of relevance to be inviolable (unlike Grice’s Cooperative Principle), relevance-theoretic accounts stress that relevance guides the inferential process both before and after the incongruity is found” (Attardo, 2017). Yus presents the “application of Relevance Theory, a cognitive pragmatics theory of human communication, to different types of humorous discourse” (Yus, 2016, p. xv). He puts forward a claim that people do not adopt any special interpretative procedures to process humorous discourse, but rather follow the usual cognitive criteria applied in standard, non-humorous varieties.

In the light of what was said in the previous chapters, it can be observed that several aspects resurface here: first of all, there is the claim that cognition itself is geared to the maximisation of relevance (Wilson & Sperber, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 1995) and that human mind dismisses

certain pieces of information while paying attention to others, which seem germane in a given situational context. Secondly, in both humorous and non-humorous communication, people make certain predictions about how the message is going to be contextualised and interpreted, as they base on shared cognitive structures, context, and inferential strategies. As Yus says,

[...] we have an evolved capacity to assess the strength and likelihood of these interpretations and end up selecting only one of these candidates, specifically the one yielding the best balance between the interest that it provides (positive cognitive effects in relevance-theoretic terminology) and the mental effort that its processing entails. (Yus, 2016, p. xvi)

What follows is that relevance helps the perceiver to make all the necessary conceptual adjustments to understand what is being communicated in a given message, with any gaps between the addressor's and addressee's meaning being filled by inference (cf. Yus, 2016). Citing Yus again, "a relevance-theoretic analysis of humour predicts that the hearer decodes the schematic text (e.g., a joke) and uses it as *evidence* of the speaker's (or writer's) humorous intentions" (Yus, 2016, p. 38). For example, in the case of humorous advertising discourse, the audience is familiar with the genre and the communicative purpose of the message is rather clear, as ads aim at selling a product or service. Furthermore, an important point to be made is that a message can produce non-propositional effects, which means that it may achieve relevance if it results in the production of emotions or impressions, or even in the enhancement of social relationships. Parenthetically, referring to the social aspect, Yus (2016) "demonstrates that the relevance of humorous utterances is often not associated with any informational or cognitive quality, but it rather tends to exert some influence upon interpersonal, interactive, and social relationships" (Ruiz-Moneva, 2018, p. 123), which directs our attention to the wider, sociocultural dimension of communication.

What emerges from this and other sections on RT presented in this volume is that humorous figurative discourse should be considered in its multidimensionality and that it may fruitfully be examined with an extensive range of research instruments which, to a certain extent, may complement each other. As regards humour, apart from relevance, conceptual blending theory can prove highly informative too, because it proposes a theory of online meaning construction, of information integration

from different mental spaces, and of emergent concepts and meanings (see Chapter 3). Each of the theories mentioned has its considerable benefits, yet none is completely sufficient in terms of explaining humour; for example, the model by Giora does not address the issue of inadmissible yet lingering meanings (Solska, 2017). RT does not explain the nature of emergent meanings, which is done by the conceptual integration theory, but this one has its shortcomings as well owing to the fact that it “does not explain which elements in the input spaces are selected and which are suppressed” (Solska, 2017). In view of the foregoing, it becomes apparent that the mechanism of humour is particularly difficult to examine with one tool only.

There are so many other linguistic forms of humour that can be studied and, as a matter of fact, may appear in ads too. For instance, puns are reported to be the most common form of humour allowing for a certain linguistic creativity and jocularly at the same time (Attardo, 1994) (for the most influential studies on puns and humour see: Attardo, 1994; Guidi, 2017 and the references therein; Raskin, 1985; Solska, 2017; Yus, 2003, 2016; on puns in advertising slogans see: Goddard, 1998; Tanaka, 1992, 1996; Van Enschoot, Hoeken, & Van Mulken, 2005; on processing puns see: Coulson & Oakley, 2000; Giora, 2003; Solska, 2012a, 2012b; Yus, 2003). Punning is not only verbal, though, as Forceville (1996) and Cook (2001) point out, for visual puns are more and more common in contemporary art and advertising alike.

Other widely studied instantiations of humour in language are irony (cf. Attardo, 2017; Attardo, Eisterhold, Hay, & Poggi, 2003; Doda-Wyszyńska, 2004; Gibbs & Izett, 2005; Giora, 2003; Haverkate, 1990; Ritchie, 2005; Shelley, 2001; Williams, 2017; Wilson & Sperber, 1992; Yus, 2016), sarcasm (Attardo, 2017; Attardo et al., 2003; Campbell, 2012; Haiman, 1998; Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989; Rockwell, 2006), satire (Dane, 1980; Grimm & Herman, 1991; Kreuz & Roberts, 1993), jokes (Attardo, 1989; Attardo & Chabanne, 1992; Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Chiaro, 1992; Dynel, 2012; Fónagy, 1982; Hetzron, 1991; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011; Palmer, 1994; Ritchie, 2004; Yus, 2016), wisecracks (Christianson, 1989; Tafoya, 2009), gags (Crafton, 1995; Demerulias, 1982; Palmer, 1994), parodies (Hutcheon, 1985; Rose, 1993; Kreuz & Roberts, 1993; Stone, 1977), riddles (Georges & Dundex, 1963; Weiner & Depalma, 1993), misprints or even graphology (Alexander, 1997), to name but a few. These will not be described herein due to the exceedingly large literature on the subject and its complexity. Instead, I will limit myself to the fundamentals of linguistic

theories of humour, namely, to key concepts provided by the Script-based Semantic Theory of Humour and its revised version known as the General Theory of Verbal Humour, which are both “cognitive-linguistic in the sense that they explore the interface between language and cognition in highly creative language use” (Brône & Feysaerts, 2004, p. 362).

4.3.3 The Script-based Semantic Theory of Humour (SSTH)

Because the world bombards people with countless stimuli, human mind is unable to analyse each and every one anew, which is why it resorts to simplified scripts or frames which considerably facilitate cognitive processes. Once again, we can refer to mental spaces here, which are temporary, “partial structures that proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning of our discourse and knowledge structures” (Fauconnier, 1997, p. 11). They constitute a kind of working storage whose content is accessed, selected, juxtaposed, manipulated or combined in the process of comprehension, with the perceiver being able to switch between different interpretations as the contextual situation unfolds (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017, pp. 168–170). The implications of this theory, along with many experiments conducted, prove that people are capable of predicting the meanings of figurative and/or ambiguous expressions and correcting their initial assumptions within the mental spaces created once new pieces of information disambiguate the said expressions (cf. Chambers et al., 2002; Spivey, 2007; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017). In the light of the foregoing and with reference to the incongruity theory of humour,

the picture that emerges is a time-pressured, involuntary heuristic search for valid expectations, which generates mental spaces in which elements are constantly being tested. According to this model, then, basic humour occurs when

1. an *active* element in a *mental space* that has
2. *covertly* entered that space (for one reason or another), and is
3. taken to be true (i.e., *epistemically committed*) within that space,
4. is diagnosed to be *false in that space*—simply in the sense that it is the loser in an epistemic reconciliation process;
5. and (trivially) the discovery is not accompanied by any (strong) negative emotional valence.

More simply put: Humour happens when an *assumption* is *epistemically committed* to in a mental space and then discovered to have been a *mistake*. (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, pp. 172–173)

Working towards delineation of semantic mechanisms of humour, Raskin (1985) put forward his Script-based Semantic Theory of Humour (henceforth SSTH) which “holds that humorousness and/or laughter result from a sudden realisation that there appears some incongruity between the concepts and objects involved in the meaning-making process (cf. Schopenhauer, 1883; Raskin, 1985; Mulder & Nijholt, 2002)” (Stwora, 2020a, p. 133). The theory advanced by Raskin rests on the hallmark notion of *linguistic script*, which can be defined as a “large chunk of semantic information surrounding the word and evoked by it [...]” (Raskin, 1985, p. 46). Apart from the linguistic one, it is also important to mention the notion of *inferential script*, which is activated inferentially and, basically, encodes the same type of information despite its not having any material form to refer to. Citing Attardo, “a reasonable inference (caused by the sum of the weak activations of the surrounding scripts) will activate the inferential script [...]” (Attardo, 2000, p. 39). His point on this issue makes use of the proposition put forward by Collins and Loftus (1975) in their article on the spreading activation theory of semantic processing, which was, in turn, inspired by Quillian’s (1967) theory of semantic memory search and semantic preparation, or priming.

Without going into details, however, what Attardo (2000) tries to convey is that strong activations of lexical scripts may engender several weaker activations of related inferential scripts. According to this view, as activation spreads, other weaker and less relevant inferential scripts can also become activated by the stronger inferential scripts activated beforehand. In this context, it is perhaps better to think of a script as “a cognitive structure internalised by the [...] speaker, which provides the speaker with information on how a given entity is structured” (Attardo, 2001, p. 2) or, alternatively, as “an organized complex of information ‘about’ something (typically, a lexical item, but not exclusively, since there are obviously non-lexicalized concepts)” (Attardo, 2002, p. 1). Thus, as cognitive structures that represent the perceiver’s knowledge of the world rooted in experience (Raskin, 1985, p. 81), “scripts are comparable to the concepts of frames [...] [or] conceptual domains [...] which figure prominently in a range of cognitive-linguistic models of grammar and semantics” (Brône, 2017, p. 250).

It is worth noting that both Raskin’s (1985) and later Attardo’s (2001) notions of scripts were founded upon the scripts first outlined by Schank and Abelson (1997/1977), which can be described as representational packets of general knowledge retrieved by the perceiver’s mind in the course of com-

prehension (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017) or as rudimentary mental representations of particular situations (Semino, 2008; Colston, 2018). Just like frames (cf. Minsky, 1981), scenarios are filled in with new pieces of updated information as a result of association of contextual details with the reference framework (cf. Minsky, 1974; Coulson, 2000). As suggested by Minsky, the detection of fallacy in humorous contexts takes place when wrong initial assumptions concerning the frame are changed and rendered logical as a result of frame-shifting which allows to understand the reconsidered situation properly. Hence, the emergent new frame should be more congruous with the context and more relevant than the preliminary one (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017, pp. 95–96). It can therefore be said that humour depends on a subversive or dissonant relation between the initial and alternative frame (Ritchie, 2005), governed by cognition, relevance, and salience which, in a given context, force the perceiver to reinterpret or, in other words, to script-shift meanings (Giora, 2003, p. 169).

Summing up this point, the theory of humour put forward by Minsky (1984) thus requires frame-shifting to be initiated once the perceiver observes some kind of incongruity between the two sets of input data, referred to as scripts by Raskin. Of course, just like other abstract “[...] notions of conceptual domain, schema, and mental space in cognitive linguistics, Raskin’s concept of script is also merely a loose and coarse approximation of what actually happens in human consciousness at the neural level” (Krikmann, 2006, p. 33).

Focusing mainly on verbal humour, Raskin claims that scripts should be seen as typical, well-established routines or patterns “immediately related to, and evoked by, lexical items” (Attardo, 1998, p. 200) which appear in the text. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that scripts can be both lexical and non-lexical (Attardo, 2002), depending on the modalities involved in the production of humorous content. That is why, right at the outset of this discussion, it should be stated that the notion of script can actually be extended so as to encompass both textual and visual chunks of semantic data (Raskin, 1985, p. 46), which makes the SSTH applicable to multimodal artefacts.

The humorous effect, according to Raskin, is produced upon the activation of one or more discrepant scripts. A given chunk of semantic information, be it a text or an image, carries humorous potential if two conditions are satisfied: (1) it “is compatible, fully or in part, with two different scripts, [and] (2) the two scripts with which [...] [it] is compatible are opposite [...]. The two scripts with which some text is compatible are said

to overlap fully or in part in this text” (Raskin, 1985, p. 99). Incongruity or opposition detected in the scripts contrasted serves as a turning point in the perceiver’s reasoning, steering his thoughts towards the relevant, humorous interpretation or towards other related sets of scripts in a given semantic network (Attardo, 1998). The scripts available to the perceiver are governed by cognitive combinatorial rules whose “function is to combine all the possible meanings of the scripts and discard those combinations that do not yield coherent readings” (Attardo, 1998, p. 202).

In the light of these changes in the perception of a message, Raskin defined jokes and humorous communication in general as a kind of non-*bona-fide* communication that violates the Gricean Cooperative Principle. It can therefore be said that he stressed the opposition of the humorous to default, typical, serious, and information-bearing *bona-fide* communication prescribed in Gricean pragmatics. By way of a reminder, according to Grice (1975), *bona-fide* communication “is the information-conveying mode of communication which represents a speaker’s sincere desire to convey information to the hearers who recognise this fact and believe what the speaker says to be true” (Carrell, 2000, p. 29). Nevertheless, Attardo (1994), Morreall (2004), and Veale (2004) actually disapprove of this dichotomy between *bona-fide* and non-*bona-fide* communication, which is expressed in the following excerpt:

It seems also that a radical dichotomy between “serious” BF (= *bona-fide*) use of language and “humorous” NBF (= non-*bona-fide*) cannot be maintained in reality. Grice’s hypothesized speaker, totally committed to the truth and relevance of his/her utterances, is a useful abstraction, but should be considered only as such. In reality, speakers engaged in everyday communication use humorous remarks that hearers decode, interpret as such, and use along with other information to build their vision of the communicative context. (Attardo, 1994, p. 287)

Reverting to the subject matter of scripts, it is vital to remember that some elements are compatible with many scripts and thus overlap. In fact, partial overlap is necessary for the scripts to be combined, yet, for the humorous effect to be produced, some kind of the already mentioned oppositeness should occur. In jokes, for instance, the “script-switch trigger” (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1998), or the “disjunctive point” (Giora, 2003), is located in the punch line, which stands in stark contrast to the perceiver’s initial expectations. As a result, the perceiver needs to backtrack and

become aware of the fact that “a different interpretation (i.e., an alternative script) was possible from the beginning. In order for the text to be viewed as humorous, this second, overlapping script must be opposite to the first” (Martin, 2007, p. 90).

This leads to finding an opposite, salient, and satisfactory resolution, which manifests itself in humour, as the incongruity is resolved when the perceiver, thanks to logical reasoning, manages to connect the introduction and the punch line (Suls, 1972; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017). Consequently, according to the SSTH theory, “some asymmetry between scripts is needed to generate humour (Viana, 2010)” (Yus, 2016, p. 123). In order to evoke humorous responses, the pairs of scripts need to be in a relationship of opposition and therefore fall into three general classes, namely: actual/non-actual, normal/abnormal, and possible/impossible (Raskin, 1985, p. 111; Stwora, 2020a, p. 134).

The three classes are all instances of a basic opposition between real and unreal situations in the texts. These three classes of oppositions are then instantiated in more concrete oppositions. Raskin lists five of the most common oppositions: good/bad, life/death, obscene/non-obscene, money/no-money, and high/low stature (Raskin, 1985, pp. 113–114 and p. 127). (Attardo, 1998, p. 204)

These are the most basic types of script oppositions, perhaps universal in most cultures because of the fact that they all touch upon essential issues in human life and experience. We could surely think of other oppositions and hence expand the list for it to encompass necessary/unnecessary, much/little, and absence/presence (Chłopicki, 1987), real/imaginary (Kyratzis, 2003) (which can also be seen as overlapping with the standard actual/non-actual script opposition by Raskin) or even more specific ones such as sex/no-sex (cf. Raskin, 1985; Mulder & Nijholt, 2002; Krikmann, 2006) or excrement/non-excrement (cf. Douglas, 1975) (which are, in fact, specific instantiations of the absence/presence opposition proposed by Chłopicki (1987)), thus revealing the potential richness of binary script oppositions.

In humorous texts, the boundaries between opposing scripts are blurred until finally realised (Kyratzis, 2003) thanks to sudden “script-switch triggers” (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1998). “The blurring of the boundaries between the two scripts” (Kyratzis, 2003, p. 3) is what Kyratzis calls the “collision” of scripts, upon which the humorous duality

is realised. This corresponds to the already introduced cognitive process of frame shifting responsible for revision of meanings (Coulson, 2000). To cite Ritchie, the effect of the trigger, in the form of the punch line or other device introducing a discrepant script, “[...] is to contradict the culturally licensed frame, activate or authorize the subversive frame, and contrast the culturally licensed frame with the subversive frame” (Ritchie, 2005, p. 282).

As far as the explanatory power of the SSTH is concerned, the theory in question helps to systematise the procedure of identifying humorous content *per se* through opposition of scripts but, unfortunately, helps not to pass value judgements on the texts scrutinised. “The SSTH was explicit in stating that it could not account for quality differences in humour. For the SSTH, a good joke and a bad one were indistinguishable” (Attardo, 1998, p. 214) since the actual quality of the humorous can be judged only against the receivers’ responses, for it is subject to the myriad factors such as context, language, personal taste or cross-cultural differences. This may be due to the fact that the SSTH model “assumes the existence of an idealised speaker/hearer whose humorous competence is abstracted from any sociological factors conditioning his mood, worldview, and the like (Attardo, 1994, p. 197)” (Stwora, 2020a, p. 133). Under this framework, the context and audience are therefore said to be irrelevant, as the perceiver is simply “unaffected by racial or gender biases, undisturbed by scatological, obscene or disgusting materials, not subject to boredom, and, most importantly, who has never ‘heard it before’ when presented with a joke” (Attardo, 1998, p. 197).

The theory herein considered was originally designed with a view to dealing solely with verbal (either spoken or written) jokes; nonetheless, since its inception, it was expanded to short stories (cf. Chłopicki, 1987, 2000), to other texts, and to non-linguistic material as well. “Needless to say, the analysis of jokes and humorous short stories is not restricted to the theoretical framework put forward by Raskin and Attardo, but may, for instance, be devoted to qualitative and/or quantitative studies of jokes’ topics, yet not conceived as scripts” (Dyner, 2011b, p. 3). A major revision of Raskin’s theory was undertaken by Attardo and Raskin (1991) and resulted in an improved version thereof by Attardo (1994, 2001). The following section will focus on this theory, known as the General Theory of Verbal Humour, which has largely replaced the SSTH and is now extensively used for all humorous text, including multimodal advertising discourse.

4.3.4 The General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH)

As noted above, the General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH) is a revised version of the SSTH developed by Raskin. Though designed specifically for the analysis of verbal humour, its scope “can actually be broadened so as to encompass visually encoded jocular material as well (Tsakona, 2009, p. 1175)” (Stwora, 2020a, p. 133; cf. Attardo, 2002). Just like its predecessor, it is based on script shifting (Giora, 2003) but the GTVH places emphasis on additional knowledge structures, which are indispensable in producing and processing humour, yet were neglected by the SSTH (Kyratzis, 2003). Thus, the GTVH addresses two serious limitations of the SSTH, namely: (1) its inability to distinguish between verbal and referential humour (which is due to their obvious semantic indistinguishability) and (2) its inability to “account for the fact that some jokes are perceived as being more similar to one another” (Attardo, 2017). Whereas the SSTH can be labelled as a semantic/pragmatic theory of humour (Attardo, 1998, 2017), the GTVH is a pragmatic and, most importantly, linguistic one which attempts to explain humour as a phenomenon embedded in a specific situational context governed by knowledge resources (KRs) which need to be tapped into when a person is producing a joke (Attardo, 1998, 2001; Attardo & Raskin, 1991). Tsakona (2009) says that various instances of humour result from various combinations of KRs, which encompass:

- (a) the *script opposition*, which is the necessary requirement for humour: a humorous text is fully or partially compatible with two different and opposed scripts [...];
- (b) the *logical mechanism*, presenting the distorted and playful logic that causes the script opposition;
- (c) the *situation*, including the objects, participants, activities, places, etc. presented in the humorous text;
- (d) the *target*, involving the persons, groups, or institutions ridiculed by humour;
- (e) the *narrative strategy*, referring to the text organization of the humorous text (narrative, dialogue, riddle, etc. [...]), or to the speech act including humour; and
- (f) the *language*, which is responsible for the exact wording of the humorous text and for the placement of the functional elements that constitute it (i.e. the distribution of information along the text and the position of the punch line and/or the jab lines). (Tsakona, 2009, p. 1173)

The first two KRs enjoy the highest status in the hierarchy established by the GTVH (Hempelmann, 2004). Transported from the original SSTH, *script opposition* (SO) (first termed “script oppositeness” (SO_p) by Raskin (1985) and then replaced with the term “opposition” by Attardo and Raskin in 1991) is claimed to be one of the two necessary and sufficient requirements for the text to be humorous, apart from script overlap (SO_v) which assures compatibility and hence makes it possible for two scripts to co-occur (Raskin, 1985). It is due to the fact that “the idea of script opposition and overlap [...] are ultimately examples of incongruity and resolution” (Attardo, 2000, p. 41). The perceiver’s smooth and consistent interpretation is interrupted as he encounters a discrepant script which constitutes a semantic barrier to be overcome by shifting to another interpretation. It means that his expectations are initially primed towards one output but are soon reshaped in accordance with the sense carried by the other script involved. So, in line with the incongruity-resolution theory, humour depends on a subversive or dissonant relation between the initial and alternative frame or script (Ritchie, 2005). “[A] humorous text may contain multiple incongruities embracing more than one pair of oppositions [...] [and] the script collision may involve more than one plane of meaning (Brock, 2004)” (Krikmann, 2006, p. 53; cf. Chłopicki, 2000).

Logical mechanism (LM), on the other hand, can be described as a function of script opposition (Hempelmann, 2004, p. 382) which handles the process of incongruity resolution introduced by the script opposition. The SSTH would view the logical mechanism KR as an implementation of the script opposition or as a tool for the script opposition (Attardo & Raskin, 1991) but this definition changed with the arrival of the GTVH, according to which

the LM parameter presupposes and embodies a “local” logic, i.e., a distorted, playful logic that does not necessarily hold outside of the world of the joke. Speakers are well aware of the limits of local logic and “go along with it” in the spirit of “willing suspension of disbelief.” (Attardo, 2001, p. 25)

First, its definition was far from perfect and limited to several manifestations of the LM, such as false analogy and false priming, figure-ground reversal, exaggeration, mere juxtaposition or polysemous and homonymous structures (Attardo, 2001; Krikmann, 2006). Its conceptual indefiniteness

and relative vagueness, however, have later on led to justifiable criticism of the logical mechanism KR itself (Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Ruch, Attardo, & Raskin, 1993), eventually resulting in the reformulation of its definition, which sounds as follows: “[T]he LM of a joke is the resolution of the SO (incongruity)” (Attardo, 1997, p. 409). Attardo is hence explicit when it comes to the statement that the logical mechanism is the resolution itself and not just a mechanism which enables resolution (for a wider taxonomy of possible logical mechanisms see Attardo (2001), Attardo, Hempelmann, & Di Maio (2002), and Krikmann (2006) for further discussion). Still, there is one reason to question the actual equality of the notions of the logical mechanism and resolution on the grounds of online processing:

Regardless of the really scanty number of empirical examples, LMs seem ready-made “traps of faulty logic” set up for the hearer, put in the minds and mouths of the joke characters and/or invoked via various “gardenpaths” or other techniques of false priming. Resolution, on the grounds of everything said about it, involves the real mental operations the receiver’s mind performs to cope with these traps. (Krikmann, 2006, p. 50)

Hempelmann says that the logical mechanism should rather be identified with a tool of the script opposition, claiming that script overlap involves a “script-switch trigger” (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1998), which activates the logical mechanism, that is, the dynamic cognitive process (Attardo, 1997, p. 409) responsible for the final resolution of the script oppositeness (Hempelmann, 2004, p. 383). Nevertheless, many a researcher claim that the logical mechanism component is problematic and superfluous in the model of humour (cf. Davies, 2004; Krikmann, 2006) and could be replaced by, for example, non-prototypicality and related humorous effects (Brône & Feyaerts, 2004, p. 364).

In line with the classification of KRs listed beforehand, Attardo also postulated the inclusion of the *situation* (SI) knowledge resource, which stands for “the environment in which the narrative takes place” (Attardo, 2017). This environment includes the prototypical activities, objects, and participants presented that provide contextual and character frames, conditioning both actual and implied relations between the situation variables involved (cf. Chłopicki, 2000). In short, the situation KR is supposed to shed light on the exact setting of a given humorous text since “it is

thanks to the contextual data contained by the frames that humorous texts are better anchored in extra-linguistic reality” (Chłopicki, 2000, p. 523). Research on this KR is still reported to be rather scarce, though.

[...] [T]his KR [...] seems to consist essentially of a list of things, activities, etc. mentioned in the text. Most significantly, the activation of the relevant scripts provides the relevant props for the joke. In this respect, the SI KR is not unique to jokes at all, in the sense that this is a function shared by all humorous and non-humorous texts. (Attardo, 2001, p. 25)

Another parameter to be described is the *target* (TA), that is, the butt of the joke or a humorous artefact in general. In simple terms, there are numerous people or things (and also related issues such as cultural symbols (cf. Guidi, 2017)) at which ridicule or criticism can be directed and all of them can potentially become butts. Targets frequently involve specific stereotypes attached and there exist sociological and cultural explanations for the choices of targets (Davies, 1990). Given the extremely rich choice of socially, culturally, ethnically, sexually or politically marked people or organisations, the list of possible targets that may fulfil the role of targets seems almost infinite. It is important to stress that jokes are often flexible enough to allow for alterations in terms of targets laughed at without losing their humorous impact but ethnic humour usually stays rigid, which means that its target cannot change for it to remain funny (Raskin, 1985; Davies, 1990). Furthermore, it should be noted that this KR may be optional since non-aggressive humour has an empty value for this parameter, as it does not actually ridicule anyone (Attardo, 2001).

The penultimate KR is *narrative strategy* (NS) which was first said to stand for “the genre, or rather microgenre [...] of the joke, in other words, whether the text of the joke is set up as expository, as a riddle, as a question-and-answer sequence, and so on” (Attardo & Raskin, 1991, p. 300; cf. Chłopicki, 2000). Nevertheless, this approach was soon rejected as misleading owing to the fact that genre theory itself is mostly associated with text types and such an overlap in terms of nomenclature could cause confusion (Attardo, 1994, 2001). It was decided to define a narrative strategy as a way in which the humorous text is organised, which means that “the information in the NS KR accounts for the fact that any joke has to be cast in some form of narrative organization, either as a simple narrative, as a dialogue (question and answer), as a (pseudo-)riddle, as an

aside in conversation, etc.” (Attardo, 2001, p. 23). This, however, does not mean that all humour is a kind of a narrative; “what the NS KR is trying to capture is rather that any narrative joke will have to be cast in a given type of narrative” (Attardo, 2001, p. 23).

The *language* (LA) KR comprises all “the linguistic choices with which the previous components are verbalized” (Attardo, 2017) and “contains all the information necessary for the verbalization of a text. It is responsible for the exact wording of the text and for the placement of the functional elements that constitute it” (Attardo, 1998, p. 223). In other words, what is humorous can be worded or presented in a number of ways without introducing any changes in semantic content that would change the humorous effect. “It includes all the choices at the phonetic, phonologic, morpho-phonemic, morphologic, lexic, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic levels of language structure [...]” (Attardo & Raskin, 1991, p. 298), with language understood as either verbal or non-verbal means of expression.

The very term *language* [...] is by no means restricted to the verbally encoded message but may be applied to the visual mode as well, for it may refer to any method of human communication and signification or to any system of signs; *the language* KR may thus stand for a “signifier of the semiotic” (Attardo, 1998, p. 242) so the signifier may apply equally to word and image. (Stwora, 2020a, p. 134)

The main hypothesis of the GTVH proposes a division of humorous texts into two classes, namely, into texts structurally similar to jokes and dissimilar from them. The former can be straightforwardly handled by the GTVH, as they are characterised by the presence of punch lines in the final position; “while the punch line is final and causing a surprise effect, jab lines are humorous elements fully integrated in the text and do not disrupt its flow (Attardo, 2001, p. 29; Tsakona, 2003)” (Tsakona, 2009, p. 1173). The latter, on the other hand, are naturally much more numerous and should be seen as composed of two elements: of a non-humorous narrative and of a humorous component woven into the said narrative (Attardo, 1988, 2001). The study of humorous texts is based on the location of all punch and jab lines along the text on the basis of the KRs presented. However, in the case of humorous texts larger than jokes, Attardo suggests the presence of a *storage area* “to accommodate the various pieces of information that make up the text [...] [or] the information that is being assumed, shared, and developed by the text” (Attardo, 2001, pp. 47–48). The said area, as

he claims, is built up of humorous strands which may be established both textually and inter-textually (Attardo, 2000).

The idea of a storage area surely makes the reader think of the theory of conceptual blending, and rightly so, for this notion also implies the presence of some marked and unmarked features in the text that can be compressed, expanded or violated. Relevant is also the passage that points out to interesting similarities with mental spaces and the conceptual integration theory, which says that “the information stored does not travel in discrete units, but consists of clusters of information (scripts, frames) which, in turn, come surrounded by a web of associations and links to other clusters of information” (Attardo, 2001, p. 48). This observation, combined with the fact that “the representation of the information in the storage area is not entirely linear [...] [and that it] admits multiple strands of information being processed and accessed simultaneously” (Attardo, 2001, p. 48), makes it possible to view the theory proposed as applicable to visual and multimodal pieces of information as well because of the way human cognition processes them. Just like metaphors, scripts (understood as chunks of semantic data) may be activated not only by linguistic, but also by non-linguistic means. Working towards the expansion of the theory of scripts, Attardo (2001) hence suggests that the storage area is dynamic a construct, moulded in accordance with the information it is exposed to.

“By adopting this multidimensional approach, addressing language structural (LA), discourse analytical (NS), sociolinguistic (TA, SI), and cognitive/logical (LM) issues, the GTVH aims at an encompassing linguistic-pragmatic (and not only semantic) account of verbal humour” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, pp. 5–6). Considering humour theory at large, the GTVH has strongly influenced linguistic humour analyses; it paved the way for the cognitive input to be taken into account in the studies on humorous text thanks to increased attention paid to mental representations involved in the process of accessing scripts and storage areas (Attardo, 2001). What is more, both the SSTH and GTVH “are conceptually close insofar as they are variants of the broader psychological model of incongruity-resolution, currently the main model in humour research” (Attardo, 1994, p. 332).

Although widely acknowledged, these theories did not escape constructive criticism and the following section will discuss this issue. The conclusion that should be drawn from the critique therein presented is that, in spite of the recognition of both the SSTH and the GTVH as the “most influential linguistic humour theories of the last two decades” (Brône, Feyaerts, & Veale, 2006, p. 203), they should not be blindly treated as

“the final word on the linguistic research on humour” (Attardo, 2017). In fact, extensively studied as it is, humour still cannot be grasped in a single, comprehensive theory (Koestler, 1964; Krikmann, 2006).

4.3.5 Some Polemic Points with Regard to the SSTH and GTVH

This part moves on to consider some polemic points concerning the SSTH and GTVH raised in large part by Brône and Feyaerts (2003, 2004) and Brône, Feyaerts, and Veale (2006). First of all, to their minds, the SSTH and GTVH are substantially overemphasising the uniqueness of humorous language and its being somehow “beside” or “above” standard language practices (Brône & Feyaerts, 2004; Krikmann, 2006). In this respect, their contribution is particularly critical about the rigid division between normality and humorousness, as markedness, saliency, and (non-)prototypicality rules, in themselves, do not depart from the linguistic level (Brône & Feyaerts, 2004; Krikmann, 2006). Such a statement seems to be in line with Koestler (1964) who was perhaps the first one to detect some common ground in standard and non-standard (i.e., humorous) communication:

The bacillus of laughter is a bug difficult to isolate: once brought under the microscope, it will turn out to be a yeast-like, universal ferment, equally useful in making wine or vinegar, and raising bread. (Koestler, 1964, p. 32)

Thus, opting for a strong cognitive orientation suitable for the analysis of dynamic meaning construction, Brône and Feyaerts (2003) say that “cognitive approaches to language might offer a much needed, integrated approach to resolution mechanisms in humour interpretation” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, p. 50). They argue that the notion of conceptual mappings borrowed from cognitive semantics can be used while discussing humour, for they observe that common cognitive construal mechanisms constitute atypical uses of language.

Thus, deviating from the prototypical core use of these mechanisms creates a marked construal that is responsible for the effect of incongruity when a hearer/reader is confronted with the stimulus. The resolution of the incongruity, on this account, is established when a hearer/reader manages to unpack the marked construal, i.e. when he or she recognizes the cognitive mechanisms underlying the humour stimulus and motivates (hence: resolves) what is incongruous at

first sight. This view emphasizes that incongruity and its resolution are merely perspectives of the same cognitive construal, in that the marked use of prevailing mechanisms simultaneously accounts for the incongruity (unexpected) and its resolution (recognizing the marked use and motivating the imagery). (Brône & Feyaerts, 2004, p. 363)

By fronting the cognitive paradigm, the said authors suggest that the phenomena of figurative language, for example, metaphor, have much in common with humour (this point will be elaborated on in the section on humorousness and metaphoricity at the end of this chapter). Moreover, thanks to adopting a construal approach to incongruity resolution, they postulate that general cognitive mechanisms are responsible for the inferential process of incongruity resolution, guided by relevance, markedness (i.e., marked informativeness), and optimal innovation (Giora, 1991; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Brône, 2017).

Marked informativeness is defined in prototype-theoretical terms, which means that the most prototypical (and simultaneously the least informative) semantic unit is unmarked and most accessible, whereas the least prototypical and the most informative one is viewed as surprising due to its being marginal and least accessible, which makes it marked in its category (Giora, 1991, p. 469). “Translated into discourse analysis, [...] informativeness is inversely proportional to (psychological) probability” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, p. 6). The humorous is therefore seen as markedly informative since its final meaning is too distant from the preceding semantic content, that is, least relevant but not irrelevant (Giora, 1991, pp. 469–470). In this context, marked informativeness can be said to correspond to incongruity-resolution theories of humour.

When it comes to the Optimal Innovation Hypothesis, it says that it is neither figurativeness nor literality that induce pleasure in the perceiver, but rather salience imbalance, that is, “the surprising discovery of the novel in the salient or the salient in the novel” (Giora, 2002, p. 12; cf. Giora, 1991; Wojtaszek, 2011b). “Giora claims that there exists a specific level of novelty, which evokes pleasurable experience in recipients. She proposes Optimal Innovation Hypothesis, which may be implied in the investigation of various types of discourse marked with high originality” (Wojtaszek, 2011b, p. 121). It is vital to remember that the value of novelty be optimal since going for the extremes is too cognitively demanding to the perceiver’s mind. A stimulus is therefore optimally innovative if it is rated as more pleasurable than a purely innovative stimulus or a more familiar stimulus

(Giora, 2002). In other words, the hypothesis “states that the subjective effect of pleasure generated by creative stimuli can be explained by a delicate balance (or tension) between innovation on the one hand and salience [...] on the other” (Brône, 2017, p. 254).

A stimulus would be optimally innovative if it involves:

- a) a novel response to a familiar stimulus, but
 - b) such that would also allow for the automatic recoverability of a salient response related to that stimulus so that the similarity and difference between the novel and the salient would be assessable.
- (Giora, 2002, p. 12)

“Once again, the emphasis is on a balance between innovation (marked informativeness, incongruity) on the one hand and recoverability (resolution) on the other” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, p. 8). In this light, optimal innovation resides in maintaining balance between familiarity and novelty. Such an approach diverts humour research from purely linguistic to cognitive-linguistic treatment of humour. Consequently, as Brône and Feyaerts point out, “if basic cognitive construal operations can be found to function in the inferential process of incongruity resolution, this supports the claim that even *full creativity* (Bergen & Binsted, 2003) is subject to general cognitive mechanisms” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, p. 50).

What is more, from a cognitive-linguistic perspective, they claim that the logical mechanism KR defined in the GTVH is misguided insofar as the process of incongruity resolution in humour interpretation is concerned. They argue in favour of a *prototype model of construal operations*, “in which incongruity and resolution appear as two perspectives of the same cognitive construal” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2004, p. 361) and non-prototypical uses are the ones potentially capable of producing humorous effects. Following the typology of construal operations featured by Langacker (2001) and Croft and Cruse (2004), “the deviation from the core use of the mechanism accounts for the effect of unexpectedness or incongruity, without however losing the semantic motivation (resolution)” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2004, p. 370; cf. Hamrick, 2007; Krikmann, 2009).

As already mentioned, over time, even the authors of the GTVH themselves have detected flaws in their model when it comes to the logical mechanism KR, for instance; recognising the fact that the logical mechanism is the least explored of all KRs (Attardo & Raskin, 1991), they later on claimed it was perhaps too vague a factor that could be easily

replaced with other aspects which influence perception. Thus, a few years later, Ruch, Attardo, and Raskin (1993) criticised the very inclusion of the logical mechanism KR and came up with a suggestion that it should be removed altogether. Eventually, its function was reallocated for the logical mechanism KR to stand for the resolution of the SO (incongruity) (Attardo, 1997), but there still are some researchers who postulate the elimination of the LM KR whatsoever (cf. Davies, 2004; Krikmann, 2006) or its replacement with more apt a notion, such as non-prototypicality, for instance (Brône & Feyaerts, 2004, p. 364).

Under the GTVH framework, KRs are essentially viewed as hierarchically structured, which means that the order of parameters (which reads as follows: script opposition, logical mechanism, situation, target, narrative strategy, and language) is not immaterial; the higher parameters impose restrictions on the lower ones (Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Attardo, 2001). Veale (2003) tries to challenge this view, as he explores several examples of humorous language which suggest that humour works at several different levels simultaneously and that KRs simply cannot be dealt with independently. Rather, he claims that they interact at all levels in the interpretation process. In conclusion, Brône & Feyaerts (2003), along with Veale (2003) and Bergen and Binsted (2003), argue that it is the cognitive-linguistic approach that is the most applicable in terms of dynamic multidimensionality of humour KRs and their interaction, in contrast to the approach of the SSTH and GTVH. As the cognitive-linguistic approach solidified, Brône, Feyaerts, and Veale (2006) came to a conclusion that the SSTH and GTVH revolve around the interrelationship between language and cognition in pragmatic terms. Their stand is that “adopting the tools developed in cognitive linguistics can shed new light on the specific semantic construal of humorous texts and the ‘marked’ character that these texts are generally considered to have (Giora 1991, 2003)” (Brône, Feyaerts, & Veale, 2006, p. 205).

In the context of humour research, they highlight the importance of yet another construal operation termed *viewpoint*; that is because the cognitive-linguistic framework “is essentially construed from a specific perspective, then adopting a different viewpoint automatically entails a different conceptualisation” (Brône, Feyaerts, & Veale, 2006, p. 210). In other words, we deal with subjectification at the pragmatic-semantic level, in which case the perceiver’s viewpoint is crucial, as it draws upon his knowledge structures, observations, beliefs, and attitudes, thus resulting in construing events or thoughts from his own perspective. If viewpoint is so strongly subjective, the mental spaces or scripts involved in the partitioning

of human discourse and knowledge structures (Fauconnier, 1997) are subjective too. “On this account, [...] the viewpoint space is the structure from which others are accessed” (Brône, Feyaerts, & Veale, 2006, p. 210) and it is subjectivity (i.e., individual cognitive conditioning) that determines whether something is perceived as humorous or not.

As far as other limitations are concerned, neither the SSTH nor the GTVH can properly handle hyperdetermined humour, which can be defined as “the presence of more than one active source of humour at the same time” (Attardo, 2000, p. 41) or as the occurrence of more than one humorous strand a time. That is because these theories were produced to deal with individual humour triggers and not with multiple ones (e.g., consisting of a pun, a satirical reference, and a sexual theme simultaneously, hence creating the humorous situation at several different levels). Of course, to some extent, such a complexity of strands encountered can be handled by means of identifying many script oppositions but “what is lacking in humour theory is a sense of how to handle more than one humorous line at the same time” (Attardo, 2000, p. 41). In such complex cases, the tools of text semantics should certainly be incorporated into the analysis, thus proving that the GTVH is still not enough if not coupled with RT, salience, etc.

In closing, it is pertinent to mention an important article by Veale (2004) who proposes an alternative conception of humour, claiming that humour is not a matter of incongruity *per se*, but rather of social logic and social conditioning. Humour, according to his view, is a cooperative social act which results from the fact that the perceiver is a social being “[...] already attuned and well-disposed towards humour in advance, adjusted to seek humour wherever it is possible” (Krikmann, 2006, p. 54). Under his framework, being humorous is seen as “licensed by the cooperative principle of joke-telling” (Veale, 2004, p. 424) which is socially sanctioned, so to speak; thus, the proposition by Veale gives priority to release and superiority theories of humour, at the same time downplaying the one of incongruity.

4.3.6 The Visual and Multimodal Means for Producing Humour

As already mentioned in the previous sections devoted to multimodality, communication is not only verbal, but also increasingly multimodal these days, thus frequently steering humour research towards the multimodal approach. This, in turn, cannot be discussed properly without referring to

visual humour and punning, studied by, for example, Sheppard (1983), Yule (1985), Forabosco (1990), Lessard (1991), Buijzen & Valkenburg (2004), Mitchell (2009) or Dynel (2011a). If images can be constructed so as to cue conceptual metaphors (see Chapter 3 on visual and multimodal metaphors), they can be constructed to elicit humour in the very same way. What is of interest here is the creative use of human cognitive capabilities to make sense of humorous images and, particularly, of visual and multimodal ads that employ humour.

As put forward by Yus (2016), in order to process visual or multimodal information, the perceiver makes use of the same strategies he would use while dealing with verbal content, that is, he searches for the most relevant information from the visual or multimodal stimulus. Naturally, various perceivers will focus on different visual elements, as evidenced by eye-tracking, for people do not always follow the same perceptual order (cf. Furió, 2002). Hence, the audience

[...] has to infer whether the visual information [...] has a purely *denotative quality* (e.g. visual information as a filler of the environment where characters interact within the limits of the panel), in which case it would be a *visual explicature*, or it has a non-coded and wholly inferential *connotative quality* that can only be obtained from the combination of the image and contextual information (as happens with utterances). In this case, we would be dealing with a *visual implicature* [...] [which has] to be obtained with the aid of context. (Yus, 2016, p. 271)

This entails several possible interpretive outcomes, but the most important issue here is that meaning is extracted from both the visual and the verbal source in a similar manner, the only difference “being the way in which the input (utterance vs. image) is transferred to the central inferential processor” (Yus, 2016, p. 273). While discussing visual and multimodal humour, it seems germane to refer to the notions of prototypical visual referents and prototypical visual syntax, already adumbrated in the previous chapter. As a result of the comparison between these two, the perceiver is capable of detecting incongruities “between the activation of the stored prototypical visual referents during perception and the actual visual configuration of the image [...] (Forceville, 1996, p. 115)” (Yus, 2016, p. 274). In the following stage, the incongruity is resolved, thus engendering humour.

“Understanding visual humour is fraught with challenges such as having to detect all objects in the scene, observing the interactions between objects, and understanding context, which are currently unsolved problems” (Chandrasekaran et al., 2015, p. 4603). In spite of its communicative complexity, the immediacy of the image makes visual input relatively easy to process since pictures are claimed to be self-explanatory. Generally speaking, visual humour often relies on exaggeration and ridicule, on transforming what is normal, standard or serious into the abnormal, unexpected, ludicrous or even absurd; such an effect is frequently achieved thanks to visual distortions, caricatures or anomalous visual arrangement and through the same cognitive operations as in the case of verbal humour, that is, through the suppression of salient aspects in favour of the less salient ones, through the compression mechanisms or the figure-ground reversal (cf. Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Tsakona, 2009).

According to Lessard (1991), the only difference between verbal and visual puns is that of the type of sign involved. Nevertheless, a major objection raised in this context is that humorous incongruity found in a visual stimulus is significantly different from that of verbal humour since they are perceived and comprehended differently; the verbal variety is usually linear, while the pictorial one lacks any rigid reading path and thus has to be taken as a whole, with the elements emphasised usually perceived first (Dynel, 2011a). Yet visual humour, especially in advertising, is often based upon the same incongruity-resolution mechanism, just as its textual counterpart is, and can be viewed through the lens of the blending theory. As Dynel (2011a) explains, the perceiver’s understanding of humorous visual blends is fed by incongruous spaces, just like conceptual blends are. He recognises a space and acknowledges its incongruity, which then makes him take the space as a blend and, consequently, look for its integrant inputs (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 333).

It could then be postulated that the stage of incongruity involves perceiving two disparate input spaces, which may either be initially regarded as distinct pictorial elements or be instantly recognised as one blended entity hinged on incongruity. Which of the two is the case depends on the nature of a particular visual representation (sometimes coupled with a short textual chunk), and thus the ease with which the interpreter takes into account the incongruity of inputs and forms the humorous blend, albeit not always instantly paying heed to the rationale or the full import of such a blend. (Dynel, 2011a, p. 66)

Shifting attention from purely visual to multimodal humour, with multimodality defined as “the relationship between different semiotic modes in human communication and their textual instantiation” (Pinar Sanz, 2015, p. 1), Dynel extends the application of the conceptual integration theory for it to encompass the instances of incongruity between pictorial and textual inputs; this strand will be explored in the section devoted to the linkage between the humorous and the metaphorical. As aptly pointed out by El Refaie, “multimodality provides distinctive opportunities for metaphor creativity by exploiting the unique affordances of different semiotic modes and the possibility of combining them in unexpected ways” (2015, p. 13). The same holds true for humour that exploits cross-modal creativity and incongruity to elicit humorous responses.

Expounding the theory of visual rhetoric in advertising produced by Durand (1970), Dyer (1982) identifies several means of producing both non-humorous and humorous multimodal content, which are further divided into the figures of addition (repetition), suppression (usually in the form of ellipsis), substitution (replacement), and exchange (inversion). Generally speaking, though, the humorous effect is most often brought about by a certain interaction between verbal and visual components. Being composed of two disparate inputs, multimodal messages open several possibilities as to the construction of multimodal humour because the markers of humorousness operate in multiple modalities. “In spite of the fact that neither of the components within the multimodal message is given priority in terms of importance or meaning-making quality (Bateman, 2008), there is a difference when it comes to the humorous effect introduced” (Stwora, 2020a, p. 132), which is evident on the basis of the quotation below:

- (a) the picture can be an illustration of the verbal joke, without adding to the humorous effect; hence, only the text is responsible for the humorous effect;
- (b) the picture provides supporting information not contained in the humorous text; hence both text and image contribute to the humorous effect;
- (c) the picture is essential for the production of humour; hence, humour is based only on the picture, not on the text, if any. (Samson & Huber, 2007, p. 14)

Therefore, it is possible to distinguish three essential types of multimodal humour production, conditioned by the nature of the relationship between

the modalities involved (Stwora, 2020a), which leads to a conclusion that, in multimodal humorous messages, the following relations can be traced:

- a) the textual: + humorous
the visual: – humorous
- b) the textual: + humorous
the visual: + humorous
- c) the textual: – humorous
the visual: + humorous

The humorous element may be identified in the textual layer, in the visual modality, and in both at the same time because multimodal messages enable the co-presence of more than one source of humour. This proposition finds corroboration in the paper by Tsakona (2009) who thoroughly investigated the language-image interaction on the example of cartoons drawing on multimodal humour. “According to Tsakona, humour is a complex process that involves interplay between verbal and nonverbal elements” (Bury, 2020, p. 178), which can carry humorous potential in different configurations. With reference to the GTVH, Tsakona stresses that the notion of the language KR, that is, the one that is responsible for the actual encoding of humour, should encompass both textual and visual effects which are put together in a message and may engender script opposition. In case of multimodal artefacts, she says, it is an incongruity, contradiction, opposition or disruption that takes place at the level of constituent semiotic modes that is responsible for producing script opposition (Tsakona, 2009).

Consequently, it is argued that, in terms of multimodal humour, it is advisable to adopt the GTVH as a framework of analysis, for this position is expandable outside of humorous texts if we treat scripts as chunks of semantic data introduced by means of both linguistic and non-linguistic means of communication. Tsakona further states that a close examination of multimodal messages shows a clear preponderance of such humorous mechanisms as exaggeration, contradiction, and metaphor, hypothesising that “this finding points to their centrality in the creation of humour in general, since such mechanisms appear to be very common in different kinds of humorous data” (Tsakona, 2009, p. 1186). Having arrived at such a conclusion, the chapter will now focus on previous research on humour in advertising.

4.4 Considerations Related to Previous Research on Humour in Advertising

Humour is used in advertising discourse with the aim of entertaining and thus attracting the prospects' attention to the products featured. A pinch of humour can really help a brand stand out from the information clutter or portray company's values in a witty manner. It can also contribute to building brand's image by establishing an identity for the brand by means of a catchy and humorous slogan, for instance, or through association with something funny and pleasurable. Humour is further reported to "conduce to liking or the so-called halo effect that can predispose an individual towards developing liking for a product or service by association with an advertising message that caused pleasurable reception" (Stwora, 2020a, p. 135).

The humorous in ads may be engendered by means of numerous devices, for example, "riddles, proverbs, fables, slogans, jokes, jingles, anecdotes, facts, aphorisms, puns, poems, songs, nursery rhymes, parodies, pastiches, stories, dialogs, definitions, conundrums, letters, and metaphors" (McKendrick, Brewer, & Plumb, 1982, p. 153). In spite of the fact that such ploys were in wide use as executional marketing tactics almost from the birth of advertising itself, serious academic research on the topic did not actually begin until the 1970s. The topic of humour in advertising "entered the mainstream of academic literature with Sternthal and Craig's (1973) work published in the *Journal of Marketing* and Kelly and Solomon's (1975) work published in the *Journal of Advertising*" (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, p. 18), which paved the way for more scholarly attention in the field, causing the study of humour in advertising to gain credibility. The area of humour studies is nowadays well developed and still progressing, making it easier for researchers in the field of advertising to draw from related areas, such as psychology, sociology or communication studies, hence confirming the all-encompassing and interdisciplinary nature of humour.

"Like advertising, humour requires stylised emphasis. The humorist exaggerates the relevant aspects of reality but simplifies or omits those elements which might sidetrack the attention of the audience" (Barsoux, 1993, p. 130). The advertiser, on the other hand, uses humour to stress the positive aspects in the advertising message and downplay any negative factors, thus producing such emotional responses as exhilaration, amusement or mirth (Hempelmann, 2017) which are to dispose consumers favourably towards the goods on offer. Furthermore, humour goes beyond simply making

things funny; for example, if treated as a riddle, it can lead to the establishment of good rapport between the advertiser and the audience once solved (Norrick, 2003). Building such a rapport can increase the persuasive potential of an ad or contribute to building trust in the brand.

Another issue to consider is increased attractiveness of a message through its being humorous and entertaining, which leads to the stimulation of emotions the audience is generally not resistant to, as it seeks to be amused (Bryant & Davies, 2013). All these aspects add up to the powerful appeal of humorous advertising. In this context, it seems pertinent to refer to the concept of embodied simulations (ES) again, expounded by Bergen (2012), Gibbs (2017), and Colston (2018). By way of a reminder, these incorporate motor, perceptual, and social components which “enable people to project themselves into the minds and actions of others, including the objects or event referred to” (Gibbs, 2017, p. 233). The most important thing, however, is that they are triggerable in other people, which can explain why humour is contagious and how it is triggered in others to feel the same enjoyable experience, related to advertising or not. That is basically why we can speak of the “strategic use of the humorous frame in communication” (Dyrel, 2017).

The advertising landscape is rife with humour, which is particularly noticeable in TV commercials, one-fifth of which is reported to contain humorous appeal (Beard, 2005; Blackford et al., 2011). Various sources indicate that between 30% and 42% of ads in general are intended to be humorous (cf. Markiewicz, 1974; Weinberger, Spotts, Campbell, & Parsons, 1995; Strick et al., 2013). Naturally, there do exist both global and culture-specific dimensions of humour in advertising. This is due to the fact that preferred humour devices differ across cultures, except for incongruity which is said to be common to all cultural contexts (Alden, Hoyer, & Lee, 1993). A comparative analysis of the types of humour used in the US and UK carried out by Weinberger and Spotts (1989) shows that dissimilarity in terms of humour use in advertising can be traced even within English-speaking cultures. Although both favour “irony, jokes, the ludicrous, satire, understatement, and wordplay” (Fuentes Luque, 2010, p. 390), the American advertising style prefers the ludicrous while the British one makes more extensive use of satire (Weinberger & Spotts, 1989; Fuentes Luque, 2010). It can therefore be said that humour itself is universal a phenomenon but humour frameworks and humorous language are bound to differ. Furthermore, the advertiser can use product- or brand-related humour, laugh at himself, at his competitors, or at specific groups

or individuals (Barsoux, 1993; Gulas & Weinberger, 2006; Fuentes Luque, 2010). Accordingly, humour in advertising can be conditional on three types of relatedness outlined by Speck (1991):

- (1) intentional—the relationship of humour to message type and message processing;
- (2) thematic—the relationship of humour to product-related themes; and
- (3) structural—the syntactical function of humour, referring to the integration of humour and product claims. (Weinberger et al., 1995, p. 46; cf. Speck, 1991)

Based on the typology proposed by Speck (1991), Martin et al. (2003) advanced another classification with a view to describing differences in the functional uses of humour conditioned by intent and target. Their propositions include affiliative, aggressive, self-enhancing, and self-defeating humour (Martin et al., 2003; Blackford et al., 2011; Bury, 2020), which can either build or potentially destroy relationships (affiliative vs. aggressive humour), improve brand image (self-enhancing humour) or laugh at the addressor of the advertising message (self-defeating humour). Irrespective of the strategy adopted, the critical questions to pose while devising humorous ads must be as follows:

1. *Is it funny?* Not just for the individual, but to that audience? In other words, does it achieve the tricky combination of familiarity on the one hand and surprise on the other?
2. *Is it pertinent?* That is, does it reinforce the message, or does it serve as a “listener reward” to refresh the audience? [...]
3. *Will it offend?* One must know one’s audience. The less homogenous that audience, the more care needs to be taken to avoid offending some faction. [...] One way to avoid causing offence is to mock oneself, provided that it does not undermine one’s credibility. (Barsoux, 1993, pp. 67–68)

Apart from the issues addressed above, there are plenty of other topics which can be considered in testing humour in advertising (see Table 2). There is the matter of context (e.g., informal and therefore more humorous versus formal), the audience (e.g., gender, national differences, age, individual need for humour, mood, attitude, etc.), the product factor (unknown

versus known goods, the type of goods, which is linked with involvement), the message (e.g., the type of humour, relatedness of humour to the message itself, location of humour, repetition) or the medium factor. Furthermore, the most important question should be borne in mind, namely: what is being measured in a given study? We can choose to check moment-to-moment reactions, attention, affective responses (including mood, liking, etc.), recall, comprehension, persuasive impact of the advertising message, or the recipients' behavioural patterns, to name but a few (cf. Gulas & Weinberger, 2006).

Context	Audience	Product	Message	Media	Measurement
humorous versus serious	gender, age, national or racial differences	fictional versus real	type of humour	press	before or after product experience
schema familiarity	individual need for humour	new versus old	amount of humour	TV	field or lab setting
warmth	prior attitude towards humour object	serious versus funny	amount of incongruity, arousal, aggression	radio	moment to moment reactions
clutter	need for cognition	high/low and rational/experiential	amount of surprise	outdoor	pre-attention effects
moment	self-monitoring		relatedness of humour to message	direct	attention
			dominance of humour	internet	affective responses, including mood, liking, and VRP type responses (including negative and offensiveness)
			location of humour	other	recall and comprehension measures
			repetition		
					persuasion
					behaviour

TABLE 2. Issues to Consider in Testing Humour in Advertising. Adapted from Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, p. 162

Alden, Hoyer, and Lee (1993, p. 65) distinguish three topics typically addressed in research on humour in advertising: (1) the analysis of humour effects on recall, evaluation, and purchase intention; (2) the study of mediating factors such as repetition of the advertisement, social setting in which the advertisement is viewed or heard, and prior attitude toward the brand; and (3) the examination of whether humour influences consumers more through cognitive processes such as enhanced recall and reduced counter-argumentation or through affective mechanisms such as transfer of liking for the advertisement to the brand. (Yus, 2016, p. 301)

In the ensuing paragraphs, several topics related to previous studies into humour in advertising will be mentioned briefly in order to show the breadth and scope of the said research field, as well as lay foundation for my research into multimodal humorous advertising discourse. To begin with, consideration will be given to attention and recall, as well as to the process of involvement and motivation brought about by the humorous factor in advertising. There are several comprehensive studies which check the amount of attention paid to humorous ads, as compared to standard ads (which lack any considerable note of levity) and thus provide solid support for a positive humour-attention link (for different studies of the positive effects of humour on attention see: Madden & Weinberger, 1982; Wu, Crocker, & Rogers, 1989; Weinberger & Gulas, 1992; Smith, 1993; Spotts, Weinberger, & Parsons, 1997; Cline & Kellaris, 1999; Mehta & Purvis, 2006; Boerman, Smit, & van Meurs, 2011; Blanc & Brigaud, 2014). Attention itself is intertwined with greater involvement and motivation to process on the part of the audience (Zhang & Zinkhan, 2006), as the addressees are encouraged to engage with humorous ads and expend some cognitive effort in order to process such advertising messages.

Another important issue is brand and/or product recall, which is “of great significance in the realm of advertising since the emotional layer of advertising discourse may prove stronger than the appeal to reason” (Stwora & Zemelka, 2020, p. 154) and, what is more, “improve the memorability of the content of the advertisement” (Yus, 2016, p. 302; cf. Blanc & Brigaud, 2014). As evidenced by previous research, humour in advertising is proven to produce positive attitudes in the audience and heighten attention levels (cf. Chung & Zhao, 2003; Cline & Kellaris, 1999; Gelb & Zinkhan, 1986; Lee & Mason, 1999; Spotts, Weinberger, & Parsons, 1997), as well as to reduce negative responses to the advertising content (Nabi, Moyer-Gusé, &

Byrne, 2007; Strick et al., 2012) (for an informative study on ad recall see: Stwora & Zemełka, 2020).

Other pieces of research examine the proposition that humour contributes to the adoption positive attitudes towards the advertising material presented and, consequently, towards the brand or product promoted (Chang & Chang, 2014; Chung & Zhao, 2003; Chattopadhyay & Basu, 1990; Cline & Kellaris, 1999; Gelb & Zinkhan, 1986; Gelb & Pickett, 1983; Lee & Mason, 1999; Norrick, 2003; Yus, 2016). In general, humour in marketing aims at increasing advertising efficiency through the production of positive attitudes, which impact on source liking, for instance (Cialdini, 2007), and can potentially influence purchase decisions in the long run. Advertisers recognise the import of emotional information management, which is why they tend towards the emotion factor in their messages, as it is very persuasive and capable of influencing the prospects' feelings, judgments, and decision-making processes (Taute, McQuitty, & Sautter, 2011). It is often the hedonic dimension that is primed in humorous advertising so as to play with and make use of the audience's emotions (cf. Eisend, 2011; Melgar & Elsner, 2016).

The jocular factor becomes a source of positive affect that needs little to no logical argumentation since it usually focuses on brand-humour pairings that may lead to spontaneous brand choices (Strick et al., 2013, p. 5) resulting from affect transfer from the advertising message *per se* to the product or brand featured (cf. Eisend 2011). (Stwora & Zemełka, 2020, p. 161)

As already mentioned, the emotive power of humour can potentially reduce negative responses to ads and successfully avert the development of negative brand associations (Strick et al., 2012). Findings presented by Eisend (2010), for example, suggest that “affective reactions triggered by humour do increase positive cognitions while humour directly reduces negative ones” (Melgar & Elsner, 2016, p. 68), for it is cognitively attractive and appealing owing to its pointing out to previously erroneous assumptions about things, concepts or situations which are suddenly changed. As a result of increased interest and active enjoyment, the audience is “more likely to adopt a favourable attitude towards the product or service on offer once it appreciates the ad's ingenuity and deviation from the norm” (Stwora, 2020a, p. 135). In this context, emotions, and humour in particular, may act as a gatekeeper controlling further advertisement processing (cf. Poels & Dewitte, 2006).

Needless to say, the appropriateness of humour, sociocultural background, age, and personal taste will influence the degrees of amusement and appreciation of humour in general (examples of studies in this direction include: Berger & Wildavsky, 1994; Olson & Roese, 1995; Ruch & Rath, 1993; Stwora, 2020a, 2020c; Suls, 1975). Parenthetically, it should be clarified that “appreciation of humour presupposes that humour has been recognised and understood” (Attardo, 2017), that is, that the perceiver comprehended the humorous message before deciding whether he finds it funny or not.

As far as positive attitudes are concerned, there is yet another important mechanism known as the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968). “In a seminal study, Zajonc demonstrated that merely exposing participants to a stimulus [...] caused an increase in liking for that stimulus. Since then, more than 200 published studies have confirmed that the effect is both robust and reliable (Bornstein, 1989)” (Bryant & Davies, 2013, p. 23). Thus, apart from the humorous value, liking can also ensue from repeated exposure to the stimulus itself, which may suggest that the best option while studying humorous ads is perhaps to choose those which are likely to be new for the respondents in order to avoid biased responses. Besides increased liking, though, previous exposure to a particular ad can cause a reverse process too because it can sour the feelings towards a given advertisement by the so-called wear-out effect (Bryant & Davies, 2013, p. 24).

In an attempt to pinpoint what makes humour in ads funny, researchers in the fields of both marketing and psychology have developed several tools to measure the audience’s emotional responses to humorous ads. Just like any other emotion, amusement is actually gradable a phenomenon (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017) and hence can be measured by means of an impressive variety of measurement instruments, the most popular of which are self-report measures. They are used to register the informants’ subjective feelings and hence “[...] focus on introspective reflections about the emotions felt with respect to an advertising stimulus” (Poels & Dewitte, 2006, p. 7). As a rule, self-report measures are divided into three categories: into verbal self-report, visual self-report, and moment-to-moment rating (especially suited to TV and radio commercials and therefore of marginal importance to this discussion) (cf. Woltman Elpers, Mukherjee, & Hoyer, 2004; Poels & Dewitte, 2006).

To begin with, “as one can easily infer, verbal self-report allows the respondents to express their feelings verbally, usually in the written form thanks to questionnaires and/or open-ended questions which are later on

used to label one’s subjective experience of emotion” (Stwora & Zemeřka, 2020, p. 156). Such a form of self-report requiring the verbalisation of the perceiver’s feelings, however, may potentially cause tiredness, which may affect his responses, hence imposing certain limitations in terms of reliability (Poels & Dewitte, 2006). The most widely used approaches to such an attitude measurement include, for example, the Likert-type scale (Likert, 1932), which is formed “by the summation of multiple Likert items that measure similar information” (Derrick & White, 2017, p. 1) so as to capture the intensity of opinion in the respondents, or the bipolar scale known as PAD, which stands for Pleasure, Arousal, and Dominance (cf. Mehrabian & Russel, 1974). The latter posits that a person’s emotional state can be captured by a combination of three independent dimensions, which read as follows:

- (a) pleasure (i.e., positive and negative emotional state),
- (b) arousal (i.e., extent of physical activity and mental alertness associated with the emotional response), and
- (c) dominance (i.e., degree of control experiences associated with the emotional response). (Stewart, Morris, & Grover, 2007, p. 128)

By way of clarification, the PAD dimensional space helps to establish the actual attitude of the respondents through mapping discrete emotions onto the said space based on the three dimensions listed above (see Table 3). Thus, the results obtained on the pleasure–displeasure scale show how enjoyable or pleasant the emotion was to the informant. The arousal–non-arousal scale, on the other hand, measures the intensity of emotion and mental activity connected with ad processing. Finally, the dominance–submissiveness scale demonstrates if the ad presented is perceived as overwhelming and/or truly appealing or not (cf. Picard, 1997; Hoffmann et al., 2012; Stwora & Zemeřka, 2020), thus resulting in either “engaged” or “disengaged” emotions, in Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa’s terms (2000).

+P+A+D	Exuberant	-P-A-D	Bored
+P+A-D	Dependent	-P-A+D	Disdainful
+P-A+D	Relaxed	-P+A-D	Anxious
+P-A-D	Docile	-P+A+D	Hostile

TABLE 3. PAD Octants as Suggested by Picard (1997). Adapted from Hoffmann et al. (2012)

The abovementioned PAD model was then successfully turned into a visual self-report based on pictures showing various emotional states (e.g., on cartoon-like figures or images of facial expressions). Unconstrained by verbalisation or finite selections of linguistic items, the visual method applied by Lang (1980) in his Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) assessment technique made it possible to reduce cognitive processing on the part of the audience (Morris & Waine, 1993) and hence allowed for obtaining more reliable data.

A visual technique designed specifically to scrutinise emotional response to marketing stimuli, i.e. to advertising messages, was developed by Morris, Strausbaugh, and Nthangeni (1996) and is based on the three dimensions from the PAD model represented visually by means of SAM, [thus resulting in AdSAM®]. [...] Each PAD dimension may thus range from high to low, which is presented pictorially on a visual scale showing (a) a series of faces ranging from happy to sad for the Pleasure variable, (b) a sequence of pictures representing feelings that range from involved or stimulated to bored or calm for the Arousal dimension, and (c) the one ranging from dominant and strong to nondominant and weak for the Dominance variable. (Stwora & Zemełka, 2020, p. 157)

Increased emphasis should be placed on yet another issue, namely, on the fact that measures of emotional response are not tantamount to the measures of the effects of emotions. These may be manifest in improved or enfeebled recall, heightened or lessened attention, greater or lesser liking, to name but a few. The measures of response, on the other hand, “may reveal the effect of emotional content in advertising, as well as other elements of an ad [...]” (Stewart, Morris, & Grover, 2007 pp. 126–127). A full discussion of the complex issue of appraisal and the theories thereof is beyond the ambit of this volume, yet the reader’s attention should be directed towards such sources as Lazarus (1991, 1999), Lowis and Nieuwoudt (1995), Olson and Roese (1995), Stewart, Morris, and Grover (2007), Fontaine (2013), and Scherer (2013), all of whom deal with emotions in psycholinguistics, various appraisal theories, and self-report models, thus trying to capture the perceived funniness of humorous stimuli.

Surprisingly, while testing attitudes by means of self-reports (which are also termed explicit attitude measures), subjects tend to claim that they not only know that something is funny, but also can tell why it is funny

(Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011). Nonetheless, accepting such subjective descriptions and explanations of humour as authoritative would oblige researchers “to accept many folk theories [and] uninformed explanations” (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p. 48) concerning the humorous *per se*. Thus, instead of the traditional phenomenological approach, Dennett (1991, 2007) proposes an alternative in the form of heterophenomenology, that is, “a perspective that accepts people’s claims that they have a certain phenomenological sense, but reserves judgment about their claims as to why they have that sense” (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p. 48). In other words, the said approach does not dismiss the respondents’ perspective, but rather brackets it and opens it for verification through logical analysis, external sources, and other empirical means (Dennett, 1991, 2007; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2017).

The topic of humour in advertising may be looked at from yet another angle, namely, from the one of persuasiveness. As reported by Gulas and Weinberger (2006), the doctoral theses by Kennedy (1972) and Markiewicz (1972) were the ones to pave the way for more academic research on humour in ads, as they took up the subject of humour and persuasion (and not of humour in advertising *per se*). In essence, advertisers intentionally invest their messages with potent persuasive appeals, humour being one of them. It is because humour is most often said to increase argument strength, attract attention, develop liking, and enhance source credibility (Fugate, 1998; Dynel, 2017), as well as “to enhance the desire to purchase the product” (Yus, 2016, p. 302; cf. Blanc & Brigaud, 2014). However, there is no lack of disagreement as to the overall effectiveness of humour as a persuasive tool. For example, “Markiewicz highlights the point that humour is not a sure choice to enhance persuasion” (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, p. 18). Studying the effects of humour on attitude change, Markiewicz found out that “humour integral to or adjacent to a persuasive message does not influence persuasion significantly; [and that] humour’s effects on comprehension and source evaluation are inconsistent” (Markiewicz, 1974, p. 407).

Investigations into the impact of humour continued nevertheless, consequently making the studies into humour in advertising gain credibility; the body of humour research grew and resulted in works by, *inter alia*, Ogilvy and Raphaelson (1982), who indicated that humour in ads is capable of changing brand preference. This, in turn, signalled “the broader acceptance of humour as a legitimate executional tactic among mainstream advertising executives” (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, p. 18). What is important, humour seems to enhance persuasion not only thanks to the impact of humour on

argument strength (Cline & Kellaris, 1999) or owing to its playing with emotions, but also due to the fact that it may positively bias advertisement design or, potentially, increase motivation to process the advertising message itself (Strick et al. 2013, p. 33).

Similarly, in an article devoted to the influence of humour strength and humour-message relatedness on ad memorability, “Cline and Kellaris (2007, p. 56) stress the function of humour in producing joy, which may enhance the consumer’s mood, and [...] this mood will influence how individuals process the advertisement” (Yus, 2016, p. 302). One of the theories put forward is that the audience’s perception of a humorous ad is better than the one of the non-humorous ad because humour simply attracts more attention, thus making the addressees more open to persuasive stratagems. Moreover, it provides the audience with pleasurable experience and hence with a stimulus which may make them cease to judge ad’s informational content, reducing people’s natural tendency to counter-argue (Eisend, 2011; Blanc & Brigaud, 2014).

The idea is that having to devote cognitive resources to solve the puzzles, incongruities, etc. that a humorous advertising text contains, the viewer or reader will have fewer cognitive resources left to engage in other tasks such as counter-arguing (Eisend, 2011, p. 116). [...] Reduced counter-arguing, in turn, may increase acceptance of the humorous message itself. (Yus, 2016, p. 302)

Humour thus constitutes a positive stimulus that can be used to overcome resistance on the part of the audience, as well as to initiate desirable associative processes, partly due to the fact that humorous ads rely on emotions instead of argumentation (Strick et al., 2012, p. 23). The jocular factor becomes a source of positive affect that needs little to no logical argumentation since it usually focuses on brand-humour pairings that may lead to spontaneous brand choices (Strick et al., 2013, p. 5) resulting from affect transfer from the advertising message *per se* to the product or brand featured (cf. Eisend, 2011). (Stwora & Zemełka, 2020, pp. 160–161)

Taking cognisance of the affective mechanism that underlies the impact of humour in advertising (Eisend, 2009), the jocular in advertising seems powerful an instrument which can do good to ads’ persuasiveness. Simultaneously, though, “Tanaka (1996) remarks that advertisers typically engage in covert communication so that the explicit intention to get the customer

to buy the product is not too evident” (Yus, 2016, p. 305). This finds corroboration in Smith (1993) or Cline and Kellaris (1999) who found out that humour enhances Aad (attitude towards the ad) and Ab (attitude towards the brand) with weaker claims. Other remarkable works that deal with humour in ads and persuasion include Markiewicz (1972), who managed to trace positive correlation between humour and persuasion in soft-sell magazine ads, or Madden (1982) and Speck (1987), who centred on the same issue in TV commercials (cf. Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, pp. 66–67).

At this point, I would like to focus on one important similarity concerning both humour and metaphor in ads, namely, on the fact that both are excellent ways of avoiding truth commitment. Humour introduces this note of levity that is a signal to the audience that they should not take the ad seriously. Since they are already accustomed to this convention of suspended seriousness, they enter the world of the humorous ad, willing to accept its claims and rules, for they are too busy solving the puzzle to produce counterarguments. A person whose attitude towards a message is positive is less likely to raise any counterarguments because, being focused on the humorous aspect of an ad, he does not think about the product’s price, quality or effectiveness (cf. Iwańska, 2013). When it comes to humour based on the incongruity-resolution pattern, the perceiver “[...] is forced to entertain several interpretations simultaneously [...], and this simultaneity puzzles him [...], resulting in the desired *stop-to-think strategy* that advertisers expect from readers in this advertisement-saturated world we live in” (Yus, 2016, p. xix).

In a similar vein, the advantages of metaphor over literal language in ads include increased pleasure and credibility, as well as reduced counterarguments (Sopory & Dillard, 2002) because of the already augmented processing effort necessary to comprehend the figurative (Bowers & Osborn, 1966). Besides, metaphors “cannot by definition be judged in terms of truth and falsity when it comes to their propositional meaning” (Wojtaszek, 2002, p. 110) which, in fact, enables the advertiser to avoid accusations of manipulative practices or dishonest advertising (Bralczyk, 2000). Because marketing claims that use metaphors are figurative in their nature, they invite various interpretations to be decoded by the audience, the members of which are ultimately responsible for the meaning decoded (Wojtaszek, 2002). As a result, humour and metaphor help to avoid truth commitment in ads and, simultaneously, may “render the consumer more receptive to multiple, distinct, positive inferences about the advertised brand” (McQuarrie & Phillips, 2005, p. 7).

Humour can also enhance persuasion indirectly by positively biasing ad elaboration (e.g., Allen & Madden, 1985), or by increasing motivation to process ads (e.g., Zhang & Zinkhan, 2006; Strick et al., 2013, p. 4). This view was first thoroughly discussed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) who proposed the *elaboration likelihood model* (ELM), which is concerned with changing the direction of attitudes through persuasive communication. Petty and Cacioppo contend that there are two routes to attitude change:

- 1) the peripheral route where persuasion is a form of short-term acceptance based on affective cues, or what is most socially acceptable;
- 2) the central route where persuasion is long lasting. Attitude change here comes about through thoughtful reflection on the information received. This central route leads not just to outward compliance (mere behaviour change) but to a change in beliefs (private acceptance). The choice of the central route assumes:
 - (a) the target audience have the motivation to process the information because of high personal relevance;
 - (b) the target audience have the ability to process the information. Central route persuasion comes about through careful consideration of the merits of the evidence while persuasion via the peripheral route emanates from affective cues or social conformity. (O'Shaughnessy & O'Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 126; cf. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)

Although the ELM model is not flawless (e.g., it assumes a strict separation of the rational from the emotional), it is regularly cited by researchers interested in consumer behaviour since it provides an explanation as to the process of associating the product and/or brand with pleasure and enjoyment engendered by humour, which would presumably, in accordance with what is proposed by Petty and Cacioppo, come under the peripheral route (O'Shaughnessy & O'Shaughnessy, 2004). The scope of the book makes it impossible to explore this issue thoroughly, yet of particular interest may be three terms the said authors introduce, that is, elaboration, elaboration likelihood, and cue.

First, elaboration is “the extent to which a person thinks about the issue-relevant arguments contained in a message” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 128). “Issue-relevant elaboration will typically result in the new arguments, or one’s personal translations of them, being integrated

into the underlying belief structure (schema) for the attitude object” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 128). Second, elaboration likelihood is high whenever “conditions foster people’s motivation and ability to engage in issue-relevant thinking” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 128). Whenever motivation or ability is weak, elaboration likelihood is low. Finally, a persuasion cue is any element in the message context that can influence attitude in the absence of arguments or argument processing. Cues operate in one of three ways: (1) they can trigger “affective states which become associated with the attitude object” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 128), (2) they can invoke a guiding schema, or (3) they can trigger inferences. (Speck, 1987, p. 130)

With regard to humour, Speck (1987, pp. 132–133) proposes his own ELM of humour’s communication effects in advertising, keeping the fundamental distinction between central route processing (CRP) and peripheral route processing (PRP). He says that “central route processing is associated with ads that employ issue-relevant schemas. Peripheral route processing is associated with ads that employ various issue-irrelevant schemas. Humour-dominant processing (HDP) is a special case of PRP” (Speck, 1987, p. 132). Over time, as opposed to peripheral processing, the associative processing model of humour in advertising was proposed by Strick et al. (2013) who suggest that recurring humour-brand pairings are capable of forming positive brand associations, regardless of the nature of processing itself (superficial versus thorough) or humour relatedness. This issue, nevertheless, is still subject to debate. Some researchers and marketing specialists, for instance, are of the opinion that both humour and the product promoted should be integral parts of the ad’s plot; it seems pertinent to cite Barsoux in this context:

Unless humour is woven into the product message, the danger is that the jokes will merely serve to draw the attention away from the serious point. Used effectively, humour softens the sales blow and puts the audience in a relaxed and warm frame of mind, in which it is more attentive to what is being said. (Barsoux, 1993, p. 145)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, several marketing studies have found that the humorous factor in ads may have little or even no effect on later consummatory behaviour, such as brand choice or purchase intentions (Chattopadhyay & Basu, 1990; Zhang & Zinkhan, 2006). All in all, then, “the current conclusion from the overall literature concurs with the view

that humour does not offer significant advantages over non-humour when persuasion is the goal” (Gulas & Weinberger, 1992, pp. 56–57).

Despite the range of evidence in favour of the view of humour as a positive factor, some researchers explore humour in advertising in its distracting potential (Gelb & Zinkhan, 1986; Krishnan & Chakravarti, 2003; Gulas & Weinberger, 2006; Eisend, 2011; Strick et al. 2013; Chang & Chang, 2014; Yus, 2016). “The decision to opt for humorous advertising is not one to be taken lightly since it can so easily backfire” (Barsoux, 1993, p. 138), especially if there is no balance between the informative and the humorous in the ad. Some forms of humour can, in fact, “harm the memory for products and brand claims” (Strick et al., 2013, p. 4) and thus potentially disrupt critical processing of advertising claims, making the entertainment level more important to the audience than the informative one (Cline & Kellaris, 1999). The information on the goods on offer may be simply shadowed by the humorous, making it impossible or at least difficult for the audience to remember the brand behind the ad afterwards (cf. Strick et al. 2013, p. 33; Chang & Chang, 2014, p. 9213). “This has been called the *VAMPIRE EFFECT* by practitioners, in cases where the innovative advertising discourse sucks the life-blood of the brand dry (Eisend, 2011, p. 116)” (Yus, 2016, p. 303). As reported by Gulas and Weinberger in their study of humour in various media, “the general result is that humour in magazine ads enhances attention [...] but appears to hinder comprehension” (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, p. 66).

Finally, research in the field of humour in advertising centres on the intersection of the plane of advertising with that of humour theories, that is, of superiority, relief, and incongruity theories. Thus, humour in advertising can be “typified according to the kind of effect that it produces in the audience” (Yus, 2016, p. 303), as evidenced by Chang and Chang (2014), whose article offers the following classification of the humorous in ads:

- a) *emotion-oriented humorous ads*, based on the principles of the relief theory of humour, which rely on humour’s ability to ease emotions and bring the audience pleasure resulting from ad processing (Chang & Chang, 2014); to put it differently, “in *THE AFFECTIVE APPROACH*, humour resulting from ad processing is determined by physiological arousal and thematic content, such as sex, aggression, and freedom” (Yus, 2016, p. 303; cf. Unger, 1995; Chang & Bandyopadhyay, 2014);

- b) *cognition-oriented humorous ads*, which deal with all kinds of humorous incongruities, that is, contain contrasts or puzzles, involve surprising juxtapositions or show unexpected situations and events that can be ascribed to the incongruity-resolution mechanism (Chang & Chang, 2014); “the key to COGNITIVE HUMOUR is incongruity (or deviation from expectations) and its resolution” (Yus, 2016, p. 303); “Chang and Bandyopadhyay (2014) remark that, in advertisements, this problem solving that incongruity creates should be framed in a context of playfulness” (Yus, 2016, p. 303);
- c) *society-oriented humorous ads*, which are “grounded in superiority theory, which means that advertisements include humorous effects by laughing at other social groups” (Yus, 2016, p. 303; cf. Chang & Chang, 2014); as far as THE SOCIAL/INTERPERSONAL APPROACH is concerned, it aims at explaining humour “in terms of the social and interpersonal contexts within which humour is produced” (Yus, 2016, p. 303), taking into account a whole range of shared cultural assumptions and the audience’s identity.

As the cognition-oriented approach to humour is the primary interest of this book, I should provide a short overview of the variables tested within this framework. These, following a comprehensive study by Chung and Zhao (2011), are persuasion, comprehension (or, optionally, recall), and attention. As already noted in this section, studies devoted to the persuasive appeal of humorous advertising produce inconclusive evidence. “Some studies reveal that some humour in advertisements does increase the reader’s or viewer’s intention to use the product and their perception of the product quality. However, other studies have found no substantial effect of humorous advertisements on persuasion” (Yus, 2016, p. 305). Similar effects can be observed as far as comprehension and recall are concerned (cf. Stwora & Zemełka, 2020). Compared to non-humorous advertisements, humorous ads yielded mixed results in terms of comprehension, “e.g. sometimes more mental effort is devoted with no clear offset in cognitive reward” (Yus, 2016, p. 305). Lastly, when it comes to the attention variable, Chung and Zhao (2011) report on a series of studies which testified to the positive effect of humorous ads across various media, that is, to increased attention resulting from the use of humour. Moreover, some researchers point out to the fact that incongruity, thanks to its potent appeal, is capable of attracting more attention than

congruity, thus having greater potential in terms of positive evaluation (cf. Yus, 2016).

Besides, empirical evidence suggests that individuals presented with incongruity are more likely to engage in detailed processing than they are with congruous inputs. A possible reason is that customers take incongruities as challenges to be solved, rather than as annoying effort-demanding pieces of discourse. (Yus, 2016, p. 307)

4.5 The Linkage between the Humorous and the Metaphorical

The central principle of double domain activation in metaphor is reminiscent of cognitive, script-based humour theories, which also focus on the activation of two (typically opposed) scripts that are connected in the process of incongruity resolution (Attardo, Hempelmann, and Di Maio, 2002). (Brône, 2017, p. 257)

For humour to be examined from a cognitive-linguistic perspective, Brône and Feyaerts (2003) propose to focus on the already introduced notions of salience imbalances, framing, markedness, (non-)prototypicality, comparison, selection processes, and construals enabling the selection of salient reference points. The topic of construals and salient reference points is particularly important, for it draws close correspondences between metaphor and humour.

Having noticed this potential interaction between metaphor and humour, Brône and Feyaerts pointed out to other researchers interested in this particular correspondence, *inter alia* to Alexander (1997) and Attardo (1994), whose papers dealt with humorous ambiguity arising from the clash of literal and figurative readings of a metaphorical expression. In a similar vein, Pollio (1996) and Kyratzis (2003) aimed at exploring the boundaries between metaphor and humour. Drawing on Koestler's (1964) idea of bisociation, Kyratzis (2003) claims that humorous bisociation is different from metaphorical conceptualisation as far as the profiling of domain boundaries is concerned; "whereas metaphors essentially focus on the interdomain connections, suppressing the obvious domain boundaries, humorous stimuli (un)intentionally emphasize the dissimilarities between domains" (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, p. 14; cf. Kyratzis, 2003).

Following the cognitive-linguistic approach favoured by Brône and Feyaerts (2003, 2004) in their discussion of the humorous (already adumbrated

in the section devoted to their criticism of the SSTH and GTVH), it becomes apparent that the concept of mappings, and especially of conceptual integration (or blending) (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), can be successfully applied to both metaphors and humorous artefacts. The recognition of the fact that blending, that is, the integration of mental spaces, can be treated as a process underlying humour clearly points out to a linkage between humorousness and metaphoricity (Coulson, 2000; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, 2004; Brône, 2017; Libura, 2017).

In spite of the fact that conceptual integration cannot be said to involve humorous effects at all times, it is an inherent feature of humour (Coulson, 2005). Under this framework, both humorous and metaphorical reasoning occur without the perceiver's conscious thought. Both involve two (or more) concepts that eventually create a new sense, both operate on input spaces, and both rely on the operations of conceptual compression and expansion, which make it possible to interpret encoded concepts thanks to their narrowing and/or broadening (Libura, 2017; Piskorska, 2017). Considered in relation to humour, the conceptual integration framework is particularly promising because "it links linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena in systematic ways that begin to explain how and why there can be imaginative emergent structure in human thought, in its everyday manifestations, as well as in its most original and singular spurs of creativity" (Fauconnier, 2007, p. 373).

It is duality, observed both in humour and metaphor, that gives rise to emergent properties (Piskorska, 2017). The idea of employing emergent structures to handle complex examples of humour seems appealing to Attardo as well, who says that "one of the observations of the blending theory is that some blends exhibit 'emerging' features, i.e. features that belong to neither of the input (mental) spaces" (Attardo, 2006, pp. 342–343; cf. Grady, Oakley, & Coulson, 1999; Attardo, 2015) and that a similar situation can be traced with regard to humour when "the interpretation requires the working out of emergent properties, i.e. such inferences that arise in an act of joint processing of two incongruent concepts" (Piskorska, 2017).

It was already demonstrated that emergent properties arise naturally when both metaphors and novel combinations of literal incongruent concepts are processed (Wilson & Carston, 2008; Piskorska, 2017), which testifies to the fact that emergent properties can be viewed as points of resemblance between the metaphorical and humorous that create specific, usually *ad hoc* sets of relevant correspondences and assumptions needed

in the process of comprehension (Piskorska, 2017). As far as the relation between the emergent properties and incongruity resolution is concerned, “incongruity resolution present in humour comprehension involves the working out of emergent implicatures/implications resulting from the clash of scenarios. They constitute the main cognitive import of a humorous utterance” (Piskorska, 2017).

Acknowledging this overlap in terms of the cognitive mechanisms involved is vital to this discussion. These mechanisms include frame-shifting as well, in which a shift in interpretation can activate previously suppressed knowledge and conceptual structures (Ritchie, 2005) which surround a given script or mental space. While humorous messages rely on a clash and subversion of discrepant scripts, “metaphors activate a vehicle frame, elements of which are connected to elements of the topic frame, usually not oppositionally but rather in a way that enriches or expands the meaning of the topic frame in the current [...] context” (Ritchie, 2005, p. 292). Furthermore, just like metaphor, humour is capable of introducing changes in the perceiver’s cognitive environment, bringing about increases in relevance. Thus, as can be seen, similarities are rife indeed, which contributes to the explanatory power of the conceptual blending theory while discussing humour. Yet, despite marked similarities, correspondences between humour and metaphor have received rather scant attention until the last ten years, more or less. To my knowledge, there are several writings that spotlight (1) the actual linkage between humour and metaphor in terms of blending and/or (2) the humorous capacity of metaphors (e.g., papers by Attardo (1994, 2006), Alexander (1997), Pollio (1996), Coulson (2000), Grady, Oakley, & Coulson (2000), Brône & Feyaerts (2003, 2004), Kyratzis (2003), Oring (2003), Ritchie (2005), Dynel (2009), and Krikmann (2009), as well as more recent works by Müller (2015), Attardo (2015), Brône (2017), and Libura (2017)).

The perspective assumed by Dynel (2009) links the power of metaphoricity with the incongruity-resolution model, concentrating on metaphors which are humorous. She follows the line of thought offered by “Fónagy (1982) [...] [and] Pollio (1996), who explain the humorousness of metaphors referring to the semantic distance between the two concepts compared” (Dynel, 2009, p. 27), that is, to the incongruity between the concepts entering the metaphorical and/or humorous content. As outlined in the article by Ortony on the workings of salience-imbalance, “the domains [...] can be incongruent or semantically remote from one another. When this happens, there often appear to be no real attribute matches at all” (1979,

p. 168). This, in turn, may potentially lead to humour which is brought about by attribute inequality. This so-called distance theory (Fónagy, 1982; Pollio, 1996) “essentially consists in postulating a threshold of ‘semantic distance’ beyond which the linkage between the two domains in the metaphorical construal becomes ‘stretched’ (i.e. too distant) and is therefore perceived as humorous” (Attardo, 2015, p. 91).

Such a stand on the issue is echoed by Krikmann (2009), who says that humour, just like metaphor, involves dual planes of meaning that, more often than not, contradict each other semantically, resulting in some kind of ambiguity or incompatibility which needs to be disambiguated. “To succeed in this, a certain intersection (similarity, analogy, ambiguous element, causal link, inferential chain, etc.) must be found between the two planes of meaning” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 17). The greater the dissimilarity between the concepts, the better the aptness of a metaphorical expression (cf. Tourangeau & Sternberg, 1982; Dynel, 2009) and, simultaneously, the greater the potential humorous incongruity displayed in a given metaphor (Fónagy, 1982; Pollio, 1996; Dynel, 2009).

In essence, such an incongruity needs to be resolved, that is, rendered congruous, for the perceiver to appreciate the humorous in full measure (see the already discussed difference between incongruity (I) and incongruity-resolution (IR) touched upon at the beginning of this chapter). The notion of resolvable incongruity is central to the workings of humorous metaphor as perceived through the lens of both linguistics and psychology (Forabosco, 2008; Dynel, 2009) since it accounts for the jocular effect produced through *diaphoricity*. Contrary to the mimetic epiphor, which centres on similarities between concepts, a diaphor places emphasis on dissimilarities, which are likely to conduce to the production of new meanings thanks to the emergence of inter-conceptual tensions (cf. Wheelwright, 1962; Mac Cormac, 1990; Dynel, 2009). It can therefore be said that disparity resulting from the collision of diaphoric elements is the actual pillar of humorous force behind metaphors.

This stand was also taken by Kyratzis (2003), whose aim was to advance the understanding of the cognitive processes behind humorous metaphors. He offers a handful of useful notions and explanations as regards “duality and tension” (Kyratzis, 2003, p. 1), which lie at the root of both humour and metaphor. More specifically, he claims that the structural similarity shared by humour and metaphor lies in the operation of the blend (a concept borrowed from Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) conceptual blending theory) because, just like metaphor, humour can be explained in terms

of conceptual integration networks. To his mind, upon bringing together two disparate concepts, “the processor at some point realises the duality, the opposition, and, consequently, the tension between the two scenarios” (Kyratzis, 2003, p. 2). A partial overlap of the scenarios, or scripts, to use the notion proposed by Raskin (1985), is a necessary condition for the creation of both metaphor and humour; still, in the latter, the sudden realisation of the boundaries between the concepts and the tension between them causes mirth. In other words, placing cognitive emphasis on dissimilarities results in disjoining the spaces relevant to metaphor, thus leading to humour.

The unexpected and sudden realisation of the duality of meaning that results in drawing the boundary between mental spaces anew is what Kyratzis calls the deautomatisation of a metaphor. It is therefore the *suddenness* of the process that elicits humorous response on the part of the perceiver thanks to the process of de-blending (Kyratzis, 2003). Nonetheless, it is still possible for humour to emerge through the fusion of boundaries between the spaces that enter metaphorical relations since “blends quite obviously appear to have a strong natural capacity to feed fantasy and produce humour” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 29). Upon corroboration of this theory in the course of research and contrary to his primary hypothesis, Kyratzis finds out that, sometimes, even if fusion does take place, the two necessary ingredients for humour, that is, duality and tension, may still be present and hence novel.

[T]he fusion of the elements projected from the input spaces is not crystallised in the way they are in more conventional metaphors. This means that the input spaces are still active and the necessary tension between them is still strong enough to cause laughter. (Kyratzis, 2003, p. 17)

Likewise, Krikmann develops a proposition that the conceptual structure behind humour and metaphor is based on two incompatible schemas, scripts or frames; whatever the label attached, the rule of thumb is that “in the case of metaphor, the first (overt, redundant) script ‘wins,’ but in the case of joke, the second (hidden, informative) prevails” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 14). Addressing the issue of the line between the metaphorical and humorous conjunctions, Pollio (1996) suggests the following explanation as to the creation of humour and/or metaphor resulting from the clash of disparate concepts:

- (1) split reference yields humour if the joined items (or the act joining them) emphasize the boundary or line separating them;
- (2) split reference yields metaphor if the boundary between the joined items (or the act joining them) is obliterated and the two items fuse to form a single entity. (Pollio, 1996, p. 248)

To put it differently, “metaphors, it is claimed, integrate information from the source and target domain to form a unified conceptual entity, suppressing the apparent domain boundaries, whereas humour, in fact, emphasises the domain discrepancies or oppositions” (Brône, 2017, p. 257). The boundary or lack thereof, resulting in the accentuation or blurring of semantic distance between the concepts, was stressed by, for example, Fónagy (1982) and Pollio (1996), and partly supported by Kyratzis (2003) (who actually disproved the second claim made by Pollio that fusing boundaries cannot contribute to humour). It is also acknowledged by Dynel (2009) but does not win unwavering support from her. The excerpt below voices her reservations as to the tenability of the propositions presented by her predecessors.

Unfortunately, this model can easily be criticised on the grounds that all metaphors, even those non-humorous, operate on some distance between the two juxtaposed concepts, and it is thus difficult, if not impossible, to determine when it is large enough to be considered humorous, which is why other provisions need to be added to render the approach more tenable. (Dynel, 2009, pp. 27–28)

Therefore, if distance itself is not sufficient an explanation for the emergence of humour in metaphor, we have to look for yet another provision. An attempt was made by Oring (2003) who tried to address the following question: what makes some metaphors humorous while others are not? He claimed that it is not distance itself that is decisive a factor; rather, he was of the opinion that the processing of the conceptual blend and, again, of incongruity, is actually relevant to the humorous effect.

According to Oring, the difference between metaphors and humorous metaphors is that metaphors are about finding some kind of a link or a connection between two, incongruous frames and then resolving the “genuine” incongruity of the mapping between them, whereas *humorous metaphors* are those in which the incongruity found in the cross-domain mapping is not fully resolved in the course of interpretation or, in other

words, characterised by “spurious appropriateness” in the connection of the frames (Oring, 2003, p. 5). If the appropriateness of connections between the domains detected by the perceiver is insufficient to justify the mapping, it results in partial resolution which, in turn, renders the metaphor humorous. This perspective was also taken by Attardo (2015) who proposed the introduction of the umbrella term *humorous metaphors* that would cover various related, yet often heterogeneous phenomena, including three major categories:

1. metaphors that are funny in and of themselves,
2. metaphors that describe a referent that is inherently funny, and
3. failed metaphors (metaphors that are involuntarily funny, or that are produced pretending to be involuntarily funny). (Attardo, 2015, p. 92)

This umbrella concept, it is argued, “collects a number of heterogeneous phenomena, some semantic, some pragmatic, and some not even linguistic (but still obviously conceptual)” (Attardo, 2015, p. 93). Still, given the number of types of humorous metaphors (Table 4), it seems impossible to formulate one unified theory that would encompass all the examples and various instantiations of such metaphors (for further discussion see Attardo (2015) and Hamrick (2007) on an interesting hypothesis that metaphoricity may be treated as a logical mechanism KR).

Type	Explanation	Example
(A) Funny metaphors	Partially resolved incongruity of cross-domain comparison	Thoughts are underpants
(B) Metaphors with funny referent	Referential humour and possibly implied comparison	Hog on ice
(C) Un-metaphors	Mapping a domain upon itself or no mapping	Red brick wall the colour of a red-brick crayon
(D) Mixed metaphors	Multiple metaphors that do not share entailments and possibly too many metaphors	Throw a monkey wrench in the procedural apple cart that has already left the station
(E) Overdone metaphors	Metaphors that violate primary metaphorical relations	A lame duck, lame from stepping on a land mine
(F) Erroneously categorised	Antanaclasis	Unlike Phil, this plan may work

TABLE 4. Various Types of Humorous Metaphors. Adapted from Attardo, 2015, p. 98

When it comes to the unspecified issue of distance, “Attardo problematizes the conceptual boundaries of the category of humorous metaphors and argues that the criterion of ‘semantic distance’ [...] is difficult to operationalize” (Brône, 2017, p. 257) since no specific or universal metric distance can be established to account for all types of humorous metaphors. Drawing on Fauconnier and Turner (1998), as well as on Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (1999), he forms a hypothesis that the principle of metonymic tightening in blending may be the possible source of the said distance; its main assumption is outlined below:

Relationships between elements from the same input should become as close as possible within the blend. For instance, Western images of personified Death often depict the figure as a skeleton, thus closely associating the event of death with an object that, in our more literal understandings, is indirectly but saliently associated with it. (Grady, Oakley, & Coulson, 1999, p. 108)

Based on the hypothesis above, Attardo (2015) suggests that, for now, it would perhaps be better to abandon the search for strict definitional features and, instead, treat humorous metaphors as a prototypical category sharing family resemblances (see Nerhardt (1976), Giora (1991), and Chen & Jiang (2018) on this issue). “With this approach, Attardo relates his account to one of the foundational principles of CL [cognitive linguistics], namely, linguistic categorisation inspired by prototype theory” (Brône, 2017, p. 257; cf. Rosch, 1973, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).

The idea itself is not new, as the claims concerning the link between humorousness and prototypicality were already made by, for example, Ertel (1968), Shurcliff (1968), Nerhardt (1976), Giora (1991), and more recently by Chen and Jiang (2018). According to these sources, a specific scenario is perceived as belonging to a class which was available and relevant in a given discursive context owing to its total similarity to the class type encountered (with total similarity understood as “similarity dependent on all ‘unidimensional similarities’ [...] to typical members of the class (or to a ‘class type’); this, in turn, rests on the assumption of a positive relationship between frequency of represented [...] [items] in the class and total similarity to the class type” (Nerhardt, 1976, p. 47).

Nonetheless, as already outlined in this chapter, for humorousness to emerge, the other script needs to be an opposing one, that is, it has to bear some typical features that could be attributed to the first scenario

and some that diverge from the said first script in a humorous way. It is therefore postulated that the other script needs not only to belong to “the class when perceived in its entirety” (Nerhardt, 1976, p. 50; cf. Shurcliff, 1968), but also to “diverge in several unidimensional qualities from the typical elements in the class” (Nerhardt, 1976, p. 50). Thus, the lesser the similarity between the class-evoking scenarios involved, the greater the funniness that stems from non-prototypicality. In the citation below, the reader should equate the notion of an event with the one of a script (the nomenclatural difference stems from the fact that Raskin’s script was popularised in 1985).

If one of the events is perceived as similar to the types in the other event’s classes (and as these classes are highly available), they will become reference classes for the former event. If an event in this manner becomes a member of a certain class actualised by another event and, at the same time, diverges enough in unidimensional similarity from a typical quality in that class, it will be found funny. If, on the other hand, the event does not have sufficient total similarity to the second event, it will not become a member of the class, there will be no expectations about it as a member of that class, and there will be neither divergence from expectations nor funniness. (Nerhardt, 1976, p. 48)

This line of reasoning is also followed by Giora (1985, 1988, 1991) who, based on Ertel (1968) and Nerhardt (1976), and on her own theory of marked informativeness, showed that too dissimilar a stimulus, that is, the one which deviates from the prototypical to such an extent that it becomes cognitively inaccessible (i.e., unavailable in terms of class inclusion), does not violate any expectations when it comes to prototypicality and thus counts not as funny (Giora, 1991). It can therefore be argued that, if the conceptual structure which arises is far from being prototypical, there occurs a conceptual shift, that is, “a jolt to our picture of the way things are supposed to be” (Morreall, 1983, p. 60; cf. Giora, 1991, 2002).

While in non-humorous metaphors only some of the features of the vehicle are salient and only some are normally attributable to the topic, in humorous ones, any features can be prioritised and assumed as the *tertium comparationis*. In humorous metaphor, indiscriminate importation of features from the vehicle to the topic takes place, regardless of the degree of their salience and relevance to either the vehicle or the tenor. (Dyner, 2009, p. 40)

While discussing the topic of prototypical features, it is also worth noting that, as a rule, prototypicality and predictability hinder the humorous in a metaphor because the more conventional the metaphor, the less surprising it becomes; this is due to the fact that its humorous potential resides in novelty, creativity, and incongruity which frequently rest on choosing metaphorical vehicles which are not conventionalised. Thus, humour and humorous metaphor profit from a kind of aptness violation (Mulder & Nijholt, 2002; Dynel, 2009), with aptness defined as “how well the vehicle is able to cover the salient features of the tenor (e.g. oil is like liquid gold vs. a train is like a worm)” (Hashemian, 2011, p. 1). Focusing on less salient or less relevant features, not directly mappable onto the other element entering the conceptual integration, can produce less expectable scenarios that conduce to more humour. In other words, the humorous stimulus is powerful enough only if it

forces the reader to cancel the immediate unmarked interpretation [...] and replace it with a marked interpretation. The notion of markedness relies on categorial internal structuring which differentiates between the cognitive status of the prototype (the unmarked member) and the marginal status of the marked member. (Giora, 1991, p. 465)

A fairly recent article by Chen and Jiang (2018) was particularly elucidative when it comes to understanding the mechanisms of multimodal humour viewed through the lens of the prototype theory. These authors argued convincingly that multimodal humour can be built on: “(1) prototypicality and non-prototypicality of category members; (2) family resemblance shared by category members; (3) the fuzzy inter-categorical boundary” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 74). Their arguments, paraphrased, run as follows.

In the case of multimodal humour built on prototypicality versus non-prototypicality of category members, “[...] one of the modalities alludes to a category whose prototype/non-prototype is presupposed while another modality presents the opposite. The incongruity between the expected and the presented, if perceived, will possibly engender humour” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 76). It is vital to mention that humour founded upon the prototypicality/non-prototypicality relation can make use of either intra- or inter-category contrast that is supposed to lead to humorous incongruity. In the former case, the elements contrasted may belong to the same category, with one of the elements taking a salient position in the formation

of a category while the other remains non-prototypical, for it is seen as less central a member, as compared to the other. In the latter, on the other hand, the prototypical element is juxtaposed with a peripheral one “[...] which bears certain resemblance to the prototype yet belongs to another category” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 79).

As far as multimodal humour based on family resemblance is concerned, the said similarity that is shared by the members of a given category provides the basis for humour. An important thing to bear in mind is that individual category members remain distinct entities which are recognisably different in nature from others of a similar type despite family resemblance. “When the distinction is deliberately disregarded and category members are seen as more or less the same, in other words, when resemblance is highlighted, humour follows from the resultant incongruity” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 77).

Lastly, as regards multimodal humour that results from fuzzy boundaries, it is said to involve solely inter-category contrast owing to the fact that it is characterised by the so-called peripheral members that have the features of at least two categories, which makes it difficult to categorise them precisely as belonging to one or the other. In view of the fact that the boundaries between the categories are generally blurred and imprecise (cf. Rosch, 1973, 1978), it may so happen that a member of a given category that is non-prototypical, and thus located closer to the fuzzy boundary, will be perceived as fitting into each of two adjoining categories. In such a way, “incorrect categorisation will result in incongruity that leads to humour” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 78).

In conclusion, this part aimed to attest to the compatibility of the incongruity-resolution pattern, acknowledged in humour studies, and the conceptual integration theory that hallmarks research on metaphor. It was pointed out that while “metaphors essentially focus on interdomain connections, thus suppressing the obvious domain boundaries, humorous stimuli (un)intentionally emphasize the dissimilarities between domains” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, p. 14; cf. Kyratzis, 2003). Therefore, “a disparity, conceived also as incongruity, between domains seems to be a plausible parameter explicating the humorous force of metaphors” (Dynel, 2009, p. 36). Appropriateness or aptness violation, corresponding roughly to script opposition in humour studies, was the factor that was established to render a given metaphor humorous as a result of partial resolution brought about by insufficient connections between two domains that would justify the mapping.

It was nonetheless said that the measurement of semantic distance between the concepts is difficult to carry out, for distance can be evaluated only intuitively (Dynel, 2009). This, in turn, inspired Nerhardt (1976), Giora (1991), Attardo (2015), as well as Chen and Jiang (2018), among others, to view humorous metaphors through the lens of prototypicality and, most importantly, of cognitive linguistics (see the issue of markedness and optimal innovation outlined by, e.g., Giora (1991, 2002), Brône and Feyaerts (2003, 2004), and Brône (2017)). In the light of the foregoing, it emerges that research on humour can greatly benefit from the cognitive framework, and that humorousness and metaphoricity are connected by similar mechanisms of conceptual patterns (Dynel, 2018).

4.6 Summary

The fourth chapter discussed several key contributions representing a broad spectrum of approaches to the study of humour. First of all, a wide range of definitions of and perspectives on humour was offered; these differed markedly in scope and emphasis, yet still do not exhaust the topic of humour itself. “Linguistic humour research is particularly prolific and can hardly be exhaustively summarised [...], insofar as it displays innumerable topics and approaches, frequently borrowed from ample literature on ‘non-humorous’ language” (Dynel, 2011b, p. 2). The theoretical backbone of humour theories was said to consist of the relief, superiority, and incongruity-resolution theory, which was the most important, given the focus of this volume.

The core concept in incongruity theories is based on the fact that human experience works with learned patterns. What we have experienced prepares us to deal with what we will experience. When we reach out to touch snow, we expect it to be cold. If a chipmunk is running toward us, we expect it to avoid us, not leap up and bite our jugular vein. If someone begins a story about George Washington, they may describe him as having faults, but we do not expect to hear that Washington plotted to murder all 56 signers of the Declaration of Independence. (Morreall, 2009, pp. 10–11)

Consequently, as aptly captured in the quotation above, if something “diverts from the cognitive model of reference” (Forabosco, 2008, p. 48), it

can be expected to be incongruous to the perceiver's mind. In other words, once he finds out that an assumed component of a scenario or schema is unexpectedly missing, the perceiver will be surprised since he or she will experience "a conceptual shift" (Morreall, 1983) that contradicts the familiar and the expected. What is familiar and expected, on the other hand, is usually conditional on the usual language pragmatics, on relevance and saliency, which guide communication and comprehension. In this context, relevance *per se* should be understood as "[...] a result of the interaction between a stimulus and the cognitive environment of the addressee" (Velasco-Sacristán & Fuertes-Olivera, 2006, p. 1997; Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Forceville, 1996). This is due to the fact that a relevant message has an effect on the assumptions made by the perceiver in the process of comprehension, that is, it causes the addressee to modify his or her views of or thoughts about the aspects of the world by adopting, rejecting, strengthening, or weakening certain assumptions.

Once faced with a humour stimulus, which deliberately plays off previous expectations and hence produces an incongruity, the perceiver "is motivated to resolve or make sense of the incongruity" (Suls, 1976, p. 41). Therefore, citing Giora, "the strongly felt mismatch of meaning salience and context at the disjunctive point triggers the need for a revisitation. The more salient meaning or script [...] has to be abandoned in favour of a less salient interpretation or script" (2003, p. 169). The incongruity that leads to humorous effects, however, cannot be fully resolved for it to remain funny because some tension (also called "residual incongruity" (cf. Forabosco, 2008)) must still linger for the humorous experience to take place (cf. Suls, 1983; Forabosco, 1992, 2008; Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Oring, 2003). Therefore, with respect to humour based on the incongruity-resolution mechanism, the lack of congruity resulting from a sudden conceptual shift is not the sole factor responsible for the production of humour; the incongruity needs to be partially resolved, which means that the "appropriateness" of the connections between the two domains or scripts should prove insufficient to fully justify the mapping (Oring, 2003). In such a way, humorous meanings may emerge thanks to surfacing inter-conceptual tensions (cf. Mac Cormac, 1990).

Reverting to the general summary of Chapter 4, Giora's Graded Saliency Hypothesis and relevance-theoretic treatments of humour were outlined. The most common linguistic theories of humour were covered too, namely, the Script-based Semantic Theory of Humour and its revised version—the General Theory of Verbal Humour. Furthermore, I included

some polemic points concerning the SSTH and GTVH raised by Brône and Feyaerts (2003, 2004) and Brône, Feyaerts, and Veale (2006). Subsequently, she focused on the visual and multimodal means for producing humour which are of critical importance when it comes to the production of humorous advertising messages and their actual interpretations by the audience. A review of previous studies on the phenomenon of humour in advertising followed, centring on such issues as, *inter alia*, attractiveness, attention, humour targets, and persuasive impact. Given the sheer number of works on humour in advertising, I did not endeavour to fully discuss them, concentrating only on those I found the most relevant to my study.

Chapter 4 was also devoted to the properties shared between metaphor and humour; the observation that such common features exist is based on the works by Attardo (1994, 2006, 2015), Brône and Feyaerts (2003), Dynel (2009), Kyratzis (2003), and Müller (2015), all of whom see the theory of conceptual integration (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002) as the common denominator of metaphor and humour. As may be concluded, figurativeness and humorousness share much of the same conceptual territory; furthermore, both involve cognitive creativity and carry an element of surprise and partial incongruity. The most important difference between the two phenomena discussed is that “metaphors [...] integrate information from the source and target domain to form a unified conceptual entity, suppressing the apparent domain boundaries, whereas humour, in fact, emphasises domain discrepancies or oppositions” (Brône, 2017, p. 257). As regards blending in multimodal humorous ads, it operates on an incongruity between the input spaces, which, according to Dynel, “is playfully resolved in the blended space, but is never dissolved, thanks to which the incongruity and congruity can be duly re-appreciated” (2011a, p. 79). This mechanism makes it possible to perceive both metaphor and humour as essential rhetorical elements of advertising which are based on conceptual frameworks and, simultaneously, involve discrepant cognitions.

Another mechanism that underlies the connection between metaphor and humour is that of scenarios (or scripts). It was mentioned beforehand that scenario-based perspectives inform the perceiver’s metaphorical interpretations and that a metaphorical scenario refers to basic mental representations of particular situations (Semino, 2008; Colston, 2018). Consequently, scenarios imply typical outlines or postulated sequences of events, as they exist in the minds of the audience. In this context, it emerges that metaphorical scenarios can be treated almost like narrative

construals; as postulated by Forceville and Urios-Aparisi (2009), as well as by Musolff (2006) before them, “many metaphors are mini-narratives. The paradigmatic NOUN A IS NOUN B formula disguises the dynamic nature of metaphor. [...] [S]ensemaking happens through real or imagined metaphor actions” (Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009, p. 11).

Unlike abstract image-schemas, scenarios include narrative, argumentative, and evaluative frame aspects, which suggest a specific, pragmatically loaded perspective for inferences about the target topic. These inferences are not cognitively or logically binding but rather a set of assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about prototypical elements of the source concepts (participants, storylines, default outcomes) as well as ethical evaluations, which are connected to social attitudes and emotional stances prevalent in the respective discourse community. (Musolff, 2016, p. 64)

This line of reasoning finds corroboration in Yule (2011/1996) who, explaining the scope of such terms as schema, frame, and script, stresses the fact that scripts (defined as great chunks of semantic and inferential information that surround a given notion (Raskin, 1985)) are the most dynamic types of pre-existing knowledge structures in that they involve event sequences. Breaking the expected chain of events leads to an incongruity that, according to the incongruity-resolution mechanism, conduces to humour. “All metaphor users/interpreters have a range of scenario perspectives to choose from. Some of them may be found to use the non-default/non-typical versions, but the majority in each group appear to ‘agree’ on using the ‘mainstream’ scenario patterns” (Musolff, 2016, p. 64). If they start to diverge from the mainstream pattern, though, the perceiver deals with incongruous, opposing scripts that force his mind to adjust his reasoning to the new cognitive situation.

Moreover, the chapter touched upon a question that is central to this book, namely: what makes some metaphors humorous while others are not? The tenability of the proposition that it is the distance between concepts that makes a given pairing incongruous (cf. Fónagy, 1982; Pollio, 1996) was already challenged by Dynel (2009), who was of the opinion that “all metaphors, even those non-humorous, operate on some distance between the two juxtaposed concepts” (pp. 27–28). It is indeed difficult to gainsay her claim, for we are unable to determine the actual distance between concepts without any other tools that could successfully measure it. Her stance

on this matter is echoed by Oring (2003) who highlighted the fact that the incongruity detected in the cross-domain mapping should be partial if it is to cause humour and, at the same time, that the distance between the inputs cannot be the sole determinant of humorousness.

That is why such researchers as, for instance, Nerhardt (1976) and Giora (1991) gravitated towards the prototype theory that, to their minds, would suit this need. Although “the role played by the principles of prototype theory in humour is apparently underexplored *vis-à-vis* other CL constructs” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 64), it is certainly worth studying, as evidenced by, for example, Chen and Jiang (2018) who tried to present multimodal humour from the prototype-theoretical perspective while staying within the realm of the incongruity-resolution theory. They claimed that “not only (non)prototypicality of category members, but also family resemblance shared by them and the vague boundaries between categories are capable of generating humour” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 79). While prototypicality *per se* cannot be seen as the sole basis conditioning humour, the possible contribution of the prototype theory to humour research is certainly appealing a prospect.

Chapter 5

Perspectives on the Study of Humorous Metaphorical Ads

Both humour and metaphor are the ingredients that greatly contribute to ad creativity due to the characteristic duality of meaning they present; not only do they embellish advertising messages and render them more attractive, but also offer interesting insights into the linguistic, communicational, and cognitive facets of advertising discourse. Inspired by the cognitive similarity between metaphor and humour and building on what was stated beforehand about the language for humorous purposes, I decided to examine the joint workings of humour and metaphor in multimodal press advertising. This specific topic was brought into focus also because of the fact that past literature on metaphor and humour operating simultaneously in multimodal ads is still rather scarce.

This part of the book hence addresses this gap by means of exploring the distribution of metaphor and humour combined in multimodal ads in English and Polish. This comprises several steps to be described in the sections to follow; first, the scope and definitions of the concepts operationalised (connected to humour and metaphor) are determined, which is followed by selecting and defining the indicators and variables to be taken into account. Data collection procedure is described and research objectives are formulated. Then, I decide on specific research methods to be applied to the material gathered and indicate the group of research participants with a view to investigating the workings of humorous metaphorical ads.

5.1 The Scope of Study and Data Collection

Following Holmes (2000), who defines humour as artefacts “which are identified by the analyst, on the basis of paralinguistic, prosodic, and discursive clues, as intended by the speaker(s) to be amusing and perceived

to be amusing by at least some participants” (p. 163), I first gathered an extensive corpus of multimodal humorous metaphorical press advertisements. The corpus comprised 100 ads in English and 100 in Polish; these were retrieved between 2016–2019 from numerous magazines and newspapers as well as from worldwide Internet resources, including several advertising databases (e.g., www.adforum.com, www.adsoftheworld.com, www.adsarchive.com), and simple searches in Google Images. All the ads herein considered are “restricted to a static presentation of advertising [...] [and] consist of written language and graphics” (Janoschka, 2004, p. 22), which means that they subscribe to a multimodal variety.

I decided to focus on metaphorical ads displaying humorous potential, that is, I gathered the material to be studied on the basis of ads’ formal humorousness and not necessarily on their actual funniness because of the fact that “funniness is an individual’s idiosyncratic evaluation of a humorous stimulus” (Dynel, 2009, p. 28). The aforementioned disparity between the perceptive and attributive aspect of humour should be recapitulated here: there is a difference between being humorous, that is, eliciting humorous response from the recipient, and carrying humorous potential, for something may be designed with a view to being humorous but eventually fail to evoke laughter or appreciation in the perceiver. The humorous aspect of each ad was therefore preliminarily assessed as carrying the humorous potential based on the criterion of incongruity (i.e., script opposition and non-prototypicality), which means that a given ad does not have to be unanimously considered genuinely funny by a larger audience. Although the ads in the sample selected were assessed subjectively, I was equipped with a theoretical apparatus in the form of communication and humour theories needed to decide whether a given ad is likely to be humorous or not.

By triangulating with all the available contextual information described by Holmes (2000) (i.e. discursive clues), plus the semantic and pragmatic information of the GTVH, plus any metalinguistic cues in the text, it becomes relatively easy to identify the presence of humour, regardless of its having been reacted to or acknowledged by the participants. (Attardo, 2017, section 3.3.1.)

5.2 Research Objectives

After establishing that the scope of this study will be restricted to the multi-modal environment of press ads, research objectives should also be clarified. The central aim of this research is to explore the workings of conceptual integration and the instances of the incongruity-resolution mechanism as instantiated in humorous metaphors found in press advertising messages in English and Polish. It will also pursue the following objectives:

1. to investigate the way in which metaphorical constructs may be used as vehicles for humorousness in advertising discourse (this will be achieved thanks to qualitative content analysis);
2. to examine the levels of appreciation of selected metaphorical ads that contain humour with the aid of questionnaires on research participants' feelings about such advertising messages (this will be based on a Likert-type scale and visual self-report applying the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) assessment technique (cf. Lang, 1980; Morris & Waine, 1993)); parenthetically, it seems important to note that "appreciation of humour presupposes that humour has been recognised and understood" (Attardo, 2017, section 3.2.1.1); and
3. to check how the informants understand and interpret the mechanisms inducing humour and metaphor in advertisements (in order to achieve this aim, I will refer to reception studies and collect the informants' feedback thanks to open-ended questions in the survey); this will allow us to see whether research participants are actually aware of the mechanisms at work in the course of ad comprehension and in the appreciation of humour value. It was already stated in Chapter 4 that such subjective descriptions of humour can be inaccurate in that they potentially produce folk theories and thus result in uninformed explanations thereof (Hurley et al., 2011). I will therefore favour the heterophenomenological approach (Dennett, 1991, 2007), that is, "a perspective that accepts people's claims that they have a certain phenomenological sense, but reserves judgment about their claims as to why they have that sense" (Hurley et al., p. 48). Consequently, the approach under consideration aims not at dismissing the informants' perspective, but rather at bracketing it and hence opening it for verification through logical analysis or external sources of theoretical and empirical nature (Dennett, 1991, 2007; Hurley et al., 2017). Com-

lined with my knowledge of the mechanisms behind metaphor and humour production, such a reception study can potentially yield interesting interpretative results.

In order to attain the abovementioned goals, I will base on a collection of ads sampled for the purpose of this research and on the theoretical background presented beforehand. Conclusions will be drawn concerning the interplay between the concepts found in both metaphor and humour construction in ads which, hopefully, will advance current knowledge of effective pragmatics of humour in figurative advertising messages, as well as build the base for future research into advertising phenomena within linguistic frameworks.

5.3 Methodology

After specifying the research foci, the method of the present study should be described. The framework for the analysis that will follow is structured around existing research on communication, advertising, metaphor, and humour discussed in the preceding chapters. Thus, using this body of theory to study the phenomenon of humorous metaphorical ads, I will start with qualitative content analysis, basing my research on observable variables in the sample described in the section devoted to data collection.

Apart from the multimodal approach to the content studied, the present work subscribes to several linguistic theories, namely Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory (RT) (1995), Fauconnier and Turner's conceptual blending theory (1998; 2002), and Giora's Graded Salience Hypothesis (2003), as well as to the incongruity-resolution theory of humour "which defines humour as a cognitive-linguistic problem-solving task that elicits positive affect (Goel & Dolan, 2001; Raskin, 1985; Suls, 1972)" (Strick et al., 2013, pp. 7–8) or, at least, is supposed to do so since it is surely the advertiser's intention to provide the audience with an appealing stimulus that will capture their attention and increase their liking for the ad and/or brand. Thus, it can be safely assumed that advertising messages which employ humour and metaphor or humorous creative metaphors may be viewed as the forms of intentionally produced humour, regardless of the actual degree of amusement elicited in the audience.

If one wishes to measure the cognitive aspect of humour, though, one is soon confronted with the fact that the presence and/or intensity of humour

cannot be measured directly since, as a concept, it is simply abstract and intangible. Rather, other measures need to be used in order to grasp and describe it; apart from the outline or character of the stimulus itself (i.e., its visible or tangible qualities that constitute the observable variables), these include a wide range of aspects borrowed from communication and cognitive theories expounded in the previous chapters, such as conceptual frameworks and the incongruity-resolution mechanism, as well as all the inferences made, which are based on extra-linguistic knowledge about the world and on the signification system. Such latent variables, as opposed to the observable ones that can be accessed and measured directly, are inferred, that is, deduced from specific evidence available in a given communicative context as well as from the researcher's reasoning rather than from explicit statements.

Thus, to answer the question of what makes a specific advertising message humorous, it is vital to identify some observable, measurable factors that will help to establish the intended humorousness of the stimulus (e.g., the presence of script opposition or divergence from prototypicality) and to measure the depth of humour evoked in research participants. Such an operationalisation will help to infer the existence of the phenomenon of interest thanks to other, measurable and observable effects it has. By way of a reminder, "in multimodal artefacts, the script opposition is engendered by some kind of incongruity, contradiction, opposition or disruption occurring within the multimodal relation between two semiotic modes, which results in the creation of jocular messages or allusions (Tsakona, 2009)" (Stwora, 2020a, p. 134). Prototypicality, on the other hand, will be understood as the quality of being prototypical, that is, of bearing similarity to a certain class type that stays in a positive relationship with the frequency of similar items belonging to the said class type (Rosch, 1973, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Nerhardt, 1976). It should be borne in mind that apart from being a measure of membership in a general concept, prototypicality is a graded property, which means that various items belonging to a given category can be rated according to the extent to which they represent the core prototypical concept.

It is also essential to determine the scope and definitions of the concepts operationalised which are of interest to the present research, namely metaphor and humour. I used the theoretical conception of metaphor from cognitive linguistics (see Chapter 3), which sees metaphor as a conceptual operation of mapping certain attributes from a source to a target domain, with the latter usually being more abstract or less accessible than the

former that is linked to something more concrete or familiar (cf. Danesi, 2008). For the metaphorical to work, the two domains involved need to be simultaneously distinct from each other and metaphorically alike for them to be connected by a set of cognitive correspondences.

Following the line of thought offered by Kövecses, “a convenient shorthand way of capturing this view of metaphor is the following: CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN A IS CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN B” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 4) and this kind of a formula generally presents the way all metaphors work since metaphorization transfers the tangible event or object to the world of abstraction by means of entailment, at the same time giving coherence to many cultural, cognitive, and perceptual regularities (cf. Eubanks, 1999). (Stwora, 2018a, p. 103)

As already mentioned, metaphor is more a matter of thought than a matter of language: it is conceptual in nature and people have access only to its textual instantiations. Thus, given that researchers can touch solely the linguistic surface of the phenomenon (as they simply cannot access human thought directly), they need other instruments to deal with metaphor. The criteria for metaphor identification “have to be derived from a theoretical definition of that phenomenon, or ‘conceptualisation,’ that can be made operational in this way” (Steen, 2016, p. 76; cf. Steen, 2007). Hence, with regard to a reliable method for metaphor identification in discourse, it is advisable to refer to the Pragglejaz Group (2007) and their metaphor identification procedure (MIP) which, although originally centred on verbal metaphor, can be extrapolated to visual and multimodal metaphors as well. The members of the said group of researchers claim that the identification of metaphor in discourse starts with understanding the overall discursive context in which it appears. Once the contextual meaning is established, the perceiver’s cognitive system divides the senses detected into concrete and abstract ones, that is, into plain and figurative meanings, which pertain both to the specific context that is taken into consideration and to other contexts as well.

To put it differently, the process of finding indirect meaning relations rests on deciding “whether the basic meaning [...] is sufficiently distinct from the contextual meaning [...] [and] whether the contextual meaning [...] can be related to the more basic meaning by some form of similarity” (Steen, 2007, p. 12). Although the Pragglejaz Group itself acknowledged several operational gaps in the procedure described (e.g., when it comes

to explicit criteria for semantic units or the specific meaning and scope of the context), its members say that several issues were “deliberately left undecided to allow for maximum freedom among metaphor researchers” (Steen, 2016, p. 79). In this book, the notion of context will refer to both internal (discursive) and external (sociocultural and linguistic) contexts, while the criterion for the identification of distinct semantic units which enter the metaphorical will be “demarcated on the basis of their metaphorical coherence” (Steen, 2016, p. 83) and on their consistency with the contextual frame constructed individually for each advertisement studied.

To conclude this point, it seems necessary to distinguish between metaphor in language as a system (the system approach) and metaphor in language as usage (the usage approach) (Steen, 2016). Whereas the former “examines metaphor as a construction in the language system that has resulted from development over time or displays variation over geographical, social, and institutional space” (Steen, 2016, p. 75), based on figurative expressions and constructions viewed as a part of a conceptual network, the latter focuses on metaphor in language, that is, on its specific instances situated in a given discursive context. Because this book centres upon selected instantiations of metaphorical language in the discourse of multimodal press advertising, I decided to limit the study to metaphor identification from the usage-oriented perspective. Thus, the following analysis will help to scrutinise the conceptual skeletons behind specific metaphors used but will not provide decisive evidence when it comes to the system approach that provides general image-schemas, for the sample is insufficient to speak for the entire discourse of advertising. However, it is sufficient enough to discuss the interplay between the concepts found in both metaphor and humour in the ads studied, which is the paramount objective of this volume.

Moving from the metaphorical expression to its actual conceptual structure, it is advisable to follow Steen (1999, 2007, 2016) who devoted a lot of research to identifying metaphors in language and hence put forward the procedure for the conceptual analysis of metaphor in which the perceiver should first find the metaphorical focus, then the metaphorical proposition, the metaphorical comparison, the metaphorical analogy, and, finally, the metaphorical mapping (Steen, 2007, p. 16). In other words, as already outlined in Chapter 3, the first step involves finding the source domain by means of searching for the unit that seems semantically incongruous or indirect in the context provided (Cameron, 2003; Charteris-Black, 2004). If the unit in question can be integrated into the overall sense conveyed

in a given discourse by means of drawing cross-domain comparisons or showing similarities that result in resolution of the incongruity, it will be labelled as metaphorical.

During the second stage, that is, the one of metaphorical proposition, several possible scenarios of conceptual skeletons are formed in the perceiver's mind, which is then followed by the identification of analogical structures in and open comparison between conceptual domains which enter a cross-domain mapping (Steen, 2007, 2016). This is because of the fact that metaphor must rest on semantic similarity between the source and target domain, on finding corresponding and/or dissimilar elements, as well as on drawing metaphorical analogies which require the addition of a "new conceptual substance to the mapping between the two domains in order to make the mapping complete" (Steen, 2007, p. 18). As a result, the perceiver arrives at the final step of metaphor identification, that is, at the metaphorical mapping *per se* that allows for the projection of implicit relevant elements of one schema onto implicit elements of the other. It seems pertinent to cite Forceville here:

For anything to be a metaphor, [...] the following three questions should be capable of being answered: (1) What are its two domains? (2) What is its target domain, and what is its source domain? (3) Which feature or (structured) cluster of features can or must be mapped from source to target? (Forceville, 1996, p. 108, adapted from Black's (1979) interaction theory). (Forceville, 2008, p. 464)

As far as the operationalisation of humour is concerned, the perceiver is likely to face a problem similar to the one encountered while discussing metaphor, namely that humour is cognitive in its nature, for it is a matter of perception. It was already said that humour is certainly not to be perceived as an inherent feature of anything and that humorousness is highly subjective. The operationalisation of humour thus poses a methodological challenge; nevertheless, based on the body of theory outlined in Chapter 4, we can see that there are several formal indicators like script opposition or (non-)prototypicality, for instance, and self-report measures which aim at capturing the phenomenon under consideration.

First of all, it would be germane to address the question of how to define humour operationally. In the preceding chapter, humour was divided into *cognitive*, *perceptive*, and *attributive* varieties. The cognitive one was said to refer to "the ability to find things funny" (Cambridge Dictionary n.d.). The

perceptive one dealt with “the way in which people see that some things are funny” (Cambridge Dictionary n.d.) or “perceive, enjoy, or express what is amusing, comical, incongruous, or absurd” (American Heritage Dictionary n.d.). And the attributive one focused on “the quality of being funny” (Cambridge Dictionary n.d.) or “the quality that makes something laughable or amusing” (American Heritage Dictionary n.d.).

If we assume that the said quality of being funny can be preliminarily identified on the basis of some formal features of attributive humour (i.e., based on observable cues like script opposition or divergence from prototypicality and thus from the perceiver’s expectations), their presence will probably trigger perceptive and cognitive humour as well. In other words, it is “a mismatch stemming from the structural features of a stimulus” (Dyrel, 2013b, p. 26; cf. Morreall, 1989, 2009) that leads to a clash between the perceiver’s expectations and usual mental patterns he/she refers to in the process of perception and comprehension. Although opposing scripts are considered formal elements enabling humour, they do not guarantee making things funny since, for it to be humorous, a given scenario needs to diverge from expectancy built up earlier by another script. It is therefore divergence, incongruity or non-prototypicality of the other scenario that “varies the humour value among jokes” (Nerhardt, 1976, p. 50) or other types of discourse in general.

In an article devoted to the operationalisation of incongruity in humour research, Nerhardt (1976) defines humour as “a consequence of the discrepancy between two mental representations, one of which is an expectation and the other is some other idea or a percept” (p. 47). Incongruity itself needs to be resolved in order to enable full humour appreciation on the part of the addressee; “by resolution is meant that the subject discovers this relationship” (Nerhardt, 1976, p. 52) between incongruous scripts once he/she “finds a cognitive rule that reconciles the incongruity and leads to humorous effects” (Yus, 2016, p. 66). There are several processing steps in humour interpretation: firstly, the perceiver makes predictions as to the meaning of the material he/she is attending to; however, if his/her predictions are disconfirmed by the appearance of a conflicting element (a “disjunctive point” (Giora, 2003)), he/she tries to resolve the incongruity so as to find a cognitive rule behind it by switching between the more and less salient meanings (Suls, 1972; Ritchie, 1999; Mulder & Nijholt, 2002). As regards the said cognitive rule, Ritchie (1999) identifies the following set of relations essential in incongruity-resolution humour: obviousness and conflict (based on saliency and script oppositions, respectively), compat-

ibility (which refers to making the trigger consistent with the less salient script), comparison (which makes it possible to compare and contrast the scripts and meanings), and inappropriateness (which points out to the other meaning's being improper or unsuitable in contextual circumstances (see: absurdity and taboo)) (Mulder & Nijholt, 2002).

These relations can be viewed in prototype-theoretical terms (which, in fact, may be related to the issue of semantic distance outlined by Dynel (2009)), which means that incongruity may be treated as divergence from the most prototypical (i.e., unmarked and most accessible) semantic unit in favour of a less prototypical (i.e., marked and cognitively distant) one (Giora, 1991; Rosch, 1973, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). “The notion of markedness relies on categorial internal structuring which differentiates between the cognitive status of the prototype (the unmarked member) and the marginal status of the marked member” (Giora, 1991, p. 465).

With regard to the linkage between the humorous and the metaphorical, it was said that both are construal phenomena which rest on joining two different input spaces and hence can be explained in terms of conceptual integration networks. Works by, *inter alia*, Kyratzis (2003) or Dynel (2009, 2018) provide overwhelming evidence for the view that structural similarity shared by humour and metaphor lies in the operation of the blend, which is mainly associated with conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). In the light of the above, support is here given to a view that humorousness and metaphoricity are connected by similar mechanisms of conceptual patterns since, in both cases, we deal with mappings and two input spaces, the only difference being the relation between them—while metaphor rests solely on inter-domain similarity (that is, on congruity), “the constituents of incongruity in humour are seen as similarity and dissimilarity” (Nerhardt, 1976, p. 47).

This is due to the fact that incongruity needs to be resolved only in part, with the other script still lingering as incongruous and thus resulting in humorous tension between the concepts involved (cf. Suls, 1983; Forabosco, 1992, 2008; Attardo & Raskin, 1991). “A complete removal of incongruity would disallow the appreciation of incongruous meanings/inputs, and hence the interpretation and appreciation of the whole humorous stimulus” (Dynel, 2011a, p. 65). This finds corroboration in Brône and Feyaerts (2003) and Kyratzis (2003) who claim that “whereas metaphors essentially focus on interdomain connections, suppressing the obvious domain boundaries, humorous stimuli (un)intentionally emphasize the dissimilarities between domains” (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, p. 14).

Moreover, both operate within the conceptual realm and produce emergent structures, rely on the operations of conceptual compression and expansion (Libura, 2017; Piskorska, 2017), as well as “generate extensive changes to cognitive environments for relatively little processing effort, leading to unexpected increments to relevance” (Ritchie, 2005, p. 275; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). The very acknowledgement of the fact that integration of mental spaces taking place in the course of blending may be treated as a process underlying humour is essential when it comes to indicating the linkage between humorousness and metaphoricity (Coulson, 2000; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, 2004; Brône, 2017; Libura, 2017), whose workings will be investigated in the lines to follow. The body of humorous metaphorical advertisements of multimodal nature to be analysed will testify to the wide applicability of the conceptual blending theory.

Given the focus on multimodal advertising messages, I decided to perform an in-depth content analysis which best suits the goal of examining communication patterns in a systematic manner, irrespective of the coding patterns applied (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Essentially, the procedure “relies on the identification and counting of significant categories of content [and] can tell us a great deal about ads that we would not normally discover by impressionistic or cursory readings” (Dyer, 1982, p. 87). The said method is widely used in qualitative research which is carried out in order to interpret meanings from the content of texts and visual or multimodal artefacts as well (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), thus proving flexible for analysing both textual and pictorial data. What is more, “content analysis describes a family of analytic approaches ranging from impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses to systematic, strict textual analyses (Rosengren, 1981)” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1277). Creswell, for instance, defines the qualitative approach as “an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem, based on building a complex holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants and often conducted in a natural setting” (Creswell, 1994, p. 2). In this light, content analysis to be performed in this chapter will centre on understanding a particular communicational phenomenon through systematic reading, observation, and description of multimodal press ads that include both metaphor and humorous incongruity. By way of clarification, we can generally distinguish between three kinds of content analysis, that is, between conventional, directed, and summative approaches.

In conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived directly from the text data. With a directed approach, analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes. A summative content analysis involves counting and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context. (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1277)

Because this book centres on the joint workings of humour and metaphor in advertising, that is, it is based on a body of theory that will work towards gaining deeper understanding of the nature of humorous metaphorical ads, I will adopt a directed approach to content analysis whose goal “is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). Nonetheless, some elements of the summative content analysis will also be included to give a more detailed picture of the topic covered, for the summative approach consists in classifying and counting the occurrences of specific features which are present in the data examined. This, in turn, will make it easier to carry out a comparative analysis of the English and Polish set of ads chosen for the purpose of this study.

The use of directed content analysis itself means that the present research follows a deductive path, according to which “the corpus does not act as the master but rather as the servant to confirm or refute a pre-existing theoretical construct” (Granger, 2012, p. 13; cf. Friedman, 2012); in line with such a corpus-based approach, the analysis moves from a more general level (e.g., preceding research on the subject matter, existing key variables and the links between these variables) to the more specific one through testing theoretical implications with the material collected (Granger, 2012; Saylor Academy, 2012). The deductive approach will make it possible to narrow the more general topic of humorous metaphorical press ads of multimodal nature so as to observe the most dominant patterns that emerge from the research material under consideration. Based on both data and theory, that is, on prior research into metaphoricity, humorousness, and advertising, the process of data analysis will be as follows:

1. First of all, qualitative content analysis of selected ads (see Appendix 1) will be performed, along with the identification of the metaphorical source and target domains involved; the blend will be discussed and the “location” of the metaphorical identified (i.e., it will be specified whether the metaphorical resides in the textual, visual or at the confluence thereof). Since the advertising material gathered for the purpose of this

research is multimodal in nature, its analysis requires reference to visual and multimodal metaphor. This part of the analysis will therefore aim at examining different roles of the text and image in the construction of the metaphorical.

Based on the typology of visual rhetoric produced by Phillips and McQuarrie (2004), the outline of multimodal metaphorical content will be identified as representing the figures of juxtaposition (two side-by-side images), fusion (two combined images) or replacement (in which the image present points to the one that is absent in the ad), which correspond to different levels of image complexity. The types of cognitive processing required to comprehend the visuals will be indicated and divided into one of the three types of meaning operation, namely into the operations of connection (that corresponds to the claim “A is associated with B”), comparison for similarity (“A is like B”), and comparison for opposition (“A is not like B”) (cf. Phillips & McQuarrie, 2004).

2. Then, the issue of the “location” of the humorous will be addressed, exploring the instantiations of visual and multimodal humour detected in the sample. The focus will be on the instantiations of attributive humour, that is, on selected multimodal ads that were designed to induce amusement on the part of the audience. In line with the nature of the relationship between the modalities involved in humour production, the textual layer, the visual layer or both of them will be recognised as primary carriers of humour. Naturally, the type of script opposition and prototypicality relations involved will be indicated as well due to their being crucial when it comes to explaining the incongruity-resolution mechanism *per se*.

It was already stated in the preceding chapter that humour in advertising is conditional on three types of relatedness, that is on intentional humour (understood as “the relationship of humour to message type and message processing” (Weinberger et al., 1995, p. 46; cf. Speck, 1991)), thematic humour (based on “the relationship of humour to product-related themes” (Weinberger et al., 1995, p. 46; cf. Speck, 1991)), and structural humour (that represents “the syntactical function of humour, referring to the integration of the humour and the product claims” (Weinberger et al., 1995, p. 46; cf. Speck, 1991)).

For the sake of clarity of the analysis, I decided to divide the ads according to the criterion of relatedness of humour to message, that is, I chose to discuss the sample based on the division into ad-related, non-related, product/brand-related, competitor-related, and audience-related

humour. It is important to note here that audience-related humour can be either inclusive or exclusive, depending on whether the ad presents the intended addressees of the ad as losers or winners (in tune with the superiority theory of humour). Furthermore, humour can be classified according to its functional use dependent upon intent and target, thus giving rise to such categories as affiliative, aggressive, self-enhancing, and self-defeating humour (Martin et al., 2003; Blackford et al., 2011). Likewise, an attempt will be made at dividing the humorous into humour categories proposed by Buijzen and Valkenburg (2004), which read as follows: “slapstick, clownish humour, surprise, misunderstanding, irony, satire, and parody” (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004, p. 162).

The presence of different types of humorous metaphors will also be acknowledged, thus resulting in another subdivision into funny metaphors, metaphors with funny referents, un-metaphors, mixed metaphors, overdone metaphors, failed metaphors, and metaphors that were erroneously categorised and thus funny (cf. Attardo, 2015). *Funny metaphors* are the vehicles for humour, so to speak, that is, they are “metaphors that are funny in and of themselves” (Attardo, 2015, p. 92), which means that the blend which takes place is funny as a result of “partially resolved incongruity of cross-domain comparison” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98). *Metaphors with funny referents*, on the other hand, are “metaphors that describe a referent that is inherently funny” (Attardo, 2015, p. 92) thanks to “referential humour and possibly implied comparison” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98). In the case of *un-metaphors*, we deal with “mapping a domain upon itself or no mapping” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98), whereas *mixed metaphors* involve “multiple metaphors that do not share entailments and possibly too many metaphors” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98). As far as *overdone metaphors* are concerned, they “violate primary metaphorical relations” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98); these are not to be mistaken for *failed metaphors* (“metaphors that are involuntarily funny, or that are produced pretending to be involuntarily funny” (Attardo, 2015, p. 92)) or for *erroneously categorised* ones which are much like the figure of speech called antanaclasis, in which a word or phrase is repeated, referred to or applicable to two different senses (e.g. “unlike Phil, this plan may work” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98)).

3. The next step places emphasis on cognitive and perceptive humour, that is, on the actual feelings of research participants towards the ads’ humorousness. For the purpose of this study, I operationalised the concept of humour by measuring how the informants feel about the advertising material presented. This required the use of both Likert-type scale and

visual self-report which applies the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) method (cf. Lang, 1980; Morris & Waine, 1993) (see Appendix 2) that were supplemented by qualitative analysis of the responses gathered.

The aim of the Likert-type scale was to indicate the amusement value of the ads under consideration and capture the intensity of opinion in the informants, as well as to check their subjective reactions to the material presented in terms of ad liking and appreciation. First, as far as *appreciation* (in terms of ad's creativity, originality, etc.) is concerned, they were asked to rate each item on an evaluation sheet on a scale from 1 to 3, with 1 standing for low liking (dislike), 2 for neutral, and 3 for high liking (like). In order to check the *appreciation of humour value*, on the other hand, they were requested to rate each ad on a scale ranging from very favourable, positive, and ambivalent, to negative attitude, represented by the responses (4) very funny, (3) funny, (2) neutral, and (1) not funny, respectively. The point behind this double-step evaluation procedure is that ad appreciation (that is, ad liking in terms of ad's creativity, the way the message was transmitted, etc.) and the appreciation of humour value are two different things. The perceiver may appreciate the format, colours, and wittiness in an ad but may not find it amusing at all; such a differentiation makes it possible to assess the actual input and effect of humour.

The SAM assessment technique in the form of visual self-report, on the other hand, makes it possible to estimate the informants' emotional states in a more effective way thanks to its being based on a combination of three independent dimensions (Pleasure, Arousal, and Dominance). The PAD dimensional space (see Table 3, p. 191) helped to establish actual attitudes of the informants by means of mapping discrete emotions onto the said space. As already mentioned, the pleasure–displeasure scale demonstrates how enjoyable or pleasant the ad was to research participants; the results obtained on the arousal–non-arousal scale show the intensity of emotion and mental activity connected with ad's processing; whereas the dominance–submissiveness scale measures if the stimulus is perceived as overwhelming and/or appealing or not (cf. Picard, 1997; Hoffmann et al., 2012; Stwora & Zemełka, 2020).

4. Once the depth of humour was measured, it seemed suitable to move on to checking how research participants actually understand the humorous material presented. To this end, I will refer to reception studies and the informants' feedback based on an open-ended questionnaire. This will allow to examine their awareness of the mechanisms inducing humour and metaphor in ads, for “being amused [...] is one

thing, but having understood the message is quite another” (Wojtaszek, 2011a, p. 169).

This part of the study is therefore centred on discussing responses from the informants who agreed to fill in the questionnaire forms that can be found in Appendix 3. The next step involves a heterophenomenological investigation focused on the analysis and interpretation of the responses gathered. It should be stressed that, as opposed to the responses produced in the previous stage, which should be as automatic as possible to minimise mental effort on the part of the informants and guarantee data reliability, the questionnaire on comprehension requires more thought and thus more processing from research participants. This is due to the fact that advertising material is usually processed subconsciously and, more often than not, also mechanically, usually as a part of another stream of infotainment, hence rarely encouraging deep, conscious, and critical reflection. Yet the fact that ads are typically perceived so automatically renders survey results even more valuable since such open-ended questions give the informants a chance to really ponder over something they pay little or no attention to on a daily basis.

5.4 Research Participants

Finally, the group of research participants for the research to be conducted should be indicated. The participants invited to take part in the investigation were all students and graduates of the Institute of English and the Institute of English Cultures and Literatures of the University of Silesia, Poland, all of whom were native speakers of Polish but, given their course of study, they were also fluent speakers of English, capable of dealing with the task ahead. Their skills in English had been confirmed by semi-annual practical examinations. Naturally, they were not informed of the specific aim of the survey and were not paid for their participation in the study.

I managed to gather answers from 150 research participants altogether, the majority of whom were women (73%); males constituted 26% of the group studied, whereas 1% of the informants marked their gender as “other.”¹ Apart from their gender, they were also supposed to indicate their age; it was established that 90% of research participants were between 18–23 years of age, 9% were between 24–29 years old, and only 1% declared to be in their thirties. It can therefore be said that the group was

¹ All values expressed in fractions were rounded to the nearest one.

rather homogeneous in terms of age, which is quite important owing to the fact that the homogeneity of the group of informants provides reliable data. This is because the results obtained from the group examined can be contrasted with other age groups in the future, thus pointing out to various trends in terms of ad perception and evaluation. The prevalence of female research participants, on the other hand, stems from the fact that, at the University of Silesia, women constitute the majority of students that choose English Philology. This inequality in terms of gender representation, however, does not constitute a drawback because the results were not that different across genders, which is why this variable was not taken into account in the study to follow.

Additionally, the point I wish to make here is that research participants are not unbiased, as they already have their most and least favourite brands or types of products, which can influence their responses (e.g., while commenting on the survey afterwards, some research participants said that they noticed they had been more likely to rate beer ads more favourably). The audience factor is very important here because, despite similar age group they belonged to, research participants differed in terms of their social background, upbringing, mood, and disposition, which can and surely did affect their responses. An ideal, yet inexistent informant would be “unaffected by racial or gender biases, undisturbed by scatological, obscene or disgusting materials, not subject to boredom, and, most importantly, [one] who has never ‘heard it before’ when presented with a joke” (Attardo, 1999, p. 197).

Although it is impossible to control individual, mental, cultural or social variables, I made sure that the sample did not contain any famous ads that could have been rated more highly due to the mere exposure effect (cf. Zajonc, 1968; Bornstein, 1989; Bryant & Davies, 2013). Furthermore, I aimed at choosing the ads that were not very widespread so as to avoid the situation in which the respondents’ previous interaction with the advertising material could potentially lead to decreased liking that results from the so-called wear-out effect. Much as I tried, though, I could only work towards eliminating the aforementioned effects since it was impossible to make sure that none of the research participants had been exposed to the ads sampled before the study took place.

Two independent questionnaires were designed, one with advertisements in English and one with ads in Polish, and this division of the material to be rated by the informants was aimed at minimising mental effort on the part of the informants so that they were not subject to boredom or

tiredness. Since one set of ads was in English and the other in Polish, I opted for two languages of data collection instruments, that is, designed a questionnaire in English for the ads in English and a survey in Polish for the Polish sample.

In spite of the fact that the tests were run in the rooms with many people tested at a time, research participants were requested to fill in the questionnaires individually, without consulting their colleagues in order to guarantee possibly unbiased responses (as it was found out that shared humour tends to be stronger). They were therefore asked not to talk with other research participants while responding to the survey so as to avoid their reacting in accordance with any group behaviour, as suggested by the principle of social proof (cf. Cialdini, 2007). I wanted to focus on the actual effects produced in the informants and on their individual reactions because, as members of the audience, they usually decode press ads on their own.

5.5 Presentation of Results

The following section will clarify the order and manner of presentation of results. Right at the outset, it should be explained that whenever a reference to the corpora is made, the whole collection of 200 ads gathered for the purpose of this study (both the English and the Polish corpus comprised 100 ads each) is meant. The smaller sets of ads selected from these corpora for the purpose of an in-depth content analysis will be referred to as samples or sets.

For convenience, the examples included in the English and Polish samples were coded for identification to facilitate further discussion. As regards the form of coding, I decided to code the ads selected for the sample by naming them Ad E- or PL- (where E stands for English and PL for Polish) followed by the number. The numbering was consecutive, assigned from 1 to 20 for each sample (i.e., from Ad E-1 to Ad E-20 and from Ad PL-1 to Ad PL-20). The selection procedure was as follows:

- a) each language corpus was divided into several subgroups, according to the butt of the joke;
- b) each subgroup was scrutinised for similarities and differences in terms of form and types of metaphor and humour in order to trace common patterns;

- c) for each language corpus, the number of humorous metaphorical ads that referred to different humour targets was established;
- d) a proportional number of ads referring to different targets was selected for the samples in order to make sure they were properly representative of the corpora of metaphorical ads which implemented incongruity-resolution humour.

Reverting to the order and manner of presentation of results, I will briefly discuss the two corpora; given the large number of ads, discussion will be limited to the most general remarks (more detailed accounts can be found in Appendix 4 and 5). I will then move on to qualitative content analysis of the samples so as to investigate the ways in which metaphor and humour cooperate in selected ads. The results will be provided in tables and then discussed with regard to the form and type of metaphor and humour used. Meaning operations and visual structures applied will receive consideration too, along with the types of script opposition (abbreviated SO) and humour functions. Finally, I will include several examples of the ads that best demonstrate the way in which metaphor and incongruity-resolution humour complement each other.

Next, attention will be shifted to ad ratings of the ads from both language samples. The results of the survey on ad ratings and emotional responses will be provided in tables and then discussed. Ad appreciation (liking) and appreciation of humour value (perceived funniness) will be presented descriptively and supplemented by data tables showing mean scores and standard deviations in liking and funniness evaluation.

The results concerning the three components of the visual self-report, on the other hand, will be expressed in percentage values. Collectively, these results, obtained from the pleasure–displeasure, arousal–non-arousal, and dominance–submissiveness scales, will help to capture specific emotional reactions of research participants thanks to the PAD model suggested by Picard (1997) (see Table 3, p. 191). The values will be assigned on the basis of whether the mean value is closer to the positive or the negative pole. Information on the overall composition of the English and Polish samples will be given on pie charts, making it possible to show the actual percentage of both successful and unsuccessful humorous metaphorical ads.

Lastly, the interpretation aspect will be considered; I will present the results of an open-ended questionnaire on ad comprehension in a descriptive manner. Following the division proposed by Toncar and Munch (2001), I will categorise the informants' responses according to the

depth of processing into externally originated meanings, recipient-modified meanings, and recipient-generated meanings. The results concerning the perceived metaphoricality of the ads will be described and presented in the form of bar charts and then discussed. Exact metaphorical understandings of the ads investigated and the perceived sources of humorousness, as stated by the informants, will be provided in tables.

5.6 The Qualitative Investigation

The qualitative investigation to be presented in the sections to follow was preceded by corpus construction, which involved the extraction of press advertisements, all retrieved between 2016 and 2019; the entire corpus comprised 100 ads in English and 100 in Polish. Once the abovementioned corpus was assembled, I divided the two language corpora into several subgroups according to the “butt of the joke” identified. The possible targets laughed at or referred to in a humorous manner were labelled as *advertiser*, *product/service*, *competitor*, *group* (with the exclusion of the recipient, which is usually conducive to a sense of detachment on his/her part), *recipient* (when the ad pokes fun at the target audience the recipient can identify with, which results in shorter a distance), *the other* (when the recipient is not likely to identify with the butt of the joke), and *external* (when humour is related to an external situation matching none of the categories above).

Such a division made it possible to secure roughly equal representation of different humour targets in the selected ads in each language group studied. The said division is particularly important because it does matter who the target is since it can, and surely will, influence humour appreciation in research participants. The perceiver is likely to respond more favourably to a humorous stimulus if the object laughed at is the other (Suls, 1976), that is, belongs to another group than the perceiver does. The rule that emerges reads as follows: the less affinity between the perceiver and the butt, the more favourable the reception (cf. Fuentes Luque, 2010; Gulas & Weinberger, 2006; Suls, 1976). This finds corroboration in Ott and Schweizer (2018) who focused on humour targeted at specific religious groups and claimed that “being targeted as a group by a joke most likely reduces the joke’s funniness for that group and jokes that are perceived as personally offensive will not be appreciated and, in many instances, lead to a total dislike of that joke” (Ott & Schweizer, 2018, p. 29).

Parenthetically, when it comes to the idea of otherness (i.e., the category of *the other*) and thus nonbelonging to a given group, Chłopicki (2019), after Davies (2012), remarks that people are more likely to poke fun at a group they do not belong to. They attribute this phenomenon to the centre/periphery pattern borrowed from the prototype theory, which, according to Davies (2012), rests on the presence of actual or imaginary, yet clearly marked boundaries between various groups, be it nations, genders, subcultures or else. All in all, the norm is that the centre laughs at the periphery but, as pointed out by Chłopicki (2019), the centre is in human minds and in their specific perceptions of the world, which differ from one individual to another.

This, in turn, leads to a conclusion that the sociocultural framework which determines what we consider funny (or not) should be understood as a cognitive concept with centre and periphery. From the perspective of the prototype theory (Rosch, 1973, 1978), it can be said that humorous effects pivot on prototypical categories sharing family resemblances (Nerhardt, 1976; Giora, 1991). Less salient meanings can be treated as less prototypical and, consequently, as potentially more humorous. The amusement value is therefore seen as directly proportional to the script's departure from the standard and the prototypical. Accordingly, as far as the butts of the joke are concerned, the amusement value will increase for the targets that are far away from the centre, that is, the perceiver (cf. Davies, 2012). The perception of the centre is subjective, of course, since every perceiver has a different view on what can be classified as standard and the most prototypical. Men will thus typically poke fun at women, brunettes at blondes, etc. It is the others that are to be ridiculed since they are unlike the centre and, hence, may afford to be funny (such a claim is also in line with the superiority theory of humour, which holds that people laugh at others to make themselves feel better than the unfortunate targets).

Having said that, I hope that the purpose of the aforementioned division into various possible targets laughed at or referred to in a humorous manner has been sufficiently explicated. Once the two language corpora were divided into the subgroups according to the "butt of the joke" identified, a proportional number of advertisements was chosen from the sub-sets described above so that the final sample of advertisements comprised 20 ads for each language group. This was chiefly due to the fact that the number of advertisements to be presented to the informants had to be reduced to a manageable portion in order to prevent tiredness on the part of research participants, which could affect their responses and, consequently, impose

major limitations in terms of reliability (cf. Poels & Dewitte, 2006). To my mind, this constraint in terms of sample's size can be compensated for by a substantial number of research participants taking part in the study. All transcripts of the ads from the English and Polish samples used as the input can be found in Appendix 1. For more information on the two corpora (100 ads each) see Appendix 4 and 5.

5.6.1 The English Corpus—Brief Overview

The English corpus comprised 100 ads that were subsequently divided into several subgroups according to the “butt of the joke” identified; it turned out that more than half of them (55) were related to the product or service on offer, which involved funny metaphorical portrayals of the goods advertised. 22 ads featured the recipient as the target, sometimes metonymically or indirectly referring to human behaviours or body parts, whereas ten ads alluded to the competitor (but only two in an overt manner). Humour related to an external situation appeared eight times and the one featuring “the other” (that is, cases in which the recipient is not likely to identify with the butt of the joke), five times.

Interestingly enough, the collection of ads under consideration did not include any ad that would poke fun at the brand or company itself, probably in order not to ridicule the advertising agent *per se*; such a strategy surely reinforces the image of the advertiser as the joke teller and, consequently, as the source of humour, which may contribute to the halo effect. In addition, none of the ads in the corpus targeted any specific group, perhaps owing to the fact that laughing at a particular class or group of people is simply risky a strategy that is likely to offend some and thus may ruin company's image.

Naturally, it is not feasible to provide an exhaustive analysis of all the ads taken into consideration since a full discussion of the advertising messages gathered is beyond the ambit of one book. Instead, a summative account will be provided in an attempt to sketch out the most general features of humorous metaphorical ads in English. As already said, the corpus in English consisted of 100 multimodal press ads, 73 of which employed multimodal metaphor; there were 26 instances of visual metaphors and only one instance of a textual metaphor. The situation was reversed when it comes to humour, for the ads that made use of visual humour outnumbered those which employed multimodal humour 62 to 38. Visual metaphor was almost always coupled with visual humour but the latter concurred with both visual and multimodal metaphor. 35% of the ads from the corpus

used multimodal humour and multimodal metaphor at the same time. With regard to metaphor type, the vast majority of the ads (92) subscribed to the category of funny metaphors and only eight could be classified as metaphors with funny referents.

According to the typology proposed by Phillips and McQuarrie (2004) in their article on the typology of visual rhetoric in advertising (see Table 1, p. 110), it was possible to indicate the types of visual structures and meaning operations used in the corpus. Relating to the types of meaning operations identified, which refer to the types of cognitive processing required to understand the pictorial, there were 57 ads that employed comparison for similarity and 52 that used the operation of connection, which corresponds to the claim “A is associated with B.” Also, there were 24 instances of comparison for opposition. Approximately 30% of the ads in the corpus were found to exploit several concurrent types of meaning operations. With reference to the types of visual structure, defined as the ways in which the elements are pictured in the ads, the corpus in English contained 51 instances of the figure of juxtaposition, 50 figures of replacement, and 28 figures of fusion. There were several advertisements that applied more than one visual structure and the most prevalent pattern coupled juxtaposition and replacement (21% of the corpus).

The number of ads included in the corpus makes it impossible to discuss all the instances and configurations of script oppositions (SOs) in detail. Nonetheless, it can be observed that the most common was the actual/non-actual SO, as it occurred 45 times; the possible/impossible SO was slightly less frequent, with 37 occurrences, and the absence/presence SO was employed 22 times (including nine instantiations in the form of sex/no-sex SO). These results confirm that the abovementioned pairs of scripts are basic—but not only—forms of opposition frequently responsible for generating humorous effects. The absence/presence SO, for example, was instantiated in more concrete oppositions (sex/no-sex, blood/no-blood, dead/alive, feathers/no-feathers, food/no-food, and Internet/no-Internet SOs). What is more, there were eight instances of the good/bad SO and four of the human/non-human SO. Also, SOs such as normal/abnormal, animate/inanimate, edible/inedible, and natural/man-made appeared three times each. In my estimation, less common SOs that were present in the corpus are a matter of design choices made by the advertisers and thus will not be mentioned here for the reasons of conciseness.

As regards humour type, surprise humour was the most frequent (71 instances) given its compatibility with the incongruity-resolution

mechanism. Disparaging humour, on the other hand, constituted 10% of the corpus, while parody and satire, used as independent humour types, not coupled with surprise humour, accounted for 7% of the corpus each. When used with other humour types, surprise humour was often coupled with parody (on 11 occasions) and irony (three times), which may testify to the fact that the expression of *schadenfreude*, that is, of “enjoyment obtained from the troubles of others” (*Merriam-Webster Dictionary* n.d.), may play an important role in humorous metaphorical ads. Other, yet rare, humour types involved slapstick humour and misunderstanding. As far as humour functions are concerned, the self-enhancing (97 instances) and affiliative (50 instances) humour functions were the most common; then followed the aggressive (34) and self-defeating (14) functions, which shows that the ads in the corpus were primarily intended to boost likeability and make the audience feel a closer connection with the ad thanks to its humorous appeal.

Several patterns can be observed on the basis of this short overview. Firstly, the analysis of the corpus in English shows that multimodal metaphor was more prevalent than the visual one, that the textual metaphor was barely present, and that funny metaphors were the most common. As a rule, visual metaphor correlated with visual humour but both visual and multimodal metaphor appeared with visual humour. When it comes to the forms of visual rhetoric that were used to construct the ads, comparison for similarity and the figures of juxtaposition and replacement were the most widespread.

Humour, on the other hand, was mostly visual; in fact, the pictorial variety was nearly twice as common as the multimodal one. Moreover, humour was commonly based on the actual/non-actual and the possible/impossible SOs. Surprise humour played first fiddle, although it should be noted that the number of ads which featured superiority humour, parody, and satire was substantial. Nevertheless, the self-enhancing and affiliative humour functions were more widespread than the aggressive and self-defeating one. Thus, having presented the most important features of the entire corpus, I will move on to a narrower sample of the ads in English.

5.6.2 Sample in English

This section will centre on 20 selected ads in English, representative of the whole corpus; the sample was chosen in such a way so as to assure that the selection process did not distort the overall gist of the entire corpus. The selection procedure was already discussed in section 5.5 on the presentation of results. As already stated, based on the sub-sets of various humour targets, a proportional number of ads that referred to different targets was

selected to ensure a roughly equal representation and a manageable portion of data to be analysed.

Therefore, the final sample of advertisements subject to qualitative investigation consisted of 20 ads, ten of which featured product- or service-related humour; five ads in the final sample targeted the recipient, two the competition, and two an external situation matching no specific category, whereas 1 belonged to the class labelled as “the other,” which means that the recipient was not likely to identify with the butt of the joke. The results to be discussed are presented in Table 5 on the following pages. In Tables 5 and 6, the cells marked in grey show multimodality of humour and/or metaphor.

As far as the construction of the metaphorical is concerned, the sample in English relied on the power of the pictorial, for visual metaphor was the most frequent (13 out of 20 instances). It is perhaps due to the sensual primacy of the image in contemporary visual culture that “does not depend on pictures but on this modern tendency to picture or visualise existence” (Mirzoeff, 2002, p. 6). Being the most immediate in conveying information (Mirzoeff, 2002; Tsakona, 2009), the pictorial therefore played first fiddle in the ads sampled.

A good example is Ad E-1 for Vitakraft promoting a conditioner for dogs; upon seeing a picture of a dog’s pink, velvety muzzle and ears which are part of a mass of pink and fluffy spun sugar wrapped around a stick, the audience surely infers that the advertiser intended to communicate some figurative meaning. The metaphorical is located in the pictorial, as both the source and target domains are rendered visually, thus resulting in a metaphor A DOG IS COTTON CANDY. This is further reinforced by the slogan “Conditioner for your beauty. For softer and sweeter hair” that conveys the idea of sweetness and softness of dog’s hair once the conditioner is applied. What follows is that the features of the source, that is, cotton candy, such as its being pink, light, sweet, and soft, are imposed onto the target domain, thus placing emphasis on comparison for similarity. This shows that one item is like the other, which is further stressed by the visual fusion of the two images. Although it is not directly related to the topic of metaphor *per se*, it is possible to point out the presence of an interesting interplay that takes place between the more literal and the more metaphorical sense of “sweetness.” While the former is obviously related to the taste, the latter pertains to pleasant emotions that may be experienced at the sight of something positively touching, endearing or delightful (in the sense of the borrowing “słotaśny” (whose even more Polonised version is: “słitaśny”) which is used in the Polish language).

English ads	Metaphor	Humour	Meaning Operation	Visual Structure	Script Opposition	Humour Type	Function	Metaphor Type
Ad E-1	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-2	textual + visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-3	visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-4	textual + visual	visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-5	visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition fusion	actual/non-actual absence/presence digestion/indigestion	satirical humour	affiliative aggressive	funny metaphor
Ad E-6	visual	textual + visual	operations of connection comparison for similarity	fusion replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad E-7	visual	visual	operation of connection	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-8	visual	visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	actual/non-actual domestic/wild	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-9	visual	visual	operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise + parody	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad E-10	visual	visual	comparison for opposition	fusion	possible/impossible good/bad	surprise + irony	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-11	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual sex/no-sex (absence/presence)	surprise humour	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor

Ad E-12	visual	visual	operation of connection	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise + slapstick humour	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-13	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	absence/presence	misunderstanding	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad E-14	textual	textual + visual	operation of connection	replacement	sex/no-sex (absence/presence)	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-15	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	normal/abnormal	parody	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-16	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	good/bad	satire disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-17	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	replacement	normal/abnormal	parody superiority humour	aggressive self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-18	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual real/imaginary old/new good/bad dark/light	parody	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-19	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-20	visual	visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	fat/slim much/little	satire disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor

TABLE 5. The Results of Qualitative Content Analysis of the Sample in English as Regards Metaphoricity and Humorousness

Multimodal metaphors, that is, the ones “constituted by a mapping, or blending, of domains from different modes” (Koller, 2009, p. 46), were detected six times (in the ads: Ad E-2, Ad E-4, Ad E-11, Ad E-16, Ad E-17, and Ad E-18) and there was only one instance of textual metaphor (in Ad E-14). Humour was mostly visual too; six instances of multimodal humour were found (Ad E-6, Ad E-11, Ad E-14 Ad E-16, Ad E-17, and Ad E-18), partially overlapping with multimodal metaphor, which confirms the synergistic operation of metaphor and humour in the English set. To be more precise, visual metaphor and visual humour were paired 12 times, which means that more than half of the ads favoured the pictorial mode over the multimodal one which happened to overlap four times (in Ad E-11, Ad E-16, Ad E-17, and Ad E-18). In spite of the fact that the perceiver could expect far more text to be involved in press advertisements, none of the ads sampled was found to employ solely textual humour.

Let it be specified that funny metaphors constituted as much as 75% of the sample; by way of a reminder, an ad can be classified as an instance of a funny metaphor if the blend that takes place is funny because of “partially resolved incongruity of cross-domain comparison” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98). The remainder of the sample consisted of metaphors with funny referents which show something that is inherently amusing. The ads within this format included the following ads: Ad E-3, Ad E-4, Ad E-12, Ad E-17, and Ad E-19. An interesting advertisement in this series is, for instance, Ad E-4 for McDonald’s that shows a cow standing on a trampoline in the middle of a meadow on a beautiful day; the picture is accompanied by a short line that constitutes the body copy and reads: “The Real Milkshake.” The said ad can be classified as belonging to the category of metaphors with funny referents, for there is no denying that a cow on a trampoline is comical indeed and, on top of that, far from being prototypical.

It is also imperative to have a look at the meaning operations identified within the ads discussed. Seven of them employed comparison for similarity (“A is like B”) and seven exploited the operation of connection corresponding to the claim “A is associated with B.” Here is an example from the English set: Ad E-12 for Lifebuoy Hand Wash shows a kitchen worktop and a dog that is squeezed and formed so as to resemble a loaf on a breadboard. The body copy in small print reads: “You eat what you touch,” which suggests that its purpose is to convince people to wash their hands before having a meal. The operation of connection and the figure of replacement, in which the image of the dog points to the one of a loaf

that is absent in the ad, make the perceiver construe an inventive metaphor *A LOAF OF BREAD IS A DOG* and, by extension, *BACTERIA ARE FOOD*.

Apart from the operation of connection and comparison for similarity, it was also possible to detect three comparisons for opposition but there were even more interesting cases in which several types of meaning operations were involved: Ad E-6 combined the operation of connection and comparison for similarity, whereas Ad E-17 and Ad E-20 made use of explicit comparison for similarity and implied comparison for opposition.

As far as the kinds of visual structure are concerned, the figure of replacement (in which the image present points to the one that is absent in the ad) was observed in eight ads; then followed the one of juxtaposition (two side-by-side images) with six instances. The figure of fusion, that is, of two combined images, was present four times, yet it also appeared in two more ads which applied more than one visual structure. These were Ad E-5 (described in detail in the section to follow) that made use of both juxtaposition and fusion, and Ad E-6 that used fusion and replacement simultaneously. By way of example, in the latter, both the source and target are cued visually, resulting in a metaphor *PANTS ARE A LIVING ROOM OR PANTS ARE A CONTAINER*, hence exploiting the image schema of containment (cf. Johnson, 1987, p. 126), which “suggests that there is a clearly delineated space, open or closed, bounded by walls, usually comprising something” (Stwora, 2018a, p. 113). Furthermore, it can be said that *TESTICLES ARE INHABITANTS* of that container and, given the attributes of the room depicted, that *TESTICLES ARE MEN* who need to feel comfortable in the place they live. With regard to visual structure, the way in which the elements are pictured in the ad point out to the figures of fusion (as the image of the pants and the room merge into one) and replacement (since testicles are replaced with eggs), whereas the types of cognitive processing required to comprehend the ad encompass the operations of connection (that corresponds to the claim “A is associated with B”) and comparison for similarity (“A is like B”).

Moving on to the pairs of script opposition detected in the English sample, I came across the possible/impossible SO nine times, the actual/non-actual SO six times, and the absence/presence SO four times, including two instantiations thereof in the form of sex/no-sex SO in the ads Ad E-11 and Ad E-14. There were also three ads (Ad E-16, Ad E-10, and Ad E-18) that exploited the good/bad SO. Some ads proved more complex, though, applying multiple SOs at the same time; for instance, Ad E-8 made use of both the actual/non-actual and domestic/wild SO, while Ad E-10 applied

the possible/impossible and good/bad SO, and Ad E-20 opted for the joint operation of the fat/slim and much/little SO. There were three SOs detected in Ad E-5 (actual/non-actual, absence/presence, and digestion/indigestion) but the record was set by Ad E-18 which made it possible to identify five SOs at the same time, namely the actual/non-actual, real/imaginary, old/new, good/bad, and the dark/light one.

The said advertisement was produced to promote KissFM radio station; the ad is very simple in its structure, as it shows a black compact cassette on a red background. At first glance, the object refers the audience to the times of analogue audio and the old hits featured by this radio station but the message is far more complex, as it uses a slogan: “iPod... I’m your father.” The slogan constitutes an explicit reference to the fifth episode of *Star Wars*. In *The Empire Strikes Back*, after the final lightsaber duel between the main villain of the Galactic Empire and the greatest hero of the Rebel Alliance, Darth Vader tells Luke Skywalker the hard truth: “Luke... I am your father.” Thus, the slogan used in the ad lends new meaning to the whole message, making it metaphorical and humorous as a result of “a comic collision of or oscillation between two frames of reference/worlds of discourse [...] [or] associative contexts” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 17).

Ad E-18 therefore makes use of the figure of juxtaposition, for the picture is juxtaposed with the text so as to convey the metaphorical meaning based on comparison for similarity (“A is like B”), which results in a metaphor A COMPACT CASSETTE IS IPOD’S FATHER. Cognately, the compact cassette represents the old generation whereas the iPod is the member of the new one. Moreover, it is possible to draw some similarities between the compact cassette and Darth Vader, as well as between iPod and Luke Skywalker, which can be done on the basis of their characteristic features that stand in stark contrast to each other; the perceiver thus deals with a black-clad old one and a “shiny” new one, the Dark and Light Side of the Force and of technology, respectively.

When it comes to the examination of the roles of the text and image in the construction of the metaphorical, it seems clear that these are equal since the verbal and the pictorial combine to trigger metaphor, with the target domain of the cassette being pictured and the source domain of *Star Wars* being rendered verbally. The same holds true for the humorous that relies on both text and image. The blend, however accurate it is, makes it impossible to completely shuffle off the incongruity perceived by the audience due to conceptual remoteness of the domains of recording format and *Star Wars* films. As already signalled, a number of SOs can be iden-

tified in this example, starting with the real/imaginary that refers to reality and the realm of *Star Wars* saga, through the old/new or good/bad, and closing with the dark/light script opposition. The function of humour is to draw correspondence between the ad and a popular series of films, thus producing self-enhancing humour in the form of parody. Due to partial resolution of the incongruity that results from a cross-domain comparison, the ad can be classified as belonging to the group of funny metaphors.

As regards humour type in the whole sample in English, surprise humour appeared in 50% of the ads, chiefly because of the fact that it goes together perfectly with the incongruity-resolution theory. Several ads made use of the joint operation of surprise humour and other humour types, for example, surprise and parody (Ad E-9), surprise and irony (Ad E-10) or surprise and slapstick humour (Ad E-12). Apart from these, there was also one instance of humour based on misunderstanding (Ad E-13) that shows woman's heels with black shoe straps that make the heels look as if they were female buttocks; this is due to comparison for similarity present in the ad that makes people associate what they see with woman's body not only because they understand the picture based on a conceptual framework which structures the organisation of their experience (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), but also because of the metonymical part-for-whole relation, which makes them associate one part of woman's body with a female in general. In the light of the foregoing, it can be said that the ad may be seen as playing with the recipient and his/her ways of thinking, making use of perceptual misconstruction to introduce humour based on misunderstanding.

It is important to note that the attractiveness of parody and satire was exploited as well. Parody appeared three times, for example, Ad E-18 described above referred to a popular series of science fiction films, Ad E-15 poked fun at exaggerated parental behaviour, whereas Ad E-17 parodied a typical dog and, indirectly, the producers of non-genuine car parts (here, superiority was implied through the ad's laughing at the weaknesses of the competition in general). Satire was used three times too (Ad E-5, Ad E-16, and Ad E-20), usually in the form of disparaging humour that, in the examples mentioned, targeted Donald Trump, his bodyguards, and Mexican people, as well as Coca-Cola and fat Elvis Presley, in that order. Worth mentioning is also the fact that several ads relied on incongruity-resolution mechanism and superiority humour in tandem; these were Ad E-16, Ad E-17, and Ad E-20 that were found to correlate positively with the simultaneous presence of both aggressive and self-enhancing function of humour.

As far as the issue of humour's function is concerned, it appears that all of the ads in the sample made use of self-enhancing humour variety. This was coupled with self-defeating function four times and was founded upon the idea of laughing at oneself, that is, ridiculing or poking fun at the product, service, brand or company, at the same time intensifying positive feelings towards the ad and increasing brand liking thanks to a pinch of humour. Furthermore, the self-enhancing variety was also applied with the affiliative and aggressive function (four times each), which means that advertisers let their ads take on both affiliative and aggressive overtones, that is, the ones that contained reference to a universal experience that renders the message more "personal" to the target audience, so to speak, and ridiculed a specific target, hence making it the butt of the joke, respectively. Moreover, it turned out that one ad may perform multiple functions as well. For example, Ad E-12 for Lifebuoy Hand Wash may belong to the category of affiliative humour, due to reference to a common experience of dog owners, of aggressive humour, given the unfortunate situation of the dog, and of self-enhancing humour, which, in line with the ad's goal, is to boost the image of the product thanks to funny content. On the other hand, Ad E-11 (described in detail in the next section) was found to carry out the affiliative, aggressive, self-enhancing, and self-defeating function; it was because it simultaneously communicates a message that refers to a universal experience, targets a specific group (i.e., women), aims at making the audience remember the message, and makes fun of itself.

All in all, in line with the division of the sample into sub-sets according to humour targets, the ads applying product- or service-related humour mainly used surprise humour; few resorted to satire, parody, and irony but, if so, they were always coupled with surprise humour in order to maintain the self-enhancing function of humour. Only three out of ten ads within this subgroup carried out the self-defeating function to laugh at themselves (in the examples Ad E-4, Ad E-6, and Ad E-9). Visual humour was usually paired with visual metaphor save for two instances of multimodal metaphor and visual humour (Ad E-2 and Ad E-4) and one instance of visual metaphor and multimodal humour (Ad E-6). Considering the whole corpus, the ads which laughed at a product or service frequently exploited multimodal humour and multimodal metaphor, although the instances of visual ones were also numerous.

As regards the portion of ads targeting the recipient, it was the most diversified, as the constitutive ads were found to use surprise humour, surprise coupled with slapstick humour, misunderstanding, and parody;

almost all of them, however, fulfilled the affiliative function. Visual metaphor matched visual humour in three out of five advertisements, whereas multimodal humour concurred with both multimodal and textual metaphor. When it comes to the same group in the whole corpus, the prevalence of multimodal humour and either visual or multimodal metaphor can be noticed. Also, more than half of the ads from the English corpus that targeted the recipient used superiority humour, showing people in various humorous situations or metonymically referring to various parts of human body, either implicitly (e.g., through comparison for similarity) or explicitly.

It should come as no surprise that advertising messages targeting the competition resorted to disparaging humour, thus serving both self-enhancing and aggressive functions; also, in the said subgroup, the proportional number of comparisons for opposition was the highest. This finding holds true for both the ads chosen for the purpose of qualitative investigation and the ads targeting the competitor, either implied or specified, in the whole English corpus. Competition was hence depicted as, for example, little dogs that cannot defend their owners (Digital Day), as something scary (Ad E-16), as uncomfortable shoes (Durex – Shoes) or even as nasty bullies (Mentos Pure).

The ads featuring external targets matching none of the categories listed before, on the other hand, relied on comparison for similarity. Referring to the whole corpus, the ads belonging to this category mainly poked fun at physical objects or animals, usually making use of multimodal structures to communicate both humour and metaphor.

Last but not least, the only advertisement in the qualitative investigation belonging to the class labelled as *THE OTHER* was found to employ satire and thus disparaging humour, fulfilling both aggressive and self-enhancing functions; although such an observation cannot constitute a finding on its own since the incidence of such ads was too low, it turns out that such a claim holds water if all the ads from the entire corpus fitting into the category are considered. Thus, all the ads ridiculing “the other” used different shades of disparaging humour, laughing at, for instance, fat Elvis Presley (Ad E-20), Hitler’s dead body flattened against a broken windscreen (an ad for the Centre of Consultancy for Road Victims), at kissing political leaders (an ad for the United Colours of Benetton and the Unhate Foundation), at two, probably gay, priests who believe not in salvation but in salivation caused by the product promoted (an ad for Antonio Federici Ice Cream – Salivation) or at a pregnant nun whose picture is supposed to

exaggerate the taste of ice cream (again, an ad for Antonio Federici Ice Cream – Immaculately Conceived).

5.6.3 Selected Case Studies—An Integrated Perspective

Last but not least, I would like to include two examples of the ads that, in my opinion, best demonstrate the way in which the metaphorical and the humorous complement each other in the construction of complex advertising messages.

The first ad to mention is Ad E-5, an original and very up-to-the-minute advertisement proposed by Hepachofa Hepat Digestive Pills. The whole picture is framed so as to resemble a stomach. On the left, there are avocado and burrito with moustaches, sombreros, and luggage; they are about to open the door leading to the other part of the stomach. On the right, on the other hand, the perceiver can see a big hamburger behind a big desk with the USA flag; the hamburger's content is stylised in such a way so as to resemble Donald Trump's hair. There are also two tall French-fries with black ties and sunglasses that stand for bodyguards. Given the above-mentioned, it can be firmly stated that the figures of juxtaposition (two side-by-side images) and fusion (two combined images) are applied and that the operation of connection is present, thanks to which the perceiver associates avocado and burrito with Mexican people and hamburgers with Americans. An obvious interpretation would therefore be that a metaphor to be identified here should be **FOODS ARE PEOPLE**. Mexican food is equalled with Mexican people, whereas French-fries act as bodyguards to Donald Trump, who is portrayed as a big, grumpy hamburger. Not only is the ad figuratively attractive, but also evocative since it alludes to the Mexico-US border and President Trump's views on the issue. Thus, its full appreciation requires specific cultural awareness and some knowledge of the situational context referred to.

The theme of conflict arising from differences is further strengthened by the body copy "This is gonna get ugly" suggesting that, if various foods mix in someone's stomach and something goes wrong, he/she can suffer from indigestion. This, in turn, leads to the metaphor **INDIGESTION IS CONFLICT**, which is inventively used in the ad discussed with a view to advertising digestive pills and pointing out to the problem of cultural clash, as perceived by Donald Trump who feels discomfort in the stomach at the very thought of not building a wall between the USA and Mexico. In this case, the metaphor is formed in such a way because the medical condition

for which the advertised product provides relief is INDIGESTION, which makes it the target domain in spite of the fact that, theoretically, in metaphors, the more abstract concept is usually portrayed by means of a more concrete one, thus “rendering the target domain more approachable and understandable through the schematicity of [the] source” (Stwora, 2018a, p. 116). Consequently, owing to the focus of the ad, the metaphorical mechanism seems reversed in this context. Notwithstanding, abstracted from the central focus of the ad, the metaphor could also work the other direction and hence take the form CONFLICT IS INDIGESTION (i.e., the US-Mexican conflict is the “conflict” in Trump’s stomach). Moreover, it is possible to draw yet another metaphor from this meaning-laden ad, namely the one suggesting that PEOPLE ARE FOODS IN A CONTAINER. Just like various ingredients mix in someone’s stomach, different types and races of people inhabit the Earth and should coexist peacefully, preferably without giving each other indigestion, so to speak. With regard to the “location” of the metaphorical in the ad discussed, the image instantiates a metaphor that is backed up by the body copy serving as a mere comment on the situation depicted.

Humour is cued visually as well, with non-prototypicality being crucial in the production of humour; while it is possible to associate various nations with different types of food, the perceiver is not likely to say that nations are foods, which, in line with the incongruity-resolution theory of humour, leads to partial resolution of the incongruity encountered and hence increases the ad’s funniness. In other words, humour is triggered because the cognitive mechanism of metaphor makes the non-prototypical take a central position in the perceiver’s mind. It is also important to note that, in fact, there are several script oppositions at play here, namely the actual/non-actual SO (since people are no food in reality), absence/presence SO (referring to the clash between Mexicans’ being on the US territory and staying in their country of origin), and, more specifically, digestion/indigestion SO. Contrasts do not end here, though, because the functional aspect of humour is two-sided too, depending on the audience’s provenience and nationality, thus taking on either affiliative or aggressive overtone. To conclude, the ad is clearly an instance of satirical humour and an example of a funny metaphor that is humorous in and of itself.

Belonging to the subset of ads making fun of the recipient, Ad E-11 titled #vilniusgspot promotes the capital city of Lithuania. In the ad, the textual and the pictorial complement each other to construct both the metaphorical and the humorous. As regards the form, the illustration shows

bed sheets with an all-over print of the political map of Europe; in the bottom part of the picture, we can see a woman reaching an orgasm, her hair dishevelled and hand clutching the sheets where Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, is located. The slogan reads “Vilnius. The G-Spot of Europe,” while the body copy adds: “Nobody knows where it is, but when you find it—it’s amazing.”

Upon the identification of the source and target domain, the perceiver arrives at the metaphor *VILNIUS IS THE G-SPOT*, with the G-spot being the source on the basis of which he/she understands the conceptual domain of Vilnius. Reference to sex and, specifically, to this highly erogenous area of woman’s body provides the perceiver with the idea of excitement, pleasure, and fun that are metaphorically attributed to Vilnius, thus painting the city as an exciting place to be discovered, explored, and experienced to the fullest. Another metaphor which could arise is *A COUNTRY IS A WOMAN’S BODY* or, more generally speaking, *A COUNTRY IS A HUMAN BEING*; this specific ad, nonetheless, aims at promoting a particular place, which gives support to the first interpretation proposed.

The said visual structure rests on juxtaposition (two side-by-side images of the map and the woman) and on the operation of connection that makes the perceiver associate sex-related pleasure with visiting Vilnius. Unusual as it is, the metaphor seems very creative and amusing since it surely departs from the expectations of the audience. This is because its members are not likely to associate an ad promoting a city with sex-related themes, for these are perceived as belonging to completely different categories of experience. Accordingly, from the prototype-theoretical perspective, incorrect categorisation results in an incongruity that, upon its resolution, leads to humour. As far as the type of script opposition is concerned, it is possible to identify several relations, starting with the actual/non-actual SO and concluding with sex/no-sex SO (cf. Raskin, 1985; Mulder & Nijholt, 2002; Krikmann, 2006), which is, in fact, a specific instantiation of the absence/presence SO proposed by Chłopicki (1987).

The functional use of humour in the example analysed poses a considerable challenge because it seems that it could come into every category delineated in Martin et al. (2003) or Blackford et al. (2011). To begin with, it may be classified as affiliative humour because of the fact that the ad contains reference to a universal experience that renders the message more “personal” to the target audience. Nevertheless, some members of the audience may find the ad inappropriate due to the sexual theme featured, thus opening space for possible aggressive humour that targets women.

If the recipient does not find the ad unsuitable or improper, though, it can be perceived as belonging to the category of self-enhancing humour whose purpose is to amuse the audience with a clever message and hence make people remember or even actually visit the city. Finally, the self-defeating humour variety can be identified since the city is portrayed as the butt of the joke, thus making fun of itself. To conclude, the ad is very complex and, in my view, causes surprise, which testifies to the fact that it can be said to represent surprise humour instantiated by means of a funny metaphor.

5.6.4 The Polish Corpus—Brief Overview

As far as the corpus in Polish is concerned, I managed to find surprisingly few press ads that were simultaneously humorous and metaphorical. Despite extensive research conducted, it turned out that linking humour and metaphor in Polish press ads is not as common a strategy as it could be assumed based on the corpus in English. Only 20 out of 100 ads from the Polish corpus were found to employ incongruity-resolution humour and metaphor at the same time, which posed a difficulty as regards data collection. Therefore, there seemed to be no choice but to consider them the sample, as this intriguing mismatch between the corpora surely merited discussion.

The detection of this important difference in terms of instantiations of humour in press advertising raises questions about the nature of humour in ads across languages and cultures, thus highlighting the importance of cultural dynamics behind advertising messages in varying sociocultural settings. Instead of the incongruity-resolution mechanism coupled with metaphor, humorous ads in the Polish corpus favoured puns, wordplay, and superiority humour. Because it is not feasible to describe so many ads in detail, I decided to focus on the most frequent features of the ads in question; more information on the Polish corpus can be found in Appendix 5.

Multimodal humour prevailed among the ads in the corpus, for it made up 91% of the ads in Polish. There were only four instances of visual humour based on the incongruity-resolution pattern, which shows a vast difference between the corpus in English and Polish. In the former, the occurrence of the ads that made use of visual humour was nearly twice more frequent, as compared to ads based on multimodal humour. As regards the corpus in Polish, it was also possible to observe five instances of verbal humour (three times in the form of puns and two times as surprise humour coupled

with disparaging humour). While the ads that poked fun at the products or services advertised were the most common in the corpus in English, the ads in the Polish collection mainly targeted external humour targets (32%). Product-related humour made up 29% of the corpus; then followed humour directed at “the other” (21%). The choice of more distant (or less related) targets was probably motivated by the advertisers’ unwillingness to ridicule their own products. Poking fun at the recipient was slightly more frequent than it was the case in the corpus in English; the Polish corpus targeted recipients on 16 occasions and, interestingly, it ridiculed a particular group twice (this point will be discussed in the following sections). No ads that would poke fun at the advertiser himself or the competitor were detected.

When it comes to the types of meaning operations involved, there were 71 instances of the operation of connection and 61 comparisons for similarity. Comparison for opposition, on the other hand, appeared only eight times. Lower incidence of comparisons for opposition was also noted for the corpus in English, which, nonetheless, employed this particular meaning operation more often. The distribution of visual structures in the Polish corpus was different from the English one, though, for Polish ads commonly made use of the figure of juxtaposition (83 times, as compared to 51 in the corpus in English). The figures of replacement and fusion appeared on 26 and 13 occasions, respectively, whereas the corpus in English contained 50 figures of replacement and 28 figures of fusion. It is true for both corpora that sometimes multiple visual structures were applied and that the most prevalent pattern that emerged consisted in linking juxtaposition and replacement (21% of each corpus).

As far as humour types are concerned, the first thing that strikes the eye is that punning was definitely the most widespread (41% of the corpus); its function in advertising discourse is to add extra dimensions to language (Djafarova, 2008, p. 268) and, therefore, attract consumers’ attention through witty messages that make use of competing levels of salience. The Polish corpus offers several interesting examples of humorous ads which are based on wordplay. The ad for Harnaś beer uses the slogan “Trza go w morde loć” that can be understood in two ways; one of the readings of this sentence is “You need to pour the beer into your mouth,” whereas the other refers to hitting someone in the face. Moreover, there is a comical clash between the word forms in standard Polish (“lać”) and the vernacular form (“loć”) which contributes to the creation of the pun. Another ad, this time for Cinema City, shows a photo of Tom Hanks waving directly at the

camera and the words “T.Hanks” at the bottom of the picture translated as “D.zięki” because the initial of his name and the last name of the actor can be read as the word “thanks.” Lastly, the ad for Amica (a company which sells household products) proposes a funny slogan “Zaprasowani?” which is a blend of “zapracowani” [time-poor] and “prasowanie” [ironing]; such a blend suggests that people may be too busy to iron and thus should buy Amica products to save time and have their clothes tumble-dried, or ironed with a new, more efficient iron.

The examples gathered in the Polish corpus have also shown that the instances of superiority humour were very frequent, which means that many ads were designed in such a way so as to laugh at the weaknesses, misfortunes, and flaws of others, therefore making the audience (or at least parts of it) feel triumphant and simply better than the unlucky targets. The butts of jokes were numerous indeed, as they included police forces, new recycling policies, modern teens, men’s flu, fat people or even Chuck Norris, to name but a few. This trend can be illustrated by the following example of an ad for BAT PSB, a chain of DIY stores that advertises bricks; the advertising message shows a TV smashed with a brick, which is accompanied by the line: “Kolejny mecz w niedzielę. Przygotuj się” [Another football match on Sunday. Be prepared]. Although the ad’s format does not make it funny *per se*, the contextual embedding does, which is because of the fact that Polish recipients associate Polish football team with poor results and frustration due to lost matches. The very depiction of a smashed TV is therefore attributed to a disappointed football fan but the clearly exaggerated picture departs from a prototypical reaction of fans. This points to the relationship of opposition between the scripts involved, thus being an instantiation of the actual/non-actual SO, for furious as he/she may be, a football fan is still unlikely to destroy his/her TV set in reality.

All in all, there were 17 instances of superiority humour, which was frequently used either in tandem with puns or surprise humour (i.e., the incongruity-resolution mechanism). An important role of parodic overtones should be stressed too—15 examples of parody were detected, which was roughly similar to the corpus in English. What is more, there was one example of humour based on the prosodic structure of the ad; it made use of alliteration so as to show sound resemblance to a foreign language.

The most common types of SOs included the actual/non-actual SO (65 examples) and the absence/presence SO (30 examples); then followed

the possible/impossible SO, which occurred 21 times. The oppositions human/non-human (or human/animal), sex/no-sex, and edible/non-edible were also quite frequent. Although lower in recurrence, the good/bad and extraordinary/ordinary SOs appeared several times as well. With regard to humour functions, the self-enhancing (98 instances) and affiliative (77 instances) humour functions were the most common, which is in line with what was already detected in the corpus in English. The aggressive (20) and self-defeating (11) functions were less common, which, again, may testify to the fact that the ads in the Polish corpus were aimed at boosting likeability and establishing good rapport with the audience by means of humour.

Furthermore, some ads in the Polish collection were very strongly contextualised, sometimes to the point that they could become incomprehensible to anyone not familiar with recent events and with the contemporary situation in Poland; this strong contextual anchoring appeared in several examples of real time marketing (RTM) practices. For example, one of the ads for Żywiec included in the corpus shows two empty glasses of beer and the repeated phrase “Ani ta Ani ta” [neither this one, nor that one], and the third glass full of beer that is accompanied by the caption “Złoto” [gold]. The ad has a deeper meaning, though, because it actually refers to Anita Włodarczyk, a Polish hammer thrower and an Olympic champion. This contextual information changes the meaning of the ad since it produces the idea of the cheering crowd that chants her name “A-ni-ta A-ni-ta” to celebrate her winning the gold medal. Of course, this ad is bound to be short-lived owing to its contextual embedding; nonetheless, temporary as its funniness might be, it seems very creative on the part of the advertiser to make use of such homophonous structures. More examples of this type of RTM could be found in the data gathered but the one discussed above should prove sufficient to illustrate the point. In such cases, some receivers will not grasp the intertextuality of the ad or the wider socio-cultural context it refers to, which naturally splits the audience but is actually axiomatic in the analyses of humorous artefacts in general.

5.6.5 Sample in Polish

Having established that as few as 20 ads from the Polish corpus employed metaphor and incongruity-resolution humour at the same time, there was no choice but to consider them the sample that was subject to qualitative investigation. Most of the ads (16, to be specific) promoted a product or service, while two targeted a certain group and two were directed at

THE OTHER. None of the ads in the said sample targeted the competitor or the recipient, which suggests that the advertisers did not want to risk offending their prospects in any way and, surprisingly, avoided laughing at the competition. The results to be discussed herein are presented in Table 6 below.

In the Polish ads collected for this study, I found eight visual metaphors and 12 multimodal metaphors, which testifies to the fact that advertisers go for the pictorial since “pictures are ‘easier’ to understand and have more impact than words, and they generally offer greater opportunity for the communication of excitement, mood, and imagination” (Dyer, 1982, p. 69). Surprisingly, the same holds for the humorous in the Polish sample because eight instances of visual humour and 12 examples of multimodal humour were detected; visual metaphor always matched visual humour and multimodal metaphor always matched multimodal humour, which shows that advertisers were consistent in the synergistic use of metaphor and humour as far as the structure of the ads is concerned. As regards metaphor type, funny metaphors prevailed; by way of a reminder, if the blend that takes place is funny because of “partially resolved incongruity of cross-domain comparison” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98), the ad can be categorised as belonging to the group of funny metaphors. It emerges from the data gathered that only two ads, Ad PL-17 and Ad PL-19, contained a metaphor with a funny referent, which constitutes just 10% of the Polish sample.

By way of illustration, the latter ad promotes Krakus vegetables and shows a pickled cucumber with tiny hands made of dill and large eyes made of horseradish and pepper, which gives it its funny looks. It is trapped in a jar full of explosions and flames. The perceiver can see a bullet hole in the jar, as well as a blurred image of a jar of pickled cucumbers in the background. The fact that this picture is accompanied by the slogan “Szkłana pułapka” [The glass trap] is a reference to the Polish translation of the title of *Die Hard* (1988) directed by John McTiernan, which makes the perceiver arrive at the metaphor KRAKUS’ PICKLED CUCUMBER IS JOHN McCLANE, the main protagonist of the *Die Hard* film series who was portrayed by Bruce Willis, or KRAKUS’ PICKLED CUCUMBER IS A HERO, a right person (or thing) that succeeds even if thrust into extraordinary circumstances. Just as John McClane is a brave man for every job, the pickled cucumber can save the party if there is nothing else to eat. Thus, there is no denying that such a referent in a metaphor is funny in itself, as a major departure from prototypicality relations is evident.

	Metaphor	Humour	Meaning operation	Visual Structure	Script Opposition	Humour Type	Function	Metaphor Type
British ads	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-1	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise irony	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-2	textual + visual	textual + visual	operations of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition fusion	possible/impossible predator/victim	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-3	visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible big/small	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-4	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-5	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad PL-6	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad PL-7	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad PL-8	textual + visual	textual + visual	operations of connection comparison for similarity	replacement juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-9	visual	visual	operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-10	textual + visual	textual + visual	operations of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	absence/presence	surprise parody	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor

Ad PL-12	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad PL-13	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence visible/invisible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-14	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual mundane/philosophical	surprise parody	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-15	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence	parody	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-16	visual		visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-17	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operations of connection comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual real/imaginary	surprise parody	affiliative self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad PL-18	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operations of connection comparison for similarity	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise parody disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-19	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise parody	affiliative self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad PL-20	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	surprise parody disparaging humour	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor

TABLE 6. The Results of Qualitative Content Analysis of the Sample in Polish as Regards Metaphoricity and Humorosity

Returning to the results of qualitative investigation, though, the Polish sample turned out to be less diversified than the English one in terms of meaning operations. There were eight instances of the operation of connection and seven examples exploited comparison for similarity but there was no comparison for opposition whatsoever. Nevertheless, five ads (Ad PL-3, Ad PL-9, Ad PL-11, Ad PL-17, and Ad PL-18) were more complex in their structure, as they employed both the operation of connection and comparison for similarity at the same time. The ad for Motos driving school (Ad PL-9), for instance, stands out as a good example, as it shows a picture of a neatly clad man that is sitting on a dinosaur equipped with a saddle and bridle; the man is holding the reins and, apparently, has successfully parked the dinosaur in the parking space. Such an image makes one think of driving lessons because of the operations of similarity (“A is like B”) and connection (“A is associated with B”) when it comes to the activity of parking a big, wild, and untamed “beast” in a parking space.

Being closely connected with meaning operations, the discussion of the kinds of visual structure should follow. There were three instances of the figure of fusion detected but it also appeared in two mixed configurations in Ad PL-3 (fusion and juxtaposition), described in detail in the section to follow, and in Ad PL-6 (fusion and replacement) that replaces wild geese with the pieces of winged butterfly fillet flying high in the sky in a V-shaped formation. The figure of replacement was detected in seven ads under scrutiny and juxtaposition was observed in seven examples as well; both were applied together in the aforementioned Ad PL-9 since the car is conspicuously absent from the ad and replaced with the dinosaur, whereas the fact of the parking space, saddle, bridle, and reins, and the dinosaur, of course, being placed close together with contrasting effect highlights the figure of humorous juxtaposition.

When it comes to the types of SO detected in the Polish sample, the actual/non-actual SO turned out to be the most frequent (eight instances); then followed the possible/impossible SO that appeared seven times and the absence/presence SO that was present five times. Several ads were found to employ two SOs concurrently: Ad PL-4 was founded upon the possible/impossible and big/small SO, Ad PL-13 made use of the absence/presence and visible/invisible SO, Ad PL-14 relied on the actual/non-actual and mundane/philosophical SO, whereas Ad PL-17 was based on the actual/non-actual and real/imaginary SO. Comparing these results concerning SOs with the English set of ads, it is possible to notice that the richness of the Polish sample was lower; moreover, the ads from the Polish sample

employed maximally two SOs at the same time, whereas those from the English set happened to use three or even five SOs simultaneously, thus being able to build far more complex advertising messages.

Moving on to the issue of humour type, given its correlation with the incongruity-resolution mechanism, surprise humour was present in all the ads sampled except for one, that is, Ad PL-15. The said advertisement for RTV Euro AGD is very simple in its structure, as it shows a set of hair straighteners against white background and is accompanied by a black slogan that reads “Nie ma fal” [There are no waves], which is supposed to refer to both wavy hair that can be straightened with the tool and to the recent song by a Polish singer and songwriter Dawid Podsiadło that has exactly the same title as the slogan in the ad under discussion. Thus, Ad PL-15 constitutes an example of a parody that provides the perceiver with a distorted representation of the song and, indirectly, the artist with a view to producing a deliberately exaggerated comical effect; the ad is strongly contextualised, though, and hence requires considerable knowledge of the situation, the song’s title, and the person being parodied (Buijzen and Valkenburg, 2004), which makes it impossible for those who are not into contemporary Polish music to grasp the humorous intention of the advertiser. Other ads in the sample relied on surprise humour that was coupled with irony once (in Ad PL-2), whereas with parody—six times (Ad PL-11, Ad PL-14, Ad PL-17, Ad PL-18, Ad PL-19, and Ad PL-20). In the latter case, surprise and parody were used twice for the purpose of creating disparaging humour in Ad PL-18 and Ad PL-20 that targeted Eskimo people and their way of hunting, as well as Prince Harry’s wedding and his disappointed female fans, respectively.

As regards the role of humour in the ads studied, self-enhancing humour was present in all the ads under consideration. It seems that it was common a strategy to use self-enhancing humour coupled with the self-defeating variety (Ad PL-6, Ad PL-7, Ad PL-8, and Ad PL-12) and to use self-enhancing and affiliative humour function as well (in Ad PL-9, Ad PL-11, Ad PL-17, and Ad PL-19). Pairing the self-enhancing and self-defeating variety takes place in, for example, Ad PL-7 for the insurance company PZU that targets its own services in a humorous way thanks to replacing a backup car with a backup reindeer; the accompanying slogan reads: “Jesteśmy przygotowani na Święta i na całą zimę” [We are ready for Christmas and for all winter], and, in festive legends, reindeer are usually associated with pulling Santa’s sleigh through the night sky to help him deliver gifts on Christmas Eve. PZU thus wishes to convey that they are ready to go to great lengths to

help their clients, even if they happen to be Santa Claus himself or if they just want to be like Santa and deliver their Christmas gifts on time. In spite of the fact that, on the face of it, nothing connects the insurance company and Christmas, the ad is created in such a way so as to “[...] construct a ‘new relevance’ for the products [...], placing them in contexts which are not immediately related to them” (Wojtaszek, 2002, p. 128) but potentially humorous thanks to this departure from what is expected and prototypical.

Reverting to the former subject of humour functions, there was only one instance testifying to the joint operation of self-enhancing and aggressive humour in Ad PL-18. Furthermore, two complex cases were detected since two ads (Ad PL-2 and Ad PL-20) served the affiliative, aggressive, and self-enhancing function simultaneously. Again, aggressive humour always appeared when disparaging humour was employed, which was also the case in the English sample.

In tune with the division of the Polish sample into particular sub-sets according to humour targets, the majority of ads belonged to the category that made fun of a product or service on offer. Comparison for similarity and the operation of connection were exploited very frequently, while comparison for opposition was absent. It is also worth mentioning that Polish ads targeting a product or service favoured surprise humour, occasionally coupled with parody, and opted for self-enhancing humour; four out of 16 ads in this subgroup made use of the self-defeating variety, three featured affiliative humour, and only one ad was found to apply the aggressive form, but this was used along with the affiliative and self-enhancing varieties which acted as a counterbalancing force to the aggressive one. All the ads within this particular subgroup were instances of funny metaphors in which the humorous blend resulted from a “partially resolved incongruity of cross-domain comparison” (Attardo, 2015, p. 98).

The remaining ads from the Polish set belonged to the categories that targeted a certain group (Ad PL-17 and Ad PL-18) and that were directed at THE OTHER (Ad PL-19 and Ad PL-20). The former subset rested on the operations of connection and comparisons for similarity, whereas the latter exploited the operation of connection only. Both groups were characterised by the presence of surprise humour and parody, with two ads employing disparaging humour and thus making use of the aggressive function of humour (in ads Ad PL-18 and Ad PL-20). Interestingly, the ads Ad PL-17 and Ad PL-19 that refrained from the use of superiority humour, despite laughing at a particular target, opted for the affiliative function of humour expressed through metaphors with funny referents.

In sum, the Polish sample turned out to be less diversified than the English one; visual metaphor was found to co-occur with visual humour, whereas multimodal metaphor concurred with multimodal humour at all times. What is more, humour types involved were less complex as compared to the English sample and, when it comes to meaning operations themselves, there was no comparison for opposition whatsoever. While the fact that the advertisers avoided laughing at the recipients themselves can be understood as a measure taken to prevent offending the prospects, it is unclear why they refrained from poking fun at the competition, even in an implicit manner or without referring to any specific competitor. It would seem that humour can provide a good opportunity to downplay the image of the competing brand or product through making it the butt of the joke, simultaneously increasing the entertainment value of the ad. The fact that the ads in the Polish sample did not target competition in any way may be accounted for in terms of the advertisers' being afraid of the accusations of unfair business practices or of being perceived as mean-spirited; such conclusions, however, are obviously speculative.

5.6.6 Selected Case Studies—An Integrated Perspective

Lastly, it seems suitable to show the joint operation of metaphor and humour in selected press advertisements in Polish. Thus, in this section, two exemplary ads will be discussed with a view to presenting a more holistic picture of the phenomenon studied.

The first ad to be examined is Ad PL-2 for Lubelska, one of the largest Polish brands on the market of vodka-based flavoured liqueurs. The picture shows five little, one-hundred-millilitre bottles of colourful vodkas by Lubelska standing in a row; there is also one extra shot of vodka in the foreground. This picture, however, is accompanied by the slogan “Program Pięćset+” [Five hundred plus program] and the signature line “Lubelska. Żyj kolorowo.” [Lubelska. Live colourful.], which completely changes the message behind the ad, rendering it metaphorical and humorous at the same time. This is due to the fact that “Program Pięćset+” is a reference to one of the latest government programs of social transfer payments in which 500 Polish zlotys is paid monthly to the parents of children in Poland. The program itself is equally hated and lauded across the Polish society and hence has as many proponents as opponents. The former claim it is a good way to redistribute wealth and simply help people; the latter, on the other hand, say that this money can be spent in a careless or wasteful manner,

warning that families with alcohol problems, for instance, will spend it on alcohol and not necessarily on the goods for children.

In this light, the ad suggests a multimodal metaphor VODKAS ARE MONEY and, by extension, CHILDREN ARE VODKAS. The said metaphor is multimodal in its nature because the two domains are represented by means of two different modes (Urios-Aparisi, 2009), the textual and the visual, that are combined to trigger the metaphorical meaning. As far as the types of meaning operation are concerned, the perceiver can detect the operation of connection that works thanks to the set of associations resulting from the figure of replacement, as five 100 PLN bills are replaced with five 100 ml bottles of vodka.

On the basis of this example, the reader can clearly see the cancellation of the previous, misguided interpretation that the ad is simple since it promotes vodka with the image of vodka. Having found this thought-perception mismatch provided by the multimodal metaphor described in the previous lines, the perceiver can arrive at the conclusion that the ad is humorous. The two scenarios are introduced by both the text and picture, which confirms the multimodal nature of humour. The actual/non-actual SO can be identified because people do not really get vodkas but funds; contextual anchoring of the advertising message, however, indicates the presence of two humour types, namely of surprise and irony. The former rests on “a comic collision of or oscillation between two frames of reference” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 17), while the latter represents the type of antagonistic and relatively pungent humour because it is “marked by a deliberate contrast between apparent and intended meaning” (*American Heritage Dictionary* n.d.).

Partial resolution of the incongruity encountered and, consequently, the lingering tension between the scripts involved results in a funny metaphor that, nonetheless, performs several functions. Except for the most evident self-enhancing function that simply amuses people, the advertisement herein studied makes use of the affiliative and aggressive humour variety since it simultaneously refers to the socio-political context many can relate to and aggresses people who actually receive such social transfers.

Another advertisement to be described here is Ad PL-3 for Ariel that shows a white, stained shirt and Ariel stain remover being poured on it. Liquid stain remover forms a blob resembling a shark that is about to devour the stain. We can also see a slogan that makes use of wordplay: “napuść go na plamy” [pour it on the stains] or, alternatively, [set it on the stains (i.e., attack them)]. The metaphorical is established by both the

visual and the textual layer because it is the slogan that clarifies that the multimodal metaphor intended is STAIN REMOVER IS A SHARK. The SHARK referent implies such qualities as being extremely dangerous, voracious, and fast, and these characteristic features of a predator are superimposed onto the target, that is, on Ariel stain remover. What is communicated is that the product is going to kill and devour the stains quickly, that it will be merciless in removing them till none is left. The meaning operations make use of the operation of connection (as the shark is associated with killing and devouring its victims) and comparison for similarity between the shark and Ariel stain remover; the former is expressed through the figure of juxtaposition owing to the fact that the Ariel-shark is placed next to the stain, thus stressing the predator-victim opposition, whereas the latter is realised thanks to the figure of fusion because the blob of stain remover and the shark are shown as one element in the picture.

Apart from the aforementioned predator/victim SO, it is possible to identify yet another and more basic one, namely that of possible/impossible SO since it is impossible for stain remover to transform into a real shark. Given the conceptual remoteness of the domains of predatory fish and of stain remover, the perceiver cannot fully resolve the incongruity encountered and thus finds the ad amusing. This impossibility and relative non-prototypicality in terms of portraying the product are responsible for triggering the humorous in the ad that, just like metaphor, is multimodal in its nature. In the light of the foregoing, Ad PL-3 falls into the categories of surprise humour and funny metaphor, while the most evident function of humour is the self-enhancing one that is supposed to boost ad liking.

5.7 Ad Ratings and Emotional Responses—Results

Having demonstrated selected instances of multimodal humour in ads with appropriate examples, the time has come to shift attention away from the cognitive to emotional reactions. This is particularly important since affect and cognition influence each other, which is why acknowledging both is vital to understanding how people actually respond to advertising stimuli. Thus, because of this need for checking the actual feelings of research participants towards the ads sampled, the following comparative study was conducted to present and compare ad ratings of the ads from the English and Polish set. For each set, the sample of ads was limited to the one selected for the content analysis performed beforehand.

As already outlined in the methodological section of this chapter, a questionnaire was prepared (see Appendix 2) that contained a Likert-type scale and visual self-report which applied the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) assessment technique (Lang, 1980; Morris & Waine, 1993) to study ad appreciation and the appreciation of humour value. The rationale behind such a division was already explained, yet let it be repeated that ad appreciation is concerned with perceived levels of ad creativity, the message itself, its form, the colours or symbols used. The appreciation of humour value, on the other hand, is supposed to capture the participants' attitudes in terms of ads' funniness and reflect their actual feelings towards the material studied. The ads were presented to research participants outside their original context, that is, they were extracted from their original sources in order not to create any unwanted distraction. It is also important to note that I decided not to include any open-ended questions in the survey on ad ratings and emotional responses in order not to force research participants into pondering over the task too much. They were told to rate as they feel, which was facilitated by the visual form of the self-report because it is claimed to be undiluted by rationalisation and less biased than verbal self-reports (Stwora & Zemełka, 2020).

The use of the Likert-type scale aimed at indicating the amusement value of the ads, capturing the intensity of opinion in research participants, and checking their reactions to the ads presented. When it comes to ad appreciation, they were requested to rate each ad on an evaluation sheet that consisted of a scale from 1 to 3, with 1 standing for low liking, 2 for neutral responses, and 3 for high liking. As regards the appreciation of humour value, research participants were asked to rate each ad on a scale that ranged from very favourable, positive, and ambivalent, to negative attitude; these were represented by the responses (4) very funny, (3) funny, (2) neutral, and (1) not funny, respectively. Again, it should be stressed that this double-step evaluation procedure is to assure accurate responses because ad liking in terms of perceived levels of ad creativity and the way the message *per se* was transmitted (ad appreciation) differs from the appreciation of humour value (the opinion concerning the actual input and effect of humour). The audience may appreciate the form, the hue and intensity of colour or the message behind an ad, for instance, and still find the message not funny.

The reason behind designing these scales in a different way (i.e., using a three-point scale for ad appreciation and a four-point scale for the appre-

ciation of humour value) was to make the informants aware that they were supposed to evaluate two different things. What is more, as regards ad liking, the goal was to apply a rapid and simple assessment technique that would show a very general direction of the informants' attitudes; that is because the central aim was to focus on humorousness ratings. As clarified by DeCastellarnau in her article on the characteristics of response scale, "while a two-point scale allows only the assessment of the direction of the attitude, a three-point scale with a midpoint allows the assessment of both the direction and the neutrality, and even more categories allow the assessment of its intensity or extremity" (2018).

Also, based on Alwin (2007), DeCastellarnau says that "the optimal of points in a scale should be considered in relation to the scales' polarity, and [...] that the use of 4-point scales improved the reliability in unipolar scales, while 2, 3, and 5-point scales improved the reliability in bipolar scales" (DeCastellarnau, 2018). Since unipolar scales are designed to make the respondents "think of the presence or absence of a quality" (Talikoti, 2019), I decided to use a four-point scale for funniness ratings. And because bipolar scales are used to balance two different qualities which are polar opposites (Talikoti, 2019) (here: liking and disliking), I opted for a three-point scale for ad liking. A lower number of points on this scale was chosen because "too many categories may reduce the clarity of the meaning of the options and limit the capacity of respondents to make clear distinctions between them (Krosnick & Fabrigar, 1997)" (DeCastellarnau, 2018). I was of the opinion that the choice between liking the ad and liking it a bit could probably confuse research participants, for liking it a bit could mean disliking it a bit as well. Besides, the aim of this scale was to check the general direction (or neutrality) of the informants' attitudes and the main goal was to focus on funniness and more exact measures of their emotional responses.

Ad appreciation (liking) and appreciation of humour value (perceived funniness) were measured on the basis of the number of answers provided by research participants. The ads scored high if positive responses significantly outnumbered the negative ones; if the trend was reversed, the ads scored low in liking and/or perceived humorousness, depending on the variable tested. Whenever mixed results are mentioned, it means that the numbers of positive and negative responses are very similar.

More exact measures of the informants' emotional responses were detected thanks to the application of the already introduced SAM assessment technique that relies on a simple, user-friendly visual self-

report (see Appendix 2), which, in turn, is based upon a combination of three independent dimensions; these include the Pleasure, Arousal, and Dominance variables that, together, create the PAD dimensional space (see Table 3, p. 191) used in order to establish the actual attitudes of research participants towards the material they are presented with (cf. Mehrabian & Russel, 1974; Picard, 1997; Hoffmann et al., 2012).

The pleasure–displeasure scale shows five faces (or emoticons) that range from very happy to sad. Research participants were asked to rate each ad in terms of its enjoyableness and, thus, to indicate whether their feelings towards the ad were positive or negative. Next is the arousal–non-arousal scale that is supposed to demonstrate the intensity of emotion and mental activity connected with ad’s processing. It shows a series of images that differ in terms of smile width, the number of exclamation marks, and the “explosiveness” of the ad, so to speak. While the option representing the most stimulating ad was depicted as an explosion (or an explosive-like burst) accompanied by three exclamation marks and a wide smile, the most boring one was shown as a sleepy face and a single dot symbolising extinguished involvement. The arousal dimension is therefore to establish whether the ad is exciting or boring and whether the perceiver feels involved and stimulated or rather bored and unimpressed. Finally, the dominance–submissiveness scale is intended to measure whether the ad is strong and persuasive (i.e., powerful) or weak and not interesting at all. The visual self-report applies the image of a cartoon-like man and of the ad that is depicted as a box of various sizes; the ad is bigger than the man for the first two options (“very powerful” and “quite powerful”), of equal size when the ad is rated as moderately powerful (“so-so”), and smaller than the individual for the responses “weak” and “very weak,” hence making it easier to determine if the stimulus is perceived as overwhelming and appealing or not (Stwora & Zemełka, 2020). The values were assigned on the basis of whether the mean value was closer to the positive or the negative pole on the pleasure–displeasure, arousal–non-arousal, and dominance–submissiveness scales.

Specific emotional states of research participants are represented as points in this three-dimensional space, thus making it possible to capture their emotional reactions to ads more accurately. In accordance with the PAD octants suggested by Picard (1997) (see Table 3, p. 191), if a given ad is to be viewed as humorous, the pleasure variable should score highly (+P), preferably along with one more variable as well, in order to assure greater strength of the message. The desired results are therefore obtained

if the pattern is +P+A+D, which testifies to exuberance in the audience, as they are supposed to feel cheerful and excited about the ad, as well as to have the impression that the ad is very strong as far as its impact is concerned. As follows from Table 7 in the section below, several ads were labelled as belonging to the strange-looking pattern +P+A±D, which is due to the fact that dominance ratings showed considerably greater variance, making it impossible to classify the said variable as either +D or -D; that is why these ads were said to point to exuberant emotion or dependence that stems from the fact that ad's dominance is actually controlled by other variables.

As regards the exact procedure applied in the evaluation of the ads and the way in which the scales were added, it was necessary to look at the results obtained from three scales. The ads were then divided into several categories, namely into (a) the ads of outstanding performance (which, for the sake of clarity, were further subdivided into the “green” and “blue” subcategories), (b) the ads of good performance, (c) the ads of satisfactory performance, (d) the ads of rather poor performance, (e) the ads of poor performance, and (f) the ads of very poor performance.

Specific characteristics of each subgroup are provided below:

- a) the ads of outstanding performance:
 - the “green” category: produced the greatest liking, funniness, and exuberance;
 - the “blue” category: produced very positive results in terms of ad liking and emotional responses (exuberance) coupled with mixed results in terms of funniness (which means that, in spite of the prevalence of the responses (4) very funny and (3) funny, neutral responses turned out to be numerous as well); parenthetically, it should be added that a considerable number of neutral responses does not disconfirm humorousness itself, but rather points out to increased standard deviations for the ads belonging to the “blue” category;
- b) the ads of good performance: instigated high ad liking, resulted in exuberance, and were rated as very funny or funny;
- c) the ads of satisfactory performance: produced good results when it comes to ad liking and attitudes towards them; they also succeeded in provoking positive emotions in research participants, resulting in exuberance and exuberant/dependent emotions; these ads could not be assigned to the category of the ads of

- good performance because of the high number of negative ratings they received;
- d) the ads of rather poor performance: managed to result in exuberance or dependence (+P+A±D) despite mixed liking coupled with mixed funniness ratings;
 - e) the ads of poor performance: did not elicit positive emotions from the informants but produced mixed results for both liking and funniness;
 - f) the ads of very poor performance: displayed such qualities as the prevalence of not funny and neutral responses, low liking, and intense boringness.

To facilitate data presentation, I decided to colour-code the table in grey whenever the results for any variable were poor. The ads of outstanding performance were colour-coded in green and blue in order for them to stand out from the table.

5.7.1 Results for the Sample in English

The results of the survey on ad ratings and emotional responses for the sample in English are provided in the table below, with the results for liking and funniness presented descriptively and the PAD dimensions expressed in percentage values (for mean scores and standard deviations in liking and funniness evaluation, see Table 8 at the end of this section).

As results from Table 7, 14 ads from the set in English performed very well, well or at least satisfactorily but, surprisingly, six advertisements performed poorly in the survey conducted. Using percentage values, 70% of the ads investigated succeeded in their being rated as humorous, whereas 30% of them failed to entertain the audience in the manner intended. Four out of six failed ads received mixed results in terms of ad liking and funniness evaluation (half of them scoring +P+A±D (which stands for exuberant or dependent) and thus not being entirely unsuccessful), while two ads caused strong dislike on the part of the informants. Nonetheless, such results should allow to see the differences between the successful and unsuccessful humorous metaphorical ads more clearly. The overall composition of the sample in English is shown in Figure 3.

It seems suitable to start with the ads of outstanding performance, marked in green and blue in Table 7; the former produced the greatest liking and exuberance, and were rated as very funny and funny (Ad E-11, Ad E-16, and Ad E-18), whereas the latter yielded very positive results in

terms of ad liking and emotional responses (exuberance) but were also characterised by mixed results as regards funniness because, despite the prevalence of the responses (4) very funny and (3) funny, neutral responses turned out to be numerous as well.

All the ads belonging to the “green” category of the most successful ones were examples of funny metaphors that made use of both multimodal humour and multimodal metaphor. In spite of the fact that they were based on different meaning operations, they shared common visual structure, that is, the figure of juxtaposition. Ad E-11 relied on surprise humour and sex-related script opposition, Ad E-16 on a satirical portrayal of the competitor thanks to disparaging humour (as the ad shows a blue Pepsi can wearing a red cape with the logo of Coca-Cola; the Pepsi’s logo is located in the lower right corner and the slogan reads: “We wish you a scary Halloween!”), and Ad E-18 on a multitude of script oppositions and on a parody related to the *Star Wars* saga. What can be concluded on the basis of these examples is that each of them was founded upon a strong perceptual mismatch, as the concepts involved were rather non-prototypical in their nature (e.g., promoting a city with sex in Ad E-11, dressing up as a competitor to have a great Halloween costume in Ad E-16 or making an old, black compact cassette stand for Darth Vader in E-18).

These ads were predominantly based on what Chen and Jiang (2018) label as the fuzzy inter-categorical boundary (present in, for instance, Ad E-11 for #vilniusgspot and Ad E-18 for KissFM) that makes use of inter-category contrasts (here, between sex and city promotion, as well as between a radio station and *Star Wars*, respectively). In the case of Ad E-16, on the other hand, it is possible to detect humour founded upon prototypicality and non-prototypicality of category members, for Coca-Cola certainly bears a resemblance to Pepsi which, in the context of the ad, constitutes the prototype, yet belongs to another category than Coke does since they are competing brands (cf. Chen & Jiang, 2018).

Staying with the ads of outstanding performance, it followed from the responses that two ads (Ad E-8 and Ad E-20) could be assigned to the “blue” category that is characterised by great liking, positive emotional responses (i.e., exuberance), and a roughly equal number of very funny/funny and neutral responses, with the positive ones being slightly prevalent, though. The said ads were classified as the instances of funny metaphors, made use of the operation of opposition, and employed both multimodal metaphor and multimodal humour.

Advertisement	Liking	Funniness	P [%]	A [%]	D [%]	Emotion
Ad E-1 Vitakraft	high	funny	:D 38 ☺ 45 ☹ 11 :/ 1 ⊗ 5	great 17 high 32 quite high 37 neutral 8 low 6	v. powerful 11 quite powerful 38 so-so 38 weak 8 v. weak 5	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-2 Audi	high	neutral	:D 19 ☺ 44 ☹ 25 :/ 7 ⊗ 5	great 18 high 24 quite high 31 neutral 18 low 9	v. powerful 14 quite powerful 32 so-so 31 weak 14 v. weak 9	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-3 Pedigree	high	funny neutral	:D 29 ☺ 37 ☹ 19 :/ 8 ⊗ 7	great 11 high 21 quite high 35 neutral 17 low 16	v. powerful 14 quite powerful 30 so-so 30 weak 14 v. weak 12	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-4 McDonald's	high	funny very funny	:D 33 ☺ 32 ☹ 17 :/ 10 ⊗ 8	great 19 high 25 quite high 29 neutral 11 low 16	v. powerful 16 quite powerful 29 so-so 28 weak 13 v. weak 14	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-5 Hepachofa Hepat Digestive Pills	high	funny very funny neutral	:D 16 ☺ 44 ☹ 29 :/ 6 ⊗ 5	great 10 high 22 quite high 37 neutral 21 low 10	v. powerful 9 quite powerful 30 so-so 34 weak 16 v. weak 11	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad E-6 Styx	high	very funny funny	:D 34 ☺ 34 ☹ 18 :/ 5 ⊗ 9	great 23 high 22 quite high 31 neutral 9 low 15	v. powerful 19 quite powerful 33 so-so 21 weak 13 v. weak 14	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-7 3M	high	mixed results	:D 30 ☺ 25 ☹ 21 :/ 12 ⊗ 12	great 17 high 22 quite high 23 neutral 19 low 19	v. powerful 19 quite powerful 24 so-so 22 weak 17 v. weak 18	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-8 Whiskas	high (great liking)	mixed results	:D 30 ☺ 45 ☹ 17 :/ 4 ⊗ 4	great 17 high 27 quite high 32 neutral 14 low 10	v. powerful 17 quite powerful 28 so-so 39 weak 11 v. weak 5	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-9 Airwick	high	neutral	:D 14 ☺ 45 ☹ 33 :/ 6 ⊗ 2	great 14 high 19 quite high 37 neutral 21 low 9	v. powerful 14 quite powerful 25 so-so 37 weak 14 v. weak 10	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad E-10 Pedigree	high	very funny funny	:D 32 ☺ 38 ☹ 23 :/ 6 ⊗ 1	great 22 high 26 quite high 25 neutral 19 low 8	v. powerful 17 quite powerful 34 so-so 28 weak 16 v. weak 5	+P+A+D exuberant

Ad E-11 #vilniusgspot	high (great liking)	very funny funny	:D 34 ☺ 29 ☹ 19 :/ 12 ☹ 6	great 22 high 29 quite high 18 neutral 13 low 18	v. powerful 24 quite powerful 34 so-so 22 weak 9 v. weak 11	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-12 Lifebuoy Hand Wash	mixed results	mixed results	:D 24 ☺ 32 ☹ 22 :/ 13 ☹ 9	great 16 high 25 quite high 21 neutral 21 low 17	v. powerful 17 quite powerful 19 so-so 29 weak 18 v. weak 17	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad E-13 Via Uno Shoes	low	not funny neutral	:D 12 ☺ 17 ☹ 38 :/ 23 ☹ 10	great 11 high 11 quite high 18 neutral 28 low 32	v. powerful 11 quite powerful 10 so-so 24 weak 27 v. weak 28	-P-A-D bored
Ad E-14 BMW Used Cars	mixed results	mixed results	:D 20 ☺ 25 ☹ 23 :/ 11 ☹ 21	great 14 high 20 quite high 22 neutral 12 low 32	v. powerful 19 quite powerful 24 so-so 20 weak 12 v. weak 25	-P+A+D hostile
Ad E-15 Bauker	low	neutral not funny	:D 10 ☺ 17 ☹ 41 :/ 15 ☹ 17	great 4 high 8 quite high 22 neutral 30 low 36	v. powerful 3 quite powerful 9 so-so 27 weak 34 v. weak 27	-P-A-D bored
Ad E-16 Pepsi	high (great liking)	very funny funny	:D 45 ☺ 37 ☹ 15 :/ 1 ☹ 2	great 31 high 32 quite high 28 neutral 6 low 3	v. powerful 34 quite powerful 30 so-so 27 weak 6 v. weak 3	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-17 Volkswa- gen Genuine Parts	mixed results	mixed re- sults	:D 12 ☺ 35 ☹ 27 :/ 11 ☹ 15	great 9 high 16 quite high 32 neutral 21 low 22	v. powerful 7 quite powerful 21 so-so 34 weak 23 v. weak 15	-P+A-D anxious
Ad E-18 KissFM	high (great liking)	very funny funny	:D 27 ☺ 52 ☹ 18 :/ 2 ☹ 1	great 15 high 30 quite high 39 neutral 10 low 6	v. powerful 16 quite powerful 39 so-so 24 weak 13 v. weak 8	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad E-19 Vileda	mixed results	neutral	:D 15 ☺ 41 ☹ 33 :/ 5 ☹ 5	great 8 high 20 quite high 37 neutral 25 low 10	v. powerful 7 quite powerful 28 so-so 35 weak 19 v. weak 11	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad E-20 SanDisk	high (great liking)	mixed re- sults	:D 21 ☺ 40 ☹ 30 :/ 5 ☹ 4	great 13 high 25 quite high 30 neutral 19 low 13	v. powerful 15 quite powerful 29 so-so 31 weak 10 v. weak 15	+P+A+D exuberant

TABLE 7. The Results of the Survey on Ad Ratings and Emotional Responses for the Sample in English

English Sample [%]




FIGURE 3. The Overall Composition of the Sample in English

For instance, the findings from Ad E-8 for Whiskas clearly relate to family resemblance shared by members of a category since the illustrative element alludes to a scene from the African steppe in which a large cat is replaced by a little kitten. Apart from the figure of replacement, comparison for opposition is present, for a kitten is obviously no cheetah. Nonetheless, upon seeing such an anomalous visual arrangement, the audience accesses its mental storage in search for the prototypical combinations of the items depicted in order to arrive at the metaphorical interpretation intended, that is, A CAT IS A CHEETAH OR A CAT IS A PREDATOR. Referring to the article by Chen and Jiang who happened to have studied a similar case, when resemblance or lack thereof is highlighted, humour is produced as a result of ensuing incongruity. In the case under consideration, the cat and cheetah “are both members of the cat category and they share some common traits. However, there remain significant differences between them” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 77) and, as the perceiver cannot help but think of the incompatible elements encountered, incongruity cannot be fully resolved, which brings about a humorous effect.

The other example in this group, Ad E-20, shows a simplified, cartoon-like image of fat Elvis Presley and contrasts it with an image of a small and tight garment on the right, which is supposed to stand for stage clothes. We can also see a little flash disk by SanDisk below. Therefore, in order to find

a relevant link between the elements of the ad, the perceiver needs to find a common denominator they share. Upon consideration, it turns out that the feature of Elvis that gains salience in the context of the ad is his growing fat with age. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that the message behind the ad is that a small garment can fit fat Elvis and that a little flash disk can store substantial amounts of data. Thus, the metaphor alluded to is: THE AMOUNT OF DATA IS WEIGHT and THE FLASH DISK IS A GARMENT. The humorous comes into play since it is not a common practice to prototypically think of Elvis in terms of his weight, let alone use such a figure to talk about a flash disk so a comic oscillation between two completely different frames of reference (Krikmann, 2009) is unavoidable. That is why liking for the ad was so great and sheer exuberance produced by the ad was reflected in the participants' attitudes.

The aforementioned ads were distinguishable from others thanks to outstanding liking (provoking approximately 70% of positive responses in terms of ad liking) but the ones to be mentioned in the lines to follow performed well too since they instigated high liking, produced exuberance, and were rated as very funny or funny. These were Ad E-1, Ad E-4, Ad E-6, and Ad E-10, almost all of which featured animals (save for Ad E-6), yet only one of them used the mechanism of metaphor with a funny referent (Ad E-4). However, as it will surface later on, animals in advertising guarantee neither increased funniness nor higher liking, as could be hypothesised. It may also be useful to note that the figure of fusion was the most often used type of visual structure in the ads listed above. The results revealed that the ads of good performance clearly depart from the usual, prototypical combinations of the objects that are merged together thanks to fusion (for a short description of Ad E-4 that applies juxtaposition see section 5.6.2). All of them were confirmed to have violated the informants' expectations, thus resulting in humour.

In Ad E-1 and Ad E-10, humour based on prototypicality/non-prototypicality of category members can be identified because the dogs presented in these advertisements are subject to both inter- and intra-category contrast. The former rests on cross-categorial contrast (i.e., the dog versus sweets in Ad E-1 and the dog versus a flower in Ad E-10) and the latter on the relation between the prototypical and the peripheral within the category of sweet, pink, and fluffy objects (Ad E-1) and within the one of smell (malodorous dog's breath and sweet-scented flower in Ad E-10). With regard to Ad E-4 and Ad E-6, it can be said that they were based on the principle of vague inter-categorial boundaries (Chen & Jiang, 2018), according to which the

elements taking part in an incongruous pairing are perceived as fitting into two adjoining categories; for example, Ad E-4 for McDonald's makes use of the fact that milk is associated both with McDonald's milkshake and with a cow, whereas the idea of shaking is shared by both milkshake and the trampoline shown in the picture.

The results indicate that there were five ads of satisfactory performance in the sample in English (they constituted 25% of the sample studied); research participants exhibited positive attitudes towards these ads, which translates into relatively high liking and positive emotions (exuberance and exuberant/dependent attitude). For Ad E-3, Ad E-5, and Ad E-7, funniness ratings yielded mixed results since the sum of responses (4) very funny and (3) funny was close to the sum of responses (2) neutral and (1) not funny. It therefore seems important to note that, although they were not dominating, negative ratings were also numerous for these examples. In a similar vein, research participants seemed to have a liking for the ads Ad E-2 and Ad E-9 but findings showed that these were most often rated as neutral despite exuberant and exuberant/dependent attitudes adopted by the informants. Although this point will be elaborated on in the section devoted to ad comprehension, it may be useful to signal that metaphors in these ads were understood by research participants but they were not impressed and amused enough to rate them higher.

The lion's share of the ads of satisfactory performance employed humour based on prototypicality/non-prototypicality of category members; yet it appears that the features that formed the basis for script opposition were not entirely straightforward to research participants, which means that resolving the incongruities took them more cognitive effort. In other words, the features that gained salience in the context of these ads may have been less foremost on their minds (Giora, 2003) and thus less accessible because, apparently, "the path to understanding" the meaning relations used was too long. Another plausible yet conjectural explanation could be that various levels of saliency offer meaning alternatives that differ along the dimensions of both relevance and attractiveness.

Taking Ad E-7 for 3M lint roller as an example, the product was depicted so as to show that it works so well that it makes the whole cat stick to it, allowing every single hair to be removed. Although the function of the product is portrayed in a typical manner, its strength and efficiency are clearly blown out of proportion for humorous purposes, hence making use of the non-prototypical effect presented and of the possible/impossible SO. Nevertheless, it seems that the attractiveness of such a portrayal was

limited as compared to the cow on a trampoline, for instance. While there is a fair bit of assumption underlying such a statement, it could be surmised that the hierarchy of prototypicality was not that well established. Put differently, the distance between the prototypical and non-prototypical was not vast enough for the frames of reference to greatly surprise the perceiver. Accordingly, in Ad E-7, the perceiver deals with a metonymical relation (the whole for one of its parts, i.e., the animal for cat hairs on the lint roller) in a typical situation associated with product usage so, to cut a long story short, such a portrayal is not really surprising since there is no actual collision between disparate associative contexts (Krikmann, 2006).

The same holds for Ad E-2, because eyes glowing in the dark are something you may actually expect in a dark forest; likewise, a playful dog presented in Ad E-3 is not unexpected a picture either. The situation becomes more complicated considering other ads of satisfactory performance, namely Ad E-5 (described in detail in section 5.6.3) and Ad E-9, for which the levels of unexpectedness expressed in prototypicality relations are not that low. After all, it is by no means typical to make use of the theme of conflict between countries to advertise a medication for indigestion, nor is it normal to associate a scent with a laser beam. Albeit humorous and creative, these two ads were characterised by considerable conceptual complexity which may have rendered them a little bit more demanding. It appears that the density of multimodal cues in the said ads was such that the effort expended by the informants on decoding them was greater than on the ads mentioned above.

More cognitive effort may have resulted in less spontaneous a reaction towards the material, which translated into a relatively high number of neutral responses in funniness ratings despite the fact that, after all, neutral attitudes were not confirmed as far as the PAD dimensional scale is concerned, as these ads were rated as exuberant and/or dependent. Taking the aforementioned into account, it could be hypothesised that simpler compositions are easier to process and, thus, may potentially lead to better humorous results; even “minimalist advertisements, if wittily devised, are ideal candidates to trigger conceptual operations in multiple directions” (Pérez-Sobrino, 2017, p. 105), whereas too much complexity can apparently prove more demanding and, thus, more problematic.

Moving on to the collection of ads that were not very successful, I decided to divide them into three subcategories, namely into the ads of rather poor, poor, and very poor performance. The first one comprised two ads, Ad E-12 and Ad E-19, that had mixed liking and mixed funniness

ratings but managed to result in +P+A±D on the PAD dimensional scale, thus leading to exuberance or dependence, which means that their emotional performance, so to speak, was not that bad. Ad E-12 (already described in 4.6.2) provoked divergent opinions in research participants, for the dog in the ad is squeezed and hence distorted to such an extent that 25% of the respondents were unsure whether they liked the ad, 25% declared dislike for the ad, whereas 50% said they liked it. Abnormal imagery is therefore what could have spoiled the ad in the eyes of the informants. Even though humour rests on the possible/impossible SO, for we obviously cannot squeeze a dog in such a ridiculous way, and in spite of the fact that the said portrayal represents a radical departure from prototypicality relations, which should assure considerable funniness, the ad was not very successful. This is clearly a speculative explanation but such a finding can be accounted for by the use of slapstick humour, whose aggressive dimension could, in all likelihood, preclude high liking.

This, however, does not explain the case of Ad E-19 whose ratings were very similar to the ad discussed above; it is correct to say that the visual layer was a little bit distorted too but it was owing to the use of the figure of fusion that was supposed to point out to comparison for similarity. Neglecting its reception, the ad contained an interesting metaphor: A CAT IS A BOMB and, consequently, CAT'S HAIRS ARE FLYING SHRAPNEL. The image connotes the idea of explosion and hence of fragments of a bomb that are thrown out in the process so, in line with the workings of cross-domain mapping, these patterns or, more specifically, image-schemas are mapped from the domain of the bomb onto the one of the cat; this, in turn, produces the interpretation that cat's hairs everywhere equals shrapnel everywhere and, therefore, that the owner's clothes and flat are damaged by shrapnel from the fur explosion. All in all, given the brand's logo, the perceiver can easily find out that the message is that Vileda is to remedy the situation thanks to a wide range of household and cleaning products it offers. Having discussed the aforementioned advertisements, it seems fair to conclude that it was the application of metaphors with funny referents that was responsible for the positive attitudes towards the ads despite mixed liking and funniness ratings. The power of metaphors with funny referents finds corroboration in the results for the whole sample in English, except for Ad E-17 to be mentioned in the lines to follow.

In the case of both Ad E-12 and Ad E-19, the humorous comes into play thanks to the fuzzy inter-categorical boundary between a dog and a loaf of bread, as well as between a cat and a bomb, respectively. While the former

is founded upon the common inter-category of bacteria (touching bacteria versus eating bacteria), the latter rests on the common idea of small fragments of a bigger whole scattered over an area and causing damage (cat hairs spread randomly throughout an apartment versus shrapnel thrown out in all directions by a bomb). Yet the use of visual distortion was probably the factor that was not appreciated by research participants.

As regards the ads that fell short of the mark, Ad E-14 and Ad E-17 should definitely be classified as the ads of poor performance that, besides mixed results for both liking and funniness, failed to elicit positive emotions from research participants. By way of illustration, Ad E-14 for BMW used cars is strongly sexualised a message that aroused hostility in the informants, probably due to the fact that such humour reinforces and perpetuates stereotypes, though it was not overly aggressive, to my mind. The said ad was founded upon the metaphor A CAR IS A WOMAN; what is more, this example allows for yet another interpretation, namely that A USED CAR IS A LOVER WHO HAD OTHER PARTNERS. It therefore made use of humour founded upon the unclear inter-categorical boundary between used cars and women who had previous sexual partners. Previous owners can be seen as previous sexual partners but, despite that knowledge, the present owner is not bothered by the fact as long as the car is his. Referring to the PAD scale, “anger [...] is characterized by low pleasure, high arousal, and high dominance” (Stewart, Morris, & Grover, 2007, p. 128), which was the case for the ad discussed; it could be said that the informants’ hostility towards the ad was caused by the preponderance of females in the study but, interestingly enough, neutral and not funny responses prevailed in the majority of male participants as well.

Ad E-17, on the other hand, was characterised by low pleasure, high arousal, and low dominance that indicate the experience of fear or anxiety in the informants (Stewart, Morris, & Grover, 2007, p. 128). This anxious attitude was a surprise, for the ad complied with all the requirements for humour elicitation; its detailed description is included in Appendix 1 but let it be said here that, in order to understand it, the receiver first needs to find relevant features that link the concept of a bizarre and obnoxious dog with the one of non-genuine car parts. The interpretation that is likely to come to the perceiver’s mind is that he/she should look for a comparison for similarity suggesting that both the dog depicted and non-genuine parts are somehow faulty.

Besides, implied is a comparison for opposition that enables the perceiver to understand that Volkswagen’s parts are not like non-genuine

parts. The figure of replacement that takes place in the ad is very important because it suggests there is some link between the domains involved. To begin with, the image present (the dog) refers the audience to the one that is absent in the ad (the parts manufactured by Volkswagen) and, apart from this, an exemplary dog is replaced by the least typical one whose attributes deviate from what is considered prototypical or even normal, as the mechanism of humour based on prototypicality/non-prototypicality of category members was at work. Although such a statement is directly related to comprehension, it seems worth explaining at this point that this ad was apparently too vague because many research participants said they failed to understand it. The image present in the ad referred the audience to the one that was absent; yet the absence of the latter was not conspicuous owing to the fact that the pairing was so unusual. Many respondents had problems with the identification of SOs, which was why they found it difficult to trace the basis on which the incongruity was constructed. Nonetheless, the very depiction of the dog turned out to be bizarre and disturbing to the point that research participants felt ad-related anxiousness and unease about the picture, even though in my view the ad was hilarious, which, in fact, highlights the massive impact of the audience factor on ads' reception.

Lastly, the ads of very poor performance should also be examined—those characterised by low liking, the prevalence of (1) not funny and (2) neutral responses in terms of funniness ratings, and, to make things worse, by intense boringness. Such extreme examples were not numerous; nevertheless, they constituted 10% of the sample in question. The first one is Ad E-13 for Via Uno Shoes (again, already referred to in 4.6.5) that, thanks to the figure of replacement, plays with the metaphor *HIGH HEELS ARE UNDERWEAR* or, referring to female body, *HEELS ARE BUTTOCKS* and *ANKLES ARE WAIST*. Humour was supposed to have resulted from fuzzy inter-categorical boundaries; the category of female body was suggested explicitly but the audience was fooled as to what it was looking at because of the visual layer that caused misunderstanding.

The way in which shoes are presented surely departs from the expectations of the audience because it is unlikely to associate them with underwear; this, in turn, points out to the absence/presence SO since what is expected based on the first impression turns out to be conspicuously absent and replaced by something else. Research participants, however, did not appreciate this ad at all; not only did they express themselves negatively in their evaluation of the advertisement (49% of the informants declared dislike for the ad and 45% said it was not funny), but also were bored

by Ad E-13. Owing to this marked reference to female body, it could be expected that male respondents were more likely to rate the ad as funny but, as it turned out, they were not that numerous in indicating that the ad was humorous. Also, it may be assumed that the very misunderstanding designed by the advertising agency responsible for this ad was too good. This is due to the fact that it succeeded not only in making the informants believe that they were looking at something else, but also in making them accept it as the ultimate message, with no humour intended, for they had problems seeing through the veil of the humorous. As the other script was apparently inaccessible, no comic oscillation between two disparate frames of reference (Krikmann, 2009) was possible.

Another advertisement that was a complete misfire was Ad E-15 for Bauker that applies the following metaphor: THE TABLE IS A BABY. The image present, that is, a little table, clearly points to the one that is absent in the ad, that is, a child, which testifies to the presence of the figure of replacement and comparison for similarity (“A is like B”), for the location of the table in the picture under consideration is such that it suggests outright personification. Given that nothing constitutes a better source domain than human beings themselves (Kövecses, 2010, p. 18), it seems surprising that research participants had low liking for the ad; 43% of the respondents declared dislike for the ad and 36% did not know what to think of it. The said ad was usually rated as (2) neutral (42%) or (1) not funny at all (37%) and the results obtained on the PAD scale indicate that the informants felt very bored.

In the case of both Ad E-13 and Ad E-15, the two domains seemed too distant for research participants to be amused although they did acknowledge the presence of the metaphorical. In other words, the ground of the metaphor (Richards, 1936/1965), that is, “the common area of meaning shared by the topic and the vehicle in the mind of the speaker” (Danesi, 2008, p. 97), was firm enough for them to notice the presence of metaphor but, at the same time, too feeble to find it funny. By way of a reminder, as already signalled in Chapter 4, it was posited by Oring that the incongruity found in the cross-domain mapping needs to be partial in order for it to engender humour and, simultaneously, that mere distance between the domains involved cannot be the main determinant of humorousness (cf. Oring, 2003). That is why Giora (1985, 1988, 1991), based on Ertel (1968) and Nerhardt (1976), as well as on her own theory of marked informativeness, opted for the prototype theory so as to bridge this gap in humour theory. She claimed that the stimulus that deviates from the prototypical to such an extent that it becomes cognitively inaccessible

cannot violate any previous expectations of the audience and hence cannot be perceived as humorous (Giora, 1991). I can therefore hypothesise that the inputs entering the blends in Ad E-13 and Ad E-15 were too disparate, that is, unavailable in terms of class inclusion, which is why the connection between them was too weak to generate humour successfully.

Ad E-15, for instance, rested on the principle of prototypicality/non-prototypicality of category members so as to produce humour but it lacked the expected evocativeness since the answers indicate that there was nothing even remotely amusing about the ad. It appears that the meanings intended by the advertiser were not very salient from the informants' perspective. Referring to the body of theory, which says that humour relies on different degrees "of centrality of the various elements of a script" (Attardo, Hempelmann, & Di Maio, 2002, p. 23), with the said centrality being associated with the idea of saliency, it can be inferred that the table was not salient enough to research participants as far as the idea of creation is concerned. This, in turn, resulted in failed humour that, in general terms, "can be explained by communicative gaps, at either the semantic or pragmatic levels" (Hale, 2018, p. 36). Also, it is only a speculation but, due to their young age, the idea of parenthood could have been rather an empty notion to the informants, which may serve as a partial explanation as to why the two concepts were too distant in terms of class inclusion and, consequently, as to why the informants were not amused by the ad. Thus, the apparent lack of fit between domains may have been the reason behind poor performance of the ad.

Summative results of the survey on ads in English gauging the degree of liking and humorousness are presented in Table 8 below that shows mean scores obtained for each ad in the sample, together with their standard deviation values. The former constitute "a measure of central tendency" (Mackey & Gass, 2005, p. 359), while the latter are "a measure of dispersion [...] that indicates how scores are spread around the mean" (Mackey & Gass, 2005, p. 366); in other words, standard deviation values are to illustrate the degree to which the informants' opinions differed from one another. It should be restated at this point that the ratings on ad liking were made on a 3-point scale ranging from (3) (that stood for high liking) to (1) (that corresponded to low liking), whereas funniness ratings ranged from (4) very funny to (1) not funny. In the table below, the M cells marked in green highlight the highest mean scores, whereas red colour was used to show the lowest mean scores. As regards standard deviations, relatively high values were marked in red to visualise results.

Ads in English	Liking		Funniness	
	M	SD	M	SD
Ad E-1	2,64	0,698	2,80	0,830
Ad E-2	2,45	0,790	2,16	0,875
Ad E-3	2,41	0,820	2,53	1,015
Ad E-4	2,39	0,850	2,71	1,058
Ad E-5	2,47	0,730	2,53	0,872
Ad E-6	2,51	0,748	2,81	1,019
Ad E-7	2,29	0,863	2,55	1,096
Ad E-8	2,67	0,585	2,71	0,869
Ad E-9	2,44	0,755	2,25	0,770
Ad E-10	2,50	0,721	2,61	0,926
Ad E-11	2,34	0,842	2,61	1,080
Ad E-12	2,26	0,831	2,47	1,085
Ad E-13	1,81	0,841	1,89	0,991
Ad E-14	2,05	0,888	2,22	1,158
Ad E-15	1,82	0,786	1,93	0,910
Ad E-16	2,77	0,561	3,01	0,905
Ad E-17	2,13	0,846	2,29	1,012
Ad E-18	2,63	0,651	3,26	0,440
Ad E-19	2,34	0,767	2,45	0,856
Ad E-20	2,49	0,712	2,57	0,937

TABLE 8. Mean Scores (M) and Standard Deviations (SDs) in Liking and Funniness Evaluation (Sample in English)

As results from the table, mean scores (M) in liking and funniness evaluation correspond to descriptive results provided in Table 7 at the beginning of this section. As expected, the lowest mean scores for both liking and funniness were observed for the ads Ad E-13, Ad E-14, and Ad E-15 that belong to the categories of ads of either poor or very poor performance; likewise, the mean score for liking obtained by Ad E-17 was very low (it was categorised as an ad of poor performance) and so was the mean score for funniness in the case of Ad E-2 that was previously classified as an ad that performed satisfactorily due to high liking and positive results as far as the PAD scale is concerned. It should come as no surprise that the highest mean scores for both liking and funniness

were obtained by the ads of outstanding performance, in particular by Ad E-16 and Ad E-18, as well as by one ad of good performance, that is, by Ad E-1.

Standard deviations (SDs) in liking evaluation were rather stable and low, which would suggest relative stability of the rating across research participants. Numerous high standard deviations in funniness evaluation, on the other hand, indicate that data values were dispersed over a wider range and, hence, that there were strong inter-individual differences between the informants as regards their ratings on the PAD scale. Yet it is important to bear in mind that the results for standard deviation are not “good” or “bad,” but rather they serve as an indicator of how the sample data was distributed. If the results obtained are highly individualised, as evidenced by high standard deviation, it seems advisable to search for more explanations as to divergent perceptions of funniness, that is, by means of additional interviews and/or open-ended questions. In such a way, the informants’ emotional states can be assessed more adequately, which will be done in the section 5.8 devoted to ad comprehension.

5.7.2 Results for the Sample in Polish

The results of the questionnaire concerning ad ratings and emotional responses for the sample in Polish, on the other hand, are presented in Table 9. Again, the results for liking and funniness are presented descriptively while the PAD dimensions are expressed in percentage values (for mean scores and standard deviations in liking and funniness evaluation, see Table 10 at the end of this section).

Table 9 shows that 13 ads (65% of the sample) received favourable feedback (three of which were of outstanding performance), while seven advertisements (35% of the sample) have failed as humorous ads. The first striking result of this study is that, as compared to the sample in English, in which the results for the ads that were not very successful were distributed evenly, the Polish sample performed proportionally worse due to the presence of five ads that were of very poor performance. Thus, while the number of ads that, on the whole, performed better or worse was not that different in the samples compared, the results for the sample in English were distributed more evenly.

The second remarkable observation is that, for the category of the ads of outstanding performance, the sample in Polish lacked any examples that could be included in the “blue” subcategory which translates not only into

high liking and positive emotional response (i.e., exuberance), but also into mixed results in terms of funniness due to more or less equal number of very funny/funny and neutral responses. What is more, no ads of good performance (i.e., showing high liking and positive emotional response (exuberance), and rated as very funny or funny) have been detected, which emphasises a major difference between the two samples compared. Figure 4 below addresses the overall composition of the sample in Polish, visually summarising the results obtained.

To begin with, 15% of all the items under consideration were classified as the ads of outstanding performance for which the frequency of positive attitudes was very high. Ad PL-2, Ad PL-14, and Ad PL-15 produced the greatest liking, evoked exuberant mood, and were predominantly rated as very funny and funny. These ads favoured multimodal humour and multimodal metaphor, relied on the operation of connection, and employed parody (in the case of Ad PL-14 and Ad PL-15) or irony (in Ad PL-2). Because of the fact that Ad PL-2 and its ironic dimension were already described in the section 5.6.6, I will limit myself to a quick mention of the two remaining ads of outstanding performance. Ad PL-14 advertises carps in a creative way by means of a slogan “Karpie diem” (literally “Carps the day”), which clearly refers to a famous Latin aphorism “Carpe diem,” usually translated as “seize the day.” Ad PL-15, too, is a parody and points out to a catchy song by Dawid Podsiadło.

Not only were these ads attractive due to their parodic and ironic overtones, but also thanks to the fact that the incongruity between the domains involved was such that it resulted in very high liking and exuberant mood on the part of the informants. In Ad PL-2 for Lubelska, the perceiver could not expect a mocking multimodal metaphor VODKAS ARE MONEY and, by extension, CHILDREN ARE VODKAS, as vodka is not likely to be associated with money, let alone with politics, social transfers, and their consequences. In a similar vein, we would not normally associate any fish with a Latin aphorism, as the two inputs stand in stark contrast to one another (by way of clarification, the mundane/philosophical SO is applied here). This collision between two different associative contexts results in humour, as the non-salient meanings intended by the senders of the aforementioned advertising messages were not expected by the audience. The same holds for Ad PL-15 in which the perceiver can see a clash between a set of hair straighteners that is advertised and the concept of waves or good vibes referred to through the slogan “Nie ma fal” [There are no waves] that is associated with the song by Dawid Podsiadło.

Advertisement	Liking	Funniness	P [%]	A [%]	D [%]	Emotion
Ad PL-1 Dziki Sad	high	mixed results	:D 18 ☺ 53 ☹ 24 :/ 4 ⊗ 1	great 7 high 19 quite high 44 neutral 23 low 7	v. powerful 6 quite powerful 31 so-so 44 weak 13 v. weak 6	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad PL-2 Lubelska	high (great liking)	very funny	:D 43 ☺ 32 ☹ 17 :/ 4 ⊗ 4	great 29 high 23 quite high 26 neutral 12 low 10	v. powerful 27 quite powerful 29 so-so 26 weak 11 v. weak 7	+P+A+D exuberant
Ad PL-3 Ariel	high (great liking)	funny	:D 21 ☺ 52 ☹ 23 :/ 3 ⊗ 1	great 14 high 26 quite high 40 neutral 13 low 7	v. powerful 14 quite powerful 32 so-so 36 weak 12 v. weak 6	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad PL-4 Gazeta Wyborcza	low (the ad was confusing)	neutral not funny	:D 4 ☺ 22 ☹ 51 :/ 17 ⊗ 6	great 3 high 8 quite high 28 neutral 34 low 27	v. powerful 2 quite powerful 12 so-so 36 weak 26 v. weak 24	-P-A-D bored
Ad PL-5 Tatra	high	neutral funny	:D 13 ☺ 48 ☹ 34 :/ 3 ⊗ 2	great 11 high 26 quite high 34 neutral 21 low 8	v. powerful 9 quite powerful 31 so-so 38 weak 11 v. weak 11	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad PL-6 Szyneczka	low (the ad was confusing)	not funny neutral	:D 7 ☺ 22 ☹ 36 :/ 20 ⊗ 15	great 3 high 8 quite high 25 neutral 29 low 35	v. powerful 4 quite powerful 7 so-so 33 weak 22 v. weak 34	-P-A-D bored
Ad PL-7 PZU	high	funny very funny	:D 21 ☺ 41 ☹ 28 :/ 5 ⊗ 5	great 11 high 18 quite high 38 neutral 21 low 12	v. powerful 9 quite powerful 30 so-so 37 weak 14 v. weak 10	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad PL-8 bet-at-home.com	mixed results	not funny	:D 14 ☺ 19 ☹ 35 :/ 17 ⊗ 15	great 10 high 12 quite high 26 neutral 24 low 28	v. powerful 11 quite powerful 16 so-so 28 weak 21 v. weak 24	-P±A-D bored or anxious
Ad PL-9 Motos	high	mixed results	:D 19 ☺ 37 ☹ 32 :/ 8 ⊗ 4	great 11 high 21 quite high 34 neutral 23 low 11	v. powerful 12 quite powerful 22 so-so 40 weak 15 v. weak 11	+P+A-D dependent
Ad PL-10 Lipton	high (great liking)	neutral	:D 18 ☺ 53 ☹ 23 :/ 4 ⊗ 2	great 11 high 25 quite high 44 neutral 12 low 8	v. powerful 8 quite powerful 43 so-so 36 weak 9 v. weak 4	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent

Ad PL-11 Żywiec	high	mixed results	:D 21 ☺ 51 ☹ 24 :/ 2 ⊗ 2	great 10 high 24 quite high 40 neutral 19 low 7	v. powerful 11 quite powerful 34 so-so 37 weak 14 v. weak 4	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad PL-12 Sylc	low (the ad was confusing)	not funny neutral	:D 4 ☺ 22 ☹ 50 :/ 16 ⊗ 8	great 2 high 9 quite high 25 neutral 40 low 24	v. powerful 2 quite powerful 15 so-so 33 weak 28 v. weak 22	-P-A-D bored
Ad PL-13 WAŚ	low	not funny	:D 6 ☺ 12 ☹ 30 :/ 27 ⊗ 25	great 4 high 6 quite high 18 neutral 26 low 46	v. powerful 6 quite powerful 7 so-so 23 weak 24 v. weak 40	-P-A-D bored
Ad PL-14 Lidl	high (great liking)	very funny funny	:D 45 ☺ 40 ☹ 8 :/ 4 ⊗ 3	great 27 high 27 quite high 32 neutral 8 low 6	v. powerful 25 quite powerful 35 so-so 28 weak 8 v. weak 4	+P+A±D exuberant
Ad PL-15 RTV Euro AGD	high (great liking)	very funny funny	:D 47 ☺ 34 ☹ 15 :/ 2 ⊗ 2	great 30 high 27 quite high 25 neutral 12 low 6	v. powerful 28 quite powerful 34 so-so 23 weak 9 v. weak 6	+P+A±D exuberant
Ad PL-16 Biedronka	high	neutral	:D 8 ☺ 45 ☹ 39 :/ 5 ⊗ 3	great 4 high 13 quite high 46 neutral 26 low 11	v. powerful 4 quite powerful 24 so-so 48 weak 15 v. weak 9	±P+A-D dependent or anxious
Ad PL-17 AXN	high	mixed results	:D 17 ☺ 45 ☹ 31 :/ 5 ⊗ 2	great 8 high 24 quite high 40 neutral 19 low 9	v. powerful 8 quite powerful 30 so-so 39 weak 14 v. weak 9	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad PL-18 Škoda	high (great liking)	funny	:D 12 ☺ 59 ☹ 22 :/ 4 ⊗ 3	great 8 high 24 quite high 41 neutral 17 low 10	v. powerful 9 quite powerful 33 so-so 41 weak 12 v. weak 5	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad PL-19 Krakus	high (great liking)	very funny funny	:D 29 ☺ 47 ☹ 19 :/ 2 ⊗ 3	great 15 high 31 quite high 32 neutral 16 low 6	v. powerful 12 quite powerful 37 so-so 37 weak 5 v. weak 9	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent
Ad PL-20 Ikea	high	very funny funny	:D 34 ☺ 30 ☹ 29 :/ 4 ⊗ 3	great 21 high 21 quite high 28 neutral 20 low 10	v. powerful 21 quite powerful 28 so-so 32 weak 12 v. weak 7	+P+A±D exuberant or dependent

TABLE 9. The Results of Survey on Ad Ratings and Emotional Responses for the Sample in Polish




FIGURE 4. The Overall Composition of the Sample in Polish

In the examples cited above, humour emerges because the inputs are too dissimilar for the incongruity to be fully resolved; some humorous tension still lingers between them, as the pairings are both unexpected and non-salient, that is, not the most frequent and not “foremost on one’s mind” (Giora, 2003, p. 15). This primacy is established upon four pillars: of conventionality, familiarity, frequency of use, and prototypicality (Giora, 2003) and funniness ratings obtained in this study show that Ad PL-2, Ad PL-14, and Ad PL-15 were the most successful in employing what is non-prototypical and unconventional. These ads were found to employ multimodal humour based on prototypicality and non-prototypicality of category members, in which “one of the modalities alludes to a category whose prototype/non-prototype is presupposed while another modality presents the opposite” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 76). In each of these ads, the inputs stood in stark intra-categorical contrast to one another; contrasting vodkas and children, a piece of fish and an aphorism, as well as a set of hair straighteners and a song, led to humorous incongruities that could not be fully resolved. The inputs were discrepant to such an extent that they easily violated the expectations the informants could have held about the elements entering the incongruous relations; as a result, the incongruities between what was expected and what was actually included in the advertising stimuli engendered humour.

The frequency and effectiveness of parody as a humorous device is reflected in other successful ads in the sample studied, for the vast majority of the ads of satisfactory performance used parody for humorous purposes. These advertising messages relied on humour founded upon prototypicality/non-prototypicality of category members and on fuzzy inter-categorical boundaries. It seems important to stress that the said category is the broadest one and holds the highest frequency of appearance in the sample in Polish, which is why it needed to be narrowed for the sake of clarity; thus, I decided to discuss the ads put into this category according to their distinctive sub-features. This, in turn, resulted in the emergence of three subgroups within the category of the ads of satisfactory performance, which will be mentioned briefly in the following paragraphs in order of appearance:

- (i) the ads that performed very well as regards ad liking and funniness but, when it comes to the results obtained on the PAD scale, resulted in exuberance (+P+A+D) and/or dependence (+P+A±D) on the part of research participants (Ad PL-3, Ad PL-7, Ad PL-18, Ad PL-19, and Ad PL-20);
- (ii) the ads that yielded very good results in terms of ad liking but were frequently rated as funny or neutral and produced dependent emotions (+P+A±D) in the informants (Ad PL-1, Ad PL-11, and Ad PL-17);
- (iii) the ads that scored quite high when it comes to ad liking, resulted in exuberant (+P+A+D) and/or dependent emotions (+P+A±D) but were mainly rated as neutral (Ad PL-5 and Ad PL-10).

First of all, I should enumerate the ads that scored highly in terms of ad liking and funniness but, as far as the PAD scale is concerned, resulted in exuberance and/or dependence on the part of the informants. These were: Ad PL-3, Ad PL-7, Ad PL-18, Ad PL-19, and Ad PL-20, with Ad PL-18 and Ad PL-20 employing superiority humour along with surprise humour (the aforementioned ads were already referred to in the sections 5.6.5 and 4.6.6 and thus will not be described here). Interestingly, as regards funniness ratings of Ad PL-18, the responses (4) very funny and (3) funny were only slightly more numerous than the neutral ones, which constituted as much as 40% of the responses gathered. In passing, it should also be noted that there were only two ads that could be categorised as metaphors with funny referents and these were Ad PL-17 (which uses a metaphor *KRAKUS' PICKLED CUCUMBER IS JOHN McCLANE*, described beforehand in 4.6.5)

and Ad PL-19 (that employs the image of a Stormtrooper from the *Star Wars* saga in order to parody pending elections and to advertise the AXN TV channel). Both advertisements were successful in eliciting humorous responses from research participants, which means that the referents had been chosen correctly by the advertising agencies.

Next were the ads Ad PL-1, Ad PL-11, and Ad PL-17 that yielded very good results in terms of ad liking but were usually rated as funny or neutral; the said ads followed the pattern +P+A±D, which translates into exuberant or dependent emotions since dominance ratings showed considerable variance. As an example, I can briefly mention Ad PL-11 for Żywiec that makes use of both multimodal humour and multimodal metaphor; the picture shows a neat row of beer glasses filled with golden beer and these glasses are standing on the railroad tracks so that they resemble railroad cars. The slogan reads “Złoty pociąg” [Golden train], which surely makes the audience think of a legendary gold train that was rumoured to be laden with treasures and was supposedly buried in a tunnel in Lower Silesia. Here, the resolution of the incongruity is based on the figure of juxtaposition, on the operation of connection, and on comparison for similarity, and it lies in family resemblance between the beer and gold treasures, as they are both golden. Hence, similarities are emphasised over differences, hence the humorous overtone may surface.

Unlike the previous triad of ads, Ad PL-5 and Ad PL-10 were predominantly rated as neutral in spite of the fact that they still met all the other requirements for the ads of satisfactory performance; both ads were designed to appeal with the visual layer, hence the presence of visual metaphor and visual humour. Ad PL-5, for example, shows a forest and a stream in the middle ground, as well as yellowish meadows and a snow-covered mountain range in the background. There is an opening in the row of trees that is formed so as to resemble a glass of beer thanks to its shape and colours from the background, which makes the audience think of such metaphors as BEER HEAD IS SNOW and BEER IS A MEADOW that, together, can be summarised as the TATRA BEER IS NATURE. Visually attractive as it is, the informants mostly viewed the ad as neutral (which, in fact, was not entirely confirmatory when the results from the PAD scale that suggest exuberance/dependence are considered).

Subsequently, one should discuss the ads that failed to instigate liking and thus performed rather poorly (Ad PL-9) or poorly (Ad PL-16). The boundary between the two subcategories may seem fuzzy but it was established because of major differences as regards the results obtained from

the PAD scale. Ad PL-9 was classified as an ad of rather poor performance since it aroused dependent emotions, produced relatively high liking, and, at the same time, yielded mixed results in terms of funniness (50% of the informants claimed that the ad was funny or very funny, whereas 34% of them rated it as neutral and 16% as not funny). I am aware of the fact that it was stated in the overview of the sample in English that the ads of poor performance were those resulting in mixed liking, mixed funniness, and exuberance. Notwithstanding, Ad PL-9 could not have been categorised as an ad of satisfactory performance owing to mixed funniness and lacking exuberance; it would also be unfair to classify it as an ad of poor performance given considerably high liking for the said ad. Thus, it was decided to include Ad PL-9 in the category of ads that performed rather poorly because, in spite of the fact that exuberance was missing, its lack in the PAD dimensional space can be compensated for by great liking.

It seems germane to say a few words concerning the ad itself; it applies multimodal metaphor and multimodal humour by means of the figure of replacement and comparison for similarity, as well as thanks to the actual/non-actual SO, respectively. The ad shows a neatly clad man sitting on a dinosaur which is equipped with a saddle and bridle. As the signature line suggests, it promotes Motos driving school, which leads to a metaphor A CAR IS A DINOSAUR OR, in more general terms, A CAR IS A WILD BEAST to be tamed by a person who is learning to drive. Given high liking, the form of the ad itself was considered creative and interesting by research participants; still, the image of a man who has just parked the dinosaur in the parking space was not amusing enough to engender humour successfully.

Humour was based on the fuzzy inter-categorical boundary between various means of transport—the dinosaur was the input that was present in the ad while the domain of the car was suggested by the metaphor that was drawn. In spite of the fact that the informants were able to find the right link between the inputs involved, some of them were of the opinion that the metaphor constructed was actually too far-fetched to be really amusing. This, in turn, can be accounted for by the fact that assigning the car and dinosaur to the same category of vehicles was not as intuitive to research participants as assumed by the advertising agency. The less salient features of the dinosaur related to the possibility of riding a beast as if it was a car were not directly accessible to the informants. The degrees of saliency varied, therefore, to the extent that the results for humour could only be mixed.

Ad PL-16, on the other hand, was the sole advertising message from the sample in Polish that fell into the category of ads of poor performance. Despite relatively high liking for the ad, the prevalence of positive responses could not fully compensate for the number of confused participants who did not know what to think of the ad (31% of the informants, to be exact). What is more, funniness ratings turned out to be mixed, for 60% of neutral responses were gathered. Yet, poor results as far as the PAD scale is concerned were a decisive factor here, as the ad elicited such emotional reactions as dependence or even anxiety, which was caused by the $\pm P$ variable. Such a surprising finding surely deserves deeper analysis. The ad under consideration shows a tomato sliced in half and filled with hot tomato soup; there is a hand holding a spoonful of soup above the tomato, as well as a small picture of three soups in the lower part of the ad. It turned out that the content was stimulating to some extent, as it was proven by the arousal variable, but the overall results from the PAD scale suggest that the two other variables did not fare very well. Mixed results for the pleasure variable and poor ratings for the one of dominance resulted in dependent emotions, which are likely to change depending on the context, mood of the perceiver, and other circumstances such as, for example, the strength of other variables.

When Mehrabian and Russel (1974) introduced the dominance variable, they stated that it was related to the feeling of control over the content the perceiver is presented with and to the extent to which he/she feels restricted in his/her response by the overwhelming or, conversely, the “underwhelming” character of the item rated. Ad PL-16 failed to be a positive source of potency, which, however, does not fully account for any anxious emotional responses that surfaced in connection with the ad. When asked to elaborate on their responses, several research participants claimed that the ad did not make a very positive impression on them due to the fact that it was too plain. They said that presenting a tomato soup in a tomato was not very amusing, probably owing to the absence of any marked difference between the two elements that could cause desired and sufficient oscillation between the scripts (in the said ad, the actual/non-actual SO is identified). Some informants, on the other hand, claimed that the tomato depicted in the ad looked artificial, as if it was made of plastic, which may serve as a partial explanation for their unease about the ad itself; nonetheless, I would like to stress that there is a fair bit of guesswork and assumption involved in such a statement.

Ad PL-16 was the sole instance of humour based on family resemblance in the whole set in Polish but the type of family resemblance proposed in the ad was not appealing to research participants whatsoever. The distinction between a tomato and a tomato soup was deliberately disregarded for the purpose of the ad because the two were fused into one item. In this context, it is possible that the mechanism of humour based on family resemblance failed because individual category members did not remain distinct entities, but rather were perceived as one and the same; after all, a tomato soup is a product made of tomatoes, which may have been the factor that precluded humorous oscillation between the frames of reference, as only one frame (“tomato frame”) was actually available.

Finally, one should focus on the ads of very poor performance that constituted 25% of the whole sample in Polish. These ads definitely fell short of the mark although they were based on both metaphors and script opposition, just as the rest of the ads in the sample in Polish discussed herein. It was noticed that there were two kinds of advertisements of very poor performance, namely those characterised by mixed results in terms of ad liking (Ad PL-4 and Ad PL-8) and those of very low liking (Ad PL-6, Ad PL-12, and Ad PL-13). The ads in both subsets were predominantly rated as neutral or not funny and led to boredom as far as emotional response is concerned. Apposite to the discussion on these advertisements is the observation made by, *inter alia*, Farber (2007) who claimed that a clear cognitive link needs to be established for the incongruity to emerge. In order to amuse the perceiver, the said link should be rooted in his/her perception of an incongruous pairing (that should contain some similarities and differences alike so that the preconceived beliefs as regards the inputs involved could be disconfirmed and result in amusement) (cf. Farber, 2007, pp. 69–71). If the link happens to be too weak to engender humour, the ad will fall short of the mark because of insufficient explanation for the elements being placed together in an ad for humorous purposes.

Such an insufficient explanation can be noticed in Ad PL-4 and Ad PL-8 whose misconceived content prevented the informants from seeing their humorous dimension and resulted in boredom, which surely was not the result intended by the advertising agencies responsible for these messages. The two ads turned out to be confusing for research participants and left them unsure what to think about them (Ad PL-4) or, at best, yielded mixed results in terms of liking (Ad PL-8). While the former relied on the possible/impossible and the big/small SOs, presenting the audience with a close-up of a network socket, in which we can see a lady selling news-

papers at the newsagents, the picture was not enough for the informants to see it as funny. Being brought up in the times in which the newsagents disappear, research participants are surely more used to the Internet as their main source of information about the world; still, the relationship between the network socket symbolising the Internet with all its invaluable resources and the newsagents was not convincing, let alone amusing to their minds. It was established that the informants were bored by the ad and, what is more, oftentimes had serious problems with understanding the metaphor too.

The other advertisements mentioned above, that is, Ad PL-8, featured a link between football and an unfertilised egg before conception, as it shows spermatozoa swimming towards a football; it therefore suggests a metaphor FOOTBALL IS LIFE, which, nevertheless, was not successful in producing humour at all. The impression the informants received was one of boredom and/or anxiety, which was due to mixed results for the arousal variable matched with poor results in terms of pleasure and dominance variables. It could be speculated that such results may be accounted for by the fact that the prevalently female audience was faced with a strongly masculine ad but that was not the case. The results obtained from the female audience did not substantially differ from those supplied by male informants taking part in the study, which suggests that gender was not the factor responsible for negative attitudes towards the ad.

Rather, in my view, this shows that the concepts of football and life were too distant to produce humour effectively. In other words, they could not be perceived as belonging to one, common category of experience and this lack of similarity was probably what ruined humour in the ad. Also, there was very little place for any incorrect categorisation to take place and this lack of any easily perceptible incongruity prevented humour from emerging. This finds corroboration in the opinions provided by the informants once the study was over, for many of them claimed that there was no humorous connection between the two concepts involved. They said that the metaphor was easy to read and they had nothing against it but they did not feel any positive emotions towards this advertising message.

The three final ads to be discussed here, namely Ad PL-6, Ad PL-12, and Ad PL-13, turned out to be abject failures since they were characterised by very low liking, were not considered humorous at all by research participants, and led to sheer boredom, as follows from the results obtained on the PAD scale. By way of illustration, Ad PL-6 for Szyneczka presents the audience with five pieces of butterfish fillet flying high in the sky in

a V-shaped formation. The slogan reads as follows: “Filet maślany. Klucz do dobrej formy,” which can be translated into English as: “Butterfish fillet. The key to good shape.” In Polish, the second meaning of the word “klucz” is “skein,” which matches the image described in the lines above. Those few informants who liked the ad said that it was so absurd that it was funny. The overwhelming majority, however, declared low liking for the ad (also, it seems important to note that the ad was confusing according to 31% of research participants) and did not think the ad was amusing (51% of negative responses and 25% neutral ones).

Almost every ad within this category employed humour based on fuzzy inter-categorical boundaries; yet this vagueness may have been responsible for blurring the sense of category membership, which hindered humour. It was posited by Attardo (2015) that once the “semantic distance” between two inputs in the metaphorical construal becomes too large, it becomes humorous to the audience. Yet, in order to “succeed in this, a certain intersection (similarity, analogy, ambiguous element, causal link, inferential chain, etc.) must be found between the two planes of meaning” (Krikmann, 2009, p. 17). Apparently, this link was too weak in the case of Ad PL-6, that is, in spite of the fact that the two inputs were disparate enough for the novel metaphor (BUTTERFISH FILLET IS A BIRD OR BUTTERFISH FILLET IS THE KEY TO GOOD SHAPE) to emerge, the said input spaces could not be put into the same category. Thus, they could not successfully diverge from the typical elements in the class and the resolution of the incongruity turned out to be an unamusing attempt at humour, at least to the majority of the informants taking part in the study.

The two remaining advertisements that performed exceptionally poorly, that is, Ad- 12 and Ad PL-13, constitute even better examples of category mismatch precluding humour. The former shows a slim, white bottle of Sylc by OsSpray standing in a pink dressing room; the metaphor intended is that SYLC IS A WOMAN or, more specifically, SYLC IS A NAKED WOMAN, for the slogan the advertising agency came up with reads: “Sylc. Naked truth about bioactive glass.” The latter, on the other hand, presents the audience with a picture of a naked woman shown from her waist to her knees; she is holding the W116 combination driving light and front position light at crotch level, covering herself, which suggests the metaphor THE VEHICLE LIGHTING SYSTEM IS A WOMAN/VAGINA. Again, the abovementioned metaphors were identified correctly by research participants but they did not consider the ads humorous whatsoever. The informants said that they found these ads confusing and shallow, in a way, as the link between the two elements

entering the metaphorical was not justified to their minds; they hence claimed that the metaphor concerning female body was too far-fetched in the context of the said ads since they could not see any connection between the concept of a woman and the products promoted.

It is only speculative and intuitive a remark but perhaps a lipstick, for instance, would have performed better than vehicle lighting systems or than bioactive glass needed for teeth remineralisation. This is owing to the fact that lipsticks can be included into the group of female attributes and are thus somehow connected with the concept of a woman, whereas both bioactive glass and driving lights lack this category membership, which may explain their failure to produce humour in this context. Also, the metaphor used in Ad PL-13 for WAŚ is based on a controversial image, which may be seen as an action of violating a taboo, for the organs and acts of sex, clearly referred to in this ad, are considered a category of common human taboos, as outlined by Allan and Burrige (2006). The issue of debatable humour itself is too vast to be covered here, though; for more information on taboo and the line between funny and distasteful ads see Stwora (2020a, 2020c), and the references therein.

In closing, I should present the summative results of the survey on the ads in Polish gauging the degree of liking and funniness; these are shown in Table 10 that contains both mean scores and standard deviation values obtained for each ad in the sample in Polish. Again, ratings on ad liking ranged from (3) (high liking) to (1) (low liking), whereas funniness ratings were made on a 4-point scale ranging from (4) very funny to (1) not funny.

When it comes to mean scores (M) in both liking and funniness evaluations for the sample in Polish, Table 10 clearly shows numerous poor results (marked in red), as compared to the sample in English. Such a situation is connected with the fact that the Polish sample performed proportionally worse than the one in English owing to the presence of five ads that were categorised as the ads of very poor performance (these were: Ad PL-4, Ad PL-6, Ad PL-8, Ad PL-12, and Ad PL-13). Additionally, poor results in terms of mean scores for funniness evaluation were noted in the case of Ad PL-5 and Ad PL-10 that, nonetheless, performed satisfactorily as regards ad liking. The highest mean scores for both liking and funniness evaluation, on the other hand, were achieved by the ads of outstanding performance, that is, by Ad PL-2, Ad PL-14, and Ad PL-15 (see the cells marked in green), which is in line with what was previously shown in Table 9 that opened this section.

Ads in Polish	Liking		Funniness	
	M	SD	M	SD
Ad PL-1	2,63	0,639	2,30	0,712
Ad PL-2	2,69	0,696	3,08	0,945
Ad PL-3	2,77	0,536	2,49	0,739
Ad PL-4	1,95	0,789	1,73	0,641
Ad PL-5	2,65	0,667	2,03	0,670
Ad PL-6	1,66	0,767	1,68	0,854
Ad PL-7	2,45	0,774	2,53	0,865
Ad PL-8	1,91	0,892	1,88	0,955
Ad PL-9	2,51	0,702	2,49	0,903
Ad PL-10	2,80	0,505	1,87	0,539
Ad PL-11	2,57	0,708	2,52	0,783
Ad PL-12	1,84	0,778	1,75	0,732
Ad PL-13	1,44	0,700	1,44	0,773
Ad PL-14	2,78	0,566	3,16	0,828
Ad PL-15	2,76	0,564	3,17	0,862
Ad PL-16	2,41	0,724	1,90	0,632
Ad PL-17	2,45	0,729	2,41	0,860
Ad PL-18	2,64	0,637	2,48	0,721
Ad PL-19	2,64	0,668	2,87	0,849
Ad PL-20	2,55	0,701	2,76	1,014

TABLE 10. Mean Scores (M) and Standard Deviations (SDs) in Liking and Funniness Evaluation (Sample in Polish)

There is yet another important divergence between the results reported in Tables 8 and 10 for the sample in English and Polish, respectively. One thing that is evident is a much bigger number of high standard deviations in funniness evaluations of the sample in English. While these ratings showed considerably greater variance, the results for the sample in Polish were more homogenous. Thus, from the above observations it can be determined that lower standard deviations testify to relative stability of ratings over multiple informants.

Also, a substantial number of high standard deviations as regards funniness ratings of the set in English may suggest lower understanding of the English ads by Polish informants. A number of research participants might not have fully understood the ads in English, hence bigger variability in the evaluations. The results obtained on the basis of the questionnaire on ad comprehension will shed light on this issue.

5.8 Ad Comprehension—Results

“Because people respond to their perceptions of the world and not to the world as it actually is, the topic of comprehension, or perception, is one of the most important subjects in marketing communication” (Shimp, 2008, p. 143). Consequently, this part of the study will focus on the interpretation aspect. In order to check if and how research participants understand humorous metaphorical ads, as well as the meaning-making mechanisms behind these advertisements, a research tool in the form of a questionnaire was designed (see Appendix 3). The sample of ads incorporated in the survey was limited to the one selected for the self-reports and content analysis.

It should be emphasised that the order in which the questionnaires from Appendix 2 and 3 were distributed to the informants is vital because the questionnaire concerning ad ratings and emotional responses (in the form of Likert-type scale and visual self-report, respectively) was supposed to be as undiluted by deeper cognitive processing as possible. Hence, as regards the questionnaire on ad ratings and emotional responses, the research participants were provided with options from which they could choose their answers so that their responses were more automatic and spontaneous. Such a procedure made it possible to gauge their feelings more precisely thanks to reduced cognitive processing on the part of the informants, which, in turn, allowed to obtain more reliable data (Morris & Waine, 1993). Then and only then could the open-ended questions from Appendix 3 be posed to research participants, for they naturally require deeper thought and verbalisation. Thus, the questionnaire included in Appendix 3 can be treated as a post-exposure survey, with the difference that the ads were available to the informants (i.e., each ad was included in the questionnaire along with the set of pertinent questions) and they did not have to memorise anything since it was not a recall-oriented survey.

When it comes to ad comprehension *per se*, there are two basic research orientations, namely the objective and subjective one. According to Mick (1992), the former is concerned with the extraction of meanings from the advertising message; “typically these meanings are considered given (i.e., intrinsic to or directly implied by the message) and intended by the advertiser” (Mick, 1992, p. 411). Thus, the objective view adopts the criterion of accuracy in order to conceptualise and evaluate comprehension of an advertising stimulus because it concentrates on “the amount of meaning accurately drawn from the message” (Mick, 1992, p. 411). Although the

intention of the advertiser is important and, as such, should be rather evident to the audience if an ad is to be successful, it is the recipient-generated meaning that actually emerges in the mind of the perceiver, thus conditioning his/her feelings towards a given advertising message. That is when the subjective orientation comes into play since, as already signalled, it is the audience that is ultimately responsible for the senses derived.

The subjective view is focused on the interpretations of a comprehender or, in other words, on perceiver-based meanings that result from “the activation of mental concepts related to the message and the processing context” (Mick, 1992, p. 412), regardless of the actual intention of the advertising agency and irrespective of whether these meanings were contained in the original message or not. In this context, the subjective experience of an advertising message is given precedence over intended meanings. This perspective seems more accurate than the objective one since it is simply wrong to assume that the audience is passive and ingests everything without giving it any thought. Rather, they actively decode the message, make sense of it, and ascribe additional meanings to what they see; naturally, they may err in their readings of ads or can potentially produce folk theories that have nothing to do with the message intended by the source. “Due to the subjective nature of the factors that influence our perceptions, comprehension is often idiosyncratic” (Shimp, 2008, p. 143). The subjective view, nonetheless, is more context-dependent and definitely more open-ended, as it allows the perceivers to share their thoughts on the message freely.

Despite the fact that the perceivers’ comprehension of ads pivots on both the features of the advertising stimulus and on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the consumers themselves (Shimp, 2008, p. 143), it is very likely that a (preferably homogenous) group of perceivers who share a specific cultural background interprets a given ad in a similar way. That is why I favoured the subjective and, at the same time, heterophenomenological approach (Dennett, 1991, 2007), which means that I accepted the informants’ claims that they do have a certain phenomenological sense and can consciously describe the objects of direct experience but, simultaneously, reserved judgment about such claims (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011, p. 48). At the same time, I included the elements of the objective view on comprehension, for “the amount of meaning accurately drawn from the message” (Mick, 1992, p. 411) shows whether or not message decoding was actually successful, which is crucial to advertisers. After all, this aspect cannot be simply excluded, as “communicating is effective when the

meaning [...] a marketing communicator intends to convey matches what consumers actually extract from a message” (Shimp, 2008, p. 143).

When we try to understand an advertisement and comprehend its message, it is always on the basis of our perceptual judgements. The composition of an advertisement puts restraint on our perceptual judgements, and thereby on our comprehension. Therefore, the precondition for comprehension is perception as it is shaped by the composition of the advertisement. (Sørensen & Andersen, 2009, p. 85)

In their article, Sørensen and Andersen refer to the Peircean perspective and stress that the composition of an ad naturally steers the audience’s comprehension in a certain direction. The way in which the message is structured, not only in terms of its form, but also of its content, determines the inferences made in the reception processes (Sørensen & Andersen, 2009). This is due to the fact that the sender and the receiver of the message happen to use the same language resources and cognitive tools, as well as share the same context and sociocultural environment that are responsible for successful communication. “Comprehension as such is anchored in the perceptual process” (Sørensen & Andersen, 2009, p. 83) so the sender can safely assume that what he/she sees as carrying a certain meaning will usually be decoded by the receiver in the manner intended. When talking about the depth of processing, Toncar and Munch (2001), for example, introduced the following division:

1. *Externally Originated Meanings* that usually consist of general restatements of the ad’s arguments;
2. *Recipient-modified Meanings*, that is, “thoughts that are illustrations [and] reactions [...] in response to the words, picture, or layout of the ad; these thoughts are in some way an enhancement or modification of the information in the ad rather than simply restatements” (Toncar & Munch, 2001, p. 59);
3. *Recipient-generated Meanings* that incorporate additional ideas which are not directly linked to the content of the ad itself. “Simple restatements of message arguments (externally originated) require less cognitive effort than inferring a conclusion on the basis of a message argument (recipient-modified)” (Toncar & Munch, 2001, p. 59).

Having clarified research orientation and the difference between various depths of processing, I will now proceed to discussing the results obtained on the basis of the questionnaire form concerning ad comprehension that was used for the purpose of the present research (see Appendix 3). Post-exposure responses recorded in the set of open-ended questions were the basis for gauging the depth of processing and comprehension. Research participants were thus asked a series of questions about what was actually being advertised, as well as about their interpretations of the ads and their perceived metaphoricality (including questions on the exact domains involved in the production of metaphors and on what makes the ads metaphorical). Also, they were requested to explain what makes the ads funny and which elements, according to the informants, contribute to their being funny. Additionally, they were asked to identify any implied claims about the products or services advertised and, lastly, to express their opinions on whether or not they had an impression that the ads were imposing any opinions upon them. In the last question, they could also verbalise their spontaneous thoughts once they processed the material.

As opposed to the surveys on ad ratings and emotional responses presented beforehand, the questionnaires concerning ad comprehension consisted solely of open-ended questions that required more time and cognitive effort from the informants. That is why the procedure yielded only about 40 fully completed surveys, which were subsequently analysed. It is also important to note that it was necessary to filter out the responses that did not seem to contribute any useful information or that quite obviously missed the point. It so happened that, sometimes, research participants skipped some questions, which may suggest that they did not know how to answer, found the questions irrelevant or were simply tired, as the questionnaire was much more cognitively demanding than the previous survey on ad ratings and emotional responses. Some thoughts on ad comprehension by research participants have already been woven into the previous parts concerning the results for ad ratings and emotional responses for both language samples in an attempt to explain the outcomes of the first survey conducted. This section will offer some general remarks on ad comprehension and provide a summative account of what was stated by the informants.

Responses to the first question revealed that, in general, correct identification of the products promoted in the ads usually did not pose major difficulties for research participants. Naturally, there were a few instances of miscomprehension but, all in all, the informants' advertising literacy

was proven to be quite high. Among the ads that were difficult to understand for some research participants, I can list Ad E-5, Ad E-9, Ad E-12, and Ad E-15, as well as Ad PL-12 and Ad PL-13, which will be briefly discussed below. Explained in relevance-theoretic terms, as it seems, these ads simply did not strike “a good balance between sparking beneficial insights or emotions and requiring the investment of mental energy” (Forceville, 2020, p. 61).

The informants had problems with the identification of the products advertised in Ad PL-12 for Syc, for not only were they unfamiliar with the brand, but also oftentimes unable to understand the connection between the concept of nudity and the bottle depicted. They were therefore confused about the ad, sometimes even to the point that they became irritated and ceased further cognitive processing, moving on to the next ad in the survey. A similar situation could be observed in the case of Ad E-15 for Bauker and Ad E-12 for Lifebuoy Hand Wash, for which slightly less than 20% and approximately 40% of research participants, respectively, were not sure what was being advertised (here, I refer to the percentages of the total volume of questionnaires received in this part of the study). It is my observation that the common denominator between these ads was that the font used was rather small and thus difficult to read without zooming in to see the text more clearly. Hence, analysed through the lens of multimodality, if any mode in these ads was at fault in this situation, it was the textual layer whose size was insufficient to catch the eye effectively and provide the audience with an effortless advertising experience.

Likewise, increased cognitive effort may have been the reason why 25% of the informants had problems with understanding Ad E-5 for Hepachofa Hepat Digestive Pills; as already described in section 5.6.3, the conceptual skeleton behind the ad was very complex and thus, for some of them, grasping the whole range of references used in this meaning-laden ad, ranging from types of foods and the theme of indigestion to the conflict between the USA and Mexico, was a challenge. As regards this particular advertisement, research participants claimed that the associations evoked by the constitutive elements of the ad were justified and coherent, which was not the case for Ad E-9 and Ad PL-13, for instance, in which the juxtapositions of incongruous elements seemed more far-fetched. When it comes to the former, almost 30% of the informants had problems with understanding why the advertiser had chosen to incorporate the picture of laser beams in the message, which may suggest that metaphorical mapping

in the ad was not well motivated to their minds. In the latter ad, their confusion was even greater because, in their opinion, placing vehicle lighting systems and a barely-covered female body in one ad made little sense and seemed unimaginative.

The next question in the survey aimed at asking research participants to provide their interpretations of the advertising messages in writing. The purpose of this question was to elicit introspective commentaries on how they understood the ads they were presented with. It turned out that the lion's share of the ads were correctly identified by the informants, which means that the majority of the ads herein studied fulfilled their communicative function and managed to get across the message intended. As regards perceived metaphoricality of the ads included in the survey, the results are provided in Figures 5 and 6 for the ads in English, and in Figures 7 and 8 for the ads in Polish. Responses to the question "Is the ad metaphorical?" were expressed in percentage values.




FIGURE 5. Responses to the Question "Is the ad metaphorical" Expressed in Percentage Values (for the Ads from Ad E-1 to Ad E-10)

It follows from the charts above that the informants usually acknowledged the metaphorical nature of the ads. The highest percentage of undecided research participants was noted for ads Ad E-1 and Ad E-10 (the number of "I don't know" responses oscillated between 30% and 40%), which is actually difficult to explain because these ads were understood correctly by research participants (see Table 11 further in this section) and,

what is more, fared well as regards funniness ratings, for instance. One possible hypothesis is that the informants' confusion may have resulted from the structure of these ads, that is, from the fact that both Ad E-1 and Ad E-10 were based on visual metaphors and employed the figure of fusion, which may have influenced their perception of metaphoricity in some way. For example, the visual structure could have been so engaging that some research participants were left unsure whether they were looking at something figurative or at something creative and original; but even this partial and conjectural explanation now given does not seem sufficient and should be treated as a suggestion that follows from qualitative content analysis.




FIGURE 6. Responses to the Question “Is the ad metaphorical?” Expressed in Percentage Values (for the Ads from Ad E-11 to Ad E-20)

A high percentage of undecided research participants (around 20%) was also observed with regard to Ad E-15 for Bauker and Ad E-17 for Volkswagen Genuine Parts, which, in terms of humorousness, were classified as the ads of very poor and poor performance, respectively. As for the former, it was already specified in the section on ad ratings and emotional responses that the metaphorical relation in the ad was strong enough for the informants to recognise it but the humorous dimension was too shaky for them to find it funny. In spite of the fact that the inputs failed to cause amusement, 75% of the informants recognised the metaphor in the ad and only 25% of them were unsure whether they should describe the ad as metaphorical

or not. Their inability to comprehend the ad properly may be attributed to the fact that, due to their young age, research participants taking part in the survey could relate neither to parental experience, nor to DIY; thus, the concepts required to understand the ad were probably less accessible in their cognitive repertoire, which resulted in their indecisiveness as regards metaphoricity ratings.

A similar problem can be detected in the latter ad, that is, Ad E-17, in which the perceiver is presented with a pairing of an extremely ugly dog and non-genuine car parts. Some informants claimed that the ad was too vague since they found it difficult to understand it and usually needed more time to process the ad. Additionally, the results obtained on the basis of emotional responses showed that the dog in the picture turned out to be bizarre to the point that the informants felt ad-related unease, which may have adversely influenced their comprehension too, because, in general, “the overwhelming affect of disgust is aversion” (Korsmeyer, 2008). Although it is not the primary concern of this study, one could think of exploring the impact of disgust on comprehension processes; “inappropriate for aesthetic pleasure” (Korsmeyer, 2008) as it is, such a strong emotion may serve as a good attention-getting device but, on the other hand, may hinder liking, as was the case in Ad E-17. Whether or not disgust may affect comprehension processes is beyond the ambit of this research but surely constitutes an interesting research topic related to various levels of “tolerance for incongruity” (Bruner & Postman, 1949, p. 208) taken to extremes.

Theorists such as Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Kant complained that disgust aroused in art is not filtered through representation into a tolerable, appreciable affective mode. The arousal of disgust seems to interrupt aesthetic thrall rather than enhance imaginary engagement with a work. What is more, according to many scientists, the primary function of disgust is to reject. (Korsmeyer, 2008)

Reverting to the topic of the ads that performed even worse in terms of metaphoricity ratings, in Ad E-3, Ad E-5, and Ad E-6, there appeared some answers suggesting that several research participants did not see the metaphoricity of the ads very clearly. In Ad E-3, the informants' claims concerning non-metaphoricity of the message were marginal; it can be surmised that, for some reason, they either did not perceive the link between the concepts as metaphorical or assumed that a liquid stain remover can

actually form a blob of an unusual shape. As far as Ad E-5 and Ad E-6 are concerned, about 20% of research participants claimed the ads were not metaphorical. Taking the former as an example, a possible explanation could be that, for some informants, associations with a satirical cartoon in Ad E-5 may have been stronger than the figurative dimension of the ad, thus preventing them from perceiving the metaphorical relation as the most important feature of this ad.

Interestingly, the highest rate of negative responses (46%, to be exact) was observed for Ad E-4 for McDonald's, which seems surprising given that it performed so well in humorousness ratings. Despite significant humorous appeal, the advertisement in question was not perceived as metaphorical by half of the informants; it is just a speculation but one could ask whether it was the metonymical relation present in the ad that affected its perceived metaphoricity. On the one hand, there is a metaphor (the cow is the source concept and milkshake is the target) which constitutes the axis of humour; on the other, it is impossible not to notice metonymy here because the concept of milk (and of a milkshake, by extension) is referred to by presenting the source for the product. The two cognitive processes, though distinct, are not mutually exclusive and thus interact closely in this ad. Nonetheless, it is possible to theorise that this metaphor-metonymy compound, popularly known as *metaphtonymy*, could be a structure that was unknown to research participants; hence, they may have focused on the metonymical and disregarded the metaphorical instead.

When it comes to the sample in Polish, the first thing to strike the eye is the percentage of negative responses to the question about the ads' metaphoricity. Although approximately half of these responses could be considered marginal, as they did not surpass 10%, their presence indicates that the informants were not entirely convinced as to the figurative nature of these ads. Ad PL-5, for example, contains a visual metaphor that may have been perceived in terms of simple resemblance due to the fact that, in the picture, the opening in the row of trees is similar in shape and colour to a glass of beer. In this context, less acute a perceiver could have mistaken the metaphorical for a purely aesthetic strategy, which was also the case in Ad PL-10 for Lipton that was not considered metaphorical by 31% of the informants.

I would like to focus mainly on the ads for which negative responses were more numerous and hence more widespread among research participants. Starting with Ad PL-2 (described in 4.6.6), the ad was probably

deemed literal by some research participants because the ironic overtones won out over the figurative dimension of the ad. Taking a look at the results obtained by Ad PL-15 and Ad PL-20, a similar pattern may be observed, for some of the informants could not help but see the literal expressions, which, in turn, may have been the cause of their claiming that the ads were not metaphorical. Also, the two ads mentioned above were strongly parodic and this humorous factor, in my view, may have dominated, thus rendering the figurative dimension less perceptible.

The remaining three ads, namely Ad PL-13, Ad PL-16, and Ad PL-17, fared badly when it comes to metaphoricity ratings. As already stated in this section, when it comes to Ad PL-13, not only did the informants have problems with understanding the ad, but they also often failed to perceive it as metaphorical. Given the fact that humorousness and metaphoricity are based on similar cognitive operations, it can be assumed that the choice of inputs to be blended was not motivated enough to research participants. In other words, they could not find sufficient explanation for the elements being placed together in the ad since, in their opinion, the message lacked any sense and logic. One additional factor could be the informants' hostility to overt sexual allusions, which might have made them reject the ad as inadequate and simply lame, for such messages may reinforce and perpetuate stereotypes.




FIGURE 7. Responses to the Question “Is the Ad Metaphorical?” Expressed in Percentage Values (for the Ads from Ad PL-1 to Ad PL-10)




FIGURE 8. Responses to the Question Is the Ad Metaphorical? Expressed in Percentage Values (for the Ads from Ad PL-11 to Ad PL-20)

Ad PL-16 was not always considered metaphorical, yet for different reasons. The ad shows a tomato soup served in a tomato, which, to many research participants, was neither very creative nor abstract. In fact, it is highly probable that many informants could have missed the presence of metaphor since the boundary between the inputs was fuzzy, almost to the point of invisibility. This was owing to the presence of a metonymical relation (involving a tomato in the shape of a bowl and a product made of tomatoes) which, actually, makes the ad a metaphor-metonymy compound, similar to Ad E-4 that was not deemed metaphorical by more than half of the informants either. Despite the fact that two examples surely do not constitute a solid basis for generalisation, it should be noted that, in both Ad PL-16 and Ad E-4, the occurrence of metaphonymical structures rendered metaphoricity less perceptible to many research participants.

Finally, in the case of Ad PL-17, the metaphorical could have been perceived as less strong an appeal than parody, on which the whole ad was based. As follows from the survey, the informants generally acknowledged the connection that was drawn between political campaigns and the form of the ad but many of them did not see it in metaphorical terms at all. On the basis of what was said, it can therefore be speculated that some pairings (e.g., metaphor plus parody or metaphor plus metonymy) can render the

figurative dimension less perceptible to the perceivers, though they do not inhibit comprehension of metaphorical ads.

Moving on from specific examples to a broader perspective, the following question included in the questionnaire was posed to make the informants specify what exactly makes the ads from both samples metaphorical, provided they previously indicated that the ads were actually metaphorical. What follows from their answers is that they were able to identify the presence of metaphors thanks to:

- a) the replacement of one element with another,
- b) the impossibility of the situation depicted,
- c) similarity (e.g., in terms of shape or colour),
- d) the presence of comparison,
- e) the presence of elements that do not belong to a given contextual setting,
- f) the combination of elements that are not normally associated with each other,
- g) the presence of allusion or veiled reference to something else,
- h) symbolism,
- i) anthropomorphisation.

What is more, some research participants identified the picture as the source of the metaphorical since they literally saw that the message was not literal based on the visual layer. It was therefore confirmed that, citing Yus, “an incongruity in the visual syntax of the image works as an *ad hoc* pointer alerting the readers to a metaphoric interpretation” (2009, p. 157). More exact metaphorical understandings of the ads under consideration are provided in Tables 11 and 12. As regards colouring, cells in green and blue correspond to the ads of outstanding performance from the “green” and “blue” categories, respectively. Grey was used whenever the results for any variable were poor. The most original interpretations provided by research participants were underlined, whereas bold type indicates that the ad was difficult to understand.

Advertisement	Metaphorical understandings
Ad E-1 Vitakraft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the idea of sweetness is transferred onto the shampoo, ● the idea of softness, ● the ad shows the results of using the shampoo.
Ad E-2 Audi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Audi cars are like beasts in the dark, ● headlights are just like wolves' eyes shining in the dark, ● <u>the idea of speed, aggression, predatory nature,</u> ● <u>male emotions,</u> ● cars are not animals <u>but they are often compared to them,</u> ● the <u>mystery</u> of the car, ● <u>the idea of safety despite darkness, extreme weather conditions or dangerous roads,</u> ● <u>there are no monsters in the real world.</u>
Ad E-3 Pedigree	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the idea of controlling your dog with a snack or with a pad, ● the dog is a remote-controlled toy, ● the idea of obedience, ● the idea of <u>happiness</u> once you feed the dog, ● <u>dogs get addicted to certain types of food.</u>
Ad E-4 McDonald's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● milk at McDonald's is as fresh as milk from a cow, ● at McDonald's, they shake the milk in its original container, in the cow, to keep it fresh, ● <u>the idea of freshness and natural source,</u> ● <u>McDonald's presents itself as eco-friendly.</u>
Ad E-5 Hepachofa Hepat Digestive Pills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the medicine will work even if you suffer from severe indigestion, similar to the one Trump has when he thinks of the US-Mexico border, ● intercultural relations cause indigestion, ● the medicine is so good that it will not let bad foods disturb your stomach, ● the medication is <u>highly effective.</u>
Ad E-6 Styx	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● men's underwear should be comfortable, ● the idea of comfort, ● testicles are just as delicate as eggs, ● the underwear is as cosy as a stereotypical man's room, ● <u>men's world.</u>
Ad E-7 3M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the lint roller's strength is such that it collects the whole cat and not only its hairs, ● effectiveness.
Ad E-8 Whiskas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Whiskas feeds cat's instincts, ● the power of cat food, ● Whiskas cat food is nutritious and may strengthen your cat, ● the idea of becoming wild and vivid.
Ad E-9 Airwick	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Airwick protects your bathroom from bad smells, ● pleasant scent is a beam of roses, ● <u>the product is infallible, just like an alarm.</u>
Ad E-10 Pedigree	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the product helps to prevent dog's bad breath, ● helping to maintain a <u>high level of dental hygiene,</u> ● the idea of freshness, ● your dog will smell like a flower.
Ad E-11# vilniusgspot	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Vilnius is like G-spot, ● reference to sex, ● the idea of pleasure and satisfaction, ● the idea of discovering unknown places.

Ad E-12 Lifebuoy Hand Wash	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● you eat what you touch, ● encouragement to wash your hands, ● animals can be a source of bacteria, ● the ad is difficult to understand.
Ad E-13 Via Uno Shoes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● your heels should look as attractive as the rest of your body, ● shoes can be sexy, ● <u>shoes can express your sex appeal,</u> ● a good pair of shoes can make you feel sexy, just as lingerie does.
Ad E-14 BMW Used Cars	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a used car is like a woman who is no longer a virgin, ● driving a car is as pleasurable as intercourse, ● a used car is just as good as a new one, ● allusion to previous sexual partners, ● people do not care about their partners' previous relationships so, when it comes to cars, they should not care about the past of a used car as long as it is pretty.
Ad E-15 Bauker	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● if you buy the product, you will be able to make beautiful things of wood, ● the idea of creation, making something on your own, ● the idea of fatherly pride, ● the theme of birth, ● you can always become a father of a piece of furniture, ● you can create something that can bring you the same kind of joy as parenthood does, ● <u>reference to Pinocchio,</u> ● the ad is confusing and incomprehensible.
Ad E-16 Pepsi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Pepsi is a hero, ● the competitor is scary, ● personification, ● Pepsi is better than its major competition, ● deprecating the competitor.
Ad E-17 Volkswagen Genuine Parts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● non-genuine car parts will not work as well as genuine ones, ● genuine parts are better than other products, ● non-genuine parts work, technically, ● the comparison between a dog and a car (both are ugly and faulty).
Ad E-18 KissFM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● this radio station plays retro hits, ● an audio cassette is compared to Darth Vader, ● an iPod is compared to Luke Skywalker, ● reference to <i>Star Wars</i>, ● <u>reference to family relations,</u> ● contrast between new and old technology.
Ad E-19 Vileda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● cat hairs are shrapnel, ● cats leave hairs on furniture and sometimes it looks like some kind of fur explosion that destroys your apartment.
Ad E-20 SanDisk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a small thing can store big things, ● Elvis is data while his garment is a flash drive, ● the idea of capacity.

TABLE 11. Selected Answers to the Question “How Do You Understand the Metaphor in the Ad?” for the Ads from the Sample in English

Advertisement	Metaphorical understandings
Ad PL-1 Dziki Sad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a bottle of cider is like an apple, ● apple-like taste, ● natural taste. ● the product is natural and <u>good</u>, ● cider resembles an apple in taste to the extent that even the hedgehog was fooled, ● the feeling of <u>relaxation</u>, ● the idea of a wild cider orchard is transferred onto the beverage, making it wild too.
Ad PL-2 Lubelska	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● money from social transfers can be spent on vodka, ● ridiculing the 500+ program, ● ironic reference to the governmental program that criticises the ruling party, ● <u>vodka is more important than politics and the fact where money comes from.</u>
Ad PL-3 Ariel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ariel stain remover devours stains like a shark, ● the product is highly effective, ● the idea of fierceness and predatory nature, ● stains are in danger, ● the shark's strength is to symbolise the removal of stains, ● the shark attacks its victims and devours/kills them.
Ad PL-4 Gazeta Wyborcza	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● you do not have to go to the newsagents to have access to daily news, ● the network socket is the new newsagents, ● everything is available online nowadays, ● the online newspaper is your window on the world, ● thanks to new media, you do not have to leave your flat to be close to the news.
Ad PL-5 Tatra	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Tatra beer is a part of Tatra mountains, ● the beer will make you feel as if you were in the Tatra mountains, ● the beer is natural, <u>cold, and pure</u>, ● the beer is as magnificent and sublime as the mountains, ● the beer is refreshing like a mountain stream, ● crystal-clear water from mountain streams is used to make this beer, ● the mountains make you feel <u>free, relaxed, and powerful</u>, and so does Tatra beer.
Ad PL-6 Szyneczka	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● butterfish fillet is low in calories, ● the fillet is the key to good shape, ● the fillet is so tasty that it can make you feel as if you were on cloud nine, ● <u>heavenly taste</u>, ● the butterfish fillet is a heavenly product as <u>it melts in your mouth</u>, ● the idea of light products, ● the ad is absurd and incomprehensible.
Ad PL-7 PZU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● backup reindeer is your backup car, ● the insurance company will adjust to the client's needs, ● <u>the insurer will go to great lengths to help you</u>, even during the Christmas break, ● <u>the insurer is trustworthy and reliable</u>, ● <u>if you do not wish to use a reindeer when your car breaks during the Christmas break, choose PZU as your insurer.</u>

Ad PL-8 bet-at-home.com	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● football is life, ● life is a game in which only the best and the fastest players can win, ● the winner is only one.
Ad PL-9 Motos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a car is a dinosaur, a fierce beast you have to tame, ● Motos driving school will teach you how to drive, you will even be able to ride a dinosaur after these driving lessons, ● a dinosaur as a means of transport, ● it does not matter what you want to drive, they will teach you how, ● <u>Motos driving school can teach older people how to drive.</u>
Ad PL-10 Lipton	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Lipton tea is full of fruits, ● the tea has a rich, fruity flavour, ● the tea is so <u>fresh</u> and natural that <u>it must be tasty,</u> ● <u>pronounced and exquisite flavour,</u> ● <u>there is no difference between drinking this tea and eating fruits.</u>
Ad PL-11 Żywiec	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Żywiec beer is a treasure, ● reference to the train filled with gold that was lost during the World War II, ● <u>what is gold is precious, important, and luxurious, and so is the beer,</u> ● <u>a precious beverage,</u> ● <u>one cannot stop after drinking one beer and needs to buy more.</u>
Ad PL-12 Sylc	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Sylc is a woman's body, ● teeth are your body and thus should be taken care of, ● Sylc restores the natural colour of your teeth, ● the product will restore your teeth's health and looks, ● <u>you should protect your teeth to look attractive,</u> ● enamel is sensitive, just like skin, ● the product is shown as a woman in a dressing room, ● <u>the ad is confusing and incomprehensible.</u>
Ad PL-13 WAŚ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● vehicle lighting systems are like a vagina, ● your car is like your woman, ● reference to sex, ● <u>a half-naked woman should draw men's attention to everything, even if the context does not fit,</u> ● <u>the ad is difficult to understand.</u>
Ad PL-14 Lidl	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● to live your life to the fullest, you have to eat a fresh Polish carp, ● seize the carp now to enjoy life and its taste, ● <u>this fish is good,</u> ● <u>hurry up and buy it soon because demand is so great,</u>
Ad PL-15 RTV Euro AGD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● this set of hair straighteners will get rid of waves, that is, of locks and wavy hair, ● reference to a song by Dawid Podsiadło, ● <u>quality guaranteed thanks to implied celebrity endorsement.</u>
Ad PL-16 Biedronka	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● soups from Biedronka are natural, ● there are no preservatives in the soup, ● tomato soup is made of tomatoes and not of other, modified or chemical substances, ● tomato is a bowl filled with tomato soup, ● the idea of freshness, ● <u>the product is healthy.</u>

Ad PL-17 AXN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the stormtrooper is a political candidate in the elections, ● the ad laughs at politicians and their empty promises, ● reference to <i>Star Wars</i> and elections, ● the audience consists of ordinary stormtroopers, just like the one in the ad, ● the candidate is one of the audience so he understands their needs and knows that they want to watch <i>Star Wars</i> on TV, ● <u>being an ordinary stormtrooper, you become a part of the <i>Star Wars</i> universe.</u>
Ad PL-18 Škoda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the car is a good bargain so you should hunt it down and buy it, ● the car is a wild animal you can hunt down, ● the buyer is a smart hunter, ● the idea of hunting wild animals, ● <u>the idea of adventure,</u> ● the car is not a whale, nor a seal but it is a good quarry nonetheless, ● it is your last chance to get the car because supply is limited, ● buying a car is like hunting because you have to prepare for the hunt and pursue your prey.
Ad PL-19 Krakus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the jar is a glass trap, ● Krakus' pickled cucumber is John McClane, ● reference to the film <i>Die Hard</i>, ● cucumbers are trapped, ● pickled cucumber is the hero of the party.
Ad PL-20 Ikea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the chair is (almost) like Prince Harry since they have the same name, ● reference to Prince Harry's wedding, ● the ad ridicules female fans of Prince Harry, ● personification of the chair, ● <u>you can fall in love with a chair if you failed to attract the prince,</u> ● <u>a handsome chair with shapely legs.</u>

TABLE 12. Selected Answers to the Question “How do you Understand the Metaphor in the Ad?” for the Ads from the Sample in English

To sum up the information provided in these tables, when it comes to the depth of processing (cf. Toncar & Munch, 2001), I found that externally originated meanings, that is, the ones that consist of simple restatements of message arguments, were very frequent. This may be attributed to the fact that the retrieval of such meanings requires less cognitive effort (Toncar & Munch, 2001), for it suffices to write about the elements of an ad in a purely descriptive fashion, to reiterate ad's explicit claims or to repeat the slogan. However, recipient-modified meanings that arise in response to the ad's content and require the perceiver to infer a conclusion on the basis of the message argument were numerous as well; this is hardly surprising since the ads chosen for the purpose of this study were metaphorical and, hence, required a little bit more cognitive elaboration. These recipient-modified meanings were usually in tune with the assumed intention of the advertising agencies responsible for the ads, although the informants rarely

referred to the exact metaphorical A is B pattern; rather, they employed similes or pointed to the presence of allusion or veiled reference to something else. Differences in wording or the aspects of metaphors that gained salience in the responses of research participants indicate that some of them took alternative meaning paths that, nonetheless, did not depart from the original metaphorical meanings.

The most original interpretations that were drawn from the ads (underlined in the tables above) can be classified as recipient-generated meanings, which are not only valid, but also creative in that they incorporate additional ideas, not directly linked to the content of the ads themselves. For example, some metaphors were not necessarily intended to convey an aura of infallibility or the idea that the products are natural, yet research participants often arrived at such conclusions. What is more, several informants were creative to the point that they actually assigned certain meanings to the ads they may not originally have had.

In Ad E-2, they associated cars and wolves or other wild beasts with male emotions in spite of the fact that they were not actually cued by the ad; rather, they linked cars with men on the basis of the fact that men are usually more interested in cars than women and, hence, transferred the qualities and attributes regarded as characteristic of men onto the vehicles. Similarly, Ad E-15 was said to contain a reference to *Pinocchio*, which was not an incorrect interpretation, as it was reasonable to associate fatherly love for a wooden object with *Pinocchio*; nevertheless, it is hard to say whether such an interpretation was intended by the creators of the ad in question. As regards the examples from the sample in Polish, Motos driving school in Ad PL-9 was interpreted as a school that can teach older people how to drive because the word “dinosaur” is often used to refer to the elderly in a pejorative manner. In the case of Ad PL-17, on the other hand, several research participants claimed that the implication of being an ordinary stormtrooper means that the receiver becomes a part of the *Star Wars* universe by extension. Again, such an interpretation was plausible and logical, although speculative if one considers the actual depth of the message or lack thereof.

Irrespective of the foregoing, it should be stressed that metaphors in the ads analysed were not always interpreted as the advertisers intended (which is in line with previous studies on this topic by, e.g., Phillips (1997) and Morgan & Reichert (1999)) and the levels of “comprehension may not be as high as ad creators would hope” (Morgan & Reichert, 1999, p. 8). Fully grasping a source concept involves understanding its relationships to

the target. Although the informants generally did not have problems with understanding metaphorical messages behind the ads, frequently three in ten participants could not identify the domains involved. However, this was rarely due to metaphor incomprehension; rather, research participants did not simply know what the domains were so they were unable to respond to the question. Such a finding suggests that the perceiver's inability to identify the source and target of a metaphorical structure does not prevent him/her from understanding the figurative.

It was noted that high levels of difficulty in the identification of domains were noted for Ad PL-12 for Sylc, for instance, which was deemed incomprehensible by many informants due to insufficient explications provided by the ad, such as small font size and scanty information on product type, which made it difficult to identify the domains involved. Another example that caused confusion was Ad E-13, for some research participants actually mistook the heels for female buttocks. In this ad, humour was supposed to be based on misunderstanding but the perceivers were actually tricked into seeing something else, which, in turn, made it impossible to identify the domains properly.

The claims implied by means of the metaphorical transfer of properties or concepts from the source to target domain were usually decoded correctly. In spite of the fact that the informants may have not been able to identify the domains themselves (which may result from their insufficient knowledge of the workings of metaphor), this lack of knowledge did not impact their actual understanding of metaphorical ads. On the contrary, their aptitude for comprehending metaphorical ads was very good although they did not always realise that they were dealing with metaphorical content. By way of example, they recognised that Ad E-3 conveyed the idea of joy and playfulness, that Ad E-6 alluded to a sense of comfort and to the world of men's entertainment, while Ad PL-1 put across the idea of naturalness and Ad PL-20 implied the idea of a consolation prize. The answers, in spite of showing the participants' insufficient understanding or sometimes even ignorance of the sense of "metaphorical," point to the potential richness of possible interpretations of the elements included in the ads, which were impossible to predict in content analysis.

According to contemporary, context-sensitive approaches to humour, "humorous texts do not have a single 'correct' interpretation; recipients may extract different meanings from them" (Tsakona, 2017, p. 197). However, more often than not, advertising messages, both humorous and non-humorous, are designed with a view to communicating specific meanings

that should be easily decoded by the audience. Based on the set of standard meaning-making mechanisms (the Gricean Cooperative Principle, conversational implicatures, relevance, and salience), the recipients refer to their knowledge and experiences, drawing from a common pool of concepts and meanings encoded in a given language. Thus, they will understand the message in a fairly uniform manner (perhaps with the exception of failed humour) thanks to shared cultural background and language practices they normally use in everyday communication. This is due to the fact that humorous communication, in general, does not substantially differ from non-humorous since the same linguistic and cognitive mechanisms are applicable (cf. Brône & Feyaerts, 2004).

Generally speaking, language users expect that the message they are about to decode will make sense; they make an assumption that the person who sends the message does so with a view to communicating something and thus is expected to cooperate (according to the tenets of the Cooperative Principle by Grice (1975, 1989)). They hence presume that “what is said or written will make sense in terms of their normal experience of things. That ‘normal’ experience will be locally interpreted by each individual and hence will be tied to the familiar and the expected” (Yule, 2011/1996, p. 84). Upon being confronted with an incongruous element in the message, the perceiver starts to search for some link between the ad and this element so as to render the message congruous again and reconcile what, at first glance, was incompatible. In the process, he/she refers to other, non-salient and less prototypical senses and, once the incongruity is resolved, the message starts to make sense; for the humorous to emerge, the said incongruity needs to be partial, with some lingering tension between the scripts preserved.

This mechanism, however, does not depart from the “standard” ways of making sense of what is being communicated, for people are well acquainted with the processes of solving incongruities on a daily basis, as they are accustomed to looking for meanings. Decoding them is just more cognitively demanding, depending on the complexity of the metaphorical and/or of the humorous, as well as on individual competence (of course, while touching upon the audience factor, it should be remembered that people may be differently sensitive to, or tolerant of, dissonance *per se*, which may condition their perception of incongruities).

However, the fact that the ads studied in this volume are metaphorical and humorous opens space for more interpretations than literal language could have produced. Naturally, “how much is read from a given metaphor

depends on the recipient, his competence, and his degree of involvement in the process of text analysis” (Maliszewski, 2018, p. 29, trans. A.S.). The key issue here is the one of the openness of metaphor, as seen “from the addresser’s perspective (the openness of metaphor as the possibility of creating new meanings and semantic games) [and] the addressee’s perspective (the openness of metaphor as the possibility of drawing more or less extensive interpretations)” (Maliszewski, 2018, p. 28, trans. A.S.). The former enables advertising agencies to create new metaphors and play with meanings, while the latter captures the possibility of decoding more or less in-depth meanings on the part of the audience. The lower the perceived degree of conventionalisation of a metaphor, the more novel it seems to the audience and, consequently, the broader the scope of interpretations, which can range from rather simplistic and narrow to free and wide (cf. Maliszewski, 2018), depending on the eye of the beholder, so to speak. Therefore, how message decoding is accomplished is largely up to the individual; however, advertisements are usually designed in such a way so as to guide the recipient and suggest the meanings intended, which makes it possible to trace some predictable patterns when it comes to ad comprehension and interpretation.

It should also be added that multimodal constructions provide opportunities for metaphor creativity thanks to the fact that different semiotic modes can be used and combined in unexpected ways, thus resulting in more original advertising messages (El Refaie, 2015), and in more possible interpretations too. Metaphors employed in multimodal ads require the audience “to construct a meaningful reading by processing verbal and visual elements together” (Koller, 2009, p. 49), which means that they perform an essentially persuasive function because metaphor, as such, suits the specificities of advertising so well. That is because it puts two domains into correspondence, for it ties the goods advertised to positive attributed values (Pérez-Sobrino, 2017, p. 50).

In this vein, it can be said that humour profits from multimodality as well, for it exploits cross-modal creativity and incongruity. According to Maćkiewicz, multimodality fosters humour in ads since, thanks to their multimodal form, they are capable of conveying more meanings and emotions, which can exert considerable persuasive impact upon the audience:

Increased use of non-verbal codes [...] [serves] the phatic function that consists in establishing and maintaining contact with the receiver. In

view of the dominance of the phatic function, other functions performed by the sender [...] seem to be relegated to a secondary priority. On the other hand, the ludic function comes to the aid of the phatic one, as it is all about capturing the recipient's attention by providing him with entertainment and pleasure. (Maćkiewicz, 2017, p. 40, trans. A.S.)

Reverting to the survey, the next question touched upon the issue of funniness itself, that is, it was concerned with the identification of exact mechanisms in or elements of the ads that contribute to their being funny. Tables 13 and 14 show the informants' responses concerning the perceived sources of humorousness for the sample in English and Polish, respectively. Again, colours were applied in the same way as in the tables above. Bold type shows that the ad missed the mark and, in general, failed to generate humorous responses. The ads of both outstanding and good performance from both collections were confirmed to have violated the expectations of research participants, which conduced to humour. The informants frequently claimed that they did not expect what they saw, were surprised by the ads' content, and saw the situations presented as impossible, thus reacting positively.

Advertisement	Perceived source of humour
Ad E-1 Vitakraft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● funny referent (sweet dog), ● the impossibility of the situation, ● pink colour that is unexpected but looks nice, ● comparison to cotton candy.
Ad E-2 Audi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● unexpectedness, ● the scenery that contrasts with the cars the ad actually promotes, ● presenting cars as wild animals.
Ad E-3 Pedigree	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● funny referent (dancing dog), ● dog controlled with a remote controller.
Ad E-4 McDonald's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● funny referent (cow on a trampoline), ● unexpectedness, ● the fact that they shake the milk in its original container, in the cow.
Ad E-5 Hepachofa Hepat Digestive Pills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● unexpectedness, ● presenting Trump as a burger, ● presenting Mexican people as Mexican food, ● using different types of food to refer to the conflict between countries.
Ad E-6 Styx	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● comparing pants to a living room, ● referring to testicles by means of eggs, ● resemblance between testicles and eggs, ● the fact that the eggs are living their own life in a comfortable apartment whose walls are made of underwear.

Ad E-7 3M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the poor cat in an unfortunate situation, ● the impossibility of the situation in the ad, ● presenting lint roller as a cat.
Ad E-8 Whiskas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● funny referent (little kitten), ● the fact that the cat is nearly as fast as a cheetah living in the wild, ● impossible situation.
Ad E-9 Airwick	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the idea of showing a toilet filled with rose lasers, ● roses and lasers are worlds apart.
Ad E-10 Pedigree	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● funny referent (the dog in the picture is very puffy), ● the fusion of the dog and a flower.
Ad E-11 #vilniusgspot	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● unexpectedness, ● sexual allusions, ● bold theme, ● advertising a city with the metaphor of sex.
Ad E-12 Lifebuoy Hand Wash	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the poor dog in the picture, ● they way the dog is squeezed, ● the ad is not funny.
Ad E-13 Via Uno Shoes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● misunderstanding that makes you take heels for female buttocks, ● comparison to underwear, ● the ad is not funny.
Ad E-14 BMW Used Cars	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● sexual allusion, ● the comparison between a car and a woman, ● laughing at females.
Ad E-15 Bauker	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● comparing the table to a child, ● exaggeration of parental behaviour, ● the ad is not funny.
Ad E-16 Pepsi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the Coca-Cola cape that is supposed to be a scary Halloween costume, ● poking fun at Coca-Cola, ● unexpectedness.
Ad E-17 Volkswagen Genuine Parts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● comparing non-genuine car parts to an ugly dog, ● pairing car parts and a dog is very unlikely, ● the ad is not funny but rather sad.
Ad E-18 KissFM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● reference to <i>Star Wars</i>, ● comparing a compact cassette to Darth Vader and an iPod to Luke Skywalker, ● old technology is compared to the Dark Side of the Force, ● incompatibility between the films and the radio station.
Ad E-19 Vileda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● funny referent (the cat), ● comparing a cat to a bomb of fur.
Ad E-20 SanDisk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● unexpectedness, ● the cartoon-like image of fat Elvis Presley, ● fat Elvis that can fit into small garment, ● the fact that Elvis is used to symbolise data on a flash drive.

TABLE 13. Perceived Sources of Humorousness for the Sample in English

Advertisement	Perceived source of humour
Ad PL-1 Dziki Sad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a cute hedgehog, ● the fact that the hedgehog is carrying a bottle of cider instead of an apple, ● that the hedgehog mistook the bottle of cider for a real apple, ● the ad is aesthetically pleasant but not necessarily funny.
Ad PL-2 Lubelska	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● reference to the current political situation in Poland, ● criticising social transfers and people who spend their money recklessly, ● unexpected link between vodka and social transfers, ● ironic overtones, ● pun, ● the ad says that you can live colourful thanks to colourful flavoured vodkas.
Ad PL-3 Ariel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the unexpected image of the shark, ● the shape of the blob of a liquid stain remover, ● the interaction between the textual and the visual layer, ● the fact that the stain is shown as a victim and Ariel as a predator, ● the ad is not funny.
Ad PL-4 Gazeta Wyborcza	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the fact that the lady at the newsagents is so small that she can be placed in the network socket, ● changed proportions, ● the way the newsagents is depicted, ● the photomontage in the ad.
Ad PL-5 Tatra	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the fact that the opening in the row of trees resembles a glass of beer thanks to its shape and colours, ● the unexpected appearance of a glass of beer, ● the fact that the Tatra beer is playing hide-and-seek with the audience.
Ad PL-6 Szyneczka	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the absurd fusion of a piece of meat and a bird or angel, ● the wings attached to the pieces of fillet, ● the fact that meat cannot fly.
Ad PL-7 PZU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a backup reindeer is present instead of a backup car, ● funny referent (reindeer).
Ad PL-8 bet-at-home.com	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the fact that spermatozoa swim towards a football, ● the ad is not funny.
Ad PL-9 Motos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a dinosaur in an atypical place, ● the clash between the picture of a dinosaur and a gentleman, ● the fact that you cannot ride a dinosaur, ● riding a dinosaur and driving a car are nothing alike.
Ad PL-10 Lipton	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● cute animals, ● the fact that the pyramid made of fruits resembles a teabag.
Ad PL-11 Żywiec	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● beer is shown as a treasure, ● wordplay, ● reference to a legendary gold train, supposedly buried in a tunnel in Lower Silesia, ● incompatibility between the legend and beer.

Ad PL-12 Sylc	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● wordplay, ● “naked” bottle of the product and clothes thrown everywhere, ● the concept of nudity with reference to the product that cannot undress, ● the ad is not funny.
Ad PL-13 WAŚ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the thought that someone could make such a ridiculous ad is funny, ● it makes no sense as there is no connection between the domains, ● the ad is not funny.
Ad PL-14 Lidl	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● unexpectedness, ● wordplay, ● the fact that a well-known aphorism was changed to advertise a fish, ● the clash between something philosophical and a piece of fish that is very mundane.
Ad PL-15 RTV Euro AGD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● reference to a song by Dawid Podsiadło, ● the way in which the ad indirectly refers to curly hair, ● creative use of words.
Ad PL-16 Biedronka	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a bowl is made of a tomato, ● the idea that you can eat your tomato soup straight from a tomato, ● the ad is not funny.
Ad PL-17 AXN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● reference to <i>Star Wars</i> and elections at the same time, ● the form is similar to the one employed on elections posters, ● comparing the audience to ordinary stormtroopers, ● the fact that stormtroopers have problems with aim and voters are equally hopeless when it comes to voting.
Ad PL-18 Škoda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the fact that one does not associate hunting with a car, ● Eskimo people are not likely to use cars or hunt them, ● the car that is floating on an ice floe, ● that Škoda is said to be a good catch.
Ad PL-19 Krakus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Krakus’ pickled cucumber is John McClane, ● reference to the film <i>Die Hard</i>, ● the picture, ● the eyes of the cucumber.
Ad PL-20 Ikea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● atypical reference to Prince Harry and his wedding, ● the similarity in terms of names (Prince Harry and chair Harry), ● the ad ridicules female fans of Prince Harry, ● personification of a piece of furniture.

TABLE 14. Perceived Sources of Humorousness for the Sample in Polish

The unexpectedness or even impossibility of the situations depicted was frequently indicated as a source of humour in the most successful ads from both samples. Broadly conceived incompatibility and creativity were also specified as important factors responsible for humorousness; so were irony, punning, wordplay, and references to popular culture that often surfaced in the survey. Humorous connections between the concepts involved, however, were not always as straightforward as the advertisers may have

wished for; many a time, research participants hit some stumbling blocks connected with reference to sensitive scripts, the unavailability of certain scripts, insufficient anchoring, or “tolerance for incongruity” (Bruner & Postman, 1949, p. 208).

The adverse influence of the latter was particularly visible with regard to Ad E-12 and Ad E-17 which employed distorted images that spoil the ads in the eyes of the informants. It can therefore be said that research participants generally had a low tolerance for radical departures from prototypicality relations or for disturbing visuals typical of aggressive humour varieties. Although tolerance for incongruity can possibly take many forms, such as tolerance for certain jokes bordering on distaste or ridiculing certain minority groups, the ads with distorted visuals were the only manifestations thereof present in the analysis conducted.

As far as abject failures are concerned, Ad E-13 for Via Uno Shoes, for example, was based on a misunderstanding that was introduced by the visual layer; nevertheless, some research participants failed to recognise the ad as a humorous misunderstanding and were fooled as to what they were looking at. They were therefore misled by the ad into believing that they were actually looking at female buttocks and not at heels, for once they ingested the image, they disregarded the text. It is highly probable that, since they did not like what they saw, they did not process the ad any further because the first, yet “premature” and incorrect perceptual hypothesis was already there. This is due to the fact that once human mind arrives at a conclusion, it rarely looks for another if the interpretation fits the context. Bruner and Postman explain this phenomenon in the following way: “perhaps the greatest single barrier to the recognition of incongruous stimuli is the tendency for perceptual hypotheses to fixate after receiving a minimum of confirmation” (1949, p. 221).

To give another example, Ad E-12 for Syc performed rather poorly in humorousness ratings because the perceivers were faced with insufficient cues; having problems with the identification of domains and with ad comprehension in general, the informants could not appreciate its humorous dimension since it is impossible for cognitively inaccessible concepts to violate previous expectations and thus cause humour (Giora, 1991). In this case, the combination of the visual and the textual within the ad apparently failed to provide sufficient anchoring (a notion drawn from Barthes (1977), which is based on the assumption that the text serves as an anchor which reinforces the meaning and secures it firmly in position, so to speak, thus steering the perceiver’s interpretation towards the intended meaning).

It is highly probable that the explanatory power of the text was reduced owing to small font size (which was also the case in Ad E-15, discussed previously in this section).

When it comes to Ad PL-12 and Ad PL-13, on the other hand, research participants claimed that these ads were rather confusing and shallow since they were based on sexual themes (female body, nudity, reference to sexual intercourse that is about to take place) that were totally unrelated to the products and unjustified by the context. To their minds, there was no link between the elements contained in the ads and, hence, they did not deem them humorous. As a rule, reference to sex was not appreciated by the informants (see Ad E-14) except for Ad E-11 for #vilniusgspot, which may be due to the fact that the ad employed the theme of sexual intercourse in an exceptionally innovative, creative, and surprising way which won much acclaim.

Lastly, the final question in the survey was: “Do you have an impression that the ad imposes any opinions upon you?” As results from the answers provided by the informants, message claims were usually made more subtle and indirect thanks to metaphor and humour, as it was rarely the case that they were of the opinion that the ads imposed any opinions on them. According to research participants, there were only two ads from the sample in English and two from the sample in Polish that felt like they were imposing opinions on them; yet the reasons why they felt so were different. Ad E-1 for Vitakraft and Ad PL-16 for Biedronka, for instance, presented the audience with superficially attractive versions of their products; while the former was sugarcoated, also literally (as the metaphor was A DOG IS COTTON CANDY), the latter seemed artificial to many informants (since the tomato depicted did not seem natural but rather plastic), which may have impacted their perception of the strength of advertising claims. Also, they were of the opinion that, despite its figurative structure, Ad PL-2 for Lubelska may be seen as too straightforward in criticising one of the latest governmental programs of social transfers; owing to this one-sided view of the problem, the persuasive appeal of the ad was more perceptible to research participants. Likewise, Ad E-5 referring to the conflict between Trump and Mexican people was seen as the one that imposed specific opinions on the audience, for Mexicans were depicted as newcomers that stand outside the room; research participants often read this ad as an implication that the USA should build the wall on the border between the two states in question.

Interestingly, Ad E-16 for Pepsi, which targeted their major competitor in a conspicuous manner, was not perceived as one that tried to impose

any opinions on the audience. It seems that the effect of humour was such that they did not consider its deprecating power, which surely carries value judgements and may strongly influence their opinions on both Pepsi and Coca-Cola, boosting the image of the former and disparaging the latter. Notwithstanding the fact that we should not generalise on the basis of one ad, such a finding surely gives food for thought when it comes to humour-induced value judgements and persuasive effects. Yet the impact of humour is more nuanced because each sample and each ad is different, which makes it difficult to generalise about humour and ad comprehension. At this point, the difference between humour-dominant and message-dominant ads should certainly be stressed since their chief purposes vary. For the former, the entertaining factor is the most important, which means that they focus on the emotive load of the message and the overall impression the audience is left with, with information being secondary. In case of the latter, on the other hand, positive emotions evoked in the audience are to amplify message claims. What really counts, though, is the specific objective pursued by a given advertising agency.

The results for comprehension measures provided in current literature on the subject matter are rather mixed. In spite of the fact that some researchers in the field posit that “humour could harm comprehension and recall and is not good for complex messages or for gaining persuasion” (Gulas & Weinberger, 2006, p. 103), others claim that it can be effective at gaining comprehension in that it is capable of altering the perceiver’s reception environment (Tyebjee, 1978). This is due to the fact that it engenders arousal in the audience, thus propelling them to process the advertising stimulus, which, in turn, may stimulate ad comprehension and recall (see: Tyebjee (1978), Wu, Crocker, & Rogers (1989), as well as Gulas & Weinberger (2006, p. 104), where they report on the U.S. and UK Agency Executive Opinions about the Communication Objectives for Humour).

It is important to bear in mind that comprehension as such is very idiosyncratic (Shimp, 2008, p. 143) and, furthermore, that “different people happen to have different interpretations of humorous texts, which means that the same humorous text may be hilarious, successful, disgusting, offensive, discriminating, etc. depending on each recipient’s perspective and value system” (Tsakona, 2017, p. 179; cf. Palmer, 1994). To take the argument further, Tsakona is of the opinion that people in general “have different *ideologies* of humour and its use” (Tsakona, 2017, p. 182), which means that their preconceptions about humour, including what is viewed

as humorous and the contexts in which humour may be used, can deeply influence their evaluations thereof.

In view of that fact, it appears that similar preconceptions can possibly influence the perception of the two sets of ads studied herein. Given the fact that people in Poland often think of foreign and especially of western products, technology, and solutions as superior to the Polish ones, it seemed germane to ask whether, in general, they consider foreign ads to be better than Polish ones. I will therefore refer to another of my studies (Stwora, 2019b) where I aimed at investigating the informants' opinions as regards the use of foreign language(s) in advertising. To this end, I designed a short, anonymous questionnaire that was distributed to the students of the Institute of English, University of Silesia, Poland, in June 2019. I managed to gather 44 responses altogether from a group of research participants aged 18-29, 86% of whom were between 18 and 23 years of age, while 14% of them were between 24 and 29 years old. The group that volunteered to take part in the study was hence rather homogenous as regards the age factor and some research participants already filled in the previous questionnaires on ad ratings and ad comprehension. As far as the informants' gender is concerned, females made up 64% of the group studied, which, again, results from the prevalence of female students at the faculty. Nevertheless, this imbalance did not influence the results in any way because, as it turned out, the responses gathered from men and women were alike.

The observation apposite to the present discussion that was made in that article (Stwora, 2019b) was that the majority of research participants declared greater liking for foreign ads, as they mostly agreed with the claim that the quality of foreign ads, as compared to Polish ones, is generally higher. Only 14% of the informants disagreed with the opinion that, as a rule, foreign advertisements are better than Polish ones. Such a conclusion suggests that Polish subjects may be biased against Polish ads and in favour of foreign advertising. This was already signalled by several informants taking part in the previous studies on ad ratings and ad comprehension, for some of them said that they had a feeling that Polish ads will be more "lame" even before they saw the ads to be rated.

Returning to the present research, the inclusion of this section on ad comprehension certainly helps us to reach a more holistic understanding of the workings of humorous metaphorical ads. Once the issues concerning the figurative complexity of the ads discussed have been dealt with and once the attitudinal and emotive aspects have been covered, it is possible

to have a closer look at comprehension itself. The relationship between ad comprehension and likeability is not straightforward, for the perceiver may not understand the ad and still like it because it is original in its format or colours, for instance. However, by inferring from specific cases, it seems clear that, for the ads that outperformed the majority in the sample, good comprehension results usually turned out to be positively related to funniness ratings. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the ads of outstanding and good performance in terms of humorousness were not usually characterised by the greatest depths of processing. Lower levels of comprehension, on the other hand, were found to adversely affect humorousness ratings, which is hardly surprising because having problems with ad comprehension is likely to contribute to a failure to appreciate its humour value.

It was argued that problems with understanding the ads properly can be attributed to faulty design, for example, insufficient textual anchoring (formal design), the unavailability of certain scripts, or limited tolerance for what is considered repulsive or deformed (conceptual design). Slightly lower understanding of the ads in English by Polish informants was confirmed, which was already supposed based on bigger variability in funniness ratings. What is more, despite the fact that many answers concerning ad comprehension showed the informants' insufficient understanding of the sense of "metaphorical," they also pointed to the potential richness of possible interpretations that can be drawn from figurative multimodal ads. This is because the boundaries of metaphor are mutable, changing depending on the perceiver, depth of processing, and context. "The boundaries of metaphor are determined by the semantic connectivity of its components which is largely stimulated by the context. In some circumstances, once inconsistent or senseless pairings of domains suddenly reveal their legitimacy" (Okopień-Sławińska, 1980, p. 33, trans. A.S.).

The same holds true for humour because its boundaries are determined by the context and by specific connections between the scripts involved, which renders humour very fluid. Furthermore, despite the advertiser's attempt at steering the audience towards the meaning intended, the very interpretation of humour is contingent on the audience factor as well. Naturally, humour is forever subjective an issue that is conditional upon individual differences such as cultural background, sensitivity, mood or circumstances, to mention but a few. What is funny for one person may turn out to be anathema to another; what seems amusing to the joke teller may be incomprehensible to the recipient; and sometimes even the most

innocent anecdote may gravely offend another person (cf. Lewis, 2006, p. 15). Davies (2008, p. 6) says that humour itself “does not *give* offence; its recipients *take* offence.” Consequently, the phenomenon of humour *per se* “cannot be blamed, for example, for promoting racist, sexist, or other discriminatory views, although it may exploit them to make people laugh” (Tsakona, 2017, p. 179). It exists only in the perceiver’s understanding of what is humorous to his/her mind (Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 2011). That is why metaphor working in tandem with humour may be subject to more interpretations and while the metaphorical in ads may seem perfectly justified to the perceiver, humorousness may be questionable, which was frequently confirmed by the results obtained from research participants.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

In conclusion, this volume focused on presenting the ways in which metaphorical and humorous elements are synergistically applied in multimodal press advertising. Broadly speaking, it aimed at showing that the humorous and metaphorical variety of advertising discourse should be perceived as a three-dimensional model that is based on independent, yet directly interacting and tightly interwoven, linguistic, conceptual, and communicative properties that form the basis of production, comprehension, and reception of advertising messages. More specifically, it worked towards exploring the linkage between the humorous and the metaphorical, highlighting important common denominators between these two construal phenomena whose operation is based on the process of conceptual integration. Their combination in the multimodal context of advertising, where both metaphor and humour play a key role, surely merited discussion.

To this end, I have examined formal and conceptual structures of humorous metaphorical ads of multimodal nature, and also their communicative functions and impact on research participants, all of which were supported by a sound body of theory. Owing to the fact that a substantial number of findings has amassed, I decided to divide this chapter into several subsections for the sake of clarity.

6.1 Conclusions Concerning Qualitative Investigation

The primary objective of this book was to explore the workings of conceptual integration and of the incongruity-resolution mechanism as realised in humorous metaphors that were present in selected multimodal press ads in English and Polish. Having identified the presence of resolvable incon-

gruity, script oppositions, and non-prototypicality as humour markers, I drew upon existing research on multimodality, conceptual blending, and humour studies in order to examine a selection of press advertisements. The conclusions following from the analysis will be presented in order of appearance.

As results from the preliminary research during the corpus construction, the amount of figurative and humorous content that advertisers are willing to build into their ads is quite large, but the combination of the metaphorical and the humorous seems not as frequent as solely metaphorical or exclusively humorous ads. In the light of the observations made herein, it is justified to claim that combining metaphor and humour in press ads in English was a common trend, whereas Polish ads that used humour and metaphor synergistically were radically less numerous as compared to the English corpus. It turns out that such a variety is very scarce when it comes to the Polish corpus, thus proving a marked tendency for humorous wordplay and superiority humour rather than for humorous metaphorical incongruities. While I would like to refrain from evaluations, this undeniably shows that there is a major difference between the corpora in terms of instantiations of humour in press advertising. These findings surely bring up some challenging questions relating to the nature of humour in ads across languages and cultures, showing that varying sociocultural settings can influence the dynamics behind advertising messages.

As regards the whole corpus of Polish humorous ads, they usually relied on wordplay, superiority humour, and strong contextualisation, frequently in the form of RTM (i.e., real time marketing) advertising that focuses on up-to-the-minute events and thus weaves ads into current social, political or cultural events. Some of these findings are in line with prior studies in the field of Polish advertising discourse which have shown that ads in Poland oftentimes make use of funny puns and wordplay, neologisms, and modified phraseology (cf. Bralczyk, 2000; Lusińska, 2007; Iwańska, 2013; Stwora, 2018b). While the continued popularity of more or less humorous word puzzles in Polish advertising is a fact to be reckoned with, it seems quite surprising that the synergistic use of humour and metaphor in Polish ads was not as common as in the corpus in English.

The paramount objective defined in the introductory part of the book was to investigate the ways in which metaphors can be used as vehicles for humour in advertising discourse; this was accomplished thanks to qualitative content analysis based on two language samples of metaphorical ads that contained incongruity-resolution humour (see Appendix 1 for

the transcripts of the advertising material used). Taking everything into account, on the basis of the ads described in Chapter 5, it can be argued that there is a productive synergy between metaphor and humour. This is due to their cognitive similarity in terms of the blending mechanism and apparent likeness of metaphorical and humorous scenarios perceived as dynamic cognitive schemata or seen as mini-narratives with implied sequences of events.

The results obtained from the sample in English indicate that the visual mode carries the greatest amount of the figurative burden, as it was detected in 13 out of 20 ads sampled. Thus, the incidence of visual metaphors clearly shows that the pictorial was actually playing first fiddle. Multimodal metaphors, on the other hand, appeared six times while there was only one verbal metaphor. This may be due to the increasing reliance on images in advertising discourse in general, as the picture is frequently capable of conveying much more information in a shorter time than the verbal is and, on top of that, it offers “greater opportunity for the communication of excitement, mood, and imagination” (Dyer, 1982, p. 69).

In this light, it comes as no surprise that humour was mostly visual as well; visual metaphor and visual humour were paired 12 times, which means that more than half of the ads from the collection in English favoured the pictorial mode over the multimodal one. When it comes to multimodal humour, six instances thereof were noted, partially overlapping with multimodal metaphor and, consequently, confirming the synergistic operation of metaphor and humour in the set in English. The primacy of images is strengthened once more, as none of the ads in English employed solely textual humour.

Once the contributions made by each modality in the Polish set were studied, it turned out that there were more multimodal than visual metaphors (12 cases of multimodal metaphors and 8 instances of visual ones). Interestingly, the distribution of multimodal metaphor matched multimodal humour at all times and visual metaphor was always coupled with visual humour, which suggests that these ads were consistent in the use of metaphor and humour expressed through the same modalities. Such a finding may also indicate that the sample in Polish was less diversified than the one in English.

As far as metaphor types are concerned, funny metaphors outnumbered the ads that employed metaphors with funny referents in both samples. Relating to the types of meaning operations identified, the results for the English sample overlapped with those for the Polish set

(the highest incidence of comparisons for similarity and the operation of connection). Yet an important difference between the two sets was that comparison for opposition was absent from the Polish set. Nonetheless, it is true for both sets that some ads were more complex since they were found to exploit several concurrent types of meaning operations. Also, the two sets of advertisements were roughly similar as regards the visual rhetoric adopted.

The possible/impossible and actual/non-actual script oppositions (SOs) were the most common in both language samples, which means that these SOs constituted the axis of asymmetry that was responsible for generating the lion's share of humour in the ads studied; by way of explanation, it was already said in Chapter 4 that "some asymmetry between scripts is needed to generate humour (Viana, 2010)" (Yus, 2016, p. 12) because, as a rule, it is some kind of incongruity that makes the message humorous. Then followed the absence/presence SO, the instances of which were less numerous but still significant. In both language sets, there were several ads that employed two SOs concurrently; nonetheless, the richness of the Polish set was lower since the ads from this sample employed maximally two SOs at the same time, whereas those from the English set used three or even five SOs simultaneously, thus building far more complex advertising messages.

I do realise that such an oversimplified description of SOs does not exhaust the topic of opposition. Nevertheless, the point was to show that the ads are based on SOs and to identify the most common types thereof, for too detailed an account of their operation was not necessary here. For example, more attention could have been devoted to the oppositions themselves and their presentation in the form of graphs but, given the scope of this research, such a procedure would not contribute to the discussion in any significant manner, only diverting the readers' attention away from the subject matter.

A comparison of results concerning humour types shows that surprise humour was the most frequent, as it appeared in 50% of the ads from the set in English and in all the ads from the Polish sample, mainly owing to the fact that it matches the incongruity-resolution pattern so well. Surprise humour was found to co-occur with other types of humour as well, generally with parody and irony, though the range of humour types was much more diversified in the English set. Disparaging humour, on the other hand, correlated positively with the presence of both the aggressive and self-enhancing function of humour, with the latter variety mitigating

aggressive overtones. Both samples made use of self-enhancing humour, which subsequently appeared in a broad range of configurations.

All in all, although both samples analysed were rather similar when it comes to the visual rhetoric adopted or the types of script opposition employed, the Polish set turned out to be less diversified than the English one with regard to complexity. Qualitative investigation revealed that the incongruity-resolution mechanism is quite rarely linked with metaphor in multimodal press advertising in Polish. What is more, the Polish set was found to be less complex when it comes to script oppositions and to the meaning operations detected (lacking comparison for opposition), and less diversified as regards the cross-modal humour-metaphor relations. This is due to the fact that the collection in Polish remained so consistent in the synergistic application of metaphor and humour expressed through the same modalities. Conversely, the ads in English were far more variegated in that they often coupled visual humour and multimodal metaphors or multimodal humour and visual metaphors, for instance. As for humour types, it should be stated once again that parodic overtones resurfaced in both samples, which points to the frequently pivotal role of parody in the ads studied.

I would like to refrain from evaluations concerning the material, though, because my intention was not to state whether the composition of the ads studied was either good or bad, but rather to describe some observable trends in the construction of multimodal press ads in the two samples compared. Notwithstanding, what surely follows from the comparison of the two corpora is that metaphor and incongruity-resolution humour frequently go hand in hand in the ads in English, while the ads from the Polish corpus preferred other humour types; this low incidence of simultaneously metaphorical and humorous ads subscribing to the incongruity-resolution pattern shows that different sociocultural settings may radically affect the structures employed in advertising messages across cultures.

6.2 Conclusions on Ad Ratings and Emotional Responses

Because affect and cognition influence each other, acknowledging both was crucial to understanding how people actually react to advertising stimuli. The volume therefore aimed at examining liking and funniness (ad ratings), as well as affective attitudes (emotional responses) towards the advertising material presented. A questionnaire based on a Likert-type scale

and visual self-report was used to check the levels of liking and appreciation of selected metaphorical ads that contain incongruity-resolution humour (see Appendix 2 for the survey). Once again, it is vital to lay great emphasis on the fact that ad appreciation (i.e., ad liking as regards perceived levels of ad creativity, the format, colours, and symbols used, etc.) and the appreciation of humour value should not be mistaken for the same thing, for the perceiver may appreciate the advertisement itself (e.g., its wittiness, colours or form) but not find it amusing at all.

The findings obtained on the basis of the survey show that 14 ads from the sample in English performed very well (25% of the ads sampled), well (20%) or at least satisfactorily (25%), which means that, overall, 70% of the ads taken into account successfully instigated humour. Perhaps the most central finding is that the ads grouped under both the “green” and “blue” categories of the ads of outstanding performance made use of multimodal metaphor and multimodal humour, which lends support to the proposition that these two phenomena might be synergistic with each other in advertising discourse. Naturally, while drawing such a conclusion, it should be stressed that, taking into account the whole sample in English, multimodal humour and multimodal metaphor in tandem did not always enjoy such an enthusiastic reception by research participants because, in fact, much depends on the specific ad under consideration. Nonetheless, the fact that the collection of the ads of outstanding performance had the highest incidence of multimodal metaphor coupled with multimodal humour may still serve as a basis for some insightful generalisation.

On the whole, the instances of failed ads employed visual metaphor and visual humour more often. Poor results may be explained by the lack of the anchoring function of the text that was present in multimodal constructions. What follows is that, supposedly, visual metaphor and visual humour were more open to interpretation, which may have resulted in more instances of miscommunication between the audience that is responsible for the decoding process and the senders of these ads who encoded them in the first place. Such an observation testifies to the force of multimodal structures in advertising, as compared to the visual mode alone, which was also confirmed by the sample in Polish.

Reverting to the issue of the ads of outstanding performance from the English sample, apart from the aforementioned multimodal nature of both humour and metaphor, the “green” category was characterised by frequent use of the figure of juxtaposition. Surprise humour was the most common humour type but marked presence of satire and parody

should also be acknowledged. Such a configuration would suggest that incongruity-resolution humour coupled with disparaging humour yielded the best results. Furthermore, it appears that the sheer multitude of script oppositions employed simultaneously in these ads was another important factor responsible for their success. Perhaps finding these ads humorous was easier for research participants because of the higher number of possible incongruities that stem from opposing scripts; thus, even if they failed to detect one of many SOs present, they would still deem the ad humorous based on the incongruities they managed to find and resolve.

The advertising messages included in the “blue” category of the ads of outstanding performance were characterised by the operation of opposition and the application of funny metaphors. The ads of good performance, on the other hand, frequently made use of pictures of animals which fulfilled the function of a funny referent in the construction of the metaphorical; notwithstanding, the use of animals in advertising cannot be perceived as a reliable guarantee for higher liking or increased funniness, which was confirmed by other ads featuring animals that were analysed. Lastly, as regards the ads of satisfactory performance, the informants oftentimes liked them but did not find them especially amusing, perhaps owing to the fact that the prototypicality relations present in them were less intuitive than in the examples from the previous categories.

Despite the fact that a significant portion of the ads examined was rated as humorous, the jocular factor was not always as effective as it could have been expected. 30% of the ads from the sample in English failed to entertain the audience in the manner intended and thus performed poorly. As shown, the results for these advertising messages were distributed quite evenly among the categories of the ads of rather poor, poor, and very poor performance, since each of them constituted 10% of all the cases analysed. To be more specific, four out of six unsuccessful ads received mixed results as regards ad liking and funniness ratings, whereas two ads caused intense dislike, that is, were classified as the ads of very poor performance.

The ads of rather poor performance employed visual metaphor and visual humour, as well as made use of abnormal imagery whose aim was to disfigure the animals depicted for humorous and figurative purposes. These advertisements were therefore characterised by the application of metaphors with funny referents, which was probably the cause of positive emotions evoked by the ads in spite of mixed liking and funniness ratings. It should be emphasised that the general positive effect of metaphors with funny referents was noted for the whole sample in English save for Ad E-17

(already described in section 5.6.2). It seems that visual distortion and the use of the aggressive dimension of slapstick humour were not appreciated by research participants. Likewise, distorted imagery was present in the ads of poor performance; in these ads, the mechanism of humour based on prototypicality/non-prototypicality of category members was at work but it was observed that many informants had problems with the identification of SOs and, hence, that they were mostly unable to trace the basis on which the incongruity was constructed.

According to the incongruity-resolution theory of humour, a fundamental condition is that the perceiver holds two cognitions which are necessarily discrepant with each other. However, as the informants had problems with the identification of the scenarios, they could not understand the message properly and so could not appreciate the humorous in the ad. Since only one cognition was being held, no dissonance could have occurred; no dissonance equals no incongruity and this, in turn, equals no humour. Paraphrasing Giora (1991), cognitively inaccessible concepts cannot violate any previous expectations, which makes it impossible for humour to emerge.

Finally, the ads of very poor performance, which displayed such qualities as the prevalence of (1) not funny and (2) neutral responses, low liking, and intense boringness, were not that numerous, as they made up 10% of the set in English; yet the inclusion of unsuccessful attempts at humour in the analysis was very valuable because failed humour makes it possible to observe the differences between successful and unsuccessful ads. The two ads that were found to be lacking in humour for most research participants sharply differed from one another but the conceptual skeleton behind them was roughly similar, for both employed visual metaphor and visual humour, comparison for similarity, and the figure of replacement. Once more, the openness of the visual form, which was not supported by any textual cues, was the factor that caused the messages to fall short of the mark.

When it comes to the set in Polish, the data showed that 13 advertisements (65% of the sample) received favourable feedback but only three of them were of outstanding performance, which stands for 15% of the whole set. An interesting peculiarity that can be noticed in the said sample is that, for the category of the ads of outstanding performance, the sample in Polish lacked any examples that could be put into the “blue” category (which translates into high liking and positive emotional response (i.e., exuberance), and, at the same time, into mixed results in terms of fun-

niness owing to a more or less equal number of very funny/funny and neutral responses). Another interesting observation is that no ads of good performance (i.e., showing high liking, positive emotional response, and rated as very funny or funny) were detected, which accentuates a marked difference between the two samples compared.

One could say that research participants were more sceptical about the set in Polish or that, for some reason, they did not appreciate its humour value. Although it is only speculative a remark, this could perhaps be due to the fact that they simply considered foreign advertising discourse superior to their domestic one. Such an observation that the quality of foreign ads, as compared to Polish ones, is generally higher finds corroboration in my article (Stwora 2019b), where I report on my findings that the majority of research participants taking part in my study declared greater liking for foreign ads. Irrespective of the reasons behind these poor ratings, the informants in the present study were rather consistent in their answers as regards the sample in Polish, which can be concluded on the basis of low standard deviations in funniness evaluations. These ratings showed considerably lower variance in comparison to the results for the set in English, which means that those obtained for the Polish ads were more homogenous and this fact testifies to greater stability of ratings over research participants taking part in the study herein described.

Generalising from the examples of the ads of outstanding performance, it can be observed that the most successful ads in the set in Polish employed multimodal humour and multimodal metaphor in tandem, as did the most successful ads in English; such a finding confirms the synergistic effects of multimodal metaphor and multimodal humour in producing successful advertising messages. Again, much depends on the ad itself because ads differ in so many other ways, for example in terms of script oppositions, visual structure, targets, the themes and symbols they use; yet, individualised as they tend to be, this marked tendency, shown in both the Polish and English samples, makes it possible to draw a conclusion that multimodality in humour and metaphor has an edge over the visual mode alone. A formulation of this sort will constitute a promising starting point as regards future comparative analysis.

Apart from the already stated multimodal character of both the metaphorical and the humorous in the ads of outstanding performance, emphasis should also be placed on the parodic and ironic overtones that lent support to these ads, which was also true for the set in English. It appears that adding a mocking dimension to the ads based on incongruity-

resolution humour yielded very positive results because such a strategy produced desired attitudinal effects in the informants. Incongruous pairings of scripts made for the purpose of these ads were unexpected and unconventional enough to surprise the perceivers with their ingenuity and wit, which undoubtedly contributed to their success.

On the other hand, the ads of satisfactory performance (divided into three smaller subgroups described in 5.7.2) amounted to half of the sample in Polish, which, again, points to major disproportions in the structure of the set under discussion. For the ads included in the first subcategory (i), good performance in terms of ad liking and funniness could be observed, with the simultaneous exuberant and/or dependent moods (+P+A±D) on the part of research participants. A significant number of these ads employed parody for humorous purposes and resorted to superiority humour which co-occurred with surprise humour. This combination of disparaging humour and incongruity-resolution humour may have accounted for their considerable performance.

The advertising messages included in the subcategories (ii) and (iii) aroused interest in the informants and were visually attractive. While the second subgroup (ii) was characterised by very good results as regards ad liking, its content was usually rated as funny or neutral and produced dependent emotions in the informants. When it comes to the third subgroup (iii), it was composed of the ads that scored quite high in terms of ad liking and managed to result in exuberant and/or dependent emotions but were mainly rated as neutral; in other words, the emotive load they carried was not powerful enough to count as funny. Both subcategories (ii) and (iii) employed visual metaphor and visual humour. Their interesting visual structure may have been the primary factor behind high liking for these ads, even though the perceptual mismatch for each of them was not as strong as was the case for the previous categories. It can be speculated that it was the engaging form of these ads that actually countered mixed results in terms of funniness and balanced mixed results for the dominance variable.

I should also briefly discuss the ads from the sample in Polish that fell short of the mark; it was determined that seven advertisements (35% of the sample) failed as humorous ads. Although, at first glance, such a finding is rather consistent with the results obtained from the sample in English, it would be wrong to claim that the two samples performed in a similar way. This is owing to the fact that the results for the ads that were not very successful were distributed more evenly in the sample in English, whereas

the Polish set performed proportionally worse because the number of the ads of very poor performance amounted to a quarter of the whole set in Polish, which shows a dramatic difference between the samples.

Almost all the ads within this category employed humour based on vague inter-categorical boundaries. Although it would surely be premature to draw any firm conclusions based on this relatively small sample, it is impossible not to hypothesise that this fuzziness may have been responsible for blurring the sense of category membership, which, in turn, hindered humour. In other words, because the input spaces employed in these ads could not be assigned to adjacent categories, there existed no sufficient common link between them on the basis of which humour could have emerged. This was because the peripheral members, that is, the ones having the features of at least two categories, which were supposed to be the basis of inter-category contrasts, did not actually share any conspicuous qualities. Rather, the link between the categories was so indirect (or sometimes even far-fetched) that the perceivers had to devote more time and cognitive effort to access the less salient features and hence find the foundation for the metaphorical. Since the inputs were not apparently perceived as belonging to adjacent categories, no primary incorrect categorisation leading to humorous responses could have taken place.

With regard to the mechanism of multimodal humour, as viewed through the lens of the prototype theory, the ads analysed were predominantly based on what Chen and Jiang (2018) label as the fuzzy inter-categorical boundary and on the prototypicality/non-prototypicality of category members. These two mechanisms were the most widespread in both language samples, as opposed to humour that employs family resemblance. In fact, it was observed that there were only two ads, one in the sample in English and the other in the set in Polish, that based their humour on deliberate marginalisation of differences between distinct category members that share family resemblance.

Thanks to the survey on ad ratings and emotional responses, it was possible to provide both an accurate account of the informants' feelings and a clear gradation of the ads according to their performance. Additionally, it was my intention to discuss the specific targets of the ads sampled but an exact comparison between the corpus in English and in Polish was impossible given the major yet unexpected difficulty with the construction of the corpus in Polish. The only ads that employed incongruity-resolution humour did not surpass the number needed for the sample construction that was set to 20, which was why I decided to consider them my sample.

It is essential to stress that the butts of jokes were not as multifarious as it was the case in the sample in English. Also, an interesting aspect to strike the eye with regard to the set in Polish is the lack of ads that targeted the competition or the recipient. While it is understandable that, in some situations, laughing at the audience *per se* may be risky, it is difficult to explain why the ads from the sample in Polish refrained from poking fun at the competition, which was not the case when it comes to the ads in English.¹

6.3 Discussion on Ad Comprehension

Lastly, I wanted to check ad comprehension in order to gain more detailed insights about the informants' understanding of the ads they rated. To this end, I used an open-ended questionnaire (see Appendix 3), which allowed to see whether research participants were actually aware of the mechanisms producing metaphor and humour in figurative advertisements and, most importantly, how they understood such ads.

Although the present study favoured the subjective view on comprehension, which focuses on individual interpretations of the perceivers, the objective view was not disregarded since it was necessary to see whether the messages intended by the advertising agencies actually matched what the informants extracted from these ads. Thus, as far as the cognition-oriented approach is concerned, testing the comprehension variable has shown that understanding the actual messages behind the advertising material selected was relatively easy for research participants. The number of meanings drawn correctly from the ads studied was quite high, which testifies to relatively high ad literacy of research participants. It appears that the informants automatically recognised that they should look for metaphorical interpretations, even if they did not always identify them as metaphors or failed to specify the domains involved in the production of figurative meanings.

¹ At this point, I would like to thank Dr Tomasz Kalaga from Kujawy and Pomorze University in Bydgoszcz for suggesting a possible explanation as to why Polish advertising seems stricter with any humour directed at competition. Based on Araczewska's (2011) article on INFOR.PL (a Polish website devoted to accounting, entrepreneurship, and HR issues), he pointed to the fact that, under unfair competition law, advertisers in Poland must not show competition in a bad light to boost their own image. Comparison of different brands may be used only if verifiable features of a product are set side by side, but this cannot be done at the expense of competition. Humour targeting competitive products is thus simply considered risky for fear of lawsuits.

Interestingly, comparing the sets in English and Polish, it was the latter that, in percentage terms, received more negative responses to the question concerning ads' metaphoricity. It seems that the figurative dimension of the ads was less perceptible to the perceivers when metaphor was paired with metonymy and with parody or satire, for instance, since they highlighted different aspects of the same message, sometimes making the metaphorical fade. Thus, the occurrence of metaphonymical structures and strongly parodic overtones rendered metaphoricity secondary to many research participants, probably because they were perceived as dominating.

What is more, when the link between the elements placed together in an ad was seen as insufficient to explain the blend, the informants were often confused and, consequently, unsure whether they were dealing with a metaphorical message or not. If the concepts required to comprehend the ad were not easily accessible in the informants' cognitive repertoire or if the ad was too complex (for example, if it contained numerous references or its visual structure was particularly rich), their indecisiveness as regards metaphoricity ratings was greater. Taking everything into account, problems with ad comprehension can be attributed to broadly conceived faulty design of certain ads. It is highly probable that it was not only the unavailability of certain scripts or limited tolerance for what is considered repulsive or deformed, but also insufficient textual anchoring that were the primary causes of poor comprehension results. It should come as no surprise that, "in mass-communication, there are as many cognitive environments in which [...] [a] stimulus must achieve relevance as there are addressees in the audience. Miscommunication may already arise on the level of encoding/decoding" (Forceville, 2020, p. 110).

As regards the identification of the domains involved in the production of the metaphorical, many informants did not know what the domains were and, therefore, could not answer the question. Despite the fact that they did not know metaphor-related terminology, apparently due to insufficient knowledge of the workings of the figurative, they did not have major problems with understanding metaphorical ads. Moreover, even if they did not realise that they were dealing with metaphorical content, research participants' aptitude for comprehending metaphorical ads usually stayed at the same level.

In line with what was stated by the informants, the presence of metaphors was cued by replacement, similarity, and comparison, although they also indicated that widely understood incongruity (also perceived as the impossibility of the situations presented) was an important factor too;

research participants also saw symbols, allusions, and various kinds of reference as the signs of the figurative. Furthermore, many of them claimed that, to their minds, the picture was the source of the metaphorical and they were not wrong because it is “an incongruity in the visual syntax of the image [that] works as an *ad hoc* pointer alerting the readers to a metaphoric interpretation” (Yus, 2009, p. 157). This is probably due to the fact that the visual layer “has done part of the ‘work’ of comprehending” (Morgan & Reichert, 1999, p. 4) so that the receiver did not have to create his/her own mental image of the situation from scratch. Instead, he/she was given some visual basis on which further recipient-modified and recipient-generated meanings could grow.

As already signalled, though, the pictorial fares much better when supported by textual anchoring that steers the audience’s comprehension in a certain direction. The present research demonstrates that verbal anchoring in multimodal ads seems to have significantly helped to increase comprehension of advertising messages thanks to the creation of verbal cues (cf. Phillips, 2000), thus improving the accuracy of interpretations of the metaphors provided by research participants. Of course, in order to really help in the comprehension processes, font size and type should be easily legible. Qualitative content analysis and the informants’ responses have shown that the textual layer of insufficient size was responsible for lower comprehension and appreciation of certain ads, which confirms the significance of sufficient verbal anchoring in multimodal ads.

With reference to the depth of processing, externally originated and recipient-modified meanings were particularly numerous. The former consisted of simple restatements of message arguments (e.g., slogans, body copies, and basic descriptions of the pictorial), whereas the latter provided more cognitive elaboration on the actual understandings of the metaphorical, even if research participants rarely referred to exact metaphorical A is B patterns. It should be emphasised that, typically, the ads of outstanding and good performance in terms of humorousness did not go hand in hand with the greatest depths of processing, which were expressed through recipient-generated meanings. These incorporated additional ideas, not directly linked to the content of the ads themselves, yet creative and valid. The presence of such recipient-generated meanings points to the fact that the boundaries of metaphor are relatively open and flexible enough to allow for the influx of more attributes or references into the blend. By way of example, some products were interpreted as natural, mysterious, and effective or as the ones that carry happiness, relaxation, or the idea of

purity despite the fact that these features and concepts were not directly cued by the ads.

This study has shown that, generally, good comprehension results were positively related to funniness ratings. When requested to explain what makes the ads in the survey funny and which elements contribute to their being funny, research participants said that it was the unexpectedness and impossibility of the situations they were presented with in the ads. These two factors were indicated most often in the most successful ads from both samples, thus confirming that the surprise factor brought about by high degrees of unconventionality is an effective humour-inducing force. The impact of incompatibility and creativity on humorousness was also noted by the informants and so were punning, wordplay, and irony, as well as specific contextual factors, such as references to popular culture which were often seen as the elements that carry the humorous load.

As regards the stumbling blocks that hindered the appreciation of humour value, it is possible to enumerate insufficient anchoring, the unavailability of certain scripts, and reference to sensitive scripts that may be appealing or appalling, depending on individual “tolerance for incongruity” (Bruner & Postman, 1949, p. 208). Furthermore, it should be mentioned that humour and metaphor in the ads herein studied may have had a positive impact on the perceived strength of message claims. When asked to express their opinions on whether or not they had an impression that the ads were imposing any opinions upon them, research participants usually said that they did not feel influenced whatsoever.

It can be concluded that the informants did understand the majority of the ads sampled, usually “at every level, from the semantic, to the pragmatic, [and] to the discursive” (Hale, 2018, p. 36), but sometimes they did not find certain ads amusing despite “getting the message.” What follows from such an observation is that “humour can fail for what are clearly not literacy deficits, but rather for discursive reasons” (Hale, 2018, p. 36). It was shown that some humorous metaphorical ads were not deemed funny because the inputs involved lacked sufficient common ground (explained in terms of distance and prototypicality relations) that would allow them to be perceived as amusing. As a result, the inputs were deficient in humorous relevance since the relation between them was not humorously straightforward to the informants’ minds. Relevance rests on the information load of a given message and the level of difficulty that is associated with the cognitive effort needed to understand it. Optimal relevance, therefore, would be ensured if the information carried was very

important (vital in the context of the ad) and if accessing this information was not too complicated (for too complicated a message would render the ad difficult to process) (cf. Kalisz, 2001, p. 20). In this light, it seems reasonable to claim that the ads that failed to elicit humour simply required too much mental effort with no clear offset in cognitive reward. Having devoted too much time and effort to get the message, the informants, in all likelihood, did not feel amused even though they ultimately understood the ads.

Obviously, “there is room in the interpretation of ads and other media messages for individual responses according to our personal perceptions or experiences” (Dyer, 1982, p. 62). After all, relevance is always “relevance-to-somebody” or, in other words, “relevance-to-an-individual” (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 142). In her paper on humour research and humour reception, Tsakona (2017) says that “humour researchers usually tend to presuppose that humorous texts will normally be perceived as such, namely that both humour producers and recipients will find the same humorous content funny. This, however, is not always the case” (Tsakona, 2017, p. 179), as evidenced by the responses to the ads analysed.

6.4 Closing Remarks

In closing, this volume centred on the synergistic application of humour and metaphor in advertising discourse, on how they work together in multimodal press ads. However, it seems impossible to assess whether it is the metaphorical or the humorous that lends more weight to the ads’ appeal, as the two are closely entwined in the ads studied and cannot be disentangled for the purpose of any analysis. Any alteration or deletion of any element within a multimodal artefact would inevitably destroy the entire message, for each multimodal ad should always be perceived as one meaningful entity (Bateman, 2008). Despite the fact that they are based on similar cognitive operations, humour and metaphor cannot be measured in the same manner and thus compared according to the same set of criteria (e.g., both humorous and metaphorical ads can be compared in terms of originality but not as far as their funniness is concerned since the figurative ad may not necessarily be amusing). The question whether humorous metaphorical ads perform better than solely metaphorical or solely humorous ones is therefore, for now, impossible to answer because there are too many imponderables for an overall prediction to be made: the audience factor,

the message itself, its originality and attractiveness, ad liking, the medium and product factor, to name but a few.

The analysis herein conducted has shown the ways in which humour and metaphor complement and support each other for the appealing advertising messages to be produced. Given the potential of both multimodal humour and multimodal metaphor signalled in this book, it can be theorised that their joint power in advertising messages results in better ad appreciation, as compared to, for example, visual humour or visual metaphors in the ads investigated. This hypothesis, however, would require additional research to confirm its transferability between research contexts, of which more in the following section devoted to the avenues for further research.

It is hoped that this investigative analysis has offered some useful insights into the operation of incongruity-resolution humour and metaphor in multimodal advertising, as it aimed at indicating distinctive discursive traits common to both successful and unsuccessful ads that co-deploy humour and metaphor. The comparative component of this research confirmed that multimodal constructions have the edge over solely visual ones that lack any verbal anchoring which could serve as a signpost guiding the perceivers' comprehension processes. Moreover, the differences between both the corpora and the samples contrasted have been examined, which made it possible to point to different communication strategies followed by the advertising discourse in English and Polish, as well as to emphasise the inherent cultural dynamics behind the connections between metaphor and humour in ads. The examples of multimodal press ads that employ metaphor and humour in tandem have shown that the incongruity-resolution mechanism may display many manifestations and produce varying responses that may be contingent upon the aptness of incongruous pairings and on the distance between the inputs involved.

The said notion of distance, along with those of suddenness and script opposition, is generally deemed insufficient an explanation as to the workings of humour. In an attempt to explain the matter, it was argued that what is non-prototypical makes people laugh. To use the variation of an aphorism that is widely known in medical circles, when people hear hoofbeats, they usually think of horses and not of zebras, which is also true for language users whose communication practices pivot on saliency. When the perceivers are faced with a text, they make certain predictions, that is, they think of the horse since it is foremost on their minds, as Giora (2003) put it. Nevertheless, if they encounter an incongruous element that conflicts with these predictions, namely a zebra instead of a horse, they

will be surprised and will start to search for relevance based on standard communication practices (i.e., assuming that the message was purposeful and intended to communicate something).

They will therefore try to resolve the incongruity, which can end in one of two ways: (a) they will find no cognitive rule governing the pairing of the congruous and the incongruous, which results in puzzlement; or (b) a cognitive rule will be found, leading to humour (cf. Suls, 1972; Ritchie, 1999; Mulder & Nijholt, 2002). According to the prototype-theoretical perspective, the perceivers will find the zebra surprising and hence humorous because the aforementioned animals belong to the same category of equids (i.e., to the horse family). Following the line of thought offered by, *inter alia*, Nerhardt (1976) and Giora (1991), and later on by Chen and Jiang (2018), it is my observation that higher degrees of humorousness are usually based on a pronounced centre-periphery dichotomy, according to which the zebra can be seen as more humorous than, for example, a bat. This is due to the fact that the prototype theory is “a theory concerning the degree of salience and typicality which we regard as an inherent source of incongruity and therefore an important inducer of humour” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 63).

In the analytical chapter, a number of examples were adduced to indicate that broadly conceived category membership (understood in terms of “(1) prototypicality and non-prototypicality of category members; (2) family resemblance shared by category members; (3) the fuzzy inter-categorical boundary” (Chen & Jiang, 2018, p. 74)) is responsible for the production of humour. Also, as evidenced by the ads that failed to produce humorous responses, incongruous pairings in the ads putting together the items that did not belong to the same category or that were not perceived as “peripheral members” (that have the features of at least two categories) proved unsuccessful in engendering humour. Hence, such a proposition about examining multimodal humour through the lens of prototype theory seems reasonably plausible.

While the qualitative investigation aimed at presenting a possibly detailed picture of the ways in which incongruity-resolution-based humour and metaphor may be synergistic with each other in advertising discourse, the book was also working towards exploring ad liking, funniness, and emotional responses triggered by these advertising stimuli, as well as ad comprehension. All these constitutive elements of the present research were included in order to render this volume as holistic as possible and, hence, to show how the overall effect brought about by such advertisements is

produced. The mechanism of conceptual integration shared by the metaphorical and the humorous allows to see that playing with meanings may lead to fascinating advertising styles; this is due to the fact that the broadly understood idea of not fitting in, or of contrast (linguistic, conceptual or contextual), actually makes room for a powerful rhetorical effect of incongruity that can render the ads more inventive and more interesting to the audience.

6.5 Limitations and Avenues for Further Research

It is not my intention to claim that the analysis presented in this work is exhaustive. I am aware of the fact that perhaps other valuable frameworks could have been applied and that much depends on the vantage point of the researcher, after all. That is why this final part of the book will be devoted to the possible limitations of this study and to the avenues for further research.

To begin with, I faced a potential problem in terms of a distinct mismatch between the two corpora investigated since, in the Polish corpus, I managed to find very few metaphorical humorous ads that were based on the incongruity-resolution mechanism. The matter was already discussed in the previous parts of the volume but let it be repeated that only 20 out of 100 ads from the Polish corpus were figurative and humorous at the same time. Owing to these difficulties in data collection, I had no choice but to consider them my sample. This may be seen as a limitation but, when I decided to focus on the subject matter, I could not have predicted this mismatch between the corpora that, nevertheless, inspired me to pursue my primary research objective even more.

This is because of the fact that a low number of humorous metaphorical ads in the Polish collection is a finding in itself and, to my mind, was not sufficient a reason to abandon the study. The very divergence regarding the formal features of the ads under consideration was countered by a short yet sufficient description of the remaining ads from the Polish collection. The detection of a major difference in terms of instantiations of humour in multimodal press advertising, on the other hand, raises fundamental questions concerning the nature of humour in ads across languages and cultures. This topic seems a highly promising research area because it is located at the confluence of humour studies, advertising research, linguistics, and cultural studies.

When it comes to transferability, that is, to the extent to which “research findings are transferable from one context to another” (Mackey & Gass, 2005, p. 368), it should be borne in mind that much depends on contextual similarities. “For transferability in qualitative research, the research context is seen as integral” (Mackey & Gass, 2005, p. 180). This, in turn, means that qualitative research findings are not usually directly transferable from one contextual setting to another. In other words, it is important to place emphasis on the fact that the observations herein made have to be treated as indicators of certain marked tendencies. As there has been little systematic research that would merge humour, metaphor, multimodality, and advertising discourse, this topic asks for more scholarly attention for the results herein presented to be confirmed (or disconfirmed). This could help to determine which findings may be appropriately transferred to another setting and, consequently, to formulate a more precise set of rules governing humorous metaphorical press ads. Further replication studies are therefore advisable to test the findings presented because the results could have potentially differed for another sample of ads. Once again, it should be emphasised that much depends on the eye of the beholder because, apart from the advertising stimuli investigated, the audience factor is decisive in the studies of this type.

Additionally, it seems fair to mention the fact that the informants taking part in the present research were aware of the experiment’s general goal to investigate advertising messages (but not of the specific ones, of course). This may have resulted in their increased focus on the material being rated, for they were supposed to fill in the questionnaires in laboratory conditions and hence interacted with the ads outside their original context. “Thus, compared to experimental participants on whom previous research conclusions were based, actual consumers may experience more resistance when confronted with commercial advertising, and may react with more avoidance or irritation” (Strick et al., 2013, p. 7). What is more, while reading a magazine or a paper, the audience does not usually centre on ads themselves, nor on their evaluation, not to mention that the sheer “abundance of advertising information exceeds the attentional resources of most consumers, which means that a lot of product information passes by unnoticed and will not be deliberately evaluated at all (see Heath, 2001)” (Strick et al., 2013, p. 6).

Furthermore, we should not lose sight of the fact that humour is a matter of perception; the audience factor is very important in determining whether a given material is funny or not. Personally, while gathering my

research material, I was of the opinion that the majority of the ads chosen for the sample was quite funny, except for two or three ads at best (these, however, still complied with all the formal humour requirements imposed on this study). The responses obtained from the informants taking part in the study, however, were not always in line with my expectations because it turned out that the ads I found hilarious fell short of the mark when rated by research participants. And, conversely, when I was not very much amused but decided to include the ad in the sample, for it fulfilled the formal requirements for it to be classified as humorous, it often occurred that the ad was rated high by the informants.

That is hardly surprising, though, because “some variation in responses may be found across informants since, in general, people differ in their reactions to stimuli and, likewise, they react differently to the advertising content they are presented with” (Stwora, 2020a, pp. 136–137). Still, given the fact that the group surveyed was rather homogenous, the results obtained are reliable. Nevertheless, apart from the age and nationality factor that, along with language proficiency, remained stable variables, the group could have been more diverse in sociolinguistic and psychographic terms, which was impossible to tell as the questionnaires were anonymous and I simply did not know the participants. Also, it could be argued that the group of research participants that consists solely of students may potentially limit the generalizability of the findings. “Although students are consumers of advertising, they are not representative of all consumers” (Morgan & Reichert, 1999, p. 9).

Yet another thorny issue when it comes to humour research and advertising is that I could not exactly tell whether or not the product or brand factor affected how successful ad ratings were. The corpus for the study was gathered so as to prevent previous ad exposure from biasing the results; that is why the ads in the two samples were chosen in such a way so as to minimise previous exposure to these particular ads. Nonetheless, controlling this variable was impossible, for I could not know for sure whether or not did the informants see the ads before; I could only base my assumptions on my own experience as regards their popularity. Previous exposure is a double-edged sword since the audience can either develop positive feelings for the brand or the ad (cf. Zajonc, 1968) or, conversely, “with repeated exposures those feelings may sour via the so-called ‘wear-out’ effect” (Bryant & Davies, 2013, p. 24). Yet the fact that the ads selected for the purpose of this research were likely to be unknown to research participants does not mean that they were not acquainted with

the brands or products beforehand. It has to be admitted that it is difficult to tell whether research participants were actually assessing their interest in the ads themselves or expressing their interest in what is being advertised. For example, some informants made a telling observation about their ratings, namely they said that they found themselves rating beer ads high as compared to other ads.

Following the line of thought offered by Musolff (2016) in his article on culture and metaphor, it also seems important to enquire whether the cultural and linguistic factors produce significant differences in figurative conceptualisations which, in turn, influence understanding processes. “There is now a growing body of evidence that much metaphoric discourse in World Englishes and English as lingua franca provide as many instances of miscommunication as of successful intercultural understanding” (Musolff, 2016, p. 54). For example, although Polish research participants taking part in contrastive studies are often fluent speakers of English, it does not necessarily mean that their conceptualisations are not impacted by their native cognitions specific to their language, so to speak. Put differently, the metaphorical cues they follow might be related to first language knowledge and not necessarily to the one pertinent to L2 cognitions.

As far as the present study is concerned, it was my intention to choose the advertising material in such a way so as to avoid unnecessary obscurity, that is why I eliminated any ads I deemed too complicated or too far-fetched for the informants to apprehend. Also, given the fact that research participants were all fluent speakers of English (their skills in English, i.e., their L2, had been confirmed by semi-annual practical examinations), they were not expected to have any major problems when it comes to the language barrier. Their ability to understand and interpret advertising stimuli according to the L2 mappings was therefore contingent on their attainment of formal education. However, it should be remembered that, in some cases, English used as a lingua franca can lead research participants to wrong interpretations of the figurative language (cf. Littlemore, 2003; Wang & Dowker, 2010; Musolff, 2016) or to the “instances of creative adaptation of L2 lexis to L1 mappings (Heredia & Cieślicka, 2015)” (Musolff, 2016, p. 55). For the Polish audiences, English is a second language, which can lead to a situation in which L1 mappings potentially influence their understanding of metaphors expressed in L2. The question, therefore, is: to what extent are multimodal and visual metaphors subject to cultural variation?

Both multimodal and visual metaphors in advertising are more open to interpretations, as compared to the verbal ones, thus making it possible

for more varied cultural connotations to emerge that, subsequently, affect comprehension (cf. Emanatian, 1995; Forceville, 2008; Maalej, 2001). That is why it seems reasonable to repeat the study conducted for the purpose of this book among the native speakers of English that know Polish in order to check whether the findings differ as a result of cultural connotations evoked by semantic domains. Although that may not be the case for these two languages, sometimes “cultural factors, like generic ones, may determine both whether a metaphor can or should be construed in the first place and, if so, what features are to be mapped from source to target” (Forceville, 2008, p. 478). The assumption of shared scripts and common mappings naturally allows the members of the same culture to communicate more than is said but, “for members of different cultures, such an assumption can lead to a great deal of miscommunication” (Yule, 2011/1996, p. 87).

Some potential lines of further investigation thus relate to the study of divergent interpretations of metaphors across cultures (Musolff, 2016), that is, to culturally constructed conceptualisations specific to particular speech communities (Sharifian, 2014, pp. 476–478). For example, checking whether the linguistic and cultural background of the perceivers lead to significant variations in terms of ad appreciation and the appreciation of metaphor and/or humour in these ads seems to be a promising area of academic interest (see Stwora, 2020c). “Apparently all cultures use humour” (Vuorela, 2005, p. 15), yet humour is contingent upon sociocultural factors since it is very local and highly context-specific as well, thus requiring some necessary cultural insider-knowledge for it to be understood properly (Critchley, 2002, p. 67; cf. Gulas & Weinberger, 2006). As regards metaphor, on the other hand, it is said to constitute a conceptual framework that is responsible for structuring the organisation of human experience (cf. Coulson, 2009, p. 615). Nonetheless, these experiences are bound to differ across cultures, thus widening or narrowing the scope of potential metaphorical mappings available to specific communities.

It is [...] understandable that, as a rule, in the course of constructing metaphorical expressions, people refer to their natural experience, i.e. to their bodies, interactions with the surrounding world and with others (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003/1980, pp. 144–145) that help them structure their experience in a systematic and schematic manner, producing ready-to-use, accessible mental stencils facilitating their thinking about abstract concepts. (Stwora, 2018a, p. 106)

At the most basic level, the pool of possible types of experience seems universal across cultures but some researchers claim that metaphors, as concepts, should be seen as specific to particular speech communities (Sharifian, 2014). “Are metaphors, as concepts, universal or culture-specific in the sense that they provide insights into culture-specific cognition patterns that are not necessarily transferrable into other cultural contexts without losing some of their semantic and/or pragmatic value?” (Musolff, 2016, p. 48). This question seems worth considering in the future, for it may inspire scholars in the field to conduct more cross-cultural studies on metaphorical (or humorous metaphorical) messages, including advertising (for an overview of the research on cross-cultural variation of metaphor, see Musolff (2016) and the references therein).

A final avenue for possible research is to extend the dataset to incorporate more examples of totally failed humour and then to compare the results with more successful humorous ads. This is particularly important because analysing solely successful humour can blind researchers in the field to the equally numerous instances of failed humour, which surely restricts the landscape of humorous interactions (cf. Attardo, 2017; Bell, 2015). Needless to say, advertisers should be careful not to overdo their ads, “as the ultimate success of an ad depends on its being recognised as such” (Wojtaszek, 2002, p. 94) and the same applies to humour that, too, must be recognised as humorous in order to be appreciated; failing to fulfil this primary function can prove disastrous not only to the ad itself, but sometimes also to the whole brand. Still, it so happens that people get the joke but they do not find it funny whatsoever (cf. Hale, 2018) or cannot appreciate particular advertising messages because they constitute highly polarising acts of humour that touch on such issues as sex, stereotypes, violence or taboo, to name but a few.

What is more, some ads may simply be “too effort-demanding for some viewers or readers, provoking opposite effect to the one intended” (Yus, 2016, p. 303). For example, a humorous metaphor in an ad may be too far-fetched or a “witty” slogan can simply be too complicated to understand for an everyman, thus making the ad fail miserably. Also, the unavailability of certain scripts or inability to find the link between the two scripts that was supposed to be humorous can lead to miscomprehension. Future investigation might usefully explore the potential of such instances of failed humour, for they actually highlight the pros and cons of contemporary research frameworks and the ways in which people understand humour in

general; what is more, such studies may have implications for advertising message design too.

As posited by Forceville, growing “awareness of the workings of multimodal metaphors can aid their potential deployment in the design and analysis of all types of documents that persuade people to do, or refrain from doing, something” (Forceville, 2008, p. 476), which is why understanding their operation is imperative. In a similar vein, humour opens the door for persuasion too, for it serves a twofold function. First of all, “it can be used for the purpose of the emotionalisation of the message and then rationalisation of, usually positive, emotion owing to its being linked with the product or service on offer” (Stwora, 2020a, p. 136). And second of all, thanks to humour, the ad can be irrationalised through reference to various surprising concepts, which can simultaneously produce strong emotions and lead to increased cognitive effort aimed at comprehending the ad. In such a way, considerable weight is given to the emotive aspect of the message, which may cause logical argumentation to fade away, as it is drowned beneath a wave of positive emotion (Bralczyk, 2000, pp. 25–26).

Nonetheless, more detailed a treatment of the topic would have carried us further afield than intended because all these additional persuasive aspects are but a tip of the iceberg. This is due to the fact that multimodal humour and metaphor, working in tandem, are not only a matter of communication, but also of cognition (and especially of conceptual integration), as well as of social and cultural practice. Thus, it is not far-fetched to say that the issues explored in this book should productively be approached in a trans-disciplinary way, for it is research in many areas that permits a fuller comprehension of the synergistic application of metaphorical and humorous elements in advertising discourse.

Appendix 1

Transcripts of the Advertising Material Used

English Advertisements

Ad E-1 – Vitakraft

Illustration: The dog's pink, velvety muzzle and ears are part of a mass of pink and fluffy spun sugar wrapped around a stick. The background is a clear blue sky and a tranquil street at the bottom of the picture. A little bottle of Vitakraft hair conditioner for dogs is located in the upper left corner.

Slogan: Conditioner for your beauty. For softer and sweeter hair.

Ad E-2 – Audi: Wolves

Illustration: A snowy forest at night. The sky is slightly overcast but the full moon shines on the snow-covered trees and ground. The trees cast strong shadows but multiple Audi headlights shine in the dark as if they were the eyes of some beasts that lie in wait.

Slogan: Auuuuuuudi. The Call of Winter.

Ad E-3 – Pedigree: Pad

Illustration: There is a happy, jumping dog in the middle of the picture. Below, two hands hold a bone-shaped Pedigree dog snack but they hold it as if it were a PlayStation pad. The yellow and blue Pedigree logo is located in the upper right corner.

Ad E-4 – McDonald's: The Real Milkshake

Illustration: A cow is standing on a trampoline in the middle of a meadow on a beautiful day. A small McDonald's logo is located in the lower right corner of the picture.

Slogan: I'm lovin' it

Body copy: The Real Milkshake.

Ad E-5 – Hepachofa Hepat Digestive Pills: Trump

Illustration: The whole picture is framed so as to resemble a stomach. On the left, there are an avocado and a burrito with moustaches, sombreros, and luggage. They are about to open the door leading to the other part of the stomach. On the right, on the other hand, one can see a big hamburger behind a big desk with the USA flag. The hamburger's content is stylised in such a way so as to resemble Donald Trump's hair. There are also two tall French-fries with black ties and sunglasses that stand for bodyguards. A small box of Hepachofa Hepat Digestive Pills is located in the lower right corner of the picture, just below the body copy.

Body copy: This is gonna get ugly.

Ad E-6 – Styx

Illustration: Striped, white and blue man's pants form a container that is furnished like a living room in the shape of man's buttocks. There is a grey couch with two eggs "sitting" on it, a modern table with tiny bottles of beer, a discarded pair of jeans, a guitar, table soccer, an emptied pizza box, and a shelf with several golden cups.

Slogan: Styx. Men's comfortable underwear.

Standing details: website

Ad E-7 – 3M: Lint Roller

Illustration: The picture shows a white, furry, and discontented cat rolled and scrunched into a lint roller with a black handle attached. There is an impeccably black tissue below.

Body copy: Lint Roller

Ad E-8 – Whiskas

Illustration: A tiny, grey kitten is chasing an antelope in the wild. There is a little Whiskas logo in the lower right corner of the picture.

Slogan: Feeding your cat's instincts

Ad E-9 – Airwick: Laser roses

Illustration: The light is off in the bathroom. One can see the toilet and a small fragment of the washbasin. An Airwick device emits numerous beams of red, laser-like light, which is made of glowing roses.

Slogan: Airwick. With Motion Sensor.

Ad E-10 – Pedigree: Chow Chow Blossom

Illustration: The picture shows a giant, brown flower whose petals are furry and shiny, with Chow Chow's muzzle in the middle. The background is peach

black. The slogan, body copy, and a small representation of the product, Pedigree DentaFlex, are located in the lower right corner of the picture.

Slogan: Fresher Breath.

Body copy: Through helping reduce plaque and tartar build-up.

Ad E-11 – #vilniusgspot

Illustration: Bed sheets with an all-over print of the political map of Europe constitute the background. In the bottom part of the picture, one can see a woman reaching an orgasm, her hair dishevelled and hand clutching the sheets where Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, is located.

Slogan: Vilnius. The G-Spot of Europe

Body copy: Nobody knows where it is, but when you find it – it's amazing.

Signature line: #vilniusgspot

Standing details: website

Ad E-12 – Lifebuoy Hand Wash: Dog

Illustration: The picture shows a kitchen worktop and a dog that is squeezed and formed so as to resemble a loaf on a breadboard. Body copy in small print is placed on the left and a little logo of the Lifebuoy Hand Wash is located in the upper-right corner.

Body copy: You eat what you touch

Ad E-13 – Via Uno Shoes

Illustration: On the left, woman's heels with black shoe straps that make the heels look as if they were female buttocks are presented against a white background. There is also a small shoe in the centre of the ad, below the slogan and just above the signature line at the bottom.

Slogan: Your feet can be sexy too.

Signature line: Via Uno. Summer Collection

Ad E-14 – BMW Used Cars

Illustration: An attractive blonde woman is lying, presumably on a bed, smiling seductively at the audience. Her arms are naked and hair is slightly dishevelled.

Body copy: You know you're not the first. But do you really care?

Signature line: BMW Premium Selection. Used Cars. BMW. Sheer Driving Pleasure.

Standing details: website

Ad E-15 – Bauker

Illustration: A shirtless, a little bit overweight but extremely happy man with a dark beard is holding a little, wooden table as if the table was his child. The

background is pitch black. A small cutting tool is shown in the lower right corner of the picture.

Slogan: Become a father.

Signature line: Bauker. Home improvement tools.

Ad E-16 – Pepsi: Halloween

Illustration: A blue Pepsi can is standing on a rock covered with moss, wearing a red cape with the logo of Coca-Cola. The Pepsi's logo is located in the lower right corner.

Slogan: We wish you a scary Halloween!

Ad E-17 – Volkswagen Genuine Parts

Illustration: The picture shows a very ugly and skinny Rascal dog, its tongue protruding and eyes wide open. The dog is partly bald, with a wisp of white hair on its muzzle and tail.

Slogan: It's a dog. Technically.

Body copy: Non-genuine parts work. Technically. Rather choose Volkswagen Genuine Parts.

Ad E-18 – KissFM

Illustration: A black compact cassette on a red background.

Slogan: iPod... I'm your father.

Signature line: KissFM 97.7 Do you remember?

Ad E-19 – Vileda: Fur bomb

Illustration: A round, brown, and furry cat is sitting on a couch in a flat. The animal is so big and round that it resembles a giant ball. Its tail, however, is a lighted fuse, which makes the cat look like a bomb on a long fuse, which is about to explode.

Slogan: fur bomb?

Signature line: Vileda

Ad E-20 – SanDisk

Illustration: The ad shows a simplified, cartoon-like image of fat Elvis Presley on the left and contrasts it with an image of a small and tight garment on the right. Below, near the body copy and signature line, there is a little flash disk by SanDisk.

Body copy: Micro 16GB USB Flash Drive

Signature line: SanDisk

Polish Advertisements

Ad PL-1 – Dzikie Sad [Wild Orchard Cider]

Illustration: In the foreground, a hedgehog is carrying a bottle of cider instead of an apple. There is a beautiful view of green meadows and forests in the background.

Slogan: Jak daleko pada jabłko od jabłoni? [Literary: How far does the apple fall from the tree? The expression metaphorically means: Like father like son.]

Ad PL-2 – Lubelska

Illustration: The picture shows five little, one-hundred-millilitre bottles of colourful vodkas by Lubelska standing in a row. There is also one extra shot in the foreground.

Slogan: Program Pięćset+ [Five hundred plus program.]

Signature line: Lubelska. Żyj kolorowo. [Lubelska. Live colourful.]

Ad PL-3 – Ariel

Illustration: The ad shows a white, stained shirt and Ariel stain remover being poured on it. Liquid stain remover forms a blob resembling a shark that is about to devour the stain. There is a small representation of the product in the lower right corner of the picture.

Slogan: napaść go na plamy [pour it on the stains OR set it on stains (i.e., attack them)]

Ad PL-4 – Gazeta Wyborcza

Illustration: The picture shows a close-up of a network socket, where one can see a lady selling newspapers at the newsagents.

Standing details: wyborcza.pl

Ad PL-5 – Tatra

Illustration: The ad shows a forest and a stream in the middle ground, as well as yellowish meadows and a snow-covered mountain range in the background. There is an opening in the row of trees that is formed so as to resemble a glass of beer thanks to its shape and colours from the background. One can also see a fragment of the bottle of Tatra beer in the lower right corner of the ad.

Ad PL-6 – Szyneczka

Illustration: The picture shows five pieces of butterfish fillet flying high in the sky in a V-shaped formation.

Slogan: Filet maślany. Klucz do dobrej formy. [Butterfish fillet. The key to good shape.] (The second meaning of the word “key” is “skein,” which matches the image).

Body copy: 86 kcal w 100g [86 kcal per 100g]

Signature line: Szyneczka. Sieć sklepów spożywczych. [Szyneczka (ham-dim.). Grocery stores.]

Ad PL-7 – PZU

Illustration: On the left, there is a reindeer with a saddle blanket on its back. There is a line on the blanket that reads: “Backup reindeer.” The blue slogan is on the right, along with the logo of PZU insurance company.

Slogan: Jesteśmy przygotowani na Święta i na całą zimę [We are ready for Christmas and for the entire winter]

Body copy: Renifer zastępczy [Backup reindeer]

Ad PL-8 – bet-at-home.com

Illustration: Spermatozoa swim towards a football. The background is dark blue but it brightens in the centre of the picture. The slogan, body copy, and logo are located in the bottom part of the ad.

Slogan: Życie to gra! [Life is a game!]

Body copy: Życie dla piłki nożnej: www.bet-at-home.com [Life for football: www.bet-at-home.com]

Signature line: Zakłady sportowe – kasyno – poker [Sports betting – casino – poker]

Standing details: website

Ad PL-9 – Motos

Illustration: A neatly clad man is sitting on a dinosaur equipped with a saddle and bridle. The man is holding the reins and, apparently, has just parked the dinosaur in the parking space successfully.

Signature line: Motos Nauka Jazdy [Motos driving school]

Standing details: telephone number

Ad PL-10 – Lipton

Illustration: The ad is divided into two distinct parts. The footer is yellow and contains the body copy and signature line in red, as well as a small picture of a cup of tea and a box of Lipton tea. The rest of the ad is filled with the picture of a pyramid of forest fruits with Lipton’s yellow label attached. Apart from forest fruits, the pyramid contains some moss and leaves, and is surrounded by several small animals and a little child on a swing.

Slogan: Odkryj nowy wymiar smaku [Discover the new dimension of taste]

Body copy: W oryginalnej torebce piramidce Lipton długie listki herbaty i duże kawałki owoców mają więcej miejsca, aby uwolnić wspaniały, owocowy smak. Odkryj pełnię intensywnego smaku z herbatą Lipton! [In the original pyramid Lipton teabag, the long leaves of tea and big pieces of fruit have more space to release their wonderful, fruity flavour. Discover the richness of intense flavour with Lipton tea!]

Signature line: Lipton tea can do that

Ad PL-11 – Żywiec

Illustration: The picture shows a row of beer glasses filled with golden beer. The glasses are standing on the railroad tracks so that they resemble railroad cars.

Slogan: Złoty pociąg [Golden train]

Signature line: Nigdy nie jeżdżę po alkoholu [I never drink-drive]

Ad PL-12 – Syc

Illustration: The ad shows a slim, white bottle of Syc by OsSpray standing in a pink room. There is also a dressing screen on the right, as well as underwear, a pink dress, a hat, and a pink bag.

Slogan: Syc. Naga prawda o bioaktywnym szkle [Syc. Naked truth about bioactive glass]

Body copy: Znosi nadwrażliwość. Odbudowuje szkliwo. Usuwa osady. [Reduces hypersensitivity. Rebuilds the enamel. Removes plaque]

Standing details: website and telephone number

Ad PL-13 – WAŚ

Illustration: One can see a naked woman shown from her waist to her knees. She is holding the W116 combination driving light and front position light at crotch level, covering herself. There is also a smaller picture of the W125DL rear combination light next to the standing details at the bottom of the ad.

Slogan: W116 lampy zespolona drogowa i pozycyjna przednia [W116 combination driving light and front position light]

Body copy: Full LED 215000 candelas

Signature line: WAŚ. Producent lamp samochodowych. [WAŚ. The producer of vehicle lighting systems.]

Standing details: www.was.eu NOWOŚĆ!!! W125DL lampa zespolona tylna [www.was.eu NEW!!! W125DL rear combination light]

Ad PL-14 – Lidl

Illustration: The ad is very simple in its form as it shows a packed piece of carp against a light blue background.

Slogan: Karpie diem. [Carps the day. (The slogan clearly refers to a famous Latin aphorism “Carpe diem,” usually translated as ‘seize the day.’)]

Body copy: Świeża ryba. Polski karp, płat, 100g [Fresh fish. Polish carp, piece, 100g]

Standing details: price and discount

Ad PL-15 – RTV Euro AGD

Illustration: There is a set of hair straighteners located in the centre of the ad. It is accompanied by a black slogan above and the logo of RTV Euro AGD.

Slogan: Nie ma fal [There are no waves]

Ad PL-16 – Biedronka

Illustration: The picture shows a tomato sliced in half and filled with hot tomato soup. Above, there is a hand holding a spoonful of soup, as well as a small picture of three soups in the lower part of the ad. Additionally, one can see the logo of Biedronka in the lower right corner of the picture.

Ad PL-17 – AXN

Illustration: The ad shows a stormtrooper from the *Star Wars* saga. The background is pitch-black, which contrasts with the white armour of the stormtrooper and with the textual part of the ad. Standing details are presented in the red footer, which, in turn, corresponds to the colour of the AXN’s logo.

Slogan: Rozumiem potrzeby zwykłych szturmowców [I understand the needs of ordinary stormtroopers]

Body copy: Wybierz sagę *Gwiezdne Wojny*. AXN. [Choose the *Star Wars* saga. AXN.]

Standing details: Od 1 października w czwartki o 22.00 [From October 1, on Thursdays, at 22.00]

Ad PL-18 – Škoda

Illustration: The ad shows two Eskimo hunters on an ice floe who have just hunted. Their quarry is a Škoda car trapped in a net.

Slogan: Sprytni myśliwi wytropili ładną sztukę. [Clever hunters have tracked a nice quarry.]

Body copy: Wyprzedaż modeli z rocznika 2016. Rabaty do 8000 zł* Sfinansujemy Twój pakiet AC/OC/NW na 2 lata!** Skorzystaj z kredytu 50/50 bez prowizji od odsetek*** Przy odrobinie sprytu i refleksu Ty też możesz złapać

Škodę z rocznika 2016 z dorodnym upustem. Pospiesz się, wielkie polowanie trwa. [2016 sellout. Discounts up to PLN 8000* We will finance your comprehensive cover, liability insurance, and accident insurance package for 2 years! ** Take out a 50/50 loan without commission on interest *** With a bit of shrewdness and reflex, you can catch a 2016 Škoda at a handsome discount too. Hurry up, the great hunt is on.]

Small print: *dotyczy modeli Škody Octavia Tour z silnikami benzynowymi z rocznika 2016. **teraz dodatkowo otrzymasz upust o wartości promocyjnego pakietu ubezpieczenia AC/OC/NW na 2 lata - 2800 zł. Oferta dotycząca modelu Škoda Fabia z rocznika 2016. O szczegóły oferty zapytaj Autoryzowanego Dealera Škody. ***każdą Škodą z rocznika 2016 możesz wyjechać z salonu już za pół ceny. Pozostałe 50% zapłacisz dopiero za rok, bez prowizji i odsetek, korzystając z kredytu 50/50 Volkswagen Bank Polska. Dostępny także atrakcyjny leasing Volkswagen Leasing Polska. Przykładowa RRSO z uwzględnieniem kosztu ubezpieczenia AC dla samochodu Fabia o wartości 40.000 PLN wynosi 4,55%. O szczegóły zapytaj Autoryzowanego Dealera Škody. [*applies to Škoda Octavia Tour models with petrol engines from 2016. **now you will get an additional discount of PLN 2800 that equals the value of the promotional two-year insurance package including comprehensive cover, liability insurance, and accident insurance. The offer stands for the 2016 Škoda Fabia model. Ask your Škoda Authorized Dealer for details. ***you can leave the car showroom with every 2016 Škoda at half price. You will pay the remaining 50% in one year, with no commission or interest, thanks to the 50/50 Volkswagen Bank Poland loan. An attractive leasing offered by Volkswagen Leasing Poland is also available. For example, the annual percentage rate of charge including the cost of comprehensive cover for a Fabia car worth PLN 40,000 is 4.55%. Ask your Škoda Authorized Dealer for details.]

Signature line: Škoda Auto. Przemysłane rozwiązania [Škoda Auto. Well-thought-out solutions]

Standing details: Škoda Kredyt. Volkswagen Bank Polska S.A. Informacje o średnim zużyciu paliwa w cyklu mieszanym, emisji CO₂ i recyklingu są dostępne pod adresem internetowym: www.skoda-auto.pl. [Škoda Loans. Volkswagen Bank Poland Joint Stock Company. Information on the average fuel consumption for the combined cycle, CO₂ emission, and recycling available on the website: www.skoda-auto.pl.]

Ad PL-19 – Krakus

Illustration: The picture shows a pickled cucumber with hands made of dill and eyes made of horseradish and pepper, which gives it its funny looks. It is

trapped in a jar full of explosions. One can see a bullet hole in the jar, as well as a blurred image of a jar of pickled cucumbers in the background.

Slogan: Szklana pułapka [The glass trap (it is a reference to the Polish translation of the title of *Die Hard* (1988) directed by John McTiernan).]

Body copy: Świat warzyw Krakus [The world of Krakus vegetables]

Standing details: Krakus 1965. Gwarancja smaku. [Krakus 1965. Taste guaranteed.]

Ad PL-20 – Ikea: Harry

Illustration: The picture shows a simple, fair chair set against a darker background. The textual part is written in white and the Ikea logo is located in the lower right corner of the ad.

Slogan: Nie martw się, HARRY jest wciąż dostępny. [Don't worry, HARRY is still available.]

Standing details: HARRY. Krzesło 169 zł [HARRY. Chair PLN 169]

Appendix 2

The Likert-Type Scale and Visual Self-Report Used

Advertising Research

PLEASE, READ THIS INTRODUCTION BEFORE PROCEEDING

Ladies and Gentlemen,

the following anonymous questionnaire is designed with the aim of investigating your responses towards a selection of advertising messages. I would like to ask you about your feelings towards and interpretations of the ads presented, as well as to check ad liking. The results will be presented in my doctoral dissertation. All the contents and images used in this questionnaire are owned or licensed by their rightful creators/owners. They are used solely for the purpose of my academic research. Thank you very much for your time and cooperation!

1. Please indicate your gender:

- male
- female
- other

2. Please indicate your age:

- 18–23
- 24–29
- 30–39
- 40–49
- 50–59
- 60–69

Ad E-n

[photo of the ad]

Do you like this ad? (in terms of ad's creativity, originality, format, style, etc.)

- no
- I don't know
- yes

The ad above is:

- very funny
- funny
- neutral
- not funny

Is the ad pleasurable? Are your feelings positive or negative? Use one of the faces ranging from happy to sad.




The pleasure dimension adapted from Lang (1980) and redesigned by A. Stwora.

Is the ad exciting or boring? Choose one of the options that range from involved/stimulated to bored/calm.



The arousal dimension adapted from Lang (1980) and redesigned by A. Stwora.

How powerful the message is? Is it strong and persuasive or weak and not interesting?



The dominance dimension adapted from Lang (1980) and redesigned by A. Stwora

Badanie reklamy

PROSZĘ ZAPOZNAĆ SIĘ Z INSTRUKCJĄ PRZED WYPEŁNIENIEM ANKIETY

Szanowni Państwo,

ten anonimowy kwestionariusz ma na celu zbadanie Państwa reakcji dotyczących wybranych reklam. Chciałabym poznać Państwa odczucia odnośnie zaprezentowanych reklam i sprawdzić, jak je Państwo oceniają. Wyniki ankiety zostaną zaprezentowane w mojej rozprawie doktorskiej. Wszystkie treści i obrazy użyte w tym kwestionariuszu są własnością lub są licencjonowane przez ich prawowitych twórców/właścicieli. Są one wykorzystywane wyłącznie do celów moich badań naukowych. Dziękuję za poświęcony czas!

1. Proszę wskazać swoją płeć:

- mężczyzna
- kobieta
- inne

2. Proszę wskazać swój wiek:

- 18–23
- 24–29
- 30–39
- 40–49
- 50–59
- 60–69

Ad PL-n

[zdjęcie reklamy]

Czy podoba Ci się ta reklama? (jeśli chodzi o kreatywność, oryginalny charakter, format, styl, itd.)

- nie
- nie wiem
- tak

Reklama powyżej jest:

- bardzo zabawna
- zabawna
- neutralna
- nie jest śmieszna

Czy reklama jest przyjemna? Twoje odczucia są pozytywne czy negatywne? Wybierz jedną z emotikoniek ułożonych od szczęśliwej do smutnej.




Aspekt przyjemności (za Lang (1980)); projekt i wykonanie: A. Stwora).

Reklama jest ekscytująca czy nudna? Wybierz jedną z odpowiedzi wyrażających zaangażowanie odbiorcy i stymulujący charakter reklamy bądź odczucie spokoju i nudy.



Aspekt pobudzenia (za Lang (1980)); projekt i wykonanie: A. Stwora).

Jaka jest siła reklamy? Jest silna i przekonująca czy słaba i mało interesująca?



Aspekt dominacji (za Lang (1980)); projekt i wykonanie: A. Stwora).

Appendix 3

Questionnaire Form on Ad Comprehension

Survey on Ad Comprehension

PLEASE, READ THIS INTRODUCTION BEFORE PROCEEDING

Ladies and Gentlemen,

the following anonymous questionnaire is designed with a view to checking ad comprehension. I would like to ask you about your comprehension and interpretations of the ads, as well as about the meaning-making mechanisms behind these messages. Feel free to share your spontaneous thoughts on the material. The results will be presented in my doctoral dissertation.

All the contents and images used in this questionnaire are owned or licensed by their rightful creators/owners. They are used solely for the purpose of my academic research.

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation!

Ad E-n

[photo of the ad]

1. What do you think is being advertised?
2. What is your interpretation of the ad?
3. Is the ad metaphorical?
- 3a. If yes, what makes it metaphorical?
4. How do you understand the metaphor in the ad?
5. Can you identify the domains involved in the production of the metaphorical?
6. Can you identify any implied claims about the product/service advertised?
7. What makes the ad funny? Which elements of the ad contribute to its being funny?
8. Do you have an impression that the ad imposes any opinions upon you?

9. Feel free to share your spontaneous thoughts on the ad, if not expressed in the previous answers.

Ankieta dotycząca rozumienia reklamy

PROSZĘ ZAPOZNAĆ SIĘ Z INSTRUKCJĄ PRZED WYPEŁNIENIEM ANKIETY

Szanowni Państwo,

ten anonimowy kwestionariusz ma na celu zbadanie rozumienia reklamy. Chciałabym zapytać, jak rozumieją i interpretują Państwo wybrane przekazy reklamowe, a także jak postrzegają Państwo mechanizmy tworzenia znaczeń w tych reklamach. Zachęcam do spontanicznego dzielenia się refleksjami na temat przedstawionego materiału. Wyniki ankiety zostaną zaprezentowane w mojej rozprawie doktorskiej.

Wszystkie treści i obrazy użyte w tym kwestionariuszu są własnością lub są licencjonowane przez ich prawowitych twórców/właścicieli. Są one wykorzystywane wyłącznie do celów moich badań naukowych.

Dziękuję za poświęcony czas i współpracę!

Ad PL-n

[zdjęcie reklamy]

1. Co Twoim zdaniem jest reklamowane?
2. Jak interpretujesz tę reklamę?
3. Czy reklama jest metaforyczna?
 - 3a. Jeśli tak, co czyni ją metaforyczną?
4. Jak rozumiesz metaforę zawartą w reklamie?
5. Czy możesz zidentyfikować domeny wchodzące w skład metafory?
6. Czy możesz wskazać dorozumiane/nie stwierdzone wprost twierdzenia dotyczące reklamowanego produktu lub usługi?
7. Co czyni reklamę humorystyczną? Jakie elementy reklamy składają się na to, że jest ona zabawna?
8. Czy masz wrażenie, że reklama narzuca Ci jakieś opinie/zdanie na temat produktu?
9. Dodatkowe przemyślenia na temat reklamy nieuwzględnione powyżej.

Appendix 4

The Corpus in English

The table below reports on selected features of the advertisements in the corpus in English. The first column indicates the advertisement analysed, whereas the two following columns show the presence of specific modalities used to express metaphor and humour, respectively. The grey fields indicate multimodality. Columns four and five are devoted to the typology of visual rhetoric outlined by Phillips and McQuarrie (2004). The subsequent column presents the pairs of script oppositions used to generate humour. Then follows the categorisation by humour type according to Buijzen and Valkenburg (2004). The penultimate column pertains to humour functions fulfilled by each ad. Finally, the last column is focused on metaphor types. While visual illustrative material could not be used for copyright reasons, the presentation of the above features yields a fuller picture of the advertisements selected for the corpus.

English ads	Metaphor	Humour	Visual structure	Meaning operation	Script opposition	Humour type	Function	Metaphor type
Ad E-1 Vitakraft	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-2 Audi	textual + visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-3 Pedigree	visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-4 McDonald's	textual + visual	visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-5 Hepachota Digestive Pills	visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition fusion	actual/non-actual absence/presence digestion/indigestion	satirical humour	affiliative aggressive	funny metaphor
Ad E-6 Styx	visual	textual + visual	operations of connection comparison for similarity	fusion replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad E-7 3M	visual	visual	operation of connection	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-8 Whiskas	visual	visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	actual/non-actual domestic/wild	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor

Ad E-10 Pedigre (Chow) Airwick	visual	visual	operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise + parody	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad E-11 #vltinusg-spot	textual + visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible good/bad	surprise + irony	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-12 Lifebuoy Hand Wash	visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	replacement	actual/non-actual sex/no-sex (absence/presence)	surprise humour	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad E-13 Via Uno Shoes	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise + slapstick humour	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-14 BMW Used Cars	textual + visual	visual	operation of connection	replacement	absence/presence	misunderstanding	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad E-15 Bauker	visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	sex/no-sex (absence/presence)	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-16 Repsl	textual + visual	visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	normal/abnormal	parody	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-17 Volkswagen Genuine Parts	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	good/bad	satire disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	replacement	normal/abnormal	parody disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent

Ad E-18 KissFM	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual real/imaginary old/new good/bad dark/light	parody	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad E-19 Vileda	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad E-20 Sandisk	visual	visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	fat/slim much/little	satire disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Mini Cooper S	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	possible/impossible animate/inanimate	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Lego Pure Brain- food	textual + visual	visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual edible/inedible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Roma - Pisa	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise + parody	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Heinz Sliced Tomato	textual + visual	visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Lotus Cookie	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement juxtaposition	absence/presence sex/no-sex	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor

Axe Happy New Year	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Nescafé Rooster	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement fusion	possible/impossible absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	metaphor with a funny referent
KFC	visual		textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement juxtaposition	actual/non-actual edible/inedible	surprise + parody	self-enhancing self-defeating aggressive affiliative	funny metaphor
McDonald's Free Wi-Fi	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Find Fun Cross	visual		visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Junckers Cold-proof	visual		visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	possible/impossible actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
MAX Shoes	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	metaphor with a funny referent
PS Vita	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition operation of connection	fusion juxtaposition	absence/presence actual/non-actual sex/no-sex	surprise + irony	aggressive affiliative	funny metaphor

Toyota Prius	textual visual	+ visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	possible/impossible animate/inanimate natural/man-made	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Toys R Us Titanic	visual	visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement	actual/non-actual adulthood/childhood drama/comedy	surprise + parody	self-enhancing self-defeating aggressive affiliative	metaphor with a funny referent
Volkswagen ParkAssist	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual natural/man-made	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Luthansa Mona Lisa	textual + visual	visual	comparison for opposition operation of connection	fusion replacement	actual/non-actual high culture/low culture classical/tacky	surprise + parody	self-enhancing aggressive affiliative	metaphor with a funny referent
Lego Create	visual	visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement juxtaposition	actual/non-actual high culture/low culture	surprise + parody	self-enhancing aggressive affiliative	funny metaphor
Hepachofa Bedroom	visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition fusion	actual/non-actual absence/presence digestion/indigestion	satirical humour	affiliative aggressive	funny metaphor
Durex Emotions	textual + visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence sex/no-sex	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative self-defeating	funny metaphor
Post Pool	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	possible/impossible animate/inanimate	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative self-defeating	funny metaphor

Bliss Bodywash	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Evan Live Young	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible old/young	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Axe Clean/ Dirty	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual sex/no-sex	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
McDonald's Baby	visual		visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Heinz Hot	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
McDonald's Happy Halloween	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence blood/no-blood	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor

Delifrance Slippers	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual edible/inedible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
AXN Channel	textual visual	+	visual	operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Egdom Car Loans	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
New Scientist Easter	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual absence/presence	surprise + parody	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Mitsubishi Motors	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual natural/man-made	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Purina	visual		visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Snickers Zebra	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Heineken	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise + parody	self-enhancing aggressive	funny metaphor
Duracell Katana	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible power of muscles/ electric power	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor

McDonald's Wolverine	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise + parody	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Gadgets 360 Mouse	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual real/virtual	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
General Electric Garlic	textual + visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	actual/non-actual good/bad	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Snickers Hunger trap	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
B-good Nurse	textual + visual	visual	operation of connection	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Intra Breaking Bad	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence Internet/no-Internet	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Airwick Flower dog	textual + visual	visual	comparison for opposition	fusion	possible/impossible good/bad	surprise + irony	self-enhancing	funny metaphor

Volkswagen Fluffy	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition	fusion	possible/impossible hard/soft	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Toyota Owl	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible absence/presence feathers/no-feathers	surprise humour	self-enhancing aggressive	funny metaphor
queertravel.de	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	normal/abnormal back/front	surprise + parody	self-enhancing affiliative self-defeating aggressive	metaphor with a funny referent
Band Aid	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition fusion	absence/presence sex/no-sex positive/negative emotions	surprise humour	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ikea Ekorre	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Del Monte Fruit	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing aggressive	funny metaphor
Arby's Burgers	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	absence/presence dressed/undressed possible/impossible	surprise + parody	self-enhancing aggressive	funny metaphor
Burger King Mind-blowing	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence sex/no-sex food/no-food	surprise humour	self-enhancing aggressive	funny metaphor

Eurostar London	textual visual	+ visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	absence/presence sex/no-sex	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Lifebuoy Hamster	visual	visual	operation of connection	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise + slapstick humour	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Condom shop	textual visual	+ visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence dressed/undressed	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	funny metaphor
Love Store Bullet	textual visual	+ textual + visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	funny metaphor
Del Mar Spa Cow	textual visual	+ visual	operation of connection	fusion juxtaposition	actual/non-actual human/non-human	surprise humour disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	funny metaphor
Del Mar Spa Pig	textual visual	+ visual	operation of connection	fusion juxtaposition	actual/non-actual human/non-human	surprise humour disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	funny metaphor
Purex Hurdles	textual visual	+ textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible long/short	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Tide Stains	textual visual	+ visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition fusion	actual/non-actual human/non-human	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor

Snickers Box	textual visual	+	visual	operation of connection	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	funny metaphor
WildWash	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	actual/non-actual human/non-human	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	metaphor with a funny referent
Dollar Shave Club	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor
Digital Day	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	big/small	disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Duracell Hello Kitty	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition operation of connection	fusion juxtaposition	absence/presence dead/alive	surprise humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Bendix brakes	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour parody	aggressive self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Durex Shoes	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for opposition comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing affiliative	funny metaphor

Mentos Pure	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	replacement juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour parody	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Citroën C3	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	replacement	actual/non-actual whole/partial	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Toyota Genuine Parts	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	absence/presence	parody disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Volkswagen Dentist	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	actual/non-actual positive/negative emotions	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Gillette Clean Shave	visual		visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	actual/non-actual shaven/unshaven	surprise humour parody	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Peugeot Brush	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Peugeot Ice cream	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Fiat	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for opposition operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor

Beneficial Bank	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
McDonald's Election Day	textual visual	+	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
CCVR Hitler	textual visual	+	visual	comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual good/bad	surprise humour slapstick humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Antonio Federici 1	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual good/bad virtuous/sinful	satire disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Antonio Federici 2	textual visual	+	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual good/bad virtuous/sinful heterosexual/homo- sexual	satire disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Benetton Merkozy	textual visual	+	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	satire disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor

Appendix 5

The Corpus in Polish

The table below reports on selected features of the advertisements in the corpus in Polish. The first column indicates the advertisement analysed, whereas the two following columns show the presence of specific modalities used to express metaphor and humour, respectively. The grey fields indicate multimodality. Columns four and five are devoted to the typology of visual rhetoric outlined by Phillips and McQuarrie (2004). The subsequent column presents the pairs of script oppositions used to generate humour. Then follows the categorisation by humour type according to Buijzen and Valkenburg (2004). The penultimate column pertains to humour functions fulfilled by each ad. Finally, the last column is focused on metaphor types. While visual illustrative material could not be used for copyright reasons, the presentation of the above features yields a fuller picture of the advertisements selected for the corpus.

Polish ads	Metaphor	Humour	Meaning operation	Visual structure	Script opposition	Humour type	Function	Metaphor type
Ad PL-1 Dziki Sad	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-2 Lubelska	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise irony	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-3 Ariel	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition fusion	possible/impossible predator/victim	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-4 Gazeta Wbyborcza	visual	visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible big/small	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-5 Tatra	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-6 Szynecka	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion replacement	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad PL-7 PZU	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad PL-8 bet-at-home.com	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor

Ad PL-9 Motos	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	replacement juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise humour	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-10 Lipton	visual	visual	operation of connection	fusion	possible/impossible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-11 Zywiec	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	absence/presence	surprise parody	affiliative self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-12 Sylc	textual + visual	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	replacement	absence/presence	surprise humour	self-enhancing self-defeating	funny metaphor
Ad PL-13 WAS	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence visible/invisible	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-14 Lidl	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual mundane/ philosophical	surprise parody	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-15 RTV Euro AGD	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence	parody	self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-16 Biedronka	visual	visual	comparison for similarity	fusion	actual/non-actual	surprise humour	self-enhancing	funny metaphor

Ad PL-17 AXN	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual real/imaginary	surprise parody	affiliative self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad PL-18 Škoda	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	replacement	possible/impossible	surprise parody disparaging humour	aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
Ad PL-19 Krakus	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise parody	affiliative self-enhancing	metaphor with a funny referent
Ad PL-20 Ikea	textual + visual	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	surprise parody disparaging humour	affiliative aggressive self-enhancing	funny metaphor
OSM Chojnice	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	parody	affiliative self-defeating	NA
Duck	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	replacement	possible/impossible	parody	self-enhancing	NA
Harnas	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	parody pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

Lidl/Esmara	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
PKP InterCity	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Calgon	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	pun disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
Lech	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual sober/drunk normal/abnormal	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Aldi	NA	textual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Orbit	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	pun	affiliative	NA
Cortland	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Kaminiarz	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	possible/impossible edible/non-edible	pun	self-enhancing	NA
Drosed	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual human/non-human edible/non-edible	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

Pedigree	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence excrement/ no-excrement good/bad	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
BAT PSB	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence violence/no-violence disappointment/joy	surprise disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
Domiporta	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual near/far	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Canal+	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition fusion	possible/impossible	surprise pun	self-enhancing	NA
Födź	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	surprise parody	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Olympus	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence sleep/no-sleep attention/ no-attention	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
House #dogfilter	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition fusion	actual/non-actual animate/inanimate virtual/real	surprise parody	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
House #skills	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise	self-enhancing	NA

Renault	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence more/less family/no-family	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
ZUS	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence insurance/no-insurance safety/danger	pun disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
Vizir	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual soft/scratchy	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Nasivin	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual quiet/loud	disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
Philips	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence hair/no-hair sex/no-sex	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
RuckZuck	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence food/no-food slim/fat	pun disparaging humour	self-enhancing aggressive	NA
bliscypl	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual resemblance/no-resemblance	surprise	self-enhancing	NA
tanio,pl	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual cheap/expensive	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

Prostaceum	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual extraordinary/ordinary absence/presence erection/no-erection	surprise disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
MediaMarkt Stoń	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	absence/presence	surprise disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
MediaMarkt Kibic	NA	textual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	possible/impossible winning/losing	surprise disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
Cinema City	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	absence/presence English/Polish	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Warszawska Szkoła Reklam Policjant	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual happy/unhappy	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Warszawska Szkoła Reklam Ulotki	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition fusion	actual/non-actual happy/unhappy ridiculous/respected	surprise disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA

Posterisan	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	absence/presence buttocks/no-buttocks haemorrhoids/no-haemorrhoids	surprise pun disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
Tarczyński	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual Polish/Chinese culture	surprise rhythm alliteration disparaging humour	self-enhancing aggressive	NA
Play	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for opposition comparison for similarity	replacement	possible/impossible heavy/light	surprise disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
BZ WBK	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence violence/no-violence	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Roxy FM Amy	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence violence/no-violence	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Roxy FM Bono	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence meat/no-meat	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

mBankksiądz	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence devil/no-devil exorcism/no-exorcism	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
mBank mSaver	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence sex/no-sex	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
WP Finance	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual violence/no-violence	surprise disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive self-defeating	NA
ASP	NA	visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	replacement	actual/non-actual high culture/low culture	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
ING Bank Śląski	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	possible/impossible	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
ZywiecAnita	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual absence/presence sport/no-sport beer/no-beer	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

Zywiec - Po kole!	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for opposition	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual order/disorder sober/drunken	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
ZywiecZona	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition replacement	absence/presence	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
ZywiecWąz	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	absence/presence	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Śmig	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Goethe InstitutMutter	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement fusion	actual/non-actual possible/impossible Polish/German language correct/incorrect	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Goethe Institut- Rowen Kopen	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual Polish/German language correct/incorrect professional/ unprofessional	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

Goethe Institut Mis	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual Polish/German language correct/incorrect	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Grosch	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual high/low culture absence/presence dead/alive	surprise pun parody	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
Lux Med	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual high/low culture absence/presence art/no-art	surprise parody	self-enhancing affiliative self-defeating	NA
Polska Press Grupa	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	replacement	actual/non-actual human/animal	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative self-defeating	NA
Amica	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual absence/presence	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Mam haka	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual	surprise pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Peterson	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual fat/slim absence/presence money/no-money	surprise pun disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA

Rockstar Energy Drink	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Credit Agricole Sully	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual animate/inanimate absence/presence money/no-money	pun	self-enhancing affiliative self-defeating	NA
Isana	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual good/bad	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Uniwersytet w Krakowie	NA	visual	comparison for opposition	juxtaposition fusion	actual/non-actual high/low culture modern/ancient	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Orange	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual Polish/English language	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Cropp	NA	textual + visual	comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	possible/impossible dead/alive	surprise	self-enhancing aggressive self-defeating	NA
merlin.pl	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition replacement	possible/impossible human/animal	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
merlin.pl Pies	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition replacement	possible/impossible human/animal crazy/sane	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

Wedel	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	possible/impossible actual/non-actual correct/incorrect language real/imaginary	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Plush na kartę	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
ARR 5 porcji	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Magnum	NA	visual	comparison for similarity operation of connection	juxtaposition fusion	actual/non-actual small/big	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Olay	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual high/low	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Kotlin	NA	textual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	pun	self-enhancing	NA
technoblog	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual human/animal absence/presence fear/courage	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

PZU Program Praktyk	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity	replacement fusion	actual/non-actual real/imaginary extraordinary/ ordinary	surprise parody	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Kupiec	NA	visual	comparison for similarity	replacement fusion	possible/impossible big/small	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Fundacja Rak'n'Roll	NA	textual + visual	operation of connection comparison for similarity comparison for opposition	juxtaposition replacement	actual/non-actual ill/healthy good/bad	surprise	self-enhancing affiliative self-defeating	NA
Kurter Akademicki	NA	textual	operation of connection	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual related/unrelated ill/healthy	surprise disparaging humour	self-enhancing affiliative aggressive	NA
Hellena	NA	textual + visual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA
Łowicz	NA	textual	comparison for similarity	juxtaposition	actual/non-actual correct/incorrect	pun	self-enhancing affiliative	NA

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Streszczenie

Celem monografii jest analiza zjawiska współwystępowania metafory i humoru w multimodalnej reklamie prasowej—w języku polskim i angielskim. Punktem wyjścia refleksji na temat współdziałania elementów metaforycznych i humorystycznych w dyskursie reklamowym jest zwrócenie uwagi na podobieństwa konceptualne w sposobach konstruowania i rozumienia zarówno humoru, jak i metafory, które autorka wiąże z teorią integracji pojęciowej.

Rozdział pierwszy koncentruje się wokół pojęcia reklamy, w szczególności zaś reklamy prasowej, a więc elementów występujących w dyskursie reklamy na poziomie tekstowym i wizualnym, by następnie ukazać, jak warstwa językowa i parajęzykowa współgrają i uzupełniają się w tworzeniu przekazu multimodalnego. Rozdział drugi przedstawia ogólny zarys teorii relewancji celem ukazania, w jaki sposób proponowana przez Forceville'a (2020) modyfikacja tejże teorii może być wykorzystana do opisu różnych aspektów komunikacji masowej. Rozdział trzeci odwołuje się do teorii przestrzeni mentalnych oraz integracji pojęciowej. Rozdział czwarty poświęcono badaniom nad humorem, uwzględniając przegląd kluczowych teorii humoru, spośród których teoria niespójności i rozwiązywania niespójności stanowi główną oś dyskusji. Omówiono także znaczenie teorii prototypów w kształtowaniu się humoru i jego sile. Rozdział zawiera również przegląd wcześniejszych badań nad humorem w reklamie oraz prezentuje zestaw cech wspólnych dla humoru i metafory.

Analityczny rozdział piąty ma na celu ukazanie działania metafory i humoru współwystępujących w multimodalnej reklamie prasowej. Podstawą poczynionych obserwacji jest korpus stu reklam prasowych w języku angielskim oraz stu w języku polskim. W celu zbadania, w jaki sposób konstrukcje metaforyczne mogą być wykorzystywane jako nośniki humoru, wybrano po dwadzieścia przykładów z każdej grupy językowej. Ich szczegółowa analiza pozwala przyjrzeć się zjawisku synergicznego działania metafory i humoru. Kolejna część rozdziału bada odczucia respondentów dotyczące atrakcyjności wybranych reklam za pomocą kwestionariuszy opartych na skali Likerta. Ponadto bada stopień ich zabawności na podstawie intuicyjnej skali obrazkowej, pozwalając ustalić walor humorystyczny i siłę perswazyjną reklamy, jak również poziom stymulacji odbiorcy. Dodatkowa ankieta, zawierająca pytania otwarte, pomaga zrozumieć, jak uczestnicy badania rozumieją mechanizmy humoru i metafory w reklamie. W części końcowej przedstawiono wyniki obu ankiet, przywołując w dyskusji odpowiednie przykłady ilustrujące omawiane zagadnienia. Rozdział szósty stanowi podsumowanie pracy i prezentuje konkluzje dotyczące analizy treści oraz wyników ankiet. Uzyskane rezultaty dają

wgląd we współdziałanie humoru i metafory w prasowej reklamie multimodalnej, a także pozwalają na zidentyfikowanie podobieństw i różnic między przykładami z każdej grupy językowej.

Monografię zamyka krótka prezentacja możliwych ograniczeń przeprowadzonego badania, która wskazuje dalsze kierunki badań w zakresie multimodalnej reklamy prasowej łączącej metaforę i humor.

Summary

The book aims at investigating the synergistic application of metaphorical and humorous elements in Polish and English multimodal press ads. The starting point for the discussion on the co-occurrence of metaphorical and humorous elements in advertising discourse is the presence of conceptual similarities as regards both construction and understanding of humour and metaphor, seen through the lens of the theory of conceptual integration.

The first chapter focuses on the notion of advertising, especially on press ads, and, consequently, centres on the verbal and visual facets with a view to presenting how different modalities complement each other to produce multimodal messages. Chapter 2 provides an overview of Relevance Theory in order to demonstrate how its expanded version, as outlined by Forceville (2020), can accommodate various dimensions of mass-communication. In the third chapter, references are made to the theory of mental spaces and the theory of conceptual integration (conceptual blending theory). The following chapter is devoted to humour studies—it outlines the most renowned theories of humour, with the incongruity-resolution theory being the main axis of discussion. Chapter 4 also addresses the role of the prototype theory in shaping humour and its strength. Discussion on previous research into humour in advertising ensues and, finally, the similarities in the conceptual operations involved in the creation and understanding of both humour and metaphor are emphasised.

The subsequent analytical chapter aims at presenting and analysing the synergistic operation of metaphor and humour in multimodal press ads. For the purpose of the study, a corpus of one hundred press ads in English and one hundred ads in Polish was gathered. Twenty examples were selected from each language group and a qualitative content analysis was performed, which made it possible to examine the joint workings of metaphor and humour in press ads. The following part of the chapter focuses on checking ad liking and affective attitudes of the informants, accomplished by having each research participant rate a set of humorous figurative ads on a Likert-type scale. Also, the perceived funniness levels of the ads sampled were examined, which, based on an intuitive visual self-report, allowed to determine the appreciation of humour value and the persuasive power of ads, along with the levels of stimulation of the perceiver. An additional open-ended questionnaire on ad comprehension was implemented to check how the informants understood the mechanisms inducing humour and metaphor in ads. In Chapter 5, the results of both surveys are shown, referring to a wealth of pertinent examples. The final chapter presents conclusions on the qualitative content analysis, ad ratings,

emotional responses, and ad comprehension. The results provide valuable insights into the workings of metaphor and humour applied synergistically in multimodal press ads; they also allow for the identification of both similarities and differences between the two language samples.

The volume closes with a short presentation of the possible limitations of the study, suggesting avenues for further research in the field of multimodal press advertising which combines metaphor and humour in tandem.

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The book *Synergistic Application* aims at investigating the co-presence of metaphorical and humorous elements in Polish and English multimodal press ads. Conceptual similarities as regards both the construction and understanding of humour and metaphor, seen through the lens of the theory of conceptual integration, are a starting point for discussion. The analysis of advertising material makes it possible to investigate the joint workings of the phenomena in question. Furthermore, research participants' feelings on perceived attractiveness and funniness levels of the ads sampled are examined. The results help to check how the informants understand the mechanisms that induce humour and metaphor in ads, which, in turn, allows for the identification of both similarities and differences between the two language samples.

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